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THE

WORKS

OF

JOHN OWEN, D.D.

EDITED

BY THOMAS RUSSELL, M.A.

WITH

MEMOIRS OF HIS LIFE AND WRITINGS,
BY WILLIAM ORME.

VOL. IX.

CONTAINING

A CONTINUATION OF
VINDICIÆ EVANGELICÆ: OR, THE MYSTERY OF THE GOSPEL VINDICATED;
OF THE DEATH OF CHRIST, AND OF JUSTIFICATION;
A REVIEW OF THE ANNOTATIONS OF HUGO GROTIUS; AND
A DISSERTATION ON DIVINE JUSTICE.

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VINDICIÆ EVANGELICÆ.

CHAP. XX.

Of the priestly office of Christ; how he was a priest; when he entered on this office; and how he dischargeth it.

MR. BIDDLE'S ELEVENTH CHAPTER EXAMINED.

His eleventh chapter is concerning the priestly office of Jesus Christ. In the first and second question he grants him to be a priest, from Heb. iv. 14. and to be appointed to that office by the Father, from Heb. v. 5. The remainder of the chapter is spent in sundry attempts to prove that Christ was not a priest, whilst he was on the earth; as also to take off from the end of his priesthood, with the benefit redounding to the church thereby.

For the first, a man would suppose Mr. Biddle were fair and ingenuous in his concessions, concerning the priesthood of Jesus Christ. May we but be allowed to propose a few questions to him, and to have answers suggested according to the analogy of his faith, I suppose his acknowledgment of this truth will be found to come exceedingly short of what may be expected. Let him therefore shew, whether Christ be a high-priest properly so called, or only in a metaphorical sense, with respect to what he doth in heaven for us, as the high priest of old did deal for the people in their things, when he received mercy from God? Again, whether Christ did or doth offer a proper sacrifice to God? and if so, of what kind? or only that his offering of himself in heaven is metaphorically so called? If any shall say that Mr. B. differs from his masters in these things, I must needs profess myself to be otherwise minded, because of his following attempt to exclude him from the investiture with, and execution of, his priestly office in this life, and at his death; whence it inevitably follows, that he can in no wise be a proper priest, nor have a proper sacrifice to offer, but that both the one and the other are metaphorical; and so termed in allusion to what the high-priest among the Jews

did for the people. That which I have to speak to, in this ensuing discourse, will hinder me from insisting much on the demonstration of this, that Christ was a priest so called, and offered to God a sacrifice of atonement or propitiation, properly so called, whereof all other priests and sacrifices appointed of God, were but types. Briefly, therefore, I shall do it.

The Scripture is so positive that Jesus Christ in the execution of his office of his mediation, was, and is a priest, a high-priest, that it is amongst all that acknowledge him utterly out of question. That he is not properly so called, but metaphorically, and in allusion to the high-priest of the Jews, as was said, the Socinians contend. I shall then, as I said, in the first place prove, that Christ was a high-priest, properly so called; and then evince when he was so, or when he entered on that office. This first is evident from that description or definition of a high-priest, which the apostle gives, Heb. v. 1. 'Every high-priest taken from among men, is ordained for men, that he may offer both gifts and sacrifices for sin.' That this is the description of a high-priest properly so called, is manifest from the apostle's accommodation of this office spoken of to Aaron, or his exemplifying of the way of entrance thereinto, from that of Aaron, v. 4. 'And no man taketh this honour to himself, but he that is called of God, as was Aaron.' That is, to be such a high-priest as Aaron was, which here he describes. One that had that honour, which Aaron had. Now certainly Aaron was a high-priest properly and truly, if ever any one was so in the world. That Jesus Christ was such a high-priest, as is here described, yea, that he is the very high-priest so described by the Holy Ghost, appears upon this twofold consideration. 1. In general, the apostle accommodates this definition or description of a high-priest, to Jesus Christ, ver. 5. 'So also Christ glorified not himself to be made a high-priest.' Were it not that very priesthood of which he treats, that Christ was so called to, it were easy so to reply: true; to a proper priesthood a man must be called, but that which is improper and metaphorical only, he may assume to himself, or obtain it upon a more general account, as all believers do. But this the apostle excludes, by comparing Christ in his admission to this office, with Aaron, who was properly so. 2. In parti-

cular, all the parts of this description have in the Scripture a full and complete accommodation unto Jesus Christ, so that he must needs be properly a high-priest, if this be the description of such a one.

1. He was taken from amongst men. That great prophecy of him so describes him, Deut. xviii. 18. 'I will raise you up a prophet from among your brethren.' He was taken from among men, or raised up from among men, or raised up from among his brethren. And in particular, it is mentioned out of what tribe amongst them he was taken, Heb. vii. 13, 14. 'For he, of whom these things are spoken, pertaineth to another tribe: For it is evident, that our Lord sprang out of Juda.' And the family he was of in that tribe, namely, that of David, is every where mentioned. 'God raised up the horn of salvation in the house of his servant David;' Luke i. 69.

2. He was ordained for men, τὰ πρὸς τὸν θεὸν, as to things appointed by God: καθίσταται, is appointed to rule and preside, and govern, as to the things of God. This ordination or appointment, is that after-mentioned, which he had of God: his ordination to this office, ver. 5, 6. 'So also Christ glorified not himself, to be made a high-priest, but he that said unto him, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee,' &c. He had his ordination from God. He who made him both Lord and Christ, made him also a high-priest; and he was made in a more solemn manner than ever any priest was, even by an oath; chap. vii. 20, 21. 'For as much as not without an oath,' &c. and he was so appointed for men, to preside and govern them in things appertaining to God, as it was with the high priest of old; the whole charge of the house of God, as to holy things, his worship, and his service, was committed to him. So is it with Jesus Christ, Heb. iii. 6. 'Christ is as a Son over his own house, whose house are we.' He is for us, and over us, in the things of the worship, and house of God. And that he was ordained for men, the Holy Ghost assures us farther, chap. vii. 26. 'Such a high-priest became us;' he was so, for us: which is the first part of the description of a high priest, properly so called.

3. The prime and peculiar end of this office, is to offer gifts and sacrifices for sin. And as we shall abundantly ma-

nifest afterward, that Christ did thus offer gifts and sacrifices for sin: so the apostle professedly affirms, that it was necessary he should do so, because he was a high-priest, chap .viii. 3. 'For every high-priest is ordained to offer gifts and sacrifices; wherefore it is of necessity, that this man have somewhat also to offer.' The force of the apostle's argument, concerning the necessity of the offering of Christ, lies thus. Every high-priest is to offer gifts and sacrifices; but Christ is a high-priest, therefore he must have somewhat to offer. Now if Christ was not a priest properly so called, it is evident his argument would be inconclusive; for from that which is properly so, to that which is only so metaphorically, and as to some likeness and proportion, no argument will lie. For instance; Every true man is a rational creature; but he that shall thence conclude, that a painted man is so, will find his conclusion very feeble. What it is that Christ had to offer, and what sacrifice he offered, shall afterward be declared. The definition then of a high-priest, properly so called, in all the parts of it, belonging unto Christ, it is necessary that the thing defined belong also unto him.

2. He who is a priest, according to the order of a true and real priesthood, he is a true and real priest. Believers are called priests, Rev. i. 5. and are said to offer up sacrifices to God;[a] spiritual sacrifices, such as God is pleased with. Whence is it, that they are not real and proper priests? Because they are not priests of any real order of priesthood, but are so called, because of some allusion to, and resemblance of, the [b]priests of old, in their access unto God. This will also by the way discover the vanity of them among us, who would have the ministers of the gospel, in contradistinction to other believers, be called priests. Of what order were they who did appropriate that appellation? The absurdity of this figment, the learned Hooker could no otherwise defend, than by affirming that priest was an abbreviation of presbyter. When both in truth, and in the intendment of them that used that term, its sense was otherwise. But to return. The sons of Aaron were properly priests. Why so? Because they were so appointed in the line of the priesthood of Levi, according to the order of Aaron. Hence I assume, Christ being called a priest, according to

[a] Heb. xiii. 16. [b] 1 Pet. ii. 9. Ephes. ii. 18. Heb. x. 22.

the order of a true and proper priesthood, was truly, and properly so. 'He was a priest after the order of Melchisedec;' Psal. cx. 4. which the apostle often insists on in the Epistle to the Hebrews. If you say that Christ is called a high-priest, after the order of Melchisedec, not properly, but by reason of some proportion and analogy, or by way of allusion to him: you may as well say, that he was a priest according to the order of Aaron; there being a great similitude between them, against which the apostle expressly disputes in the whole of the 7th chapter to the Hebrews. He therefore was a real priest, according to a real and proper order.

3. Again, He that was appointed of God to offer sacrifices for the sins of men, was a priest properly so called; but that Christ did so, and was so appointed, will appear in our farther consideration of the time, when he was a priest, as also in that following, of the sacrifice he offered; so that at present I shall not need to insist upon it.

4. Let it be considered, that the great medium of the apostolical persuasion against apostacy in that Epistle to the Hebrews, consists in the exalting of the priesthood of Christ, above that of Aaron: now that which is metaphorically only so in any kind, is clearly and evidently less so, than that which is properly and directly so. If Christ be metaphorically only a priest, he is less than Aaron on that consideration. He may be far more excellent than Aaron in other respects, yet in respect of the priesthood he is less excellent, which is so directly opposite to the design of the apostle in that epistle, as nothing can be more. It is then evident on all these considerations, and might be made farther conspicuous, by such as are in readiness to be added, that Christ was, and is, truly and properly a high-priest, which was the first thing designed for confirmation.

The Racovian catechism doth not directly ask or answer this question, Whether Christ be a high-priest properly so called? but yet insinuates its author's judgment expressly to the contrary. [c] 'The sacerdotal office of Christ is placed herein, that as by his kingly office he can help and relieve

[c] Munus igitur sacerdotale in eo situm est, quod quemadmodum pro regio munere potest nobis in omnibus nostris necessitatibus subvenire: ita pro munere sacerdotali subvenire vult, ac porro subvenit: atque hæc illius subveniendi, seu opis afferendæ ratio, sacrificium ejus appellatur. Catec. Rac. de Mun. Chr. Sacer. Q. 1.

our necessities; so by his sacerdotal office he will help, and actually doth so: and this way of his helping or relieving us, is called his sacrifice.'

Thus they begin. But, 1. That any office of Christ should bespeak power to relieve us, without a will, as is here affirmed of his kingly, is a proud, foolish, and ignorant fancy. Is this enough for a king among men, that he be able to relieve his subjects, though he be not willing? or is not this a proper description of a wicked tyrant? Christ as a king, is as well willing, as able to save; Isa. xxxii. 1, 2. 2. Christ as a high-priest is no less able than willing also, and as a king, he is no less willing than able; Heb. vii. 27. That is, as a king he is both able and willing to save us, as to the application of salvation, and the means thereof. As a priest, he is both willing and able to save us, as to the procuring of salvation, and all the means thereof. 3. It is a senseless folly to imagine, that the sacrifice of Christ consists in the manner of affording us that help and relief, which as a king he is able to give us: such weak engines do these men apply, for the subversion of the cross of Christ; but of this more afterward.

But they proceed to give us their whole sense, in the next question and answer, which are as followeth.

'Q. [d]Why is this way of his affording help, called a sacrifice?

'A. It is called so by a figurative manner of speaking; for as in the old covenant, the high-priest entering into the holiest of holies, did do those things, which pertained to the expiation of the sins of the people; so Christ hath now entered the heavens, that there he might appear before God for us, and perform all things that belong to the expiation of our sins.'

The sum of what is here insinuated, is, 1. That the sacrifice of Christ is but a figurative sacrifice, and so consequently, that he himself is a figurative priest: for as the priest is, such is his sacrifice: proper, if proper; metaphorical, if me-

[d] Quare hæc ejus opis afferendæ ratio sacrificium vocatur?—Vocatur ita figurato loquendi modo, quod quemadmodum in prisco fœdere summus Pontifex ingressus in sanctum sanctorum, ea quæ ad expianda peccata populi spectarent, perficiebat: ita Christus nunc penetravit cœlos, ut illic Deo appareat pro nobis, et omnia ad expiationem peccatorum nostrorum spectantia peragat. Heb. ii. 17. iv. 14. v. 1. ix. 24. De Mun. Chr. Sacerdot. Q. 2.

taphorical. What say our catechists for the proof hereof? They have said it; not one word of reason, or any one testimony of Scripture is produced to give countenance to this figment. 2. That the high priest made atonement and expiation of sins, only by his entering into the most holy place, and what he did there: which is notoriously false, and contrary to very many express testimonies of Scripture; Lev. iv. 3. 13. 21. 27. v. 16. vi. 5—7. xvi. &c. 3. That Christ was not a high-priest, until he entered the holy place; of which afterward. 4. That he made not expiation of our sins, until he entered heaven, and appeared in the presence of God. Of the truth whereof, let the reader consult Heb. i. 3. If Christ be a figurative priest, I see no reason why he is not a figurative king also; and such indeed those men seem to make him.

The second thing proposed is, that Christ was a high-priest, whilst he was on the earth; and offered a sacrifice to God. I shall here first answer what was objected by Mr. Biddle to the contrary, and then confirm the truth itself.

I say then, first, that Christ was a priest, while he was on earth, and he continueth to be so for ever; that is, until the whole work of mediation be accomplished.

Socinus first published his opinion in this business in his book 'De Jesu Christo Servatore' against Covet. For some time the venom of that error was not taken notice of. Six years after, as himself telleth us, ([e]Epistola ad Niemojev. 1.) he wrote his answer to Volanus, wherein he confirmed it again at large. Whereupon Niemojevius, a man of his own anti-trinitarian infidelity, writes to him, and [f]asks him sharply (in substance), if he was not mad to affirm, a thing so contrary to express texts of Scripture. (Epist. Joh. Niemojev. 1. ad Faust. Socin.) Before him, that atheistical monk, Ochinus, had dropped some few things in his dialogues hereabout. Before him also, Abailardus had made an entrance into the same abomination, of whom, says [g]Bernard, (Epistola 190.) 'Habemus in Francia novum de doctore magistro theologum:

[e] Nam annos abhinc sex atque eo amplius idem paradoxum in mea de Jesu Christo Servatore disputatione sine dubio legisti. Faust. Socin. Res. ad Joh. Niemojev. Ep. 1.

[f] Verum non sine mærore (ne quid gravius addam), incidi inter legendum in quoddam paradoxon, dum Christum in morte, sive in cruce sacrificium obtulisse pernegas, Joh. Niemojev. Epist. 1. ad Faust. Socin.

[g] Vide Bernard. Epist. 109.

qui ab ineunte ætate sua in arte dialectica lusit, et nunc in Scripturis sacris insani.'

How the whole nation of the Socinians have since consented into this notion of their master, I need not manifest. It is grown one of the articles of their creed; as this man here lays it down among the substantial grounds of Christian religion. Confessedly on their part, the whole doctrine of the satisfaction of Christ, and justification, turns on this hinge. For though we have other innumerable demonstrations of the truth we assert, yet as to them, if this be proved, no more is needful. For if Christ was a priest, and offered himself a sacrifice, it cannot but be a sacrifice of atonement, seeing it was by blood and death. Crellius tells us, that Christ died for us on a double account; partly as the [h]mediator, and surety of the new covenant; partly as a priest, that was to offer himself to God. A man might think he granted Christ to have been a priest on the earth, and as such to have offered himself a sacrifice. So also doth [i]Volkelius allow the killing of the sacrifice, to represent the death of Christ. Now the killing of the sacrifice, was the sacrificing of it. So Stuckius proves from that of the poet, 'Et nigram mactabis ovem, lucumque revises.' But Crellius afterward expounds himself, and tells us, [k]that this twofold office of Christ (than which nothing can be spoken more ridiculously) of a mediator and a priest did as it were meet in the death of Christ: the one ending (that is, his being a mediator), and the other beginning. And [l]Volkelius doth the like; with a sufficient contradiction to his assertion, calling the death of Christ the beginning and entrance of his priesthood. For his mediatorship, Crellius telleth us that it is most evident, that Christ therein was subordinate to God:

[h] Etenim mortem, Christus subiit, duplici ratione; partim quidem, ut fœderis mediator, seu sponsor, et veluti testator quidem partim ut Sacerdos Deo ipsum oblaturus. Crell. de caus. mort. Christi, p. 6.

[i] Partes hujus muneris hæc sunt potissimum; mactatio victimæ, in tabernaculum ad oblationem peragendam ingressio, et ex eodem egressio. Ac mactatio quidem mortem Christi violentam, sanguinisque profusionem continet. Volkel. de vera Relig. lib. 3. cap. 37. p. 145.

[k] In morte utrumque munus (mediatoris, et sacerdotis) veluti coit: et prius quidem in ea desinit, eaque confirmatur postremum autem incipit, et ad id Christus fuit quodammodo præparatus, p. 8.

[l] Hinc colligitur solam Christi mortem, nequaquam illam perfectam absolutamque ipsius oblationem de qua in Epist. ad Hebræos agitur, fuisse—sed principium et præparationem quandam istius sacerdotii in cœlo demum administrandi, extitisse. Idem. ibid.

so he phrases it; that is, he was a mediator with us from God, and not at all [m]with God for us. And this he proves, because he [n]put not himself into this office, nor was put into it by us, so to confirm the covenant between God and us; but was a minister and messenger of God, who sent him for this purpose. But the folly of this shall be afterward manifested. Christ was given of God, by his own consent, to be a mediator for us, and to lay down his life a ransom for us; 1 Tim. ii. 4—6. which certainly he did to God for us, and not for God to us, as shall afterward be evinced. But coming to speak of his priesthood he is at a loss. [o]'When,' saith he, 'he is considered as a priest (for that he was properly a priest he denies, calling it 'Sacerdotii, et oblationis metaphora') although he seemeth to be like one who doth something with God in the name of men, if we consider diligently, we shall find that he is such a priest, as performs something with us, in the name of God.'

This proof is, παρὰ τὴν σύνδεσιν καὶ διαίρεσιν. But this is no new thing with these men. Because Christ as a high-priest, doth something with us for God, therefore he did nothing with God for us. As though because the high-priest of old, was over the house of God, and ruled therein, therefore he did not offer sacrifices to God for the sins of the people. All that Crellius, in his ensuing discourse hath to prove this by, is, because as he saith, 'Christ offered not his sacrifice until he came to heaven.' Which because he proves not, nor endeavours to do it, we may see what are the texts of Scripture urged for the confirmation of that conceit by Mr. B. and others.

Seeing all the proofs collected for this purpose are out of the Epistle to the Hebrews, I shall consider them in order as they lie in the epistle, and not as transposed by his questions with whom I have to do.

The first is, in his eleventh question, thus insinuated; 'Why would God have Christ come to his priestly office by

[m] Jam vero satis apparet, Christum priori modo spectatum, penitus Deo subordinatum esse, p. 6.

[n] Neque enim vel ipsum ingessit, vel a nobis missus est ad fœdus inter Deum, et nos peragendum: sed Dei, qui ipsum in hunc finem miserat, minister, ac internuntius hac in parte fuit, p. 7.

[o] Cum vero consideratur ut Sacerdos, etsi similitudinem refert ejus, qui Deo aliquid hominum nomine præstet. Si tamen rem ipsam penitus spectes, deprehendes, talem eum esse sacerdotem, qui Dei nomine nobis aliquod præstet, p. 7.

suffering?' According to the tenor of the doctrine before delivered, the inference is, that until after his sufferings he obtained not his priestly office, for by them he entered upon it. The answer is, 'Heb. ii. 10. 17, 18.'

Ans. 1. The apostle doth not say absolutely, that it became Christ to be made like us, that he might be a high-priest, but that he might be a merciful high-priest. That is, his suffering and death were not required antecedently, that he might be a priest, but they were required to the execution of that end of his priesthood, which consists in sympathy and sufferance together with them, in whose stead he was a priest. He sustained all his afflictions, and death itself, not that he might be a priest, but that being merciful, and having experience, he might on that account be ready to succour them that are tempted; and this the words of the last verse do evidently evince to be the meaning of the Holy Ghost; 'in that he suffered, being tempted.' His sufferings were to this end of his priesthood, that he should be merciful, able to succour them that are tempted; besides, it is plainly said, that he was a high-priest, εἰς τὸ ἱλάσκεσθαι τὰς ἁμαρτίας τοῦ λαοῦ, or ἱλάσκεσθαι τὸν θεὸν περὶ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν, to make reconciliation for the sins of the people. Now that reconciliation was made by his death and blood the Scripture informs us, Rom. v. 10. 'Whilst we were enemies, we were reconciled by the death of his Son;' Dan. ix. 24. So that even from this place of Scripture, produced to the contrary, it is evident, that Christ 'was a high-priest on earth,' because he was so when he made reconciliation, which he did in his death on the cross.

But yet Mr. Biddle's candid procedure in this business may be remarked; with his huckstering the word of God. He reads the words in this order: 'It became him to make the captain of their salvation perfect through suffering; that he might be a merciful and faithful high-priest.' Who would not conclude, that this is the series and tenor of the apostle's discourse; and that Christ is said to be made perfect through sufferings, that he might be a merciful high-priest? These words of 'making perfect through suffering,' are part of the 10th verse; 'that he might be a merciful high-priest,' part of the 17th. Between which two there intercedes a discourse of a business quite of another nature; namely, his

being 'made like his brethren' in taking on 'him the seed of Abraham,' whereof these words, 'that he might be a merciful and faithful high-priest,' are the immediate issue; that is, he had a body prepared him, that he might be a priest, and have a sacrifice. Our High Priest was exercised with sufferings and temptations, says the apostle: Jesus was exercised with sufferings and temptations, that he might be our high-priest, says Mr. Biddle.

Heb. viii. 1, 2. is insisted on to the same purpose in his third question, which is, 'What manner of high-priest is Christ?'

'A. Heb. viii. 1, 2. We have such a high-priest, who is set on the right hand of the throne of the majesty in the heavens. A minister of the sanctuary, and of the true tabernacle,' &c. I name this in the next place, because it is coincident with that of chap. iv. 14. insisted on by Socinus, though omitted by our author.

Hence it is inferred, that Christ entered the heavens before he was a high-priest; and is a high-priest only when he is set 'down at the right hand of the Majesty on high.'

Ans. That Christ is a high-priest there also, we grant; that he is so there only, there is not one word in the place cited to prove. Heb. iv. 14. saith indeed, that 'our High Priest is entered into the heavens;' but it says not, that he was not our high-priest before he did so; as the high-priest of the Jews entered into the holy place; but yet he was a high-priest before, or he could not have entered into it. He is such a high-priest, 'who is set on the right hand of the throne of majesty;' that is, not like the typical high-priest who died, and was no more; but he abides in his office of priesthood; not to offer sacrifice, for that he did once for all, but to intercede for us for ever.

Heb. viii. 4. is nextly produced in answer to this question.

'Was not Christ a priest whilst he was upon earth; namely, when he died on the cross?

'A. Heb. viii. 4. vii. 15, 16.

The same question and answer is given by the Racovian catechism, and this is the main place insisted on by all the Socinians: 'For if he were on earth, he should not be a

priest, seeing that there are priests, that offer gifts according to the law.'

Ans. 1. Ἐπὶ γῆς may be interpreted of the state and condition of him spoken of, and not of the place wherein he was. If he were ἐπὶ γῆς of a mere earthly condition, as the high-priest of the Jews, he should not be a priest. So is the expression used elsewhere. Col. iii. 2. we are commanded not to mind τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς; that is, 'terrene' things, earthly things. And, ver. 5. 'mortify your members,' τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, that is, your earthly members.

2. If the word signify the place, and not the condition of the things, whereof they are, they may be referred to the tabernacle, of which he speaks, and not to the high-priest: ver. 2. the apostle tells us, that he is the minister, or priest of the true tabernacle, which God made, and not man: and then, ver. 3. that in the other tabernacle there were 'priests that offered daily sacrifices;' so that, saith he, if this tabernacle ἦν ἐπὶ γῆς, he should not be a priest of it. For in the the earthly tabernacle there were other administrators; but to pass these interpretations,

3. The apostle does not say, that he that is upon the earth can be no priest, which must be our adversaries' argument, if any, from this place, and thus formed, He that is upon the earth is no priest; Christ before his ascension was upon the earth, therefore he was no priest. This is not the intendment of the apostle, for in the same verse he affirms, that there were priests on the earth. This, then, is the utmost of his intendment; that if Christ had been only to continue on the earth, and to have done what priests did, or were to do upon the earth, there was neither need of him, nor room for him: but now is he a priest, seeing he was not to take upon him their work; but had an eternal priesthood of his own to administer. There is no more in this place, than there is, chap. vii. 19. 23, 24, which is a clear assertion, that Christ had a priesthood of his own, which was to perfect and complete all things; being not to share with the priests, that had all their work to do upon the earth. And in ver. 13—15. of chap. 7. you have a full exposition of the whole matter. The sum is, Christ was none of the priests of the Old Testament; no priest of the law: all their earthly things vanished, when he undertook the administration of

heavenly. So that neither doth this at all evince, that Christ was not a priest of the order of Melchisedec, even before his ascension.

To this, Heb. vii. 15, 16. is urged, and those words, 'After the power of an endless life,' are insisted on: as though Christ was not a priest, until after he had ended his life, and risen again.

But is this the intendment of the apostle? Doth he aim at any such thing? The apostle is insisting on one of his arguments to prove from the institution of the priesthood of Melchisedec, or a priesthood after his order, the excellency of the priesthood of Christ above that of Aaron; from the manner of the institution of the one and of the other, this argument lies: says he, 'The priests of the Jews were made κατὰ νόμον ἐντολῆς σαρκικῆς, according to the law of a carnal commandment:' that is, by carnal rights and ceremonies; by carnal oil and ordinances; 'but this man is made a priest after the order of Melchisedec, κατὰ δύναμιν ζοῆς ἀκαταλύτου, by virtue of an endless life; by the appointment of God, having such a life, as should never by death interrupt him in the administration of his office; for though the life of Christ was intercepted three days, yet his person was never dissolved, as to the administration of his office of priesthood: which is the thing spoken of, and in respect of that he had an endless life.

Quest. 9. is to the same purpose. 'How did Christ enter into the holy place to offer himself?

'A. By his own blood;' Heb. ix. 12.

Ans. Would not any one imagine, that it was said in the Scripture, that Christ entered into the holy place to offer himself; that that is taken for granted, and the *modus*, or manner how he did it, is alone inquired after? This is but one part of the sophistry Mr. B. makes use of in this Scripture catechism. But it is so far from being a true report of the testimony of the Scripture, that the plain contrary is asserted; namely, that Christ offered himself before his entrance into the holy place, not made with hands, and then entered thereinto, to appear in the presence of God for us. Christ entered by his own blood into the holy place, inasmuch as having shed and offered his blood a sacrifice to God, with the efficacy of it he entered into his presence, to carry on

the work of his priesthood in his intercession for us. As the high-priest, having offered without a sacrifice to God, entered with the blood of it into the most holy place, there to perfect and complete the duties of his office, in offering and interceding for the people.

The remaining questions of this chapter may be speedily despatched. His sixth is,

'What benefit happeneth by Christ's priesthood?

'A. Heb. v. 9, 10.'

Though the place be very improperly urged, as to an answer to the question proposed; there being very many more testimonies clearly and distinctly expressing the immediate fruits and benefits of the priestly office of Christ; yet because we grant, that by his priesthood principally and eminently, Christ is become the author of salvation, we shall not dissent, as to this question and answer. Only we add as to the manner, that the way whereby Christ by his priesthood became the author of salvation, consists principally in the offering up of himself to death, in, and by the shedding of his blood, whereby he obtained for us eternal redemption; Heb. ix. 14. 26.

But this Mr. B. makes inquiry after. 'Q. 8. How can Christ save them by his priesthood?

'A. Heb. vii. 25. ix. 28.'

Ans. 1. We acknowledge the use of the intercession of Christ, for the carrying on, and the completing of the work of our salvation: as that also it is the apostle's design there to manifest his ability to save, beyond what the Aaronical priests could pretend unto, which is mentioned chap. vii. 25. but, that 'he saves us thereby,' exclusively to the oblation he made of himself at his death; or any otherwise, but as carrying on that work, whose foundation was laid therein (redemption being meritoriously procured thereby), I suppose Mr. B. doth not think, that this place is any way useful to prove. And that place which he subjoins is not added at all to the advantage of his intendment: for it is most evident, that it is of the offering of Christ by death, and the shedding of his blood, or the sacrifice of himself, as ver. 26. that the apostle there speaks.

There is not any thing else that is needful for me to insist upon in this chapter; for though the Scripture instructs

us in many other uses, that we are to make of the doctrine of the priesthood of Christ, than what he expresses in his last question, yet that being one eminent one amongst them (especially the foundation of coming with boldness to the throne of grace, being rightly understood), I shall not need to insist farther on it.

Not to put myself, or reader to any needless trouble, Mr. B. acknowledging that Christ is a high-priest, and having opposed only his investiture with the office, whilst he was upon the earth, and that to destroy the atonement made by the sacrifice of himself; having proved that he was a priest properly so called; I shall now prove that he was a high-priest whilst he was upon earth, and shew afterward what he had to offer, with the efficacy of his sacrifice, and the intent thereof. First, the Scripture will speedily determine the difference; Eph. v. 2. 'Christ hath loved us, and hath given himself for us an offering and a sacrifice to God, for a sweet-smelling savour.' He that offereth sacrifices and offerings unto God, is a priest: so the apostle defines a priest, Heb. v. 1. He is one 'taken from amongst men,' and ordained to offer gifts and sacrifices for sins. Now thus did Christ do, in his giving himself for us: παρέδωκεν, he delivered himself for us. To deliver himself, or to be delivered for us, notes his death, always in contradistinction to any other act of his: so Eph. v. 25. Gal. ii. 22. Rom. viii. 32. iv. 25. ὃς παρεδόθη διὰ τὰ παραπτώματα ἡμῶν, καὶ ἠγέρθη διὰ τὴν δικαίωσιν ἡμῶν. In that delivery of himself he sacrificed; therefore he was then a priest.

To this Socinus invented an answer, in his book 'de Servatore,' which he insists on again, Epist. 2. ad Niemojev. and whereunto [p]his followers have added nothing, it being fixed on by them all; in particular by Smalcius in Catech. Racov. And yet it is in itself ludicrous, and almost jocular. The words they tell us are thus to be read, παρέδωκεν ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν. And there they place a point in the verse. προσφορὰν καὶ θυσίαν τῷ θεῷ· without any dependance upon the former words, making this to be the sense of the whole. Christ gave himself to death for us; and O what an offering was that to God, and O what a sacrifice! that is, in a metaphorical sense: not that Christ offered himself to God for us;

[p] Volkel. de ver. Relig. lib. 3. cap. 37. p. 146.

but that Paul called his giving himself to die, an offering, or a thing grateful to God, as good works are called an offering; Phil. iv. 18. that is, the dying of Christ was 'præclarum facinus,' as Volkelius speaks. But,

1. It is easy to answer or avoid any thing by such ways as this; divide, cut off sentences in the dependance of the words, and you may make what sense of them you please; or none at all.

2. These words, προσφορὰν καὶ θυσίαν, have no other word to be regulated by, but παρέδωκεν: and therefore must relate thereunto; and Christ is affirmed in them to have given himself an offering and a sacrifice.

3. These words, an 'offering and a sacrifice,' are not a commendation of Christ's giving himself, but an illustration, and a description of what he gave; that is, himself a sacrifice of sweet savour to God. So that notwithstanding this exception (becoming only them that make it), it is evident from hence, that Christ offered himself a sacrifice in his death, and was therefore then a priest fitted for that work.

2. Heb. v. 6, 7. 'As he saith also in another place, Thou art a priest for ever, after the order of Melchisedec: who in the days of his flesh, when he had offered up prayers and supplications, with strong cries and tears, unto him that was able to save him from death;' ver. 6. The apostle tells us, that he was a priest; and, ver. 7. what he did by virtue of that priesthood, προσένεγκε δεήσεις καὶ ἱκετηρίας. It is a temple expression of the office of a priest, that is used. So ver. 1. a high-priest is appointed ἵνα προσφέρῃ, that he may offer. Now when did Christ do this? It was in the days of his flesh, 'with strong cries and tears,' both which evidence this his offering to have been before his death, and at his death; and his mentioning of prayers and tears, is not so much to shew the matter of his offering, which was himself, as the manner, or at least the concomitants of the sacrifice of himself, prayers, and tears; and these were not for himself, but for his church, and the business that for their sakes he had undertaken.

3. Heb. i. 3. 'When he had by himself purged our sins, [illegible] at the right hand of the Majesty on high.' The [illegible] of our sins was by sacrifice; there was never any καθαρισμοῦ; but now Christ did this before his as-

cension: καθαρισμὸν ποιησάμενος, when he had himself, or after he had purged our sins; and that δι ἑαυτοῦ, by himself, or the sacrifice of himself. That our sins are purged by the oblation of Christ, the Scripture is clear; hence his blood is said to 'wash us from all our sins.' And Heb. x. 10. 'sanctified,' is the same with 'purged:' and this through the offering of the body of Christ; ἐφάπαξ Christ then offering this sacrifice whilst he was on the earth, was a priest in so doing.

Unto this may be added sundry others of the same import; chap. vii. 27. 'Who needed not daily, as those high-priests, to offer up sacrifice, first for his own sins, and then for the people's; for this he did once, when he offered up himself.' The one sacrifice of Christ is here compared to the daily sacrifices of the priests. Now those daily sacrifices were not performed in the most holy place, whither the high priest entered but once in a year, which alone was a representation of heaven; so that what Christ did in heaven cannot answer to them, but what he did on earth, before he entered the holy place, not made with hands.

And chap. ix. 12. 'He entered by his own blood into the holy place, αἰωνίαν λύτρωσιν εὑράμενος, after he had obtained eternal redemption.' Redemption is every where in the Scripture ascribed to the blood of Christ. And himself abundantly manifesteth on what account it is to be had, when he says, that he gave his life a ransom, or a price of redemption. Where, and when Christ laid down his life, we know: and yet that our redemption or freedom is by the offering of Christ for us, is as evident; chap. ix. 26. 'He puts away sin (which is our redemption) by the sacrifice of himself;' so that this sacrifice of himself, was before he entered the holy place; and consequently he was a priest before his entrance into heaven. It is, I say, apparent from these places, that Christ offered himself before he went into the holy place, or sat down at the right hand of the Majesty on high, which was to be proved from them.

4. Christ is often said to offer himself once for all: designing by that expression some individual action of Christ, and not such a continued course of procedure, as is his presentation of himself in heaven; or the continuation of his oblation, as to its efficacy by his intercession; so Heb. vii. 27. τοῦτο ἐποίησεν ἐφάπαξ. ix. 28. ἅπαξ προσενεχθεὶς. &c.

x. 10. 12. 14. In all these places the offering of Christ is not only said to be one, but to be once offered; now no offering of Christ, besides that which he offered on the earth, can be said to be once offered. For that which is done in heaven is done always, and for ever; but that which is done always, cannot be said to be done once for all. To be always done, or in doing, as is Christ's offering himself in heaven, and to be done once for all, as was the oblation spoken of in those places, whereby our sins are done away, are plainly contradictory. It is said to be so offered ἅπαξ, as to be opposed unto πολλάκις, whereby the apostle expresses that of the Aaronical sacrifice, which in two other words he had before delivered; they were offered διηνεκὲς, and κατ' ἡμέραν; that is, πολλάκις, in which sense his offering himself in heaven cannot be said to be done ἅπαξ, but only that on the cross. Besides, he was ἅπαξ προσενεχθεὶς εἰς τὸ πολλῶν ἀνενεγκεῖν ἁμαρτίας, ver. 28. and how he did that we are informed, 1 Pet. ii. 24. Ὃς τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν αὐτὸς ἀνήνεγκεν ἐν τῷ σώματι αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τὸ ξύλον· he did it in his body on the tree.

Besides, the apostle, Heb. ix. 26. tells us, that he speaks of such an offering, as was accompanied with suffering: he must have often suffered since the foundation of the world. It was such an offering, as could neither be repeated nor continued without suffering that he treats of. We do not deny, that Christ offers himself in heaven; that is, that he presents himself, as one that was so offered, to his Father: but the offering of himself, that was on earth, and therefore there was he a priest.

5. Once more; that sacrifice which answered those sacrifices, whose blood was never carried into the holy place; that must be performed on earth, and not in heaven. That many proper sacrifices were offered as types of Christ, whose blood was not carried into the holy place, the apostle assures us, Heb. x. 11. The daily sacrifices had none of their blood carried into the holy place; for the high-priest went in thither only once in the year. But now these were all true sacrifices and types of the sacrifice of Christ; and therefore, the sacrifices of Christ also, to answer the types, must be offered before his entrance into heaven, as was in part declared before. Yea, there was no other sacrifice of these,

but what was performed in their killing and slaying; and therefore, there must be a sacrifice prefigured by them, consisting in killing and shedding of blood. All this is asserted by the apostle, Heb. vii. 27. 'Who needeth not daily as those high-priests, to offer up sacrifices, for this he did once, when he offered up himself. Those sacrifices which were offered καθ' ἡμεραν, 'daily,' were types of the sacrifice of Christ; and that of his, which was offered ἐφάπαξ, did answer thereunto; which was his death, and nothing else.

CHAP. XXI.

Of the death of Christ, the causes, ends, and fruits thereof, with an entrance into the doctrine of his satisfaction thereby.

Mr. Biddle's 12th chapter is concerning the death of Christ, the causes, and fruits, and ends thereof: the error and mistake whereabout, is the second great head of the Socinian religion; next to his person there is not any thing they set themselves so industriously to oppose as his death, in the sense wherein it hath constantly hitherto been embraced by all Christians, as the great foundation of their faith and confidence.

That the Lord Jesus our Mediator, did not by his death and sufferings undergo the penalty of the law as the punishment due to our sins, that he did not make satisfaction to God, or make reconciliation for transgressors, that he did not thereby properly redeem us by the payment of a ransom, nor so suffer for us, as that our sins should in the justice of God be a meritorious cause of his suffering, is the second great article of the creed, which they[a] labour to assert and maintain.

There is not any thing about which they have laid out so much of their strength as about this; namely, that Jesus Christ is called our Saviour in respect of the way of salvation, which he hath revealed to us, and the power committed to him to deliver us, and save us, in and by obedience required at our hands, nor on the account of any satisfaction

[a] Vid. Faust. Socin. de Jes. Christ. Servator. Prælect. Theol. Lect. Sac. Pæræn. ad Volan. Epistola ad Niemojev. Thes. de Justif. Smal. Ref. Thes. Fran. adv. Smigl. Nov. Monst. Catec. Rac. &c. Crelli. de Caus. Mor. Christ. Vindic. ad Grot. Volkel. Ver. Relig. Christ. Ostorod. Institut. cap. 11. Schlichting. Epist. ad Hebræ. &c.

he hath made for us, or atonement by the sacrifice of himself.

How Faustus Socinus first broached this opinion, with what difficulty he got it to be entertained with the men of his own profession, as to the doctrine of the Trinity, has been before declared. What weight he laid upon this opinion about the death of Christ, and the opposition he had engaged in against his satisfaction, with the diligence he used, and the pains he took about the one and the other, is evident from his writings to this purpose which are yet extant. His book, 'De Jesu Christo Servatore' is wholly taken up with this argument; so is the greatest part of his 'Prælections;' his 'Lectiones Sacræ' are some of them of the same subject; and his 'Parænesis' against Volanus; many of his Epistles, especially those to Smalcius, and Volkelius, and Niemojevius, as also his treatises about justification, have the same design. Smalcius is no less industrious in the same cause, both in his Racovian catechism, and his answers and replies with Franzius and Smiglecius. It is the main design of Schlichtingius's comment on the Hebrews; Crellius, 'de Causis mortis Christi,' and his defence of Socinus against Grotius dwells on this doctrine. Volkelius hath his share in the same work, &c.

What those at large contend for, Mr. Biddle endeavours slily to insinuate into his catechumens in this chapter: having thereby briefly spoken of salvation by Christ, and of his mediation in general, in consideration of his sixth and seventh chapters, I shall now, God assisting, take up the whole matter, and after a brief discovery of his intendment in his queries concerning the death of Christ, give an account of our whole doctrine of his satisfaction, confirming it from the Scriptures, and vindicating it from the exceptions f his masters.

For the order of procedure, I shall first consider Mr. Bide's questions; then state the point in difference, by exessing what is the judgment of our adversaries concerning ue death of Christ, and what we ascribe thereto; and then demonstrate from the Scripture the truth contended for.

Mr. Biddle's first question is,

'Was it the will and purpose of God that Christ should ' e death of the cross? What saith the apostle Peter.

to the Jews concerning this? A. Acts ii. 22, 23.' To which he subjoins, 'What say the disciples in general concerning the same? A. Acts iv. 24. 27, 28.'

It is not unknown what difference we have, both with the Socinians and Arminians, about the purposes and efficacious decrees, and the infallibility of the prescience of God: something already hath been spoken to this purpose, in our discourse concerning the prescience of God, as formerly in that of perseverance. How unable Mr. Biddle's companions are to disentangle themselves from the evidence of that testimony, which is given to the truth we contend for, by these texts which here he with so much confidence recites, hath been abundantly by others demonstrated. I shall not here enter into the merits of that cause, nor shall I impose on Mr. Biddle the opinion of any other men, which he doth not expressly own; only I shall desire him to reconcile what he here speaks in his query, with what he before delivered concerning God's 'not foreseeing our free actions, that are for to come.' What God purposes shall be and come to pass, he certainly foresees that that will come to pass. That Christ should die the death of the cross was to be brought about by the free actions of men, if any thing in the world was ever so, and accomplished in the same manner; yet that this should be done, yea, so done, God purposed; and therefore without doubt foresaw that it should be accomplished, and so foresaw all the free actions whereby it was accomplished. And if he foresaw any one free action, why not all? there being the same reason of one and all. But at the present let this pass. His second question is,

'Did Christ die to reconcile and bring God to us, or on the contrary, to bring us to God?

'A. Rom. v. 10. Eph. ii. 14. 16. 2 Cor. v. 19. 1 Pet. iii. 18.'

That I may, by the way, speak a little to this question, reserving the full discussion of the matter intended to the ensuing discourse; the terms of it are first to be explained.

1. By 'reconciling God,' we intend the making of such an atonement, whereby his wrath or anger, in all the effects of it, are turned away. Though we use not the expression of reconciling God to us, but of reconciling us to God, by the taking away, or removal of his wrath and anger, or the making reconciliation with God for sin; yet as to reconcile

God, intends the appeasing of the justice and anger of God, so that, whereas before we were obnoxious to his displeasure, enmity, hatred, and wrath thereby, and on that account we come to be accepted with him, we say Christ died to reconcile God to us, which in the progress of this discourse with plentiful demonstrations from the Scripture shall be evinced.

2. Of 'bringing God to us,' we speak not; unless by bringing God to us, he intends the procurement of the grace and favour of God toward us, and his loving presence to be with us, and then we say, in that sense, Christ by his death brought God to us.

3. Our 'reconciliation to God,' or the reconciliation as it stands on our part, is our conversion unto God, our deliverance from all that enmity and opposition unto God, which is in us by nature; and this also we say is the effect and fruit of the death of Christ.

4. Our 'bringing unto God,' mentioned, 1 Pet. iii. 18. is of a larger and more comprehensive signification, than that of our reconciliation; containing the whole effect of the death of Christ, in the removal of every hinderance, and the collation of every thing necessarily required to the perfect and complete accomplishment of the work of our salvation, and so contains no less the reconciliation of God to us, than ours to him; and is not proper to make up one member of the division there instituted, being a general expression of them both.

Now concerning these things Mr. Biddle inquires, 'Whether Christ by his death reconciled God to us, or on the contrary, us to God?' So insinuating that one of these effects of the death of Christ is inconsistent with the other; this seems to be the man's aim.

1. To intimate that this is the state of the difference between him and us; that we say, Christ died to 'reconcile God to us;' and he, that he died to 'reconcile us to God.'

2. That these things are contrary, so that they who say the one, must deny the other; that we who say, that Christ died to reconcile God to us, must of necessity deny that he died to reconcile us to God; and that he also, who saith, he died to reconcile us to God, may, and must deny, on that account, the other effect by us ascribed to his death. But

this sophistry is so gross, as it is not worth the while to insist upon its discovery; we say, that Christ died to reconcile God to us in the sense before explained, and us unto God; and these things are so far from being of any repugnancy one to another, as to the making up of one entire end and effect of the death of Christ, that without them both, the work of reconciliation is by no means complete.

Not to prevent the full proof and evidence hereof, which is intended, it may at present suffice, that we evince it by the light of this one consideration: If in the Scripture it is expressly and frequently affirmed, that antecedently to the consideration of the death of Christ, and the effects thereof, there is not only a real enmity on our parts against God, but also a law enmity on the part of God against us, and that both of these are removed by virtue of the death of Christ; then the reconciliation of God to us, and our reconciliation to God, are both of them one entire effect of the death of Christ. That there is in us by nature a real enmity against God, before it be taken away by the virtue of the death of Christ, and so we reconciled to him, is not denied; and if it were, it might be easily evinced from Rom. viii. 7, 8. Tit. iii. 3. Eph. ii. 12. and innumerable other places; and certainly the evidence on the other side, that there was a law enmity on the part of God against us, antecedent to the consideration of the death of Christ, is no less clear. The great sanction of the law, Gen. iii. Deut. xxvii. 29. considered in conjunction with the justice of God, Rom. i. 32. Hab. i. 13. Psal. v. 4—6. 2 Thess. x. 5, 6. and the testimonies given concerning the state and condition of man in reference to the law and justice of God, John iii. 36. Rom. v. 18. Eph. ii. 3. 12, &c. with the express assignation of the reconciliation pleaded for, to be made by the death of Christ, Dan. ix. 24. Heb. ii. 18. do abundantly evince it; there being then a mutual enmity between God and us, though not of the same kind (it being physical on our part, and legal or moral on the part of God), Christ our Mediator making up peace and friendship between us, doth not only reconcile us to God by his Spirit, but God also to us, by his blood; but of this more afterward under the consideration of the death of Christ, as it was a sacrifice.

For the texts cited by Mr. Biddle, as making to his pur-

pose, the most, if not all of them look another way than he intends to use them. They will in the following chapter come under full consideration. Rom. v. 10. 'When we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son;' is the first mentioned. That our being reconciled to God, in this place doth not intend our conversion to him, and our deposition of the real enmity, that is in us against him, but our acceptance with him, upon the account of the atonement made in the blood of Christ, whereby he is reconciled to us, is evident from sundry circumstances of the place. For,

1. That which is called 'being reconciled by his death,' in ver. 10. is 'being justified by his blood;' ver. 9. The observation of the same antithesis in both verses makes this evident. Now to be justified by the blood of Christ, is not to have our enmity with God slain and destroyed (which is our sanctification), but our acceptation with God upon the account of the shedding of the blood of Christ for us; which is his reconciliation to us.

2. We are thus reconciled, when we are enemies, as in the verse insisted on; 'when we were enemies we were reconciled.' Now we are not reconciled in the sense of deposing our enmity to God (that deposition being our sanctification) whilst we are enemies, and therefore it is the reconciliation of God to us, that is intended.

3. Ver. 11. we are said to receive this reconciliation; or as the word is rendered, the [b] 'atonement;' the word is the same with that used ver. 10. Now we cannot be said to receive our own conversion, but the reconciliation of God by the blood of Christ, his favour upon the atonement made, that by faith we do receive. Thus Mr. Biddle's first witness speaks expressly against him, and the design for the carrying on whereof he was called forth; as afterward will more fully appear.

His second also, of Eph. ii. 14. 16. speaks the same language; 'He is our peace, who hath made both one, that he might reconcile both unto God in one body, by his cross, having slain the enmity thereby;' setting aside the [illegible] f the apostle to manifest the reconciliation [illegible] nd Gentiles by the cross of Christ, it is evi- [illegible] iliation here meant, consists in slaying the

[b] Καταλλαγὴν.

enmity mentioned, so making peace. Now what is the enmity intended? Not the enmity that is in our hearts to God, but the legal enmity that lay against us, on the part of God; as is evident from ver. 15. and the whole design of the place, as afterward will appear more fully.

There is indeed, 2 Cor. v. 18—20. mention made of reconciliation in both the senses insisted on; of us to God; ver. 20. where the apostle saith, the end of the ministry is to reconcile us to God; to prevail with us to lay down our enmity against him, and opposition to him; of God to us, ver. 19. 'God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself;' which to be the import of the words is evinced from the exegetical expression immediately following; 'not imputing to them their sins and transgressions;' God was so reconciling the world unto himself in Christ, as that upon the account of what was done in Christ, he will not impute their sins; the legal enmity he had against them, on the account whereof alone men's sins are imputed to them, being taken away. And this is farther cleared by the sum of his former discourse, which the apostle gives us, ver. 21. declaring how 'God was in Christ, reconciling the world to himself;' 'For,' saith he, 'he made him sin for us who knew no sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him.' Thus he was in Christ reconciling the world to himself; in that he made him to be sin, or a sacrifice for sin, so to make an atonement for us, that we might be accepted before God, as righteous on the account of Christ.

Much less doth that of the 1 Pet. iii. 18. in the last place mentioned, speak at all to Mr. B.'s purpose: 'Christ hath once suffered for sin, the just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God.' 'Bringing to God,' is a general expression of the accomplishment of the whole work of our salvation, both in the removal of all hinderances, and the collation of all things necessary to the fulfilling of the work: of this the apostle mentions the great fundamental and procuring cause, which is the suffering of Christ in our stead, the just for the unjust; Christ in our stead suffered for our sins, that he might bring us to God. Now this suffering of Christ in our stead, for our sins, is most eminently the cause of the reconciliation of God to us; and by the intimation

thereof, of our reconciliation to God, and so of our manuduction to him.

Thus, though it be most true, that Christ died to reconcile us to God, by our conversion to him, yet all the places cited by Mr. Biddle to prove it (so unhappy is he in his quotations), speak to the defence of that truth, which he doth oppose, and not of that which he would assert; and which by asserting in opposition to the truth, with which it hath an eminent consistency, he doth corrupt.

The next question I shall not insist upon; it is concerning the object of the death of Christ, and the universality thereof; the words of it are, 'For whom did Christ die?' The answer is from 2 Cor. v. 14, 15. 1 Tim. v. 6. Heb. ii. 9. John vi. 8. where mention is made of 'all,' and the 'world' in reference to the death of Christ. The question concerning the object of the death of Christ, or whom he died for, hath of late by very many been fully discussed; and I have myself spoken [e]elsewhere somewhat to that purpose; it shall not then here be insisted on; in a word, we confess that Christ died for all, and for the world; but whereas it is very seldom that these words are comprehensive of all and every man in the world, but most frequently are used for some of all sorts, they for whom Christ died, being in some places expounded to be the 'church, believers, the children, those given unto him out of the world;' and nowhere described by any term expressive constantly of an absolute universality: we say the words insisted on are to be taken in the latter sense, and not the former; being ready, God assisting, to put it to the issue and trial with our adversaries, when we are called thereunto.

He proceeds: 'What was the procuring cause of Christ's death?

'A. Rom. iv. 25. Isa. liii. 5. 1 Cor. xv. 3.' The expressions are; that 'Christ was delivered for our offences,' that 'Christ died for our sins, and was bruised for our iniquities.'

That in these and the like places, that clause for our sins, offences, and transgressions, is expressive of the procuring cause of the death of Christ, Mr. B. grants; sin can be no otherwise the procuring cause of the death of Christ,

[e] Salus Electorum sanguis Jesu.

but as it is morally meritorious thereof. To say 'our sins were the procuring cause of the death of Christ,' is to say, that our sins merited the death of Christ; and whereas this can no otherwise be, but as our sins were imputed to him, and he was put to death for them, Mr. B. hath in this one question granted the whole of what in this subject he contends against. If our sins were the procuring cause of the death of Christ, then the death of Christ was that punishment which was due to them: or in the justice, or according to the tenor of the law of God, was procured by them; and so consequently, he in his death underwent the penalty of our sins, suffering in our stead, and making thereby satisfaction for what we had done amiss. Mr. Biddle's masters say generally that the expression of, 'dying for our sins,' denotes the final cause of the death of Christ; that is, Christ intended by his death to confirm the truth, in obedience whereunto we shall receive forgiveness of sin; this grant of Mr. B.'s, that the procuring cause of the death of Christ is hereby expressed, will perhaps appear more prejudicial to his whole cause, than he is yet aware of; especially being proposed in distinction from the final cause, or end of the death of Christ, which in the next place he mentions, as afterward will more fully appear; although I confess he is not alone, Crellius[d] making the same concession.

The last question of this chapter is, 'What are the ends of Christ's suffering and death intimated by the Scripture?' Whereunto by way of answer, sundry texts of Scripture are subjoined; every one of them expressing some one end or other, some effect or fruit, something of the aim and intendment of Christ in his suffering and death; whereunto exceeding many others might be annexed. But this business of the death of Christ, its causes, ends, and influence into the work of our salvation, the manifestation that therein he underwent the punishment due to our sins, making atonement, and giving satisfaction for them, redeeming us properly by the price of his blood, &c. being of so great weight and importance as it is, lying at the very bottom and foundation of all our hope and confidence, I shall, leaving Mr. Biddle, handle the whole matter at large in the ensuing chapters.

[d] Crellius de Causis Mortis Christi. p. 13.

For our more clear and distinct procedure in this important head of the religion of Jesus Christ, I shall first lay down the most eminent considerations of the death of Christ, as proposed in the Scripture; and then give an account of the most special effects of it in particular, answering to those considerations of it; in all manifesting wherein the expiation of our sins by his blood doth consist.

The principal considerations of the death of Christ, are of it, 1. as a price; 2. as a sacrifice; 3. as a penalty. Of which in the order wherein they are mentioned.

CHAP. XXII.

The several considerations of the death of Christ, as to the expiation of our sins thereby, and the satisfaction made therein: First, of it as a price. Secondly, as a sacrifice.

1. THE death of Christ in this business is a price: and that properly so called; 1 Cor. vi. 20. ἠγοράσθητε τιμῆς, 'you were bought with a price;' and if we will know what that price was, with which we are bought, the Holy Ghost informs us, 1 Pet. i. 17, 18. 'Ye were not redeemed with corruptible things, as silver and gold, but with the precious blood of Christ.' It is the blood of Christ, which in this business hath that use which silver and gold have in the redeeming of captives; and paid it is into the hand of him, by whose power and authority the captive is detained, as shall be proved; and himself tells us what a kind of price it is, that is so paid; it is λύτρον, Matt. xx. 28. 'He came to lay down his life,' λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν; which for its more evidence and clearness, is called, ἀντίλυτρον, 1 Tim. ii. 6. 'a price of redemption,' for the delivery of another.

The first mention of a ransom in the Scripture is in Exod. xxi. 30. 'If there be laid on him a sum of money, then he shall give for the ransom of his life, whatever is laid on him.' The word in the original is פדין, which the Septuagint there render λύτρα· δώσει λύτρα τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτοῦ: and it is used again in the same sense, Psal. xlix. 9. and in both places intends a valuable price, to be paid for the deliverance of that, which upon guilt became obnoxious to death. It is true, the word is from פדה 'redimere, vindicare, asserere in libertatem,' by

any ways and means, by power, strength, or otherwise. But wherever it is applied to such a kind of redemption, as had a price going along with it, the Septuagint constantly render it by ἀπολυτροῦν, and sometimes λυτρώσασθαι, otherwise by ῥύομαι, and the like.

It is then confessed, that פדה in the Old Testament, is sometimes taken for *redemit* in a metaphorical sense, not strictly and literally, by the intervention of a price; but that λυτρώσασθαι, the word whereby it is rendered, when a price intervened, is ever so taken in the New Testament, is denied Indeed Moses is called λυτρωτὴς, Acts i. 35. in reference to the metaphorical redemption of Israel out of Egypt: a deliverance by power and strong arm; but shall we say because that word is used improperly in one place, where no price could be paid, where God plainly says, it was not done by a price, but by power, therefore it must be so used in those places, where there is express mention of a price, both the matter of it, and its formality as a price, and speaketh not a word of doing it any other way, but by the payment of a price. But of this afterward.

There is mention of a ransom in ten places of the Old Testament; to ransom, and ransomed, in two or three more. In two of these places, Exod. xxi. 30. and Psal. xlix. 9. the word is פדין from פדה as before, and rendered by the Septuagint λύτρον, in all other places it is in the Hebrew כפר, which properly signifies a propitiation, as Psal. xlix. 8. which the LXX have variously rendered. Twice it is mentioned in Job, chap. xxxiii. 24. and xxxvi. 18. In the first place, they have left it quite out, and in the latter so corrupted the sense, that they have rendered it altogether unintelligible. Prov. vi. 35. and xiii. 8. they have properly rendered it λύτρον, or a price of redemption, it being in both places used in such business, as a ransom useth to be accepted in. Chap. xxi. 18. they have properly rendered it to the subject matter, περικάθαρμα· περικαθάρματα, are things publicly devoted to destruction, as it were to turn away anger from others, coming upon them for their sakes.

So is κάθαρμα, 'Homo piacularis pro lustratione et expiatione patriæ devotus;' whence the word is often used as *scelus* in Latin, for a wicked man, a man fit to be destroyed and taken away. Γρύζειν δὲ καὶ τολμᾶτον ὦ καθάρματε, says

he in the poet,[a] καθαρμὸς is used in the same sense by Herodotus, καθαρμὸν τῆς χώρης ποιουμένων Ἀχαιῶν, Ἀθάμαντα τὸν Ἀιόλον, 'Athamas was made a *piaculum*, or a propitiation for the country.' Whence Budæus renders that of the apostle, ὥσπερ περι καθάρματα τοῦ κόσμου ἐγενήθημεν: 'nos tanquam piacula mundi facti sumus, et succidaneæ pro populo victimæ:' 'we are as the accursed things of the world, and sacrifices for the people:' reading the words,[b] ὥσπερ καθάρματα: not ὡς περικαθάρματα. The Greek Scholiast, who reads it as we commonly do, rendering it by ἀποσαρώματα; as the Vulgar Latin 'purgamenta,' to the same purpose; such as have all manner of filth cast upon them.

And Isa. xliii. 3. 'they have rendered the same word ἄλλαγμα, 'a commutation by price;' so Matt. xvi. 26. τὶ δώσει ἄνθρωπος ἀντάλλαγμα τῆς ψυχῆς: 'a price in exchange.' Now in all these places and others, the Hebrews use the word כפר 'a propitiation,' by way of allusion; as is most especially evident from that of Isaiah, 'I will give Egypt a propitiation for thee;' that is, as God is atoned by a propitiatory sacrifice, wherein something is offered him in the room of the offender, so will he do with them; put them into trouble, in room of the church, as the sacrificed beast was, in the room of him for whom it was sacrificed; and hence does that word signify a ransom, because what God appointed in his worship to redeem any thing, that by the law was devoted, which was a compensation by his institution (as a clean beast in the room of a firstborn was to be offered a sacrifice to God), was so called. And the word 'satisfaction,' which is but once used in the Scripture, or twice together; Numb. xxxv. 31. is כפר in the original. כפר indeed is originally pitch or bitumen: hence what God says to Noah about making the ark, וכפרת Gen. vi. 14. the Septuagint have rendered ἀσφαλτώσεις τῇ ἀσφάλτῳ 'bituminabis bitumine.' כפר *in Pihel*, is 'placavit, expiavit, expiationem fecit;' because by sacrifice sins are covered, as if they had not been; to cover or hide, being the first use of the word.

And this is the rise and use of the word 'ransom' in the Scripture, both פדה פדיון and כפר which are rendered by λύτρον, περικάθαρμα, ἀντίλυτρον, ἄλλαγμα: it denotes properly a price of redemption, a valuable compensation made by

[a] Aristoph. in Plut.

[b] 1 Cor. iv. 13.

one thing for another, either in the native signification, as in the case of the first word; or by the first translation or it from the sacrifice of atonement, as in the latter. Of this farther afterward in the business of redemption. For the present is sufficeth, that the death of Christ was a price of ransom, and these are the words whereby it is expressed.

2. It was a sacrifice; and what sacrifice it was shall be declared.

1. That Christ offered a sacrifice, is abundantly evident from what was said before, in the consideration of the time and place, when and wherein Christ was a high-priest. The necessity of this the apostle confirms, Heb. viii. 3. 'For every high-priest is ordained to offer gifts and sacrifices: wherefore it is of necessity that this man have somewhat also to offer.' If he be a priest, he must have a sacrifice; the very nature of his employment requires it. The whole and entire office and employment of a high-priest, as a priest, consists in offering sacrifice, with the performance of those things, which did necessarily precede and follow that action. It is of necessity, then, that he should also have somewhat to offer as a sacrifice to God.

For the other part of our inquiry, viz. What it was that he sacrificed? I shall manifest in this order of process (taking leave to enlarge a little in this, intending not so much the thing, proved before, as the manner of it).

1. He was not to offer any sacrifice, that any priest had offered before, by God's appointment.

2. He did not actually offer any such sacrifice.

3. I shall shew positively what he did offer.

1. He was not to offer any sacrifice that the priests of old had appointed for them to offer. He came to do another manner of work, than could be brought about with the blood of bulls and goats. It cost more to redeem our souls. That which was of more worth in itself, of nearer concernment to him that offered it, of a more manifold alliance to them for whom it was offered, and of better acceptation with God to whom it was offered, was to be his sacrifice. This is the aim of the Holy Ghost; Heb. x. 1—7. 'For the law,' &c.

This is the sum of the apostle's discourse; the sacrifices instituted by the law, could not effect, nor work that which

Christ our High Priest was to accomplish by his sacrifice; and therefore he was not to offer them; but they were to be abolished, and something else to be brought in that might supply their room and defect.

What was wanting in these sacrifices, the apostle ascribes to the law, whereby they were instituted. The law could not do it, that is, the ceremonial law could not do it. The law which instituted and appointed these sacrifices, could not accomplish that end of the institution, by them. And with this expression of it he subjoins a reason of this weakness of the law. 'It had a shadow of good things to come, and not the very image of the things themselves.' An obscure representation of those good things, which, when they were instituted and in force, were *μέλλοντα* to come, though now actually exhibited, and existent: that is, Jesus Christ himself, and the good things of the gospel accompanying of him. It had but a shadow of these things, not the image; that is, the substance of them; for so I had rather understand image here substantially; as that may be called the image of a picture, by which it is drawn; than to make *σκιὰ* and *εἰκὼν* here to differ but gradually, as the first rude shape and proportion, and the perfect limning of any thing do. The reason then why all the solemn, operous, burdensome service of old, could not (of itself) take away sin, is because it did not contain Christ in it, but only had a shadow of him.

2. The apostle instances in particular, by what means the law could not do this great work, of 'making the comers thereunto perfect.' *Τοὺς προσερχομένους*, that is, those who come to God by it, the worshippers; which is spoke in opposition to what is said of Christ; chap. vii. 25. 'He is able to save to the uttermost *τοὺς προσερχομένους*, those that come to God by him.' The word expresseth any man under the consideration of one coming to God for acceptation. As Heb. xi. 6. 'He that cometh unto God' *δεῖ τὸν προσερχόμενον* these it could not make perfect; that is, it could not perfectly atone God, and take away their sins, so that the conscience should no more be troubled, nor tormented with the guilt of sin, as ver. 2. 4. By what could not the law do this? By those sacrifices which it offered year by year continually.

Not to speak of sacrifices in general. The sacrifices of the Jews may be referred to four heads.

1. The daily sacrifice of morning and evening, which is instituted Exod. xxix. 38, 39. which being omitted, was renewed by Nehem. x. 33. And wholly taken away for a long season by Antiochus, according to the prophecy of Daniel, Dan. xi. 31. this is the *juge sacrificium* typifying Christ's constant presence with his church, in the benefit of his death always.

2. Voluntary and occasional, which had no prefixed time, nor matter; so that they were of such creatures as God had allowed to be sacrificed, they were left to the will of the offerer, according as occasion and necessity was by providence administered. Now of these sacrifices there was a peculiar reason, that did not (as far as I can find) belong unto any of the rest. The judicial government of that nation being as their own historian Josephus calls it, Θεοκρατία, and immediately in the hand of God. He appointed these voluntary sacrifices, which were a part of his religious worship, to have a place also in the judicial government of the people. For whereas he had appointed death to be the punishment due to every sin; he allowed that for many sins sacrifice should be offered, for the expiating of the guilt contracted in that commonwealth, of which himself was the governor. Thus for many sins of ignorance and weakness, and other perversities, sacrifice was offered, and the guilty person died not, according to the general tenor of the law, 'Cursed is every one that continueth not in all these things.' Hence[c] David in his great sin of murder and adultery flies to mere mercy; acknowledging that God had appointed no sacrifice for the expiation of those sins, as to the guilt political, contracted in that commonwealth, though otherwise, no sins nor sinners were excluded from the benefit of sacrifices. This was their political regard, which they had, or could have only on this account; that God was the supreme political governor of that people, their Lord, and King.

3 Sacrifices extraordinary on solemn occasions: which seem some of them to be mixed of the two former kinds; stated and voluntary. Such was Solomon's great sacrifice at the dedication of the temple. These partly answered

[c] Psal. li. 16.

the sacrifice instituted at the dedication of the altar and tabernacle, partly the free-will offerings, which God allowed the people, according to their occasions; and appointed them for them.

4. Appointed sacrifices on solemn days: as on the sabbath, new moons, passover, feast of weeks, lesser and greater jubilee, but especially the solemn anniversary sacrifice of expiation, when the high-priest entered into the holy place, with the blood of the beast sacrificed, on the tenth day of the month Tizri. The institution of this sacrifice you have Lev. xvi. throughout. The matter of it was one bullock, and two goats, or kids of goats, ver. 2. 5. The manner was this, 1. In the entrance 'Aaron offered one bullock peculiarly for himself and his house;' ver. 6. 2. Lots were cast on the two goats, one to be a sin-offering, the other to be *Azazel*, ver. 8, 9. 3. The bullock and goat being slain, the blood was carried into the holy place. 4. *Azazel* having all the sins of the people confessed over him, was sent into the wilderness to perish; ver. 21. 5. The end of this sacrifice was atonement and cleansing, ver. 30. Of the whole nature, ends, significancy, and use, of this sacrifice (as of others), elsewhere; at present, I attend only the thesis proposed.

Now if perfect atonement and expiation might be expected from any of the sacrifices so instituted by God, certainly it might be from this; therefore this doth the apostle choose to instance in. This was the sacrifice offered κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν, and εἰς τὸ διηνεκὲς: but these, saith he, could not do it; the law by them could not do it, and this he proves with two arguments.

1. From the event, ver. 2, 3. 'For then would they not have ceased to be offered; because that the worshipper once purged, should have had no more conscience of sin? But in these sacrifices, there was a remembrance made again of sins every year.' The words of the second verse are to be read with an interrogation, conclusive in the negative: would they not have ceased to have been offered? That is certainly they would; and because they did not do so, it is evident from the event, that they could not take away sin. In most copies the words are, ἐπὶ ἂν ἐπαύσαντο προσφερόμεναι. Those that add the negative particle οὐκ, put it for οὐχὶ, as is frequently used.

2. From the nature of the thing itself, ver. 4. 'For it was not possible, that the blood of bulls and goats should take away sin.' The reason in these words is evident and plain, especially that of ver. 4. There is a twofold impossibility in the thing.

1. In regard of impetration; it was impossible they should really atone God, who was provoked. First, The conjunction between the sinner and the sacrificed beast, was not such, or so near (being only that of possessor and possessed), that really and beyond representation and type, the blood of the one could satisfy for the sin of the other. Much less, secondly, was there an innate worth of the blood of any beast, though never so innocent, to atone the justice of God, that was offended at sin; Mich. vi. 6, 7. Nor thirdly, was there any will in them for such an undertaking, or commutation. The sacrifice was bound with cords to the horns of the altar; Christ went willingly to the sacrifice of himself.

2. In regard of application. The blood of common sacrifices being once shed, was a dead thing, and had no more worth nor efficacy: it could not possibly be a living way for us to come to God by; nor could it be preserved, to be sprinkled upon the conscience of the sinner.

Hence doth the apostle make it evident, in the first place, that Christ was not to offer any of the sacrifices which former priests had offered, because it was utterly impossible, that by such sacrifices, the end of the sacrifice which he was to offer, should be accomplished. This also he proves,

2. Because God had expressly disallowed of those sacrifices, as to that end; not only it was impossible in the nature of the thing itself, but also God had absolutely rejected the tender of them, as to the taking away sin, and bringing sinners to God. But it may be said, did not God appoint them for that end and purpose, as was spoken before; the end of the sacrifice in the day of expiation was (Lev. xvi. 30.) to atone, and cleanse; 'on that day shall the priest make an atonement for you to cleanse you' (for the priest made an atonement actively, by offering the sacrifice: the sacrifice itself passively, by undergoing the penalty of death; Christ, who was both priest and sacrifice, did both). I answer; they were never appointed of God for to accomplish that end, by any real worth and efficacy of their own, but merely to ty-

pify, prefigure, and point out him, and that; which did the work, which they represented; and so served as the apostle speaks, until the time of reformation; Heb. ix. 10. they served the use of that people, in the under-age condition, wherein God was pleased to keep them.

But now that God rejected them as to this end and purpose, the apostle proves by the testimony of David, speaking of the acceptance of Christ, Psal. xl. 6, 7. 'Sacrifice and offering thou didst not desire; mine ears hast thou opened; burnt-offering, and sin-offering hast thou not required. Then said I, Lo I come,' &c. which the apostle insists on, ver. 6—9. There are several accounts, upon which God in Scripture is said to disregard, and not to approve or accept of sacrifices, which yet were of his own institution. 1. In respect of the hypocrisy of the offerers: that people being grown formal and corrupt, trusted in sacrifices, and the work wrought in them, and said by them, they should be justified; God expressing his indignation against such sacrifices, or the sacrifices of such persons, rejects the things themselves wherein they trusted, that is, in reference to them that used them. This is the intention of the Holy Ghost, Isa. i. 12, 13. but this is not the cause of their rejection in this place of the psalmist; for he speaketh of them who walketh with God in uprightness, and waited for his salvation; even of himself and other saints, as appears in the context, ver. 5. &c. 2. Comparatively; they are rejected as to the outward work of them, in comparison of his more spiritual worship; as Psal. l. 12—14. but neither are they here rejected on that account; nor is there mention of any opposition between the outward worship of sacrifice, and any other more spiritual and internal part thereof: but between sacrifice, and the boring of the ear, or preparing of the body of Christ, as expressly, ver. 6.

Their rejection then here mentioned, is, in reference to that which is asserted, in opposition to them, and in reference to the end, for which that is asserted: look to what

hrist had a body fitted and prepared for, and to that
d the compassing of it, are all sacrifices rejected of
ow this was to take away sin, so that as to thate nd
cted.

in our passage may we remove what the Raco-

vian catechism gives us, as the difference between the expiation under the Old Testament, and that under the New, concerning which, Chap. de Mun. Ch. Sacerdot. q. 5. they thus inquire.

'Q. What[d] is the difference between the expiation of sin in the Old and New Testament?

'A. The expiation of sins under the New Testament, is not only much different from that under the Old, but also is far better, and more excellent: and that chiefly for two causes: the first is, that under the Old Testament, expiation by those legal sacrifices was appointed only for those sins, which happened upon imprudence and infirmity; from whence they were also called infirmities and ignorances. But for greater sins, such as were manifest transgressions of the command of God, there were no sacrifices instituted, but the punishment of death was proposed to them: and if God did forgive such to any, he did not do it by virtue of the covenant, but of singular mercy, which God besides the covenant did afford, when, and to whom he would: but under the new covenant, not only those sins are expiated, which happen by imprudence and infirmity, but those also, which are transgressions of most evident commands of God, whilst he who happened so to fall, doth not continue therein, but is changed by true repentance, and falleth not into that sin again. The latter cause is, because under the Old Testament, expiation of sins was so performed, that only temporal punishment was taken away from them, whose sins were expiated. But under the New, the expiation is such, as not only takes

[d] Quodnam est discrimen inter veteris, et novi fœderis peccatorum expiationem? —Expiatio peccatorum sub novo fœdere, non solum distat ab expiatione peccatorum sub vetere plurimum, verum etiam longe præstantior, et excellentior est: id vero duabus potissimum de causis: prior est, quod sub vetere fœdere, iis tantum peccatis expiatio, per illa legalia sacrificia, constituta fuit, quæ per imprudentiam, vel per infirmitatem admissa fuere, unde etiam infirmitates, et ignorantiæ nuncupabantur: verum pro peccatis gravioribus, quæ transgressiones erant mandati Dei manifestæ, nulla sacrificia instituta fuerant, sed mortis pœna fuit proposita. Quod si talia Deus alicui condonabat, id non vi fœderis fiebat, sed misericordia Dei singulari, quam Deus citra fœdus, et quando, et cui libuit exhibebat: sub novo vero fœdere peccata expiantur, non solum per imprudentiam et infirmitatem admissa, verum etiam ea, quæ apertissimorum Dei mandatorum sunt transgressiones, dummodo is cui labi ad eum modum contigerit, in eo non perseveret; verum per veram panitentiam resipiscat, nec ad illud peccatum amplius relabatur. Posterior vero causa est, quod sub prisco fœdere ad eum modum peccatorum expiatio peragebatur, ut pœna temporaria tantum, ab iis, quorum peccata expiabantur, tolleretur: sub novo vero ea est expiatio, ut non solum pœnas temporarias, verum etiam æternas amoveat, et loco pœnarum, æternam vitam in fœdere promissam, iis quorum peccata fuerint expiata offerat. De Mun. Ch. Sacerdot. Q. 5.

away temporal, but eternal punishment, and in their stead, offers eternal life promised in the covenant, to them whose sins are expiated.' Thus they.

Some brief animadversions will give the reader a clear account of this discourse. 1. Sundry things are here splendidly supposed by our catechists, than which nothing could be imagined or invented more false: as 1. That the covenant was not the same for substance under the Old and New Testament, before and after the coming of Christ in the flesh. 2. That those under the Old Testament were not pardoned or saved by Christ. 3. That death temporal was all that was threatened by the law. 4. That God forgave sin, and not in, or by the covenant. 5. That there were no promises of eternal life under the Old Testament, &c. on these and the like goodly principles, is this whole discourse erected; let us now consider their assertions. The first is,

1. That expiation by legal sacrifices was only for some sins and not of all; as sins of infirmity and ignorance, not great crimes: wherein, 1. They suppose, that the legal sacrifices did by themselves, and their own efficacy, expiate sin, which is directly contrary to the discourse of the apostle now insisted on. 2. Their affirmation hereon is most false: Aaron making an atonement for sin, confessed over the goat all the iniquities of the children of Israel, and all their transgressions, in all their sins; Lev. xvi. 21. and besides, all manner of sins are comprised under those expressions of ignorances and infirmities.

2. They say, 'for greater sins there was then no expiation, but death was threatened to them.' But then, 1. None that ever committed such sins were saved; for without expiation there is no salvation. 2. Death was threatened, and inflicted without mercy for some sins, as the law with its judicial additaments was the rule of the judaical polity; and for those sins, there was no sacrifice for a deliverance from death temporal; but death was threatened to every sin, small and great, as the law was a rule of moral obedience unto God; and so in respect of sacrifices there was no distinction. This difference of sacrifices for some sins, and not for others in particular, did depend merely on their use by God's appointment in the commonwealth of that people, and had no regard to the spiritual expiation of sin, which they typified.

3. That God forgave the sins of his people of old, by singular mercy, and not by virtue of his covenant, is a bold figment. God exercises no singular mercy, but in the covenant thereof; Eph. ii. 12.

4. Their condition of expiation (by the way) under the New Testament, that the sinner fall not again into the same sin, is a matter that these men understand not; but this is no place to discuss it.

5. That the expiation under the Old Testament reached only to the removal of temporal punishment, is another imagination of our catechists. It was death eternal that was threatened, as the punishment due to the transgression of the law, as it was the rule of obedience to God, as hath been proved; even the death that Christ delivered us from; Rom. v. 12, &c. Heb. ii. 14, 15. God was atoned by those sacrifices, according to their way of making atonement, Lev. xvi. 30. so that the punishment avoided was eternal punishment. 2. Neither is this indeed spoken by our catechists, as though they believed any punishment should be eternal; but they only hide themselves in ambiguity of the expression, it being annihilation they intend thereby. 3. The πρῶτον ψεῦδος of this discourse is, that expiation by sacrifices was no other, than what was done really by the sacrifices themselves, so everting their typical nature and institution, and divesting them of the efficacy of the blood of Christ, which they did represent.

6. It is confessed, that there is a difference between the expiation under the Old Testament, and that under the New; but this of application and manifestation, not of impetration and procurement. This is Jesus Christ, 'the same yesterday, to day, and for ever.'

But they plead proof of Scripture for what they say in the ensuing question.

'Q. How[e] dost thou demonstrate both these?

'A. That the sins, which could not be expiated under the Old Testament, are all expiated under the New, Paul witnesseth, Acts xiii. 38, 39. and the same is also affirmed;

[e] Qua ratione vero utrumque demonstras?—Peccata, quæ sub vetere fœdere expiari non potuere omnia sub novo expiari testatur Apostolus Paulus, in Actis, cap. xiii. 38, 39. idem habetur; Rom. iii. 25. Heb. ix. 15. Quod vero ea ratione expientur peccata sub novo fœdere, ut etiam æterna pœna amoveatur, et vita æterna donetur, habetur Heb. ix. 12. ubi sup. Q. 6.

Rom. iii. 25. Heb. ix. 15. But that sins are so expiated under the New Testament, as that also eternal punishment is removed, and life eternal given, we have Heb. ix. 12.'

This work will speedily be at an issue. 1. It is denied, that Paul, Acts xiii. 38, 39. makes a distinction of sins, whereof some might be expiated by Moses' law, and others not. He says no more there, than in this place to the Hebrews, namely, that the legal sacrifices, wherein they rested and trusted, could not of themselves free them, or their consciences from sin, or give them peace with God; being but types and shadows of good things to come; the body being Christ, by whom alone all justification from sin is to be obtained. Absolutely, the sacrifices of the law expiated no sin, and so were they rested in by the Jews. Typically, they expiated all, and so Paul calls them from them to the antitype (or rather thing typified) now actually exhibited.

2. The two next places of Rom. iii. 25. Heb. ix. 15. do expressly condemn the figment they strive to establish by them; both of them assigning the pardon of sins that were past, and their expiation, unto the blood and sacrifice of Christ; though there were then purifications, purgations, sacrifices, yet the meritorious, and efficient cause of all expiation, was the blood of Christ, which manifests the expiation under the Old and New Testament for substance to have been the same.

3. That the expiation under the New Testament is accompanied with deliverance from eternal punishment, and a grant of life eternal, is confessed; and so also was that under the Old, or it was no expiation at all, that had respect either to God, or the souls of men: but to proceed with the sacrifice of Christ.

This is the first thing I proposed, Christ being to offer sacrifice, was not to offer the sacrifice of the priests of old; because they could never bring about what he aimed at in his sacrifice; it was impossible in the nature of the thing itself, and they were expressly, as to that end, rejected of God himself.

2. Christ as a priest did never offer these sacrifices; it is true, as one made under the law, and whom it became to fulfil all righteousness, he was present at them: but as a priest he never offered them; for the apostle expressly af-

firms, that he could not be a priest, that had right to offer those sacrifices, as before; and he positively refuses the owning himself for such a priest, when having cured the leprous man, he bade him go shew himself to the priest according to the law.

3. What Christ did offer indeed, as his sacrifice, is nextly mentioned. This the apostle expresseth in that which is asserted, in opposition to the sacrifices rejected; Heb. x. 5. 'But a body hast thou prepared me.'

The words in the psalm are in the sound of them otherwise, Psal. xl. 6. אזנים כרית לי 'mine ears hast thou digged:' which the Septuagint render, and the apostle from them, σῶμα κατηρτίσω μοὶ; 'a body hast thou prepared me.' Of the accomodation of the interpretation to the original, there is much contention; some think here is an allusion to the custom among the Jews, of boring the ear of him, who was upon his own consent to be a servant for ever. Now because Christ took a body to be obedient, and a servant to his Father, this is expressed by the boring of the ear, which therefore the Septuagint renders by preparing a body, wherein he might be so obedient; but this to me seems too curious on the part of the allusion, and too much strained on the part of the application, and therefore I shall not insist on it.

Plainly, כרה signifies not only in its first sense to 'dig,' but also to 'prepare,' and is so rendered by the Septuagint; now, whereas the original expresseth only the ears, which are the organ by which we hear, and become obedient (whence to hear is sometimes as much as to be obedient), it mentions the ear synecdochically, for the whole body, which God so prepared for obedience to himself: and that which the original expressed synecdochically, the Septuagint, and after them the apostle rendered more plainly and fully, naming the whole body wherein he obeyed, when the ears were only expressed, whereby he learned obedience.

The interpretation of this place by the Socinians, is as ridiculous as any they make use of; take it in the words of Volkelius. [f] 'Add hereto that the mortal body of Christ,

[f] Adde quod corpus mortale, quo Christus ante mortem, imo ante suum in cœlum ascensum præditus erat, ad hoc Sacerdotium obeundum, et sacrificium penitus absolvendum, aptum non fuit; ideoque tunc demum corpus, huic rei accommoda

which he had before his death, yea, before his ascension into heaven, was not fit for his undergoing this office of priesthood, or wholly to accomplish the sacrifice: wherefore the divine writer to the Hebrews, chap. x. 5. declareth, that then he had a perfect body, accommodated unto this work, when he went into the world; that is, to come, which is heaven.' A heap of foolish abominations. 1. The truth is, no body but a mortal body was fit to be this sacrifice, which was to be accomplished, according to all the types of it, by shedding of blood, without which there is no remission. 2. It is false, that Christ had a mortal body after his resurrection; or that he hath any other body now in heaven, than what he rose withal. 3. It is false that the world, spoken of simply, doth any where signify the world to come, or that the world here signifies heaven. 4. It is false that the coming into the world, signifies going out of the world: as it is here interpreted. 5. Christ's bringing into the world, was by his incarnation and birth, Heb. i. 6. according to the constant use of that expression in the Scripture, as his ascension is his leaving the world, and going to his Father, John xiii. 1. xiv. 19. xvi. 28.

But I must not insist on this; it is the body that God prepared Christ for his obedience, that is, his whole human nature that is asserted for the matter of Christ's offering. For the clearing whereof the reader may observe, that the matter of the offering and sacrifice of Christ is expressed three ways.

1. It is said to be of the body and blood of Christ; Heb. x. 10. The offering of the body of Jesus, and the blood of Christ, is said to [g]purge us from our sins, that is, by the sacrifice of it; and in his blood have we redemption, and by his own 'blood did he enter into the holy place,' Heb. ix. 12. and most expressly, xiii. 12.

2. His soul; Isa. liii. 10. 'When thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin.'

3. It is most frequently said to be himself that was offered. Eph. v. 2. Heb. i. 3. ix. 14. 25, 26. vii. 27. Hence appears what was the matter of the sacrifice of this High

perfectum ei fuisse, divinus Author indicat, Heb. x. 5. cum in mundum, nempe um illum, qui cœlum est, ingrederetur. Volkel. de vera Relig. lib. 3. cap. 37. c. Christi. p. 146.

g 1 John i. 7. Ephes. i. 13.

Priest, even himself; he sacrificed himself; his whole human nature; he offered up his body and soul, as a propitiatory sacrifice to God; a sacrifice for atonement and expiation.

Farther, to clear this, I must desire the reader to take notice of the import of this expression; 'He sacrificed himself,' or Christ sacrificed himself. 'He' in the first place, as it is spoken of the sacrificer, denotes the person of Christ, and both natures herein; 'himself,' as the sacrificed, is only the human nature of Christ, wherein and whereof that sacrifice was made. He makes the atonement actively, as the priest; himself passively, as the sacrifice.

1. 'He' is the person of Christ, God and man jointly and distinctly acting in the work.

1. As God; Heb. ix. 14. 'through the eternal Spirit he offered himself to God.' His eternal Spirit, or Deity, was the principal agent, offering; and wherever there is mentioning of Christ's offering himself, it relates principally to the person, God-man, who offered.

2. The free will of his human nature was in it also; so Heb. x. 7. 'Lo, I come to do thy will;' when God had prepared him a body, opened his hears, he says, 'Lo, I come to do thy will;' as it was written of him in the volume of God's book; and that this expression, 'Lo, I come to do thy will,' sets out the readiness of the human will of Christ, is evident from that exposition which is given of it, Psal. xl. 8. 'yea thy law is within my heart,' or in the 'midst of my bowels;' thy law, the law of the Mediator, that I am to undertake, it is in the midst of my heart; which is an expression of the greatest readiness and willingness possible. He then that offers is our Mediator, God and man in one person; and the offering is the act of the person.

2. 'Himself' offered, as the matter of the sacrifice, is only the human nature of Christ, soul and body, as was said; which is evident from the description of a sacrifice, what it is.

A sacrifice is a religious oblation, wherein something by the ministry of a priest, appointed of God thereunto, is dedicated to God and destroyed, as to what it was, for the ends and purposes of spiritual worship whereunto it is instituted. I shall only take notice of that one part of this definition, which asserts that the thing sacrificed was to be

destroyed as to what it was. This is clear from all the sacrifices that ever were; either they were slain or burnt, or sent to destruction. Now the person of Christ was not dissolved, but the union of his natures continued; even then when the human nature was in itself destroyed, by the separation of soul and body. It was the soul and body of Christ that was sacrificed; his body being killed, and his soul separated; so that at that season it was destroyed as to what it was; though it was impossible he should be detained by death.

And this sacrifice of Christ, was typified by the two goats; his body, whose blood was shed, by the goat that was slain visibly; and his soul by *Azazel*, on whose head the sins of the people were confessed, and he is sent away into the wilderness to suffer there by a fall or famishment.

This also will farther appear in our following consideration of the death of Christ, as a punishment; when I shall shew, that he suffered both in soul and body.

But it may be said, if only the human nature of Christ was offered, how could it be a sacrifice of such infinite value, as to the justice of God, for all the sins of all the elect, whereunto it was appointed.

Ans. Though the thing sacrificed was but finite, yet the person sacrificing was infinite; and the ἀποτέλεσμα of the action follows the agent; that is, our Mediator θεάνθρωπος; whence the sacrifice was of infinite value.

And this is the second consideration of the death of Christ, it was a sacrifice; what is the peculiar influence of his death as a sacrifice, into the satisfaction he hath made, shall be declared afterward.

From what hath been spoken, a brief description of the sacrifice of Christ, as to all the concernments of it may be taken.

1. The person designing, appointing, and instituting this sacrifice, is God the Father; as in grace contriving the great work of the salvation of the elect; a 'body did he prepare him;' and therein he came to do his will, Heb. x. 9. in that which he did, which the sacrifices of old could not do. He came to fulfil the will of God, his appointment and ordinance, being his servant therein; made βραχύ τι less than the Father, that he might be obedient to death: God the Father sent him when he made his soul an offering.

2. He to whom it was offered, was God; God essentially considered, with his glorious property of justice, which was to be atoned; 'he gave himself a sacrifice to God, for a sweet smelling savour;' Eph. v. 2. that is, to atone him being provoked, as we shall see afterward.

3. The person offering was Christ the Mediator, God and man; 'he offered himself to God;' Heb. ix. 14. And because he did it, who was God and man, and as God and man, God is said to 'redeem his church with his own blood;' Acts xx. 28.

4. The matter of the sacrifice was his whole human nature, body and soul, called himself, as I have shewed, in sundry particulars.

5. The immediate efficient cause of his offering, and the destruction of that which he offered unto God, as before described, was his own will: 'Lo, I come,' saith he, 'to do thy will;' and 'no man,' saith he, 'taketh my life from me; I lay down my life, and I have power to take it up again;' John x. 17, 18. What men or devils did to him, as what he suffered from the curse of the law, comes under another consideration, as his death was a penalty; as it was a sacrifice, his own will was all the cause immediately effecting it.

6. The fire that was to set this holocaust on a flame, was the Holy Spirit; Heb. ix. 14. Through the eternal Spirit; that the fire which came down from heaven, and was always kept alive upon the altar, was a type of the Holy Ghost, might easily be demonstrated. I have done it elsewhere. Now the Holy Spirit did this in Christ; he was offered through the eternal Spirit; as others were by fire.

7. The Scripture speaks nothing of the altar, on which Christ was offered. Some assign the cross. That of our Saviour is abundantly sufficient to evince the folly thereof; Matt. xxiii. 18, 19. If the cross was the altar, it was greater than Christ, and sanctified him, which is blasphemy. Besides, Christ himself is said to be an altar; Heb. xiii. 10. and he is said to sanctify himself to be an offering or a sacrifice; John xviii. 19. So that indeed the Deity of Christ, that supported, bore up, and sanctified the human nature as offered, was the altar; and the cross was but an instrument of the cruelty of man, that taketh place in the death of Christ as it was a penalty, but hath no place in it as a sacrifice.

That this sacrifice of Christ was a sacrifice of propitiation, as made by blood, as answering the typical sacrifices of old; that the end and effect of it was atonement or reconciliation, shall elsewhere be more fully manifested: the discovery of it also will in part be made, by what in the ensuing discourse shall be spoken about reconciliation itself.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of the death of Christ, as it was a punishment, and the satisfaction made thereby.

So is the death of Christ revealed as a price, and a sacrifice: what are the proper effects of it, under these considerations, shall be afterward declared.

The third consideration of it, is, being a penalty, or a punishment; to clear this, I shall demonstrate four things.

1. What punishment, properly so called, is.

2. That Christ's death was a punishment, or that in his death he did undergo punishment.

3. What that was that Christ underwent, or the material cause of that punishment.

4. Wherein the formality of its being a punishment did consist; or whence that dispensation had its equity.

For the first I shall give the definition of it, or the description of its general nature.

2. The ends of it are to be considered.

For the first, that usual general description seemeth to be comprehensive of the whole nature of punishment; it is, 'malum passionis, quod infligitur ob malum actionis,' an evil of suffering inflicted for doing evil. Or more largely to describe it; it is an effect of justice in him, who hath sovereign power and right, to order and dispose of offenders, whereby he that doth contrary to the rule of his actions, is recompensed with that which is evil to himself, according to the demerit of his fault.

1. It is an[b] effect of justice; hence God's punishing is

[a] non reddit faciendo quod debet reddet patiendo quod debet. August. lib. 3. Arbit.

[b] Plat. de Just. Vindic. δικὴ τιμωρίας ἀπαίτησις παρὰ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων. Hier.

often called an inflicting of anger, as Rom. iii. 5. 'Is God unrighteous, ὁ ἐπιφέρων τὴν ὀργήν, who inflicteth anger?' Anger is put for the justice of God, Rom. i. 18. 'the anger or wrath of God is revealed from heaven,' &c. That is, his vindictive justice against sin, is manifested by its effects; and again, the cause for the effect. Anger for the effect of it in punishment. And therefore we have translated the word 'vengeance,' Rom. iii. 5. which denotes the punishment itself.

2. It is of him, who hath sovereign power, and judiciary right to dispose of the offenders; and this is either immediate in God himself, as in the case whereof we speak; he is the only 'lawgiver, who is able to save, and destroy;' Jam. iv. 12. or it is by him delegated to men, for the use of human society; so Christ tells Pilate, he could have no power over him (whom he considered as a malefactor) unless it was given him from above; John xix. 11. though that is spoken in reference to that peculiar dispensation.

3. The nature of it consists in this, that it be evil to him, on whom it is inflicted, either by the immission of that which is corrupting, vexing, and destroying, or the subtraction of that which is cheering, useful, good, and desirable, in what kind soever. And, therefore, did the ancients call the punishment 'fraus,' because, when it came upon men, they had deceived, and cut short themselves of some good, that otherwise they might have enjoyed. So the historian,[c] 'Cæteræ multitudini diem statuit, antequam liceret sine fraude ab armis discedere:' that is, that they might go away freely, without punishment. And so is that expression explained by Ulpian; Dig. lib. 20. 'Capitalem fraudem admittere, est tale aliquid delinquere, propter quod, capite puniendus sit.'

The schoolmen have two rules that pass amongst them without control. 1. That 'Omne peccatum est adeo voluntarium, ut si non sit voluntarium non est peccatum.' It is so of the nature of sin, that it be voluntary, that if any thing be not voluntary, it is not sin. The other is, 'est ex natura pœnæ ut sit involuntaria:' it is so of the nature of punishment, that it be against the will of him that is punished, that if it be not so, it is not punishment.

Neither of which rules is true, yea, the latter is undoubt-

[c] Salust. bell. Catil.

edly false. For the first, every sin is thus far indeed voluntary, that what is done contrary to the express will of him that doth it, is not his sin; but that the actual will, or willing of the sinner is required, to make any thing his sin, is false. In the case of original sin manifestly; wherefore John gives us another definition of sin than theirs is, that it is, 'dictum, factum, concupitum, contra legem;' namely, that it is ἀνομία, 'a transgression of the law;' have it the actual consent of the will or no, if it be a transgression of the law, an inconformity to the law, it is sin.

For the latter it is true indeed, that for the most part it falls out, that every one that is to be punished, is unwilling to undergo it; and there is an improper nolleity (if I may so speak) in nature, unto the subtracting of any good from it, or the immission of any evil upon it; yet, as to the perfection of the nature of punishment, there is no more required, than what was laid down in general before, that there be 'malum passionis, ob malum actionis,' a suffering of evil for doing of evil, whether men will or no. Yea, men may be willing to it, as the soldiers of Cæsar after their defeat at[d] Dyrrachium, came to him, and desired that they might be punished, 'more antiquo:' being ashamed of their flight. But whatever really or personally is evil to a man, for his evil is punishment; though chiefly among the Latins, punishment relates to things real: capital revenges had another name. Punishments were chiefly pecuniary, as Servius on that of Virgil: 'Post mihi non simili pœna commissa luetis: luetis: persolvetis: et hic sermo a pecunia descendit, antiquorum enim pœnæ omnes pecuniariæ fuerunt.' And 'supplicium' is of the same importance. Punishments were called 'supplicia,' because with the mulcts of men, they sacrificed, and made their supplications to God: whence the word is sometimes used for that worship; as in Salustius, describing the old Romans, he says they were in 'suppliciis Deorum magnifici.'

4. There is the procuring cause of it, which is, doing evil, contrary to the law and rule whereby the offender ought to walk, and regulate his actings and proceedings: 'omnis pœna, si justa est, peccati pœna est,' says Aug. indeed, not

[d] Quanta fortitudine dimicaverint, testimonio est, quod adverso semel apud Dyrrachium prælio, pœnam in se ultro depoposcunt. Sueton. in Jul. Cæs. cap. 68. More trio decimari voluerunt. Appianus,

only, 'si justa est,' but 'si pœna est;' taking it properly, offence must precede punishment.

And whatever evil befalls any, that is not procured by offence, is not properly punishment, but hath some other name and nature. The name 'pœna,' is used for any thing that is vexatious or troublesome, any toil or labour, as in the tragedian, speaking of one who tired himself with travel in hunting. [e] 'Quid te ipse pœnis gravibus infestus gravas;' but improperly is it thus used. This Abraham evinceth in his plea with God; Gen. xviii. 25. 'That be far from thee to do after this manner, to slay the righteous with the wicked; and that the righteous should be as the wicked, that be far from thee: shall not the judge of all the earth do right?' It is of God as the judge of all the earth of whom he speaks; that is, of him that hath the supreme power of disposing of offenders; and of his justice inflicting; which, as I said, was the cause of punishment. It is that, whereby God doth right: and he gives the procuring cause of all punishment, the wickedness of men; 'That be far from thee, to destroy the righteous with the wicked.' And therefore, that place of Job, chap. ix. 22. 'This is one thing, therefore I said it, he destroys the perfect and the wicked;' is not to be understood absolutely, but according to the subject of the dispute in hand, between him and Bildad. Bildad says, chap, viii. 20. That 'God will not cast away a perfect man,' that is, he will not afflict a godly man to death. He grants that a godly man may be afflicted, which Eliphas's companion seemed to deny: yet, says he, he will not cast him away; that is, leave him without relief from that affliction, even in this life. To this Job's answer is, 'this is one thing;' that is, one thing I am resolved on, 'and therefore I said it,' and will abide by it, 'he destroyeth the perfect and the wicked;' not only wicked men are destroyed and cut off in this life, but perfect men also; but yet in this very destruction, as there is a difference in the persons, one being perfect, the other wicked; so there is in God's dealing with them; one being afflicted to the door of heaven, the other cursed into hell. But for punishment properly so called, the cause is sin, or the offence of the person punished. And therefore in the Hebrew, the same words (many of them) signify both sin and punishment;

[e] Senec. Hippol. Act. 2.

so near and indissoluble is their relation. Προσήκει δήπουθεν ὡς χρέα κληρονομίας διαδέχεσθαι τῆς πονηρίας τὴν κόλασιν. Plut. de Sera Numin. vindicta.

5. The measure of any penalty, is the demerit of the offence; it is a rendering to men, as for their works, so according to them:[f]

> Nec vincet ratio hoc, tantundem ut peccet, idemque
> Qui teneros caules alieni fregerit horti
> Et qui nocturnus Divum sacra legerit. Adsit
> Regula, peccatis quæ pœnas irroget æquas:
> Ne scutica dignum horribili sectere flagello.

I shall not trouble the reader with the heathens apprehension of Rhadamanthean righteousness, and the exact rendering to every one according to his desert even in another world.

There is a twofold rule of this proportion of sin and punishment; the one constitutive, the other declarative. The rule constitutive of the proportion of penalty for sin, is the infinitely wise, holy, and righteous will of God. The rule declarative of it is the law.

For the first, it is his judgment that they which commit sin are worthy of death, Rom. i. 32. This the apostle fully declares; chap. ii. 5—10. The day of punishing, he calls the day of the revelation of the righteous judgment of God. That is, what his judgment is concerning the demerit of sin. The world shall then know, what in justice he requires for the due vengeance of it. And this according to his will; ver. 6. he will in his righteous judgment render to every one according to his deeds.

And here it is to be observed, that though there be an exceeding great variation in sin, in respect of degrees, so that some seem as mountains, others in comparison of them but as molehills, yet it is the general nature of sin (which is the creatures subducting itself from under the dominion of God, and dependance upon him), that punishment original is suited unto; whence death is appointed to every sin, and that eternal; wherein the degrees of punishment vary not the kind.

2. For[g] the several kinds of punishment (I call them so,

[f] Hor. Sat. lib. 1. 3.—Vid. Catonis orat. apud Salust. Bel. Catalin.

[g] Puniendis peccatis tres esse debere causas existimatum est. Una est quæ νουθέτησις vel κόλασις vel παραίνεσις dicitur: cum pœna adhibetur castigandi atque emendandi

in a general acceptation of both words) they are distinguished according to their ends and causes; the ends of punishments, or all such things as have in them the nature of punishments, may be referred to the ensuing heads.

1. The first end of punishment, is, the good of him that is punished, and this is twofold. 1. For amendment, and recovery from the evil and sin that he hath committed. This kind of punishing is frequently mentioned in Scripture; so eminently, Lev. xxvi. doth the Lord describe it at large, and insists upon it, reckoning up in a long series, a catalogue of several judgments: he interposing, 'But if ye shall not be reformed by these things, but will walk contrary to me,' as ver. 25. then will I do so and so, or add this or that punishment to them foregoing: and this in reference to the former end of their reformation, and the success of this procedure, we find variously expressed; sometimes the end of it in some measure was fulfilled, Psal. xviii. 32—35. sometimes otherwise, Isa. i. 5. 'Why should you be smitten any more? you will revolt more and more;' intimating, that the end of the former smiting was to cure their revoltings. And this kind of punishment is called[h] *νουθεσιά* correction for instruction; and is not punishment in its strict and proper sense.

2. For the taking off of sinners, to prevent such other wickednesses as they would commit, should patience be exercised towards them. The very heathen saw, that he that was wicked and not to be reclaimed, it was even good for him, and to him, that he should be destroyed. Such a one as Plutarch says, was *ἑτέροις γε πάντως βλαβερὸν ἀυτῷ τε βλαβερώτατον*, 'hurtful to others, but most of all to himself.' How much more is this evident to us, who know that future judgments shall be proportionably increased to the wickedness of men in this world; and if every drop of judgment in the world to come, be incomparably greater than the greatest and heaviest a man can possibly suffer in this life, or lose his life by, it is most evident, that a man may be

gratia, ut is qui fortuito deliquit, attentior fiat, correctiorque. Altera est, quam ii, qui vocabula ista curiosius diviserunt, *τιμωρίαν* appellant, ea causa animadvertendi est, quum dignitas authoritasque ejus, in quem est peccatum tuenda est, ne prætermissa animadversio contemptum ejus pariat, et honorem elevet, &c. vid. A. Gell. lib. 6. cap. 24.

[h] *Καὶ γὰρ ἡ νουθεσία καὶ ὁ ψόγος ἐμποιεῖ μετάνοιαν καὶ αἰσχύνην.* Plut. de virtut.

punished with death for his own good; 'mitius punientur.' This is κολασία. And this hath no place in human administrations of punishments, when they arise to death itself; men cannot kill a man, to prevent their dealing worse with him, for that is their worst; they can do no more says our Saviour; but accidentally it may be for his good. Generally κόλασις, or κολασία, is, as [i]Aristotle speaks, πάσκοντος ἕνεκα; and is thereby differenced from τιμωρία (of which afterward), which as he says, is τοῦ ποιοῦντος ἕνεκα ἵνα ἀποπληρωθῇ. Hence ἀκολάστος, is one not corrected, not restrained, 'incastigatus.' And therefore, the punishment of death cannot at all properly be κόλασις: but cutting off by God to prevent farther sin, hath in it τὶ ανάλογον thereunto.

2. The second end of punishment, which gives a second kind of them in the general sense before-mentioned, is for the good of others, and this also is various.

1. For the good of them that may be like minded with him that is punished; that they may be deterred, affrighted, and persuaded from the like evils. This was the end of the punishing of the presumptuous sinner; Deut. xvii. 12, 13. 'That man shall die, and all the people shall hear, and fear, and do no more presumptuously.' 'The people;' that is, any among them that was like minded unto him that was stoned and destroyed. So in some places they have taken lions that have destroyed men, and hung them on crosses, to fright others that should attempt the like. Hence 'exemplum,' is sometimes put absolutely for punishment, because punishment is for that end. So in the Comedian,[k] 'Quæ futura exempla dicunt in eum indigna;' on which place Donatus, 'graves pœnæ, quæ possunt cæteris documento esse, exempla dicuntur.' And this is a tacit end in human punishment. I do not know that God hath committed any pure revenge unto men; that is, punishing with a mere respect to what is past. Nor should one man destroy another, but for the good of others. Now the good of no man lies in revenge. The content that men take therein, is their sin, and cannot be absolutely good to them. So the philosopher,[l] 'nemo prudens punit quia peccatum est, sed ne peccetur; revocari enim præterita non possunt, futura prohibeantur:' and Rom. xiii. 4. 'If ye do that which

[i] Arist. Rhet. 1. [k] Terent. Eunuch. act. 5. sce. 4. [l] Sen.

is evil, be afraid,' &c. See what he hath done to others, and be afraid.

2. It is for the good of others, that they may not be hurt in the like kind, as some were by the sin of him who is punished for it. This[m] seems to be the main end of that great fundamental law of human society, 'Let him that hath killed by violence be killed, that the rest of men may live in peace.' And these kinds of punishments in reference to this end are called *παραδείγματα*,[n] 'examples;' that others by impunity be not enticed to evil, and that the residue of men may be freed from the harm that is brought upon them, by reason of such evils.

Hence the historian says, that commonwealths should rather be mindful of things done evilly, than of good turns; the forgetfulness of the latter, is a discouragement to some good, but of the former an encouragement to all licentiousness. Thus Joseph[o] suspecting his espoused consort, yet refused *παραδειγματίσαι*, to make an open example of her by punishment. And these[p] punishments are thus called from their use, and not from their own nature; and therefore, differ not from *κολασίαι* and *τιμωρίαι*, but only as to the end and use from whence they have their denomination.

3. The good of him that punisheth is aimed at, and this is proper to God. Man punisheth not, nor can, nor ought, for his own good, or the satisfaction of his own justice; but 'God made all things for himself, and the wicked for the day of evil;' Prov. xvi. 4. Rom. ix. 22. and in God's dealing with men, whatever he doth unless it be for this end, it is not properly punishment.

This is *τιμωρία*, 'vindicta noxæ;' purely the recompensing of the evil that is committed, that it may be revenged. This, I say, in God's dealing is properly punishment, the revenge of the evil done, that himself, or his justice may be satisfied, as was seen before, from Rom. ii. 7—9. Whatever of evil God doth to any, which is therefore called punishment, because it partaketh of the general nature of punishment, and is evil to him that is punished; yet if the intendment of

[m] Naturale jus talionis hic indicatur. Grot. in Gen. ix. 6.

[n] Inde *παραδειγματικὸς συλλογισμὸς*, et *παραδειγματικὸν ἐνθύμημα*. [o] Matt. i. 19.

[p] *Κολάσατε δὲ ἀξίως τούτους τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις συμμάχοις παράδειγμα σαφὲς κατα-στήσατε.* Thucid. lib. 3.

God be not to revenge the evil past upon him, in a proportion of law, it is not punishment properly so called. And therefore it will not suffice to prove that believers are, or may be punished for sin, to heap up texts of Scripture, where they are said to be punished, and that in reference to their sin; unless it can be also proved, that God doth it 'animo ulciscendi,' and that their punishment is 'vindicta noxæ,' and that it is done τοῦ πονοῦντος ἕνεκα ἵνα ἀποκληροθῇ: but of this I am not now to treat. The reader may hence see what punishment is in general; what are the ends of it, and its kinds from thence; and what is punishment from God, properly so called. It is 'vindicta noxæ, animo ulciscendi, ut ipsi satisfiat:' and this kind of punishment was the death of Christ: which is to be proved.

3. That the death of Christ was a punishment properly so called, which is the third consideration of it, as I said, is next to be proved. Of all the places of Scripture and testimonies whereby this may be demonstrated, I shall fix only on one portion of Scripture: and that is, Isa. liii. What in particular shall be produced from thence, will appear when I have given some general considerations of the chapter, which I shall do at large, as looking on that portion of Scripture as the sum of what is spoken in the Old Testament, concerning the satisfactory death of Jesus Christ.

1. This whole prophecy from ver. 13. of chap. lii. which is the head of the present discourse, is evinced to belong to the Messias, against the Jews.

1. Because the Chaldee paraphrast, one of their most ancient masters, expressly names the Messias, and interprets that whole chapter of him; 'Behold,' saith he, 'my servant the Messias shall declare prudently.' And the ancient rabbins, as is abundantly proved by others, were of the same mind. Which miserably entangles their present obdurate masters, who would fix the prophecy upon any, rather than on the Messias. Seeing evidently, that if it be proved to belong to the Messias *in thesi*, it can be applied to none other *in hypothesi*, but Jesus of Nazareth.

2. Because they are not able to find out, or fix on any one whatever, to whom the things here spoken of, may be accommodated. They speak indeed of Jeremiah, Josias, a righteous man in general, the whole people of Israel, of

Messiah Ben Joseph, a man of straw of their own setting up; but it is easy to manifest, were that our present work, that scarce any one expression in this prophecy, much less all, do or can agree to any one, or all of them named, so that it must be brought home to its proper subject: of this at large in the ensuing digression against Grotius.

2. That to us it is evident above all contradiction, that the whole belongs to Jesus Christ; because not only particular testimonies are taken from hence in the New Testament and applied to him, as Matt. viii. 17. Mark. xv. 28. Luke xxii. 37. Rom. x. 16. but it is also expounded of him in general for the conversion of souls; Acts viii. 28. The story is known of Philip and the eunuch.

3. This is such a prophecy of Christ, as belongs to him not only properly, but immediately: that is, it doth not in the first place point out any type of Christ, and by him shadow out Christ, as it is in sundry psalms, where David and Solomon are firstly spoken of, though the Messias be principally intended: but here is no such thing. Christ himself is immediately spoken of. Socinus says indeed, that he doubted not but that these things did primarily belong to another, could he be discovered who he was, and that from him was the allusion taken, and the accommodation made to Christ: 'and if,' saith he, 'it could be found out who he was, much light might be given into many expressions in the chapter.' But this is a bold figment, for which there is not the least countenance given either from Scripture or reason; which is evidently decried from the former arguments, whereby the impudency of the Jews is confounded; and shall be farther in the ensuing digression, where it shall be proved, that it is impossible to fix on any one but Jesus Christ, to whom the several expressions, and matters expressed in this prophecy may be accommodated.

2. Now there are three general parts of this prophecy, to consider it with reference to the business in hand. As the seat of this truth in the Old Testament,

1. A description given of Christ, in a mean, low, miserable condition, from ver. 14. of chap. lii. to ver. 5. of chap. liii. His 'visage was marred, and his form, more than the sons of men, he hath no form, nor comeliness,' ver. 2. 'No beauty, a man of grief and sorrows, despised, neglected, ac-

quainted with grief;' ver. 3. looked on 'as stricken and afflicted of God,' ver. 4.

2. The reason is given of this representation of the Messias, of whom it is said in the entrance of the prophecy, that he should deal prudently, and be exalted, and extolled, and be very high. To which this description of him seems most adverse and contrary. The reason, I say, hereof is given from ver. 5. to the 10. it was on the account of his being punished, and broken for us, and our sins.

3. The issue of all this from ver. 10. to the end, in the justification and salvation of believers.

It is the second that I shall insist upon, to prove the death of Christ, to have in it the nature of punishment, properly and strictly so called.

Not to insist upon all the particular passages, that might be done to great advantage, and ought to be done, did I purpose the thorough and full handling of the business before me (but I am 'in transitu,' and pressing to somewhat farther), I shall only urge two things.

1. The expressions throughout, that describe the state and condition of Christ as here proposed.

2. One or two singular assertions, comprehensive of much of the rest.

For the first, let the reader consider what is contained in the several words, here setting forth the condition of Christ; we have, 'despising and rejecting, sorrow and grief;' ver. 4. He was 'stricken, smitten, afflicted;' or there was striking, smiting, affliction on him, 'Wounded, bruised, chastised with stripes;' ver. 5. wounding, bruising, chastising unto soreness, oppressed, stricken, cut off, killed, brought to slaughter; ver. 7—9. 'Bruised, sacrificed, and his soul made an offering for sin;' ver. 10.

Now certainly for the material part, or the matter of punishment, here it is abundantly: here is 'malum passionis' in every kind. Immission of evil, subtraction of good in soul and body: here is plentiful measure heaped up, shaken together, and running over.

But it may be said, though here be the matter of punishment, yet it may be all this was for some other end; and so it may be it was *νουθεσία*, or *δοκιμασία*, or *παιδυσία*, not *τιμωρία*, or punishment properly so called.

Consider then the ends of punishment before insisted on, and see what of them is applicable to the transaction between God and Christ here mentioned.

1. Was it for his own correction? No, says the prophet, ver. 9. 'He had done no violence, neither was any deceit in his mouth.' He was perfectly innocent. So that he had no need of any chastisement for his amendment; and so signally in sundry places, where mention is made of the death of Christ, his own spotless innocency is often pleaded. Neither was it for his instruction that he might be wise, and instructed in the will of God; for at the very entrance of the prophecy, chap. lii. 13. he says, he shall deal prudently and be exalted. He was faithful before in all things. And though he experimentally learned obedience, by his sufferings, yet habitually to the utmost his ears were bored, and himself prepared to the will of God, before the afflictions here principally intended. Neither,

3. Was he παράδειγμα; punished for example; to be made an example to others, that they might not offend: for what can offenders learn from the punishment of one who never offended. He was 'cut off, but not for himself:' and the end assigned, ver. 11, 12. which is not the instruction only, but the justification and salvation of others, will not allow this end. 'He shall justify many, for he shall bear their iniquities;' he set us an example in his obedience; but he was not punished for an example. Neither,

4. Was it μαρτυρία, a suffering to bear witness and testimony to the truth. There is no mention of any such end in this place. Yea, to make that the main intendment here, is a monstrous figment. The expressions all along as we shall see in the next place, are, that all this was for our transgressions, for our sins, for our iniquities, for our peace. God wounded, bruised, killed him, for our iniquities; that is, he died to bear witness to his doctrine. 'Credat Apella.'

2. Then, the matter of punishment being expressed, see the cause of the infliction of it. It was for transgressions, for iniquities, ver. 5. for wandering and iniquity, ver. 6. for transgressions, ver. 8. for sin, ver. 12. Let us now remember the general description of punishment that was given at the beginning; it is 'malum passionis quod infligitur ob malum actionis,' and see how directly it suits with this pu-

nishment of Jesus Christ. 1. Here is 'malum passionis' inflicted, wounding, bruising, killing. And 2. there is 'malum actionis' deserving, sin, iniquity, and transgression. How these met on an innocent person, shall be afterward declared. 2. Go along to the peculiar description of punishment properly so called, as managed by God. It is 'vindicta noxæ;' now if all other ends and causes whatever, as of chastisement or example, &c. be removed, and this only be asserted, then this affliction of Christ was 'vindicta noxæ,' punishment in the most proper sense; but that these ends are so removed hath been declared upon the particular consideration of them.

And this is the first argument from this place to prove that the death of Christ and his suffering, hath the nature of punishment.

2. The second is, from the more particular expressions of it to this purpose, both on the part of the person punishing, and on the part of the person punished: a single expression on each part may be insisted on.

1. On the part of God punishing, take that of ver. 6. 'The Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all:' of which sort also is that of ver. 10. 'Yet it pleased the Lord to bruise him, he put him to grief, when thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin.'

2. On the part of him punished, ver. 11. 'He shall bear their iniquities.' From the consideration of those expressions we shall evidently evince what we have proposed. Of these in the next chapter.

CHAP. XXIV.

Some particular testimonies evincing the death of Christ to be a punishment, properly so called.

The two expressions that I chose in particular to consider, are nextly to be insisted on.

The first relates to him, who did inflict the punishment. The other to him that was punished.

The first in ver. 6. 'The Lord laid on him the iniquities of us all.' The person punishing, is Jehovah, the person pu-

nished called 'him;' that is, he who is spoken of throughout the whole prophecy; the Messiah Jesus Christ, as above declared.

For the opening of the words, that the efficacy of them to our purpose in hand may appear. Two of them are especially to be considered. 1. What is meant by that which is rendered 'laid on him,' 2. What is meant by 'iniquity.'

The first by our translation is rendered in the margin, 'made to meet;' he 'made to meet;' 'on him the iniquities of us all;' the Vulgar Latin, 'posuit Dominus in eo.' The 'Lord put upon him,' according to our translation in the text. 'Montanus, Dominus fecit occurrere in eum.' 'God hath caused to meet on him,' according to our translation in the margin. Junius to the same purpose. 'Jehovah fecit ut incurrat,' 'the Lord made them meet, and fall on him.' The Septuagint render it, καὶ κύριος παρέδωκεν αὐτὸν ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις ἡμῶν. 'The Lord delivered him to our sins,' that is, to be punished for them. By others the word is rendered 'impegit, traduxit, conjecit,' all to the same purpose, importing an act of God in conveying our sins to Christ.

The word here used is הפגיע; its root is פגשׁע to which all the significations mentioned, are assigned; 'occurrere, obviam ire, incurrere, aggredi, rogare, precari.' The first general signification of it is to meet, as the bounds of a field, or country, or house, meet with one another. Joshua xix. 34. ופגע בזבולן So all along in that chapter, where the bounds of one country are said to reach to another; that is, to meet with them; it is the word here used. So in voluntary agents, it is 'obviam ire,' or to meet, and that either for good or evil; for good it is spoken of God, Psal. lxiv. 5. thou meetest him, &c. and so for evil, Amos v. 19. 'as if a man fled from a lion, and a bear meet him:' ופגעו that is, to tear him in pieces. Hence because men that met others, went to them, to desire some help of them, the word also signifies to ask, to pray, entreat, or intercede; so the word is used Isa. lix. 16. there was no entreater, מפגיע none to meet, to come and ask. And in this very chapter, ver. 12. he made intercession for the transgressors; the word is the same with that here used; to meet the Lord, and intercede for transgressors, to stay his hand against them, is its sense.

2. To meet, or to make to meet properly, which is the first, and most clear sense of the word. It is often used for to meet 'animo hostili,' to meet, to fall upon for hurt, 1 Sam. xxii. 17. the servants of the king would not put forth the hand לִפְגֹּעַ to meet, that is, as we have translated it, to fall upon the priests and kill them; so 2 Sam. i. 15. David bid his young man arise, פְּגַע fall upon the Amalekite, that is, to kill him. Judg. xv. 12. Samson made the men of Judah swear that they would not תִּפְגְּעוּן meet with him, or fall on him themselves.

Nextly, it may be inquired in what sense the word is here used, whether in the first spoken of, to ask, entreat, intercede; or in the latter, to meet; or to meet with.

Grotius interpreteth it (to remove, so much of his interpretation by the way), 'permisit Deus, ut ille nostro gravi crimine indignissima pateretur;' that so he might suit what is spoken to Jeremiah, without pretence or colour of proof. For the word, it is forty-six times used in the Old Testament, and if in any one of them it may be truly rendered 'permisit,' as it is done by him, or to that sense, let it be here so applied also. And for that sense; which is, that God suffered the Jews by their wickedness to entreat him evilly, it is most remote from the intendment of the words, and the Holy Ghost in them.

1. First then, that the words cannot be interpreted to pray, or intercede, is evident from the contexture; wherein it is said (in this sense) 'he prayed him for the iniquity of us all;' that is, the Lord prayed Christ for the iniquities of us all. This sense of the word הִפְגִּיעַ in this place, Socinus himself grants not to be proper, nor consistent. 'Porro significatio illa, precari, in loco nostro locum habere non potest; alioqui sequeretur Isaiam voluisse dicere, Deum fecisse, ut omnium nostrum iniquitas per Christum, vel pro Christo precata fuerit, quod longe absurdissimum esse nemo non videt.' cap. 21. p. 132. Prælec. Socin.

2. It is then 'to meet:' now the word here used being in iphil, which makes a double action of that expressed by ding the cause, by whose power, virtue, and impress, the ng is done; thence it is here rendered 'occurrere fecit,' e made to meet,' and so the sense of it is, God made our t, as it were, to set upon, or to fall upon Jesus Christ,

which is the most common use of the word, as hath been shewed.

It is objected, that the word signifies to meet, yet no more but this may be the meaning of them; God in Christ met with all our iniquities; that is, for their pardoning, and removal, and taking away.

Of the many things that may be given in for the eversion of this Gloss, I shall name only two, whereof the first is to the word, the latter to the matter. For the word; the conjugation according to the common rule, enforces the sense formerly mentioned: be made to meet, and not be met.

2. The prophet in these words renders a reason of the contemptible sad condition of the Messiah, at which so many were scandalized, and whereupon so few believed the report of the gospel concerning him; and this is, that 'God laid on him our iniquities;' now there is no reason why he should be represented in so deplorable a state and condition, if God only met with, and prevented our sin, in and by him, which he did (as they say) in his resurrection, wherein he was exceeding glorious; so that the meaning of the word is, that God made our sins to meet on him, by laying them on him; and this sense Socinus himself consents unto, Prælec. cap. 21. p. 133. But this also will farther appear in the explication of the next word: and that is 'our iniquities.'

'He hath laid on him the iniquities of us all.' עון How the iniquitiy of us, that is, the punishment of our iniquity? I shall offer three things, to make good this interpretation.

1. That the word is often found in that sense; so that it is no new, or uncouth thing, that here it should be so, Gen. iv. 13. עוני 'mine iniquity' is greater than I can bear, it is the same word here used; they are the words of Cain, upon the denunciation of God's judgment on him; and what iniquity it is, he gives you an account in the next words, 'behold thou hast cast me out,' ver. 14. that was only the punishment laid on him. It is used in like manner several times; Lev. xx. 17. 19. 1 Sam. xxviii. 10. Saul swear to the witch, that no iniquity should befall her; that is, no punishment for that which she did at his command, in raising up a spirit to consult withal, contrary to the law. And also in sundry other places: so that this is no new signification of the word, and is here most proper.

2. It appears from the explication that is given of this thing in many other expressions in the chapter. 'God laid on him the iniquity of us all.' How? in that it pleased him to 'bruise him, and put him to grief;' ver. 10. In that he 'was wounded for our transgressions, and he was bruised for our iniquities,' ver. 5. as will be made more evident when I come to the next phrase: 'He bare our iniquities,' which answers to this, 'He laid them on him.'

3. Because he did so lay our sin on Christ, that he made his soul an offering for sin: when our iniquities were on him, his soul, that is, he by a usual synecdoche (the soul for the person), was made אשם an offering for sin; the word here used, is like 'piaculum' in Latin, which signifies the fault, and him who is punished for it in a way of a public sacrifice. So is this word taken both for a sin, a trespass, and a sacrifice for the expiation of it. As another word, viz. חטאת is used also; Lev. iv. 3. He shall offer it לחטאת for a sin; that is, an offering for sin; so also Exod. xxix. 14. Lev. iv. 29. And this very word is so used Lev. vii. 2. They shall kill אשם that is, the sin, or sin-offering, or trespass-offering, as there it is rendered: and other instances might be given. Now God did so cause our iniquities to meet on Christ, that he then under them made himself אשם or an offering for sin. Now in the offering for sin, the penalty of the offence was, 'suo more,' laid on the beast, that was sacrificed or made an offering; Paul interpreteth these words by other expressions, 2 Cor. v. 21. he made him to be a sin for us, that is an offering for sin, אשם. He made him sin, when he made him a curse, the curse of the law, Gal. iii. 13. that is, gave him up to the punishment, by the law due to sin: Rom. viii. 3. 'God sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin,' καὶ περὶ ἁμαρτίας, for sin, a sacrifice for sin, condemned sin in the flesh, Heb. x. 6. Ὁλοκαυτώματα καὶ περὶ ἁμαρτίας οὐκ εὐδόκησας, 'in burnt-offerings, and for sin thou hadst no pleasure;' and again, ὅτι θυσίαν καὶ προσφορὰν καὶ ὁλοκαυτώματα καὶ περὶ ἁμαρτίας. It appears then from all that hath been said, that our iniquities that were laid on Christ, were the punishment due to our iniquity.

Farther to clear this, I shall a little consider what act of God this was, whereby he laid our iniquities on Christ; and these two things are considerable therein.

1. How it was typically prefigured.

2. How it was done, or in what act of God the doing of it doth consist.

1. This was eminently represented in the great anniversary sacrifice, of which I have spoken formerly; especially in that part which concerns the goat,[a] on which the lot fell to be sent away. That that goat was a sacrifice, is evident from ver. 5. where both the kids of the goats (afterward said to be two goats), are said to be a sin-offering; how this was dealt withal, see ver. 21. 'Aaron shall lay both his hands upon the live goat, and confess our sin, all the iniquities of all the people, all their transgressions in all their sins, and put them upon the head of the goat.' Now in what sense could the sins of the people, be put upon the head of the goat.

1. This was not merely a representation; as it were a show or pageant, to set forth the taking away of iniquity; but sins were really, as to that typical institution, laid on the head of the goat: whence he became a 'piaculum,' an ἀνάθημα, and he that touched him was defiled, so ver. 26. The man that carried out the goat was unclean until he was legally purified, and that because the sin of the people was on the head of the goat, which he so carried away.

2. The proper pravity, malice, and filth of sin, could not be laid on the goat. Neither the nature of the thing, nor the subject will bear it; for neither is sin, which is a privation, an irregularity, an obliquity, such a thing, as that it can be translated from one to another, although it hath an infectious, and a contagious quality to diffuse itself, that is, to beget something of the like nature in others: nor was the goat a subject wherein any such pernicious or depraved habit might reside, which belongs only to intelligent creatures, which have a moral rule to walk by.

3. It must be the punishment of sin, that is here intended, which was in the type laid on the head of the goat. And therefore it was sent away into a land not inhabited, a land of separation, a wilderness, there to perish, as all the Jewish doctors agree: that is, to undergo the punishment that was inflicted on him. That in such sacrifices for sin, there was a real imputation of sin unto punishment, shall afterward be farther cleared.

[a] Ἀποπομπαῖος.

Unto this transaction doth the prophet allude in this expression, he laid on, or put on him. As the high-priest confessed all the sins, iniquities, and transgressions of the people and laid them on the head of the scape-goat, which he bare, undergoing the utmost punishment he was capable of, and that punishment, which in the general kind and nature is the punishment, due to sin, an evil and violent death. So did God lay all the sins, all the punishment due to them, really upon one that was fit, able, and appointed to bear it, which he suffered under to the utmost, that the justice of God required on that account. He then took a view of all our sins and iniquities. He knew what was past and what was to come, knowing all our thoughts afar off. Not the least error of our minds, darkness of our understandings, perverseness of our wills, carnality of our affections, sin of our nature, or lives, escaped him. All were γυμνὰ καὶ τετρα χαλισμένα before him. This is set out by the variety of expressions used in this matter in the type; all the iniquities, all the transgressions, and all the sins. And so by every word whereby we express sin, in this 53rd of Isaiah: going astray, turning aside, iniquity, transgression, sin, and the like. God, I say, made them all to meet on Christ in the punishment due to them.

2. What is the act of God, whereby he casts our sins on Christ.

I have[b] elsewhere considered, how God in this business is to be looked on: I said now in the entrance of this discourse, that punishment is an effect of justice in him, who had power to dispose of the offender as such. To this two things are required.

1. That he have in his hand power to dispose of all the concernments of the offence and sinner, as the governor of him and them all. This is in God. He is by nature the King and Governor of all the world. Our Lawgiver; James iv. 12. Having made rational creatures, and required obedience at their hands, it is essentially belonging to him to be their[c] Governor, and not only to have the sovereign disposal of them, as he hath the supreme dominion over them, with

[b] Vide of the death of Christ, the price he paid, and the purchase he made.
[c] Vid. Diatrib. de Justit. Divin.

the legal dispose of them, in answer to the moral subjection to him, and the obedience he requires of them.

2. That as he be a King, and have supreme government, so he be a judge to put in execution his justice. Thus God is judge himself. Psal. l. 6. 'He is the judge of the world.' Gen. xviii. 25. Psal. xciv. 2. Psal. lxxv. 7. Isa. xxxiii. 22. as in innumerable other places. Now as God is thus the great Governor and Judge, he pursues the constitutive principle of punishment, his own righteous and holy will, proportioning penalties to the demerit of sin.

Thus in the laying our sin on Christ, there was a twofold act of God: one as a governor, the other as a judge properly.

1. The first is, 'innovatio obligationis,' the 'innovation of the obligation,' wherein we were detained, and bound over to punishment. Whereas in the tenor of the law as to its obligation unto punishment, there was none originally but the name of the offender, 'In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt die:' and 'Cursed is every one that continues not:' and 'the soul that sinneth it shall die;' God now puts in the name of the surety of Jesus Christ; that he might become responsible for our sins, and undergo the punishment that we were obliged to. Christ was ὑπὸ νόμον γενόμενον, he was made under the law; that is, he was put into subjection, to the obligation of it unto punishment: God put his name into the obligation, and so the law came to have its advantage against him, who otherwise was most free from the charge of it. Then was Christ made sin, when by being put into the obligation of the law, he became liable to the punishment of it. He was the Mediator of the new covenant, the 'Mediator between God and man;' 1 Tim. ii. 5. So a Mediator, as to 'lay down his life a ransom' for them, for whom he was a Mediator, ver. 6. and the surety of the covenant is he also; Heb. vii. 22. Such a surety, as paid that which he never took, made satisfaction for those sins which he never did.

2. The second act of God as a judge, is 'inflictio pœnæ.' Christ being now made obnoxious, and that by his own consent, the justice of God finding him in the law, layeth the weight of all on him. 'He had done no violence, neither was any deceit found in his mouth;' well then, it will be well with him; surely it shall be well with the innocent,

no evil shall befall him; nay but said he, ver. 10. 'Yet it pleased the Lord to bruise him, he hath put him to grief;' yea, but what was the reason of this? Why was this the will of God? why did this seem good to the just Judge of all the world? The reason is in the very next words, 'His soul was made an offering for sin,' which before is expressed 'he bare our grief, he was wounded for our transgressions;' being made liable to them he was punished for them.

By that which is said it is evident from this first expression, or the assignation of an action to God in reference to him, that this death of Christ was a punishment, he who had power to do it, bringing in him (on his own voluntary offer) into the obligation to punishment, and inflicting punishment on him accordingly.

The second expression whereby the same thing is farther convinced is on the part of him that was punished, and this in ver. 4. 'Surely he hath borne our griefs, and carried our sorrows,' or which is more evident, ver. 11. 'He shall bear their iniquities.'

For the right understanding of the words, I shall give a few brief previous observations, that may give light to the matter we treat of. And the first is,

1. That as this whole thing was done in the justice of God, as hath been declared, so it was done by the counsel and appointment of God. The apostles confess the death of Christ to have proceeded thence; Acts iv. 28. ii. 23. Now as laying of our sins on Christ, being designed our mediator, and undertaking the work, was an act of God, as the governor of all, and the righteous judge, so this of the determinate counsel, and fore-appointment, or the eternal designation of Christ to his office, is an act of sovereign power and dominion in God, whereby he doth as he pleaseth, according to the counsel of his will. As he would make the world in his sovereign good pleasure, when he might have otherwise done, Rev. iv. 11. so he would determine, that Christ should bear our iniquities, when he might otherwise have disposed of it, Rom. xi. 34—37.

2. In respect of us, this pre-appointment of God was an act of grace, that is, a sovereign act of his good pleasure, whence all good things, all fruits of love whatever to us do flow. Therefore, it is called love; John iii. 16. and so in

the fruit of it is it expressed; Rom. viii. 32. And on this John often insists in his Gospel and Epistle; 1 John iv. 9—11. His aim on his own part was the declaration of his righteousness; Rom. iii. 25. and to make way for the praise of his 'glorious grace,' Eph. i. 6. on our parts, that we might have all those good things, which are the fruits of the most intense love.

3. That Christ himself was willing to undergo this burden and undertake this work; and this as it is consistent with his death being a punishment, so it is of necessity to make good the other considerations of it, namely, that it should be a price and a sacrifice. For no man gives a price, and therein parts with that which is precious to him unwillingly; nor is a sacrifice acceptable that comes not from a free and willing mind. That he was thus willing himself professeth, both in the undertaking and carrying of it on; in the undertaking; Heb. x. 9. 'Lo I come to do thy will O God.' It is the expression of one breaking out with a ready joy to do the thing proposed to him. So the church of old looked on him, as one that came freely and cheerfully, Cant. ii. 8, 9. 'It is the voice of my beloved, behold he cometh leaping on the mountains, skipping on the hills: my beloved is like a roe, or a young hart, he standeth behind the wall, he looketh forth at the window, shewing himself through the lattice.' The church looked on Christ as yet at a distance from the actual performance of the work he had undertaken, and so herself kept off from that clear and close communion which she longed after, and thence she says of him, that he 'stood behind the wall,' that he 'looked forth at the window, and shewed himself at the lattices.' There was a wall yet hindering the actual exhibition of Christ; the 'fulness of time was not come.' The purpose of God was not yet to bring forth; but yet in the meantime, Christ looked on the church through the window of the promise, and the lattice of the Levitical ceremonies.

And what discovery do they make of him, in the view they take in the broad light of the promises, and the many glimpses of the ceremonial types. They see him coming, 'leaping on the mountains, and skipping on the hills,' coming speedily with a great deal of joy and willingness.

So of himself he declares what his mind was from old,

from everlasting; Prov. viii. 30, 31. 'Rejoicing always before him,' that is, 'before God his Father;' but in what did he rejoice? 'in the habitable parts of the earth, and my delight was with the sons of men.' When this joy of his was, he tells you ver. 22, 23. 26, 27. He rejoiced before God his Father in the sons of men, before they were created; that is, in the work he had to do for them.

His will was also in the carrying of it on unto accomplishment, he must be doing his Father's business, his will who sent him, Luke xii. 50. πῶς συνέχομαι. He was pained as a woman in travail to be delivered, to come to be baptized in his own blood. And when he was giving himself up to the utmost of it, he professes his readiness to it, John xviii. 11. when Peter who once before would have advised him to spare himself, now being his counsel was not followed, would have rescued him with his sword; as for his advice he was called Satan, so for his profferred assistance he is now rebuked; and the reason of it is given, 'shall I not drink of the cup?' It is true, that it might appear, that his death was not a price, and a sacrifice only, but a punishment also, wherein there was an immission of every thing that was evil to the suffering nature, and a subtraction of that which was good, he discovered that averseness to the drinking of the cup, which the truth of the human nature absolutely required (and which the amazing bitterness of the cup overpowered him withal), yet still his will conquered and prevailed in all; Matt. xxvi. 53, 54.

4. Christ's love was also in it, his delight was in the sons of men; his love towards them carried him out to the work; and Paul proves it by the instance of himself; Gal. ii. 20. 'Who loved me.' And John applies the same to all believers, Rev. i. 5, 6. 'To him that loved us,' &c. And thus was this great work undertaken.

These things being premised, let us look again to the words under consideration.

1. For the word he bare our grief, ver. 4. it is נשׂא; a word of as large, and as many various acceptions as any, if not absolutely the most extensive in the whole Hebrew tongue. It hath usually assigned unto it by the lexicographer eight or nine several significations; and to make it evident, that it is of various acceptions, it is used (in the

collections of Calasius) eight hundred and eighteen times in the Old Testament, whereof not a third part is answered in any language by one and the same word. With those senses of it that are metaphorical we have not any thing to do. That which is the first, or most proper sense of it and what is most frequently used, is to 'carry' or 'bear,' and by which it is here translated as in very many other places.

Socinus would have it here be as much as 'abstulit,' he took away, so saith he, 'God took away our sin in Christ, when by him he declared, and confirmed the way whereby pardon and remission is to be obtained; as he pardoned our sin in Christ, by discovering the new covenant, and mercy therein.' Now because the word is of such various significations, there is a necessity that it be interpreted by the circumstances of the place where it is used. And because there is not any circumstance of the place, on the account whereof the word should be rendered 'abstulit,' he took away, and not 'tulit,' he 'took,' 'bare,' or 'suffered,' we must consider what arguments or reasons are scraped together 'aliunde' by them, and then evince what is the proper signification of it, in this place.

1. This very expression is used of God Exod. xxxiv. 7. נשא עון 'ferens iniquitatem,' as also it is again repeated; Numb. xiv. 18. In both which places, we translate it 'forgiving,' 'forgiving iniquities, transgressions, and sins.' Nor can it be properly spoken of God, to bear; for God cannot bear, as the word properly signifies.

The sum of the objection is; the word that is used so many times, and so often metaphorically, is once or twice in another place used for to take away, or to pardon; therefore, this must be the sense of it in this place. God cannot be said to bear iniquities, but only metaphorically, and so he is often said to bear, to be pressed, to be weary, and made to serve with them; he is said to bear our sins, in reference to the end of bearing any thing, which is to carry it away; God in Christ taking away, pardoning our sins, is said to bear them, because that is the way which sins are taken away; they are taken up, carried, and laid aside. But he of whom these words are spoken here, did bear properly, and could do so, as shall be shewed.

2. The interpretation of this place by Matthew, or the application of it is insisted on: which is of more importance; Matt. viii. 16, 17. Christ curing the diseases of many, and bodily sicknesses, is said to 'bear our griefs,' according as it is said in Isaiah, that he should do. Now he did not bear our diseases, by 'taking them upon himself,' and so becoming diseased, but morally, in that by his power he took them away from them, in whom they were.

Not to make many words, nor to multiply interpretations and accommodations of these places, which may be seen in them, who have to good purpose made it their business to consider the parallel places of the Old and New Testaments, and to reconcile them: I say only, it is no new thing to have the effect and evidence, and end of a thing, spoken of in the New Testament, in answer to the cause, and rise of it, mentioned in the Old, by the application of the same words unto it which they are mentioned in. For instance, Paul, Eph. iv. 8. citing that of the psalmist, Psal. lxviii. 18. 'Thou hast ascended up on high, and hast led captivity captive, and received gifts for men;' renders it, 'when he ascended up on high, he led captivity captive, and gave gifts unto men;' and that because his giving of them, was the end of his receiving of them; and his receiving of them, the foundation of his giving of them: the effect and fruit being here expressed, the foundation and ground supposed.

So also, 'Mine ears hast thou bored,' Psal. xl. is rendered 'a body hast thou prepared me,' Heb. x. because the end of the boring the ears of Christ was, that he might offer his body a sacrifice to God; so it is here in this place of Matthew; Christ's taking away the bodily distempers, and sicknesses of men, was an effect, and an evidence of his taking away their sin, which was done by bearing of them. And therefore Matthew mentioning the effect and evidence of the thing, doth it in the words that express the cause and foundation of it. Not that that was a complete accomplishment of what was foretold, but that it was so demonstrated in the effect and evidence of it. Nor do the Socinians themselves think that this was a full accomplishment of what is spoken by the prophet, themselves insisting on another interpretation of the words: so that notwithstanding these exceptions, the word here may have its proper signi-

fication of bearing or carrying; which also that it hath, may be farther evidenced.

1. Here is no cogent reason, why the metaphorical use of the word should be understood. When it is spoken of God, there is a necessity, that it should be interpreted by the effect; because properly he cannot bear, nor undergo grief, sorrow, or punishment. But as to the Mediator, the case is otherwise, for he confessedly underwent these things properly, wherein we say that this word, bearing of punishment, doth consist; he was so bruised, so broken, so slain; so that there is no reason to depart from the propriety of the word.

2. Those who would have the sense of the word to be, 'to take away,' in this place, confess it is by way of the allusion before-mentioned; that he that takes away a thing, takes it up, and bears it on his shoulders, or in his arms, until he lay it down; and by virtue of this allusion doth it signify to take away. But why? seeing that taking up, and bearing, in this place is proper, as hath been shewed, why must that be leaped over, and that which is improper, and spoken by way of allusion, be insisted on?

3. It appears that this is the sense of the word, from all the circumstances of the text, and context. Take three that are most considerable.

1. The subject spoken of, who did thus bear our griefs; and this is Christ; of whom such things are affirmed, in answer to this question, how did he bear our griefs? as will admit of no other sense: the Holy Ghost tells us how he did it, 1 Pet. ii. 24, 25. 'Who his ownself bare our sins in his body on the tree.' That Peter in that place expressed this part of the prophecy of Isaiah, which we insist upon, is evident; the phrase at the close of ver. 24. and the beginning of ver. 25. of this chapter make it so: they are the very words of the end of the 5th and beginning of the 6th verses here; how then did Christ bear our griefs? Why in that 'he bear our sin in his own body on the tree.'

I shall not insist on the precise signification of the word ἀναφέρω, here used, as though it expressed the outward manner of that suffering of Christ for sin, when he was lifted up on the cross or tree. It is enough, that our sins were on him, his body; that is, his whole human nature (by a usual synecdoche), when he was on the tree; that he did it

when he suffered in the flesh, cap. iv. 1. He that did so bear our grief, sin, and iniquities, as to have them in his own body, when he suffered in the flesh, he is said properly therein 'tulisse,' not 'abstulisse,' to 'have borne,' not 'taken away' our griefs. But that this is the case, in Christ's bearing our grief, the Holy Ghost doth thus manifest.

2. The manner how Christ bare them evidently manifesteth, in what sense this expression is to be understood. He so bare them, that in doing so, 'he was wounded and bruised, grieved, chastised, slain,' as it is at large expressed in the context. Christ bare our grief, so as in doing of it, to be wounded, broken, grieved, killed, which is not to take them away, but really to bear them upon himself.

3. The cause of this bearing our grief, is assigned to be sin; 'he was wounded for our transgressions,' as was shewn before: now this cannot be the sense, for our sins, he took them away; but for our sins, he bare the punishment due to them, 2 Cor. v. 21.

4. To put all out of question, the Holy Ghost in this chapter useth another word in the same matter, with this, that will admit of no other sense, than that which is proper. And that is סבל v. 11. יסבל הוא ועונתם 'He shall bear their iniquities:' and it is used immediately after this we have insisted on, as explicative of it; and 'carried our sorrows:' now as נשא properly signifies to 'lift,' to take up that which a man may carry, so סבל signifies to bear, and undergo the burden, that is taken, or that a man hath laid on his shoulders. And Matthew hath rendered this word by *βαστάζω, τὰς νόσους ἐβάστασεν*, that is 'bajulo, porto;' to bear a thing, as a man doth a burden on his shoulders; nor is it once used in the Scriptures, but it is either properly to bear a burden, or metaphorically from thence, to undergo that which is heavy and burdensome; thus did Christ bear our griefs, our iniquities, by putting his shoulder under them, taking them on himself.

2. What did he thus bear? our griefs, our sins; or our iniquities, our sins. Let us see by a second instance, what it is in the language of God, 'To bear iniquities,' and this argument will be at an issue. Lament. v. 7. 'Our fathers have sinned, and are not, and we have borne their iniquities.' 'We have borne their iniquities,' or the punishment that was due to them; 'They are not,' they are gone out of the

world, before the day of recompense came, and we lie under the punishment threatened and inflicted for their sins, and our own. Distinctly,

1: Men are said to bear their own sin, Levit. xix. 5. 'every one that eateth it shall bear his iniquity;' that is, he shall be esteemed guilty, and be punished: Levit. xx. 17. 'He shall bear his iniquity,' is the same with 'he shall be killed,' ver. 16. 'and he shall be cut off from his people;' ver. 18. For a man to bear his iniquity, is constantly for him to answer the guilt, and undergo the punishment due to it.

2. So also of the sins of others; Numb. xiv. 33. 'And your children shall wander in the wilderness forty years, and shall bear your whoredoms: bear you, whoredoms;' that is, my anger for them, and the punishment due to them; Numb. xxx. 15. He that compels by his power and authority another to break a vow, shall himself be liable to the punishment due to such a breach of vow. Ezek. xviii. 20. is an explanation of all these places; 'The soul that sins it shall die,' it shall be punished; 'The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father,' &c. The son shall not be punished for the sin of the father: nor the father for the sin of the son. In brief, this expression, to bear iniquities, is never otherwise used in Scripture, but only for to undergo the punishment due thereunto.

Thus much then we have clearly evinced. God did so lay our sins on Christ, as that he bare and underwent that which was due to them; God inflicting it on him, and he willingly undergoing it. Which is my second demonstration from this place, that the death of Christ is also a punishment. Which is all that I shall urge to that purpose. And this is that, and all that we intend, by the satisfaction of Christ.

But now having laid so great stress as to our doctrine, under demonstration upon this place of the prophet, and finding some attempting to take away our foundation, before I proceed, I shall divert to the consideration of the annotations of Grotius on this whole chapter, and rescue it from his force and violence, used in contending to make what is here spoken to suit the prophet Jeremiah, and to intend him in the first place: to establish which vain conjecture, he hath perverted the sense of the whole, and of every particular verse, from the beginning to the end of this prophecy.

CHAP. XXV.

A digression concerning the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah: and the vindication of it from the perverse interpretation of

HUGO GROTIUS.

THIS chapter is well by some termed Carnificina Rabbinorum; a place of Scripture that sets them on the rack; and makes them turn themselves all ways possible to escape the torture, which he puts their unbelieving hearts unto. Not long since a worthy and very learned friend told me, that speaking with Manasseh Ben Israel at Amsterdam, and urging this prophecy unto him, he ingenuously told him, 'Profecto locus iste magnum scandalum dedit;' to whom the other replied; 'Recte, quia Christus vobis lapis scandali est.' Hulsius, the Hebrew professor at Breda, professes that some Jews told him, that their Rabbins could easily have extricated themselves from all other places of the prophets, if Isaiah in this place had but held his peace. 'Huls.[a] Theolog. Judaic. lib. 1. part. 2. Dict. Sapp. de Tempor. Messiæ.' Though I value not their boasting of their extricating themselves from the other prophesies, knowing that they are no less entangled with that of Daniel, chap. ix. (Of which there is an eminent story[b] in Franzius, de Sacrificiis, concerning his dispute with a learned Jew on that subject): yet it appears, that by this, they are confessedly extricated beyond all hope of evading, until they divest themselves of their cursed hypothesis.

Hence it is that with so much greediness they scraped together all the copies of Abrabaniel's comment on this chapter; so that it was very hard for a Christian, a long time to get a sight of it; as Constantine l' Empereur acquaints us in his[c] preface to his refutation of it: because

[a] Aliqui Judæi mihi confessi sunt, Rabbinos suos ex Propheticis Scripturis facile se extricare potuisse, modo Isaias tacuisset.

[b] ...sput. decima, de sacrificiorum duratione, Thes. 82—84. &c.

[c] ...rabiniel tam avide a Judais passim conquiritur, ut vix tandem ejus compos ...erim. Nam eum Christiani superiorem putant: qui solide eorum argumenta stant. l' Emper. Prolog. ad Lectorem: præfix. Com. Abrab. in cap. 53. Is.

they thought themselves in some measure instructed by him, to avoid the arguments of the Christians from hence, by his application of the whole to Josiah: and I must needs say he hath put as good, yea, a far better colour of probability upon his interpretation, than he with whom I have to do, hath done on his.

How ungrateful then, and how unacceptable to all professors of the name of Jesus Christ, must the labours of Grotius needs be; who hath to the utmost of his power reached out his hand to relieve the poor blind creatures from their rack and torture, by applying (though successlessly) this whole prophecy of Jeremiah, casting himself into the same entanglements with them, not yielding them indeed the least relief, is easily to conjecture. And this is not a little aggravated, in that the Socinians who are no less racked and tortured with this Scripture than the Jews, durst never yet attempt to accommodate the things here spoken of to any other; though they have expressed a desire of so doing; and which if they could compass, they would free themselves from the sharpest sword that lies at the throat of their cause; seeing, if it is certain, that the things here mentioned may be applied to any other, the satisfaction of Christ cannot from them be confirmed. This digression then, is to cast into the fire that broken crutch, which this learned man hath lent unto the Jews and Socinians to lean upon, and keep themselves from sinking under their unbelief.

To discover the rise of that learned man's opinion, that Jeremiah is intended in this prophecy, the conceits of the Jewish Doctors may a little be considered, who are divided amongst themselves; the ancient doctors generally conclude, that it is the Messiah, who is here intended, 'behold my servant the Messiah shall prosper,' says the Chaldee Paraphrast upon the place. And Constantius l' Empereur tells from[d] R. Simeon, in his book Salkout, that the ancient Rabbins, in their ancient book Tancluma, and higher, were of the same judgment. Rabbi Moses Alscheth is urged to the same purpose at large by Hulsius. And in his comment on

[d] Porro libri istius, unde hæc sectio in Esaiam desumpta est, Author perhibetur D. Simeon, concionatorum princeps, qui Francofurti olim degebat. Hic e Judæorum vetustissimis Scriptis, secundum bibliorum seriem, dicta et explicationes plurimas: magna diligentia et labore collegit: unde libre suo nomen סלקוט ac si peram dicas: quia ut in pera reconduntur plurima: l' Emper.

this place he says expressly, 'Ecce doctores nostri laudatæ memoriæ uno ore statuunt, et a majoribus acceperunt, de rege Messia sermonem esse, et doctorum L. M. vestigiis insistemus.' And one passage in him is very admirable, in the same place, saith he; 'Dicunt Doctores nostri L. M. omnium afflictionum quæ mundum ingressæ sunt, tertia pars Davidi et patriarchis obtigit: tertia altera seculo excisionis, ultima tertia pars regi Messiæ incumbet.' Where he urgeth the common consent of their doctors for the sufferings of the Messiah. Of the same mind was R. Solomon, as he is cited by Petrus Galatinus, lib. 8. cap. 14. As the same is affirmed by the Misdrach Resh. cap. 2. 14. And in Beresheth Rabba on Gen. xxiv. as is observed by Raimundus Martin. Pug. fidei 3. p. Dist. 1. cap. 10. So that before these men grew impudent and crafty in corrupting and perverting the testimonies of the Old Testament, concerning the Messiah, they generally granted him, and only him, to be here intended. It was not for want of company then, that Grotius took in with the modern Rabbins, who being mad with envy and malice care not what they say, so they may oppose Jesus Christ.

2. Many of the following Jewish doctors interpret this place of the whole people of the Jews. And this way go the men, who are of the greatest note amongst them in these latter days; as R. D. Kimchi, Aben Ezra, Abarbiniel, Lipman, with what weak and mean pretences, with what inconsistency as to the words of the text, hath been by others manifested.

3. Abrabinel, or Abrabaniel, a man of great note and honour amongst them, though he assents to the former exposition of applying the whole prophecy to the people of the Jews, and interprets the words at large accordingly, which exposition is confuted by Constantine l'Empereur, yet he inclines to a singular opinion of his own, that Josiah is the man pointed at, and described: but he is the first and last, that abides by that interpretation.

4. Grotius interprets the words of Jeremiah in the first place; not denying them (as we shall see) to have an ac-

tion to Christ. In this he hath the company of i; R. Saadias Gaon, mentioned by Aben Ezra upon hap. of this prophecy, ver. 13. But this fancy of

Saadias is fully confuted by Abarbinel: which words because they sufficiently evert the whole design of Grotius also, I shall transcribe as they lie in the translation of 'Hulsius. Revera ne unum quidem versiculum video, qui de Jeremiah exponi possit: qua ratione de eo dicetur, Extolletur et altus erit valde? Item illud, propter eum obdent reges os suum, nam ætas illa prophetas habere consueverat. Quomodo etiam dici potest morbos nostros portasse, et dolores nostros bajulasse, et in tumice ejus curationem nobis esse, Deum in ipsum incurrere fecisse peccata omnium nostrum: quasi ipsi pœna incubuisset, et Israel fuisset immunis. Jam illud, propter peccatum populi mei plaga ipsis, item, dedit cum improbis sepulcrum ejus, ad ipsum referri nequit; multo minus illud, videbit semen, prolongabit dies, item, cum robustis partietur spolium. In quibus omnibus nihil est quod de ipso commode affirmari possit. Unde vehementer miror, quomodo R. Hagaon in hanc sententiam perduci potuerit, et sapientes dari qui hanc expositionem laudant: cum tamen tota ista exponendi ratio plane aliena sit, et e Scriptura non facta.'

Now certainly if this Jew thought he had sufficient cause to admire, that the blind Rabbi should thus wrest the sense of the Holy Ghost, and that any wise man should be so foolish as to commend it: we cannot but be excused, in admiring that any man professing himself a Christian, should insist in his steps, and that any should commend him for so doing.

That, therefore, which here is affirmed, in the entrance of his discourse by Abarbinel, namely, that not one verse can, or may, be expounded of Jeremiah, shall now particularly be made good against Grotius.

1. He confesseth with us, that the head of this prophecy and discourse is in ver. 13. chap. 52. The words of that verse are,

'Behold my servant shall deal prudently: he shall be exalted and extolled, and be very high.'

Of the sense of which words, thus he:

'Ecce intelliget servus meus] Hæc omnia clarissime revelata cognoscet Jeremiah. Exaltabitur et elevabitur et sublimis erit valde.] In magno honore erit apud ipsos Chaldæos, Jerem. 39. chap. v. 40. My servant Jeremiah shall

have all these things clearly revealed to him, and he shall be in great honour with the Chaldeans.' So he,

First, for the words themselves: שכל with the Vulgar Latin, he renders 'intelliget,' shall 'understand.' The word signifies rather 'prudence' for action with success, than any speculative knowledge by revelation; 1 Sam. xviii. 30. it is used of David behaving himself wisely in the business of his military and civil employment. Its opposite, saith Pagnin, is נבל ('quod incogitantiam significat in rebus agendis et ignavam levitatem') which signifies 'incogitancy in the management of affairs, and idle lightness.' Whence the word is usually taken for to 'prosper' in affairs, as it is used of our Saviour, Jerem. xxiii. 5. 'a king shall reign והשכיל and 'prosper.' Nor can it be otherwise used here, considering the connexion of the words wherein it stands: it being the precedent to his being 'highly exalted' who is spoken of; which rather follows his 'dealing prudently,' than his 'receiving revelations.' So that in the very entrance there is a mistake in the sense of the word, and that mistake lies at the bottom of the whole interpretation.

2. I deny that God speaks any where in the Scripture of any one besides Jesus Christ in this phrase, without any addition, 'my servant;' as here, 'Behold my servant.' So he speaks of Christ, chap. xlii. 1. 19. and other places; but not of any other person whatever. It is an expression κατ' ἐξοχήν, and not to be applied to any, but to him, who was the great servant of the Father, in the work of mediation.

3. Even in respect of revelations, there is no ground why those made to Jeremiah, should be spoken of so emphatically, and by way of eminence above others; seeing he came short of the prophet, by whom these words are written. Nor can any instance be given of such a prediction used concerning any prophet whatever, that was to be raised up in the church of the Jews; but of Christ himself only.

4. The exposition of the close of these words, 'he shall be exalted and extolled, and be very high' (the great exaltation of the Lord Jesus Christ in his kingdom, when he was made a Prince and a Saviour, in a most eminent manner, ng set forth in various expressions, no one reaching to the

Eminentiæ notionem quavis formula expressit, quia illius eminentia erit sublimis enitia erit sublimis excellentia. D. Kimchi.

glory of it); is unworthy the learned annotator. 'He shall be exalted and extolled, and be very high;' that is, the Chaldeans shall give him 'victuals' and a 'reward;' Jer. xl. 5. and after awhile, he shall be carried a prisoner into Egypt, and there knocked on the head: such was the exaltation of the poor prophet. What resemblance hath all this, to the exaltation of Jesus Christ, whom the learned man confesseth to be intended in these words.

The sense then of these words is, 'Jesus Christ the Messiah, the servant of the Father,' Isa. xlii. 1. 19. Phil. ii. 7, 8. 'shall deal prudently,' and prosper in the business of doing his Father's will, and carrying on the affairs of his own kingdom;' Isa. ix. 7. 'And be exalted far above all principalities and powers, having a name given him above every name, that at the name Jesus,' &c. Phil. ii. 7, 8.

The next verse is,

'As many were astonished at thee, his visage was so marred, more than any man, and his form more than the sons of men.'

Of the accomplishment of this, in and upon the Lord Jesus Christ, there is no difficulty. The astonishment mentioned is that of men, at his low, and despicable condition as to outward appearance; which was such, as that he said of himself, 'he was a worm and no man,' Ps. xxii. His condition was such, and his visage such, as all that knew any thing of him, were astonished to the purpose. The marring of his visage and form, as it may point out all the acts of violence, that were done upon his face, by spitting, buffetting, and the like; so they express his whole despised, contemned, persecuted estate and condition. But let us attend to our annotator.

'Modo secunda, modo tertia persona de Jeremia loquitur, quod frequens Hebræis. Sicut multi mirati erant hominem tam egregium tam fæde tractari, in carcerem detrudi, deinde in lacum lutosum, ibique; et pædore et cibi inopia tabescere. Sic contra, rebus mutatis, admirationi erit honos ipsi habitus.' 'He speaks of Jeremiah, sometimes in the second, sometimes in the third person, which is frequent with the Hebrews. As many wondered that so excellent a person should so vilely be dealt with, be thrust into prison, and then into a miry lake, and there to pine with

stink, and want of food. So on the contrary, affairs being changed, the honour afforded him shall be matter of admiration.'

1. To grant the first observation, as to the change of persons in the discourse, the word (שמם 'shall be astonished') here used, signifies not every slight admiration, by wondering upon any occasion, or that may be a little more than ordinary: but mostly, an astonishment arising from the contemplation of some ruthful spectacle. So Levit. xxvi. 32. 'I will bring the land into desolation, and the enemies which dwell therein, shall be astonished at it;' and the word is near twenty times used to the same purpose. This by way of diminution is made, 'mirati sunt, admirationi erit.'

2. This astonishment of men, is by Grotius referred both to the dejection and exaltation of Jeremiah, whereof there is nothing in the words. It is the amazement of men, at the despicable condition of him, that is spoken of, only, that is intended; but without intruding something of his exaltation, this discourse had wanted all colour or pretext.

3. Was it so great a matter in Jerusalem, that a prophet should be put in prison there, where they imprisoned, stoned, tortured, and slew them almost all, one after another, in their several generations, that it should be thus prophesied of, as a thing that men would, and should be amazed at? Was it any wonder at all in that city, whose streets not long before, had run with the blood of innocent men, that a prophet should be cast into prison? Or was this peculiar to Jeremiah to be dealt so withal? Is it any matter of astonishment to this very day? Was his honour afterward, such an amazing thing, in that for a little season he was suffered to go at liberty, and had victuals given him? Was not this, as to the thing itself, common to him with many hundred others? Were his afflictions such, as to be beyond compare with those of any man, or any of the sons of men? Or his honours such as to dazzle the eyes of men with admiration and astonishment? Let a man dare to make bold with the word of God, and he may make as many such applications as he pleaseth, and find out what person he will, to answer all the prophecies of the Messiah. This not succeeding, let us try the next verse.

'So shall he sprinkle many nations; the kings shall shut

their mouths at him: for that which had not been told them, shall they see, and that which they had not heard, shall they consider.'

'Ita asperget gentes multas,' in Hebro 'sic asperget;' 'ut respondeat illi sicut, quod præcessit. Multos ex gentibus ab idolorum cultu avertet. Similitudo sumpta ab aspersionibus legalibus; unde et Chaldæis זוי est objurgari. At LXX habent οὕτω θαυμάσονται ἔθνη πολλὰ ἐπὶ αὐτῷ· non male, nam mirari est aspergi fulgore alicujus.' 'In the Hebrew it is, So he shall sprinkle, that it might answer to the 'As' that went before. He shall turn many of the nations from the worship of idols. A similitude taken from the legal washings: whence זוי with the Chaldees is to 'rebuke.' The LXX render it, 'So shall many nations wonder at him:' not badly. For to wonder is as it were, to be sprinkled with any one's brightness.'

For the exposition of the words;

1. We agree that it is, 'So he shall sprinkle:' an ἀπόδωσις, relating to the πρότασις, ver. 14. 'As many were astonished,' &c. The great work of Christ, and his exaltation therein, being rendered in opposition to his humiliation and dejection before-mentioned. As he was in so mean a condition, that men were astonished at him, so he shall be exalted in his great work of converting the nations to their admiration.

2. It is granted that the expression, 'he shall sprinkle,' is an allusion to the legal washings and purifications, which as they were typical of real sanctification and holiness; so from them is the promise thereof so often expressed in the terms of 'washing' and 'cleansing,' Ezek. xxxvi. 26, 27. the term being preserved and used in the New Testament frequently; the blood of Christ, whereby this work is done, being therefore called the 'blood of sprinkling;' Eph. v. 25, 26. Heb. ix. 14. The pouring out of the Spirit by Jesus Christ, for the purifying and sanctifying of many nations, not the Jews only, but the children of God throughout the world, by faith in his blood, is that which is here intended. What the use of זוי in the Chaldee to this purpose is, I know not.

3. The LXX have very badly rendered the words, 'many

nations shall wonder at him;' both as to words and sense. For 1. as the words will not bear it; so 2, they make that the action of the nations towards Christ, which is his towards them. They lose the whole sense of the words, and what they say, falls in with what follows, and is clearly expressed. 3. It is not helped by the explanation given to it by the annotator. The first expression is metaphorical, which the LXX render by a word proper, remote from the sense intended, which the annotator explains by another metaphor. By which kind of procedure, men may lead words and senses whither and which way they please.

4. For the accommodation of the words to Jeremiah; how did he sprinkle many nations; so as to answer the type of legal cleansing? Did he pour out the Spirit upon them? Did he sanctify, and make them holy? Did he purge them from their iniquities? But he turned 'many amongst the nations, from the worship of idols.' But who told Grotius so? Where is it written or recorded? He prophesied indeed of the desolation of idols and idolaters. Of the conversion of many, of any among the heathen by his preaching, he being not purposely sent to them, what evidence have we? If a man may feign what he please, and affix it to whom he please, he may make whom he will to be foretold in any prophecy.

'Kings shall shut their mouth at him. Reges, ut Nebuchodonosor Chaldæorum, et Nechos Ægyptiorum, eorumque satrapæ admirabuntur cum silentio, ubi videbunt omnia, quæ dixit Jeremias ad amussim et suis temporibus impleta.' 'Kings, as Nebuchodonosor of the Chaldees, and Necho of the Egyptians, and their princes, shall admire with silence, when they shall see all things foretold by Jeremiah come to pass exactly, and to be fulfilled in their own time.'

That by this expression, wonder and amazement is intended, is agreed: as men, all sorts of men before were astonished at his low condition; so even the greatest of them shall be astonished at the prosperity of his work and exaltation. The reason of this their shutting their mouths in silence and admiration, is, from the work which he shall do; that is, he shall sprinkle many nations; as is evident from the following reason assigned: 'for that which hath not been

told them, shall they see;' which expresseth the means whereby he should 'sprinkle many nations,' even by the preaching of the gospel to their conversion.

For the application hereof to Jeremiah. 1. That the kings mentioned did so become silent with admiration at him and astonishment, is ἄγραφον: and all these magnificent thoughts of the Chaldeans dealing with Jeremiah, is built only on this; that looking on him, as a man that had dissuaded the Jews from their rebellion against them, and rebuked all their wickedness, and foretold their ruin, they gave him his life and liberty. 2. The reason assigned by Grotius, why they should so admire him, is for his predictions: but the reason of the great amazement and astonishment at him, in the text, is his sprinkling of many nations: so that nothing, not a word or expression, doth here agree to him. Yea this gloss is directly contrary to the letter of the text.

The close of these words is; 'That which had not been told them shall they see, and that which they had not heard, shall they consider.' Of which he says, 'They shall see that come to pass, foreseen and foretold by him, which they had not heard of by their astrologers or magicians.'

1. But what is it, that is here intended? The desolation of Jerusalem. That was it which Jeremiah foretold; upon the account whereof he had that respect with the Chaldees, which through the mercy of God he obtained. Is this that which is thus emphatically expressed; 'That which they had not heard, that which they had not been told, this they should see, this they should consider.' That this is directly spoken of Jesus Christ, that he is the thing which they had not seen, or heard of, the apostle tells us, Rom. xv. 21. Strange that this should be the desolation of Jerusalem. 2. It is probable that the magicians and astrologers, whose life and trade it was to flatter their kings with hope of success in their wars and undertaking, had foretold the taking of Jerusalem, considering that the king of the Chaldees,[s] had used all manner of divinations, before he undertook the war against it. It is too much trouble to abide on such vain imaginations. Nor doth Grotius take any care to evidence, how that which he delivers as the sense of the words, may so much as be ty-

[s] Ezek. xxi. 21. 22.

pically spoken of Jesus Christ, or be any way accommodated to him.

The prophet proceeds, chap. liii. with the same continued discourse. 'Who hath believed our report; and to whom is the arm of the Lord revealed?' which words are thus illustrated by the annotator.

'Vultis scire, inquit, quis ille sit futurus de quo cæpi agere, qui et meis prophetiis plenam habebit fidem, et ipse de maximis rebus, quas potentia Dei peraget, revelationes accipiet exactissimas, omnibus circumstantiis additis: Dabo vobis geminas ejus notas, unde cognosci possit: Hæ notæ in Jeremiam quidem congruunt prius, sed potius in Christum.' 'Will you know, saith he, who he shall be, of whom I have begun to treat? Who shall both fully believe my prophecies, and shall himself receive most exact revelations of the great things that the power of God shall bring to pass, all the circumstances being added; I will give you two notes of him, by which he may be known. These notes in the first place agree to Jeremiah; but rather to Christ.'

1. I suppose if we had not the advantage of receiving quite another interpretation of these words, from the Holy Ghost himself in the New Testament, yet it would not have been easy for any to have swallowed this gloss, that is as little allied to the text, as any thing that can possibly be imagined. The Holy Ghost tells us, that these words are the complaint of the prophet, and the church of believers unto God, concerning the paucity of them that would believe in Christ, or did so believe, when he was exhibited in the flesh: the power of the Lord with him for our salvation, being effectually revealed to very few of the Jews: so John xii. 37, 38. 'But though he had done so many miracles before them, yet they believed not on him, that the saying of Isaias the prophet might be fulfilled, Lord who hath believed our report, and to whom hath the arm of the Lord been revealed? So Rom. x. 16. 'But they have not obeyed the gospel; for Isaias saith, Lord, who hath believed our report?'

2. Let us now a little compare these several interpreta-

'Who hath believed our report?' Lord how few do be-

Christ, working miracles himself, and preached by

les? Jeremiah shall believe my prophecies, saith

Grotius. To whom is the arm of the Lord revealed? To how few is the power of God unto salvation made known by the Holy Ghost? Jeremiah also shall have clear revelations, says Grotius. And this is counted learnedly to interpret the Scriptures; and every day are such annotations on the Scripture multiplied.

3. It is not then the prophet's prediction of what he should do, of whom he treats, what he should believe, what he should receive, whereof there is notice given in this verse; but what others shall do in reference to the preaching of him; they shall not believe, 'Who hath believed?'

4. The annotator tells us, these words do agree to Christ chiefly, and *magis*, κατὰ λέξιν. This then must be the signification of them, according to his interpretation, in relation unto Christ: 'He shall believe the prophecies of Isaiah, and receive revelations of his own.' For my part I am rather of the mind of John and Paul, concerning these words, than of the learned annotator's.

5. There is no mention of describing the person spoken of by two notes: but in the first words the prophet enters upon the description of Christ, what he was, what he did, and suffered for us, which he pursues to the end of the chapter.

Ver. 2. 'For he shall grow up before him as a tender plant, and as a root out of a dry ground; he hath no form nor comeliness, and when we shall see him, there is no beauty, that we should desire him.' An entrance is made in these words, into the account that the prophet intends to give, why so few believed in Christ the Messiah, when he came, after they had looked for him, and desired him so long, namely his great unsuitableness to their expectation: they looked for a person shining in honour and glory, raising a visible pompous terrene kingdom, whereof they should be made partakers. But Christ, when he comes indeed, grows up both in his human nature, and his kingdom, as a tender plant, obnoxious to the incursions of beasts, winds, and storms, and treading on of every one; yet preserved by the providence of God, under whose eye, and before whom he grew up, he shall prosper; and he shall be as a root preserved in the dry ground of the parched house of David, and poor family of Mary and Joseph, every way outwardly con-

temptible; so that from thence none could look for the springing of such a branch of the Lord. And whereas they expected that he should appear with a great deal of outward form, loveliness, beauty, and every thing that should make a glorious person desirable, when they come to see him, indeed, in his outward condition, they shall not be able to discover any thing in the world, for which they should desire him, own him, or receive him. And therefore after they shall have gone forth upon the report that shall go of him, to see him, they shall be offended and return, and say, 'Is not this the carpenter's son, and are not his brethren with us?' This sword of the Lord, which lies at the heart of the Jews to this day, the learned annotator labours to ease them of, by accommodating these words to Jeremiah; which through the favour of the reader, I shall no otherwise refute, than by its repetition: 'for he shall grow up before the Lord as a tender plant; Jeremiah shall serve God in his prophetical office, whilst he is young. And as a root out of a dry ground: He shall be born at Anathoth, a poor village. He hath no form nor comeliness: he shall be heavy and sad. And when we see him, &c. He shall not have an amiable countenance.' Who might not these things be spoken of him that was a prophet, if the name of Anathoth be left out, and some other supplied in the room thereof?

The third verse pursues the description of the Messiah in respect of his abject outward condition, which being of the same import with the former, and it being not my aim to comment on the text, I shall pass by.

Ver. 4. 'Surely he hath borne our griefs and carried our sorrows: yet we did esteem him stricken, smitten of God, and afflicted.' Having formerly given the sense of these words, and vindicated them from the exceptions of the Socinians, I shall do no more but animadvert upon their accommodation to Jeremiah by Grotius. Thus then he,

'Vere languores nostros ipse tulit.] Ille non talia meritus, mala subiit quæ nos eramus meriti. Hæc omnia ait Judæos dicturos post captam urbem.' 'He that deserved no such thing underwent the evils that we had deserved. All these things he saith the Jews shall say after the taking of the city.'

It is of the unworthy dealing of the Jews with the pro-

phet in Jerusalem during the siege, that he supposes these words are spoken, and spoken by the Jews after the taking of the city. The sum is, when he was so hardly treated, we deserved it, even to be so dealt withal, not he, who delivered the word of God.

But 1. The words are, 'he bare our griefs, and carried our sorrows.' That by our griefs and sorrows, our sins and the punishment due to them are intended, hath been declared. That the force of the words 'bearing and carrying' do evince, that he took them upon himself, hath also been manifested. That he so took them, as that God made them meet upon him in his justice, hath likewise been proved. That by his bearing of them we come to have peace, and are freed, shall be farther cleared; as it is expressly mentioned, ver. 5. 11. Let us now see how this may be accommodated to Jeremiah. Did he undergo the punishment due to the sins of the Jews? Or did they bear their own sins? Did God cause their sins to meet on him, then when he bare them, or is it not expressly against his law, that one should bear the sins of another? Were the Jews freed? Had they peace by Jeremiah's sufferings? Or rather did they not hasten their utter ruin? If this be to interpret the Scripture, I know not what it is to corrupt it.

2. There is not the least evidence, that the Jews had any such thoughts, or were at all greatly troubled after the taking of the city by the Chaldeans, concerning their dealings with Jeremiah; whom they afterward accused to his face, of being a false prophet, and lying to them in the name of the Lord. Neither are these words supposed to be spoken by the Jews, but by the church of God.

'Et nos existimavimus eum percussum (leprosum ver. 6.) vulneratum et a Deo humiliatum.] [g]Nos credimus Jeremiam merito conjectum in carcerem et lacum, Deo illum exosum habente, ut hostem urbis, templi, et pseudo prophetam.' 'We believed that Jeremiah was deservedly cast into the prison and mire, God hating him as an enemy of the city and temple, and as a false prophet.' But,

1. These words may be thus applied to any prophet whatever, that suffered persecution and martyrdom from the Jews, as who of them did not, the one or the other? For

[g] Grot.

they quickly saw their error and mistake as to one, though at the same time they fall upon another; as our Saviour upbraideth the Pharisees.

Nor

2. Was this any such great matter, that the Jews should think a true prophet to be a false prophet, and therefore deservedly punished, as in the law was appointed, that it should thus signally be foretold concerning Jeremiah. But that the Son of God, the Son and heir of the vineyard, should be so dealt withal, this is that the prophet might well bring in the church thus signally complaining of. Of him to this day are the thoughts of the Jews no other than as here recorded, which they express by calling him תלוי.

The reason of the low condition of the Messiah, which was so misapprehended of the Jews, is rendered in the next verse, and their mistake rectified.

'But he was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities, the chastisement of our peace was upon him, and with his stripes we are healed.'

I suppose it will not be questioned, but that these words belong to our blessed Saviour, and that redemption which he wrought for us by his death and blood. Not only the full accomplishment of the thing itself as delivered in the New Testament, but the quotation of the words themselves, to that end and purpose; 1 Pet. ii. 24. do undeniably evince it. In what sense the words are to be understood of him, we have formerly declared. That in that sense they are applicable to any other will not be pleaded. That they have any other sense is yet to be proved. To this, thus the annotator,

'Ipse autem vulneratus est propter iniquitates nostras] in Hebræo,[h] At vero ipse vulneratus est (id est, male tractatus est) crimine nostro: in nobis culpa fuit, non in ipso: Sic et quod sequitur, Attritus est per culpam nostrorum: Iniquissima de eo sensimus et propterea crudelitur eum tractavimus: id nunc rebus ipsis apparet. Similia dixerant Judæi qui se converterunt die Pentecostes: et deinceps.'

'But he was wounded for our transgressions] In the Hebrew, But he was wounded (that is, evilly entreated) by our fault. The fault was in us, not in him. And so that which follows; 'He wasbruised by our fault:' we thought

[h] Grot.

ill of him, and therefore handled him cruelly. This now is evident from the things themselves. The like things said the Jews, who converted themselves on the day of Pentecost, and afterward.'

The reading of the words must first be considered, and then their sense and meaning. For against both these doth the learned annotator transgress, perverting the former, that he might the more easily wrest the latter. 'He was wounded for our sins' 'crimine nostro' by our crime; that is, it was our fault not his, that he was so evilly dealt with. And not to insist on the word, 'wounded' or 'tormented with pain,' which is slightly interpreted by evil-entreated, the question is, whether the efficient, or procuring and meritorious cause of Christ's wounding be here expressed.

2. The words used to express this cause of wounding are two, and both emphatical: the first is פשע, he was wounded מפשעינו for our prevarications, our proud transgressing of the law, פשע, 'est rebellare, et exire a voluntate Domini, vel præcepto, ex superbia:' R. D. in Michi. It is properly to rebel against man or God. Against man; 2 Kings iii. 7. 'The king of Moab פשע hath rebelled against me:' and chap. viii. 20. 'In his days Edom פשע rebelled:' as also against God; Isa. i. 2. 'I have brought up children, and they פשעו have rebelled against me.' Nor is it used in any other sense in the Scripture, but for prevarication and rebellion with an high hand, and through pride. The other word is עוה. He was bruised מעונותינו 'for our iniquities;' the word signifies, a declining from the right way, with perversity and frowardness. עוה, 'est inique vel perverse agere; proprie curvum esse, vel incurvari;' so that all sorts of sins, are here emphatically and distinctly expressed, even the greatest rebellion, and most perverse, crooked turning aside from the ways of God.

3. Their causality, in reference to the wounding of him here mentioned, is expressed in the preposition מן which properly is 'de, ex, a, e,' 'from,' or 'for.' Now to put an issue to the sense of these words, and thence, in a good measure, to the sense of this place, let the reader consult the collections of the use of this preposition in Pagnine, Buxtorf, Calasius, or any other; when he finds it with sin as here, and relating to punishment, if he find it once to signify any

thing but the meritorious procuring cause of punishment, the learned annotator may yet enjoy his interpretation in quietness. But if this be so? If this expression do constantly and perpetually denote the impulsive procuring cause of punishment; it was not well done of him, to leave the preposition quite out in the first place, and in the next place so to express it, as to confine it to signify the efficient cause of what is affirmed.

This being then the reading of the words, 'He was wounded or tormented for our sins.' The sense as relating to Jesus Christ, is manifest. When we thought he was justly for his own sake, as a seducer and malefactor, smitten of God, he was then under the punishment due to our iniquities; was so tormented for what we had deserved. This is thus rendered by our annotator; 'Jeremiah was not in the fault, who prophesied to us, but we, that he was so evilly dealt with. He was bruised for our iniquities, that is, we thought hard of him, and dealt evilly with him;' which may pass with the former.

The LXX render these words: *αὐτὸς δὲ ἐτραυματίσθη διὰ τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν, καὶ μεμαλάκισται διὰ τὰς ἀνομίας ἡμῶν.* Rightly! to be wounded *διὰ τὰς ἁμαρτίας*, is to be wounded for, and not by sin, no otherwise than that also signifies the impulsive cause. And the Chaldee paraphrast, not able to avoid the clearness of the expression, denoting the meritorious cause of punishment, and yet not understanding how the Messiah should be wounded, or punished, he thus rendered the words: 'Et ipse ædificabit domum sanctuarii nostri, quod violatum est propter peccata nostra, et traditum est propter iniquitates nostras.' 'He shall build the house of our sanctuary, which was violated for our sins (that is, as a punishment of them) and delivered for our iniquities.' So he: not being able to offer sufficient violence to the phrase of expression, nor understanding an accommodation of the words to him spoken of, he leaves the words, with their own proper significancy, but turns their intendment, by an addition to them of his own.

Proceed we to the next words, which are exegetical of these: 'He was wounded for our sins; the chastisement of our peace was upon him, and with his stripes are we healed.' Of these thus the annotator.

super eum] apud eum, id est, ...taria, si ea reciperemus.' 'He ...ings, if we would have received

... this sense of the words, nothing pecu... the rest of the prophets did so, and ... than he.

... are not, 'He gave us good counsel, ... taken it.' But, 'The chastisement of our ... him.' And what affinity there is between ...ssions, that the one of them should be used ...ation of the other, I profess I know not; Peter ...by, 'He bare our sins in his own body on the ... ii. 24.

...ord rendered by us, 'chastisement;' by the Vulgar ...ch Grotius follows, 'disciplina,' is מוסר, which ...h its first signification to 'learn,' so it signifies ... correct,' because learning is seldom carried on with... rrection; and thence 'disciplina' signifies the same. ...what is the 'correction of our peace?' Was it the in... ction of Christ, not that he gave, but that he had, that ... have our peace by? The word עליו he renders, 'apud ...um,' contrary to the known sense of the word; עלה is 'to ascend, to lift up, to make to ascend;' a word of most frequent use; thence is the word used, rendered 'super;' intimating that the chastisement of our peace was made to ascend on him: as Peter expresseth the sense of this place; ὃς τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν αὐτὸς ἀνήνεγκεν ἐν τῷ σώματι αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τὸ ξύλον· 'he carried up our sins on his body on the tree;' they were made to ascend on him. The LXX render the words ἐπ' αὐτὸν; the Vulgar Latin 'super eum.' And there is not the least colour for the annotator's, 'apud eum.' Now 'the chastisement of our peace,' that is, the punishment that was due, that we might have peace, or, whereby we have peace with God, 'was upon him;' is, it seems, 'He gave us good counsel and admonition, if we would have followed it.'

4. Here is no word expressing any act of the person spoken of, but his suffering or undergoing punishment. But of this enough.

'Et livore ejus sanati sumus.] Livore ejus, id est, ipsius patientia, nos sanati fuissemus, id est, liberati ab impenden-

tibus malis, si verbis ipsius, tanta malorum tolerantia confirmatis, habuissemus fidem. Hebræi potentialem modum aliter quam per indicativum exprimere nequeunt; ideo multa adhibenda attentio ad consequendos sensus.' 'With his stripes we are healed; with his wound, or sore, or stripe, that is, by his patience we might have been healed; that is, freed from impendent evils, had we believed his words, confirmed with so great bearing of evils. The Hebrews cannot express the potential mood, but by the indicative: therefore much attention is to be used to find out the sense.'

I cannot but profess, that setting aside some of the monstrous figments of the Jewish Rabbins, I never in my whole life met with an interpretation of Scripture, offering more palpable violence to the words, than this of the annotator. Doubtless to repeat it, with all sober men, is sufficient to confute it. I shall briefly add;

1. The prophet says, 'we are healed:' the annotator, 'we might have been healed, but are not.'

2. The healing in the prophet, is by deliverance from sin, mentioned in the words foregoing: and so interpreted by Peter, 1 Ep. ii. 24. whereby we have peace with God, which we have. The healing in the annotator, is the deliverance from the destruction by the Chaldeans which they were not delivered from, but might have been.

3. חבורה in the prophet, is μώλωψ in Peter; but 'patience' in the annotator.

4. 'By his stripes we are healed,' is in the annotator, 'By hearkening to him we might have been healed;' or delivered from the evils threatened, 'by his stripes;' that is, 'by hearkening to his counsel, when he endured evils patiently;' 'we are healed,' that is, we might have been delivered, but are not.

5. As to the reason given of this interpretation, that the Hebrews have no potential mood, I shall desire to know who compelled the learned annotator to suppose himself wiser than the Holy Ghost, 1 Pet. ii. 24. to wrest these words into a potential signification, which he expresseth directly, actually, indicatively. For a Jew to have done this out of hatred and enmity to the cross of Christ, had been tolerable: but for a man professing himself a Christian, it is somewhat a strange attempt.

6. To close with this verse; we do not esteem ourselves at all beholding to the annotator, for allowing an accommodation of these words to our blessed Saviour; affirming, that the Jews, who converted themselves (for so it must be expressed, least any should mistake, and think their conversion to have been the work of the Spirit, and grace of God) on the day of Pentecost, used such words as those that the Jews are feigned to use in reference to Jeremiah. It is quite of another business that the prophet is speaking: not of the sin of the Jews in crucifying Christ, but of all our sins, for which he was crucified.

——Munera quidem misit, sed misit in hamo.

Ver. 6. 'All we like sheep are gone astray, we are turned every one to his own way, and the Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all.

Grotius. 'Erraveramus a Manassis temporibus, alii ad alia idola: et permisit Deus ut ille nostro gravi crimine indigna patereturʼ. 'We have all erred from the days of Manasseh, some following some idols, others others: And God permitted that he by our grievous crime should suffer most unworthy things.'

Though the words of this verse are most important, ye having at large before insisted on the latter words of it, I shall be brief in my animadversions on the signal depravation of them by the learned annotator. Therefore,

1. Why is this confession of sins restrained to the times of Manasseh? and not afterward? The expression is universal. כלנו 'all of us:' and a man to his own way. And if these words may be allowed to respect Jesus Christ at all, they will not bear any such restriction. But this is the πρῶτον ψεῦδος of this interpretation; that these are the words of the Jews after the destruction of Jerusalem; which are the words of the converted Jews and Gentiles, after the suffering of Jesus Christ.

2. Why is the sin confessed, restrained to idolatry? Men's own ways which they walk in, when they turn from the ways of God, and know not the ways of peace, comprehend all their evils of every kind that their hearts and lives are infected withal.

3. The last words are unworthy a person of much less learning, and judgment than the annotator. For,

1. The word נִגַּשׂ (of which before) is interpreted without pretence, warrant, or colour, 'Permisit,' God permitted. But of that word sufficiently before.

2. By 'his suffering unworthy things through our fault' he understands, not the meritorious cause of his suffering, but the means whereby he suffered: even the unbelief and cruelty of the Jews, which is most remote from the sense of the place.

3. He mentions here distinctly, the fault of them that speak, and his suffering that is spoken of. 'Permisit Deus ut ille nostro gravi crimine indigna pateretur:' when in the text the fault of them that speak, is the suffering of him that is spoken of. 'Our iniquities were laid on him;' that is, the punishment due to them.

4. His suffering in the text is God's act: in the annotations, the Jews only.

5. There is neither sense nor coherence in this interpretation of the words. 'We have all sinned, and followed idols: and God hath suffered him to be evilly entreated by us:' when the whole context evidently gives an account of our deserving, and the ways whereby we are delivered: and therein a reason of the low and abject condition of the Messiah in this world. But of this at large elsewhere.

Ver. 7. 'He was oppressed, and he was afflicted, yet he opened not his mouth: he is brought as a lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep before her shearers is dumb, so he opened not his mouth.'

'Oblatus est, quia ipse voluit, et non aperuit os suum.] in Heb. oppressus et afflictus fuit, et non aperuit os suum. Sensum bene expresserunt LXX *καὶ αὐτὸς διὰ τὸ κεκακῶσθαι οὐκ ἀνοίγε τὸ στόμα αὐτοῦ.* Etiam tunc cum in carcerem ageretur, et in locum lutosum nihil fecit, dixitve iracunde.

'Sicut ovis] mitissimum animal.

'Et quasi agnus] cum quo ispe Jeremias se comparat, cap 11. v. 18.

'He was offered because he would, and he opened not his mouth; in the Hebrew, he was oppressed and afflicted. The LXX have well expressed the sense. Because of affliction he opened not his mouth: even then when he was thrown into the prison and mire, he neither did, nor spake any thing angrily.'

'As a sheep' a most mild creature.

'And as a lamb,' wherewith Jeremiah compares himself, chap. xi. ver. 18.'

The process of the words is to give an account of the same matter formerly insisted on, concerning one's suffering for the sin of others. That the words are spoken of the Lord Jesus, the Holy Ghost hath long since put it out of question; Acts viii. 32. And though there be some difficulty and variety in the interpretation of the first words, yet his patient suffering as the lamb of God, typed out by all the sacrifices of the Jews, under the punishment due to our sins, shines through the whole.

1. For the words themselves, they are נגש והוא which are variously rendered: καὶ αὐτὸς διὰ τὸ κεκακῶσθαι, LXX. And he for, or because of affliction. 'Oblatus est quia ipse voluit. Vulg. Lat. He was offered because he would. 'Oppressus est et ipse afflictus est. Arias Mont. Exigitur et ipse affligitur,' Jun. 'it was exacted, and he was afflicted.' Others, 'it was exacted, and he answered,' which seems most to agree with the letter; נגש is sometimes written with the point on the right corner of ש and then it signifies to approach, to draw nigh; and in the matter of sacrifice it signifies to offer, because men drew nigh to the Lord in offering. So Amos v. 25. הגשתם לי. Have you made to draw nigh your offerings and sacrifices? Or have you offered? Thus the Vulg. Lat. read the word, and rendered it 'Oblatus est,' he was offered. With the point in the left corner, it is to exact, to require, to afflict, to oppress. To exact and require at the hands of any, is the most common sense of the word. So 2 Kings xxiii. 35, Jehoiachim exacted silver and gold of the people of the land. Thence is נוגש an exactor, one that requires what is imposed on men; Zec. ix. 8. x. 4. Being used here in a passive sense, it is, it was exacted, and required of him; that is, the punishment due to our sins was required of Jesus Christ, having undertaken to be a sponsor: and so Junius hath supplied the words: 'Exigitur pœna,' 'punishment was exacted.' And this is more proper, than what we read; 'He was oppressed;' though that also be significant of the same thing. How the punishment of our sin was exacted or required of Jeremiah, the annotator declares not.

The other word is נענה the Vulgate Latin seems to look to the active use of the word, 'to answer;' and therefore renders it 'voluit;' he would, he willingly submitted to it, or he undertook to do that which was exacted. And much may be said for this interpretation from the use of the word in Scripture. And then the sense will be, it was exacted of him, or our punishment was required of him, and he undertook it with willingness, and patience: so it denotes the will of Christ in undergoing the penalty due to our sins, which he expresseth; Psal. xl. 8. Heb. x. 6, 7. Take it in the sense wherein it is most commonly used, and it denotes the event of the exacting the penalty of our sins of him: 'He was afflicted.' In what sense this may possibly be applied to Jeremiah, I leave to the annotator's friend to find out.

The next words, 'He opened not his mouth,' he applies unto the patience of Jeremiah, who did neither speak, nor do any thing angrily when he was cast into prison. Of that honour which we owe to all the saints departed, and in an especial manner to the great builders of the church of God, the prophets and apostles, this is no small part, that we deliver them from under the burden of having that ascribed to them, who are members, which is peculiar to their head. I say then, the perfect submission and patience expressed in these words, was not found in holy Jeremiah, who in his affliction and trial opened his mouth, and cursed the day wherein he was born: and when he says that himself was as a lamb, and as an ox appointed to the slaughter, in the same place, and at the same time he prays for vengeance on his adversaries, Jerem. xi. 19; in those words, not denoting his patience, but his being exposed to their cruelty.

Ver. 8. 'He was taken from prison and from judgment, and who shall declare his generation? For he was cut off out of the land of the living; for the transgression of my people was he smitten.'

The person speaking is here changed, as is manifest from the close of the verse, 'for the transgression of my people;' who were the speakers before. These, then, are the words [illegible] by the prophet: and they are not without their diffi- [illegible] concerning which the reader may consult commen- [illegible] argo. Grotius thus,

[illegible]cere et judicio ablatus est] id est, liberatus tan-

dem: Judicium vocat hoc, quia specie judicii ipsi hæc mala imposita fuerunt, Jerem. 32. 3. liberatur autem per Babylonios. Generationem ejus quis enarrabit?] Quis numerare poterit dies vitæ ejus? id est, erit valde longævus. Quia abscissus est de terra viventium nempe] cum actus fuit primum in carcerem, deinde in lacum illum cænosum, et rursum in carcerem.'

'He was taken from prison and judgment,' that is, he was at length delivered. He calls it judgment, because these evils were imposed on him with a pretence of judgment. But he was freed by the Babylonians; who shall declare his generation? 'Who shall be able to number the days of his life?' that is, he shall live very long. 'For he was cut off out of the land of the living,' namely, when he was thrown into the prison, and then into the miry pit, and then into prison again. He adds, 'Propter scelus populi mei percussi eum,'] in Heb. 'est plaga ipsi (supple supervenit) populi summo errore, ac crimine, ut ante dictum est.' 'For the wickedness of my people I have stricken him,' in the Hebrew it is, 'Stroke it on him,' that is, befel him, through the great error and fault of the people, as is before said.' So far he.

The sense of these words being a little tried out, their application will be manifest. The first words are not without their difficulty, מעצר 'from prison' say we. The word is from עצר, 'prohibere,' 'coercere;' to 'forbid' and 'restrain:' and is no where used for a prison directly. The LXX have rendered it, ἐν τῇ ταπεινώσει ἡ κρίσις αὐτοῦ ἤρθη, in his humility or humiliation, his judgment or sentence was taken away; refering one of the words to one thing, and another to another. The Vulgar Latin, 'Angustia, Arias Mountanus, clausura: Junius, per coarctationem:' rendering the preposition by, not from. The word is rendered by us, 'oppression;' Psal. cvii. 39. it is at the utmost in reference to a prison, 'claustrum,' a place where any may be shut up; but may as well be rendered 'angustia,' with the Vulgar Latin; better 'coarctation,' with Junius, being taken for any kind of strait and restraint. And, indeed, properly our Saviour was not cast into a prison, though he was all night under restraint. If the intendment of the words be about what he was delivered from, under which he was; and not what he was

delivered from, that he should not undergo it, ומכושפט and 'from judgment,' there is no difficulty in the word. Only whose judgment it is, that he was taken from, is worth inquiry; whether that of God or man: לקח he was taken, 'ublatus est.' The Vulgar Latin, 'he was taken up.' לקח is 'capere, accipere, ferre, tollere,' a word of very large use, both in a good, and in a bad sense; 'to be taken up,' it will scarcely be found to signify; 'to be taken away,' very often.

Now the sense of these words is, that either Christ was taken away, that is, killed and slain by his pressures, and the pretended judgment that was passed on him, or else that he was delivered from the straits and judgment, that might have come upon him. Although he was so afflicted, yet he was taken away from distress and judgment. Junius would have the former sense; and the exegesis of the word, taken away, by the following words, 'he was cut off from the land of the living,' seem to require it. In that sense the words are, by durance, restraint, affliction and judgment, either the righteous judgment of God, as Junius, or the pretended juridical process of men, he was taken away or slain. If I go off from this sense of the words, of all other apprehensions, I should cleave to that of eternal restraint or condemnation, from which Christ was delivered in his greatest distress; Isa. l. 7, 8. Heb. v. 7. Though his afflictions were great, and his pressures sore, yet he was delivered from eternal restraint and condemnation; it being not possible that he should be detained of death.

Applying all this to Jeremiah, says Grotius, he was 'delivered from prison and judgment by the Babylonians.' That לקח is delivered, and that he was delivered by the Babylonians from judgment, after that judgment had passed on him, and sentence been executed for many months, is strange. But let us proceed to what follows.

'Who shall declare his generation?' Who shall speak it, or be able to speak it? דורו 'his generation.' דור is 'ætas, generatio, sæculum:' Gr. γενεὰ. τὴν γενεὰν αὐτοῦ εἰς διηγήσεται; who shall 'expound his generation,' or declare it; that is, though he be so taken away by oppression and judgment, yet his continuance, his generation, his abiding shall be such, as 'Quis eloquetur?' Who shall speak it? It shall be

...er; for he was to be 'satisfied with long, or ... and therein to see the salvation of God.' ... says Grotius, 'Who can declare the generation ... he shall live so great a space of time.' He ... prophecy when he was 'very young;' chap. i. 5. ... thirteenth year of Josiah; and he continued pro... in Jerusalem until the eleventh year of Zedekiah, ...rty years; and how long he lived after this is un... Probably he might live in all sixty years; whereas ...ident that Hosea prophesied eighty years or very Now that this should be so marvellous a thing, that ... should live sixty or seventy years, that God should ...l it, as a strange thing, above twice so many years be..., and express it by way of admiration, that none should ...able to declare it, is such an interpretation of Scripture, ... becomes not the learned annotator. Let the learned ...eader consult Abarbinel's accommodation of these words to Josiah, and he will see what shifts the poor man is put to to give them any tolerable sense.

'For he was cut off out of the land of the living.' ὅτι αἴρεται ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ἡ ζωὴ αὐτοῦ. 'His life was taken from the earth:' to the sense, not the letter: נגזר 'cut off,' as a branch is cut off a tree; גזר is 'abscindere, succidere, extidere,' to cut off. The 'land of the living,' is the state and condition of them that live in this world; so that to be cut off from the land of the living, is a proper expression for to be slain, as in reference to Christ it is expressed by another word, Dan. ix. 26. The meaning of this is, says Grotius, 'Jeremiah was cast into the prison, and into the miry lake. He was cut off out of the land of the living;' that is, he was put into prison twice, and taken out again. If this be not to offer violence to the word of God, I know not what is. The learned man confesses, that this whole prophecy belongs to Christ also; but he leaves no sense to the words, whereby they possibly may be applied to him. How was Christ cast into prison, and a miry pit, and taken out from thence by the way of deliverance?

'For the transgression of my people was he stricken.' Of the sense of this expression, that Christ was smitten, or that the stroke of punishment was upon him for our sins, or the sins of God's people, I have spoken before. Grotius

would have it, by the sins, that is, the 'people sinned in doing of it;' that is, in putting Jeremiah into prison. The whole context evidently manifests, and the preposition in the relation wherein it stands to sin and punishment, necessarily requires, that the impulsive and meritorious, not the efficient cause, be denoted thereby.

Ver. 9. 'And he made his grave with the wicked, and with the rich in his death, because he had done no violence, nor was any deceit in his month.'

'Et dabit impios pro sepultura et divitem pro morte sua.] Illi ipsi interficere eum etiam voluerant, ut legimus Jerem. xxvi. At Deus istius vice viros potentes quidem, sed improbos, sacerdotes nempe, mortem Jeremiæ machinatos, morti dedit per Chaldæos;' 2 Reg. xxv. 18—21. Nihil illis divitiæ suæ profuerunt, quibus redimi se posse speraverant. Eo quod iniquitatem non fecerit, neque dolus fuerit in ore ejus.] quanquam nihil aliud dixerat, quam quod Deus ei mandaverat.'

'And he shall give the wicked for his grave or burial, and the rich for his death. They would have slain him, as we read; Jerem. xxvi. But God gave them, that were very powerful indeed, but wicked, even the priests that designed his death, up to death by the Chaldeans, 2 Kings xxv. 18. their riches, whereby they hoped to redeem themselves, profited them nothing,—although he had not said any thing, but what God commanded him.'

It is confessed, that the first words are full of difficulty, and various are the interpretations of them: which the reader may consult in expositors. It is not my work at present to comment on the text, but to consider its accommodation by Grotius. The most single sense of the words to me seems to be, that Christ being cut off from the land of the living, had his sepulchre among wicked men, being taken down from the cross as a malefactor, and yet was buried in the 'grave of a rich man,' by Joseph of Arimathea in his own grave; the consent of which interpretation with the text, is discovered by Forsterus and Mercerus, names of sufficient authority in all Hebrew literature. The sense that Grotius fixes on, is, that 'God delivered Jeremiah from death, and gave others to be slain in his stead, who had contrived his death.' But,

1. Of deliverance from death here is no mention; yea he who is spoken of, was במתיו 'in mortibus ejus,' in his deaths, or under death and its power. So that it is not, others shall die for him, but, he being dead, under the power of death, his grave, or burial, or sepulchre, shall be so disposed of.

2. There is not any word spoken of putting others to death; but of giving, or placing his grave with the wicked. Nor were those mentioned in 2 Kings xxv. 18, 19. that were slain by the king of Babel, as it doth any way appear, of the peculiar enemies of Jeremiah; the chief of them Seraiah, being probably he, to whom Jeremiah gave his prophecy against Babylon, who is said to be a 'quiet prince;' Jer. li. 59. 61.

3. It is well that it is granted, that *pro* is as much as *vice;* 'for one,' in one's stead; which the learned annotator's friends will scarce allow.

4. The application of those words, 'He did no violence, nor was there any deceit found in his mouth' (which are used to express the absolutely perfect innocency of the Son of God), to any man, who as a man is, or was a liar, is little less than blasphemy, and to restrain them to the prophet's message from God, is devoid of all pretence of plea.

Ver. 10. 'Yet it pleased the Lord to bruise him; he shall put him to grief; when thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin, he shall see his seed, he shall prolong his days, and the pleasure of the Lord shall prosper in his hand.'

'Tamen Deo visum est eum conterere and infirmare.] id est, attenuare fame, illuvie, squalore; verba activa apud Hebræos sæpe permittendi habent significationem; causa sequitur, cur id Deus permiserit. Si posuerit pro delicto animam suam, videbit semen longævum.] verteris recte: ut cum semetipsum subjecerit panis, videat semen, diuque vivat. Hebræis pæna etiam injuste irrogata אשם dicitur, quia infligitur si non sonti, certe quasi sonti; sic חמא sumi apparet,' Gen. xxxi. 39. Zech. xiv. 19. 'Vixit diu Jeremias in Egypto.'

'Yet it seemed good to God to bruise and weaken him. that is, to weaken him, and bring him down by hunger, filth &c. Active verbs among the Hebrews, have often the signification of permitting; the reason follows, why God suffered this. If he make his soul, &c. You shall rightly

read it, that when he hath submitted himself to punishments, that then he may see his seed and live long. Amongst the Hebrews punishment unjustly inflicted, is called *asham*, because it is inflicted on him that is guilty or supposed so. So it is evident, that *chata* is taken Gen. xxxi. 39. Zech. xiv. 19. Jeremiah lived long in Egypt.'

The words and sense are both briefly to be considered. חפץ 'voluit,' the Lord would bruise him, 'delectatus est;' Jun. It pleased the Lord, say we. The Greek renders this word βούλεται, properly; although in the following words it utterly departs from the original. The word is not only 'veste,' but 'voluntatem seu complacentiam habere,' to take delight to do the thing, and in the doing of it, which we will to be done; Numb. xiv. 8. Judges xiii. 23. Our translation refers it to the purpose, and good pleasure of God; so is the word used Jonah i. 14. and in sundry other places. The noun of the same signification is used again in this verse, חפץ and translated, 'the pleasure; the pleasure of the Lord shall prosper;' that is, the thing which pleases him, and which he hath purposed to do. The purpose and pleasure of the Lord in giving Christ up to death; Acts ii. 23. and iv. 26, 27. is doubtless that which the prophet here intends; which also as to the execution of it, is farther expressed; Zech. xiii. 7.

2. It pleased the Lord, דכאו 'eum contundere; conterere, frangere;' to bruise, or break him; in answer to what was said before, ver. 5. 'he was wounded, he was bruised,' &c.

That which is said to accommodate all this to Jeremiah, is that by all this is intended, that God permitted it to be done to him. But,

1. The word חפץ is nowhere used in that sense, nor will any where bear that interpretation. And though some active verbs in the Hebrew may be interpreted in a sense of permitting, or suffering the thing to be done, which is said to be done; yet that all may so be interpreted when we please, without a cogent reason of such an interpretation; that this verb signifying not only to will, but with delight and purpose, should be so interpreted, and that in this place, not admitting of such a gloss in any other place, is that which was needful to be said by the learned annotator; but with what pretence of reason or truth, I know not.

2. As to Christ, to whom he confesseth these words properly to belong, the proper sense of the word is to be retained, as hath been shewed; and it is very marvellous, the improper sense of the word should be used in reference to him, to whom it nextly belongs; and the proper, in reference to him, who is more remotely, and secondarily signified.

For the second passage; 'when,' or 'if, thou or he shall make his soul an offering for sin;' or as it may be read, 'when his soul shall make an offering for sin;' it may relate either to God, giving him up for a sacrifice, his soul for his whole human nature; or to Christ, whose soul was, or who offered himself as a sacrifice to God; Eph. v. 2. Which way soever it be taken, it is peculiar to Christ; for neither did God ever make any one else an offering for sin, nor did ever any person but Christ, make himself an offering, or had power so to do, or would have been accepted in so doing. To suit these words to Jeremiah, it is said, that אשם in the Hebrew, signifies any punishment, though unjustly inflicted.

I will not say that the learned annotator affirms this, with a mind to deceive; but yet I cannot but think, that as he hath not given, so he could not give one instance out of the Scripture, of that use of the word which he pretends. This I am sure, that his assertion hath put me to the labour, of considering all the places of Scripture, where the word is used, in the full collections of Calasius; and I dare confidently assure the reader, that there is no colour for this assertion, nor instance to make it good. The Greeks have rendered it περὶ ἁμαρτίας, 'an offering for sin;' as is expressed, Rom. viii. 3. Heb. x. 5. 8. so the word is used Lev. v. 16. vii. 1. But,

If אשם be not used in that sense, yet חטא is, in Gen. xxxi. 39. Zech. xiv. 19. But,

1. This doth not satisfy, if this word may not be so interpreted, which is here used; yet another, which is not here used, may be so interpreted; and therefore, that which is here used, must have the same sense. Nor,

2. Can he prove that חטא hath any other signification, but either of sin, or punishment, or satisfaction; in the first place instanced in, Gen. xxxi. 39. Jacob says, that, for that

which was taken away out of the flock of Laban, he expiated it, he made satisfaction for it, as the law afterward required in such cases should be done; Exod. xxii. 12. And in that place of Zech. xiv. 19. it is precisely punishment for sin. But this word is not in our text.

Take then the word in any sense that it will admit of, to apply this expression to Jeremiah, is no less than blasphemy. To say that either God, or himself made him a sacrifice for sin, is to blaspheme the one sacrifice of the Son of God.

For the next words, 'he shall see his seed,' Grotius knows not how to make any application of them to Jeremiah, and therefore he speaks nothing of them. How they belong to Christ is evident, Psal. xxii. 30. Heb. ii. 8, 9. that, 'he shall prolong his days,' is not applicable to Jeremiah, of whom the annotator knew not how long he lived in Egypt, hath been formerly declared. Christ prolonged his days, in that notwithstanding that he was dead, he is alive, and lives for ever.

The last clause concerning the prospering of the good pleasure, the will, and pleasure of the Lord, in the hand of Jesus Christ, for the gathering of his church, through his blood, and making peace between God and man, hath little relation to any thing, that is spoken of Jeremiah, whose ministry for the conversion of souls, doth not seem to have had any thing eminent in it above other prophets; yea falling in a time, when the wickedness of the people, to whom he was sent, was come up to the height, his message seemed to be almost totally rejected.

Ver. 11. 'He shall see of the travail of his soul, and shall be satisfied; by his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many, for he shall bear their iniquities.'

The event, and glorious issue of the suffering of Christ, in respect of himself and others, with the reason thereof, is briefly comprised and expressed in this verse.

'Videbit et saturabitur.] videbit diu ad satietatem: simile loquendi genus in Hebræo, Gen. xxv. 8. xxxv. 19. 1 Paral. xxiii. 1. xxix. 28. 2 Paral. xxiv. 14.

'In scientia sua.] per eam quam habet Dei cognitionem.

'Justificabit ipse justus servus meus multos.] Exemplo et institutione corriget multos etiam ex gentibus. Hæc est

maxime propria verbi, צדיק significatio, et Græci δίκαιος, ut apparet Dan. xii. 3. Apocal. xxii. 11. et alibi sæpe.

'Et iniquitates eorum ipse portabit.] id est, auferet, per μετωνυμίαν, quia qui sordes aliquas auferunt, solent eos collo supposito portare. Abstulit Jeremias multorum peccata, ita ut diximus, corrigendo.'

'He shall see and be satisfied:' He shall see long, unto satiety; the like phrase of speech you have in the Hebrew; Gen. xxv. 8, &c. 'By his knowledge.' By that knowledge which he hath of God. 'He shall justify many.' By his example and institution he shall convert many, even from among the heathen: this is the most proper sense of the word הצדיק and of δίκαιος in the Greek; as appeareth Dan. xii. 3. Rev. xxii. 11; &c. 'For he shall bear their iniquities,' that is, take them away by a metonymy; because those that take away filth, used to take it on their necks, and bear it. Jeremiah took away the sins of many, as was said, by correcting or amending them.'

The intelligent reader will easily perceive the whole Socinian poison, about the death of Christ, to be infolded in this interpretation. His knowledge is the 'knowledge' that he had of God, and his will, which he declares: to 'justify,' is to 'amend men's lives,' and to 'bear sin,' is to take it away. According to the analogy of this faith, you may apply the text to whom you please, as well as to Jeremiah. But the words are of another import, as we shall briefly see.

1. Those words מעמל נפשו which the Vulgar Latin renders 'pro eo quod laboravit:' ad verbum, 'propter laborem animæ suæ,' which express the object of the seeing mentioned, and that wherewith he was satisfied, are not taken notice of. The 'travail of the soul' of Christ, is the fruit of his 'labour, travail,' and suffering: this, says the prophet, he 'shall see,' that is, 'receive, perceive, enjoy;' as the verb יראה in many places signifies; verbs of sense, with the Hebrews, having very large significations: ישבע 'saturabitur,' he shall be 'full and 'well-contented,' and pleased with the fruit that he shall have of all his labour and travail. This (saith Grotius) is, 'he shall see to satiety,' whereby he intends he should 'live very long,' as is evident from the places whither he sends us for an exposition of these words; Gen. xxv. 8,

&c. in all which mention is made of men that were old, and 'full of days.'

1. But to 'live to satiety,' is to live till a man be weary of living, which may not be ascribed to the prophet.

2. This of his 'long life,' was spoken of immediately before, according to the interpretation of our annotator, and is not, probably, instantly again repeated.

3. The long life of Jeremiah, by way of eminency above others, is but pretended, as hath been evinced. But,

4. How came this word 'to see,' to be taken neutrally, and to signify 'to live?' What instance of this sense, or use of the word, can be given? I dare boldly say, not one. He shall 'see unto satiety,' that is, 'he shall live long.'

5. The words 'videbit, saturabitur,' do not stand in any such relation to one another or construction, as to endure to be cast into this form: it is not 'videbit diu ad satietatem;' much less 'vivet ad satietatem,' but 'videbit, saturabitur.'

6. The word 'shall see,' evidently relates to the words going before, 'the travail of his soul.' If it had been 'he shall see many years, or many days, and be satisfied,' it had been something. But it is, 'he shall see of the travail of his soul, and be satisfied.'

2. By his knowledge בדעתו 'in,' or 'by his knowledge,' 'in scientia sua,' Vulg. Lat. 'Cognitione sui,' Jun. The LXX wholly pervert all the words of this verse, except the last, as they do also of the former. That by the 'knowledge' here mentioned, is meant the knowledge of Christ taken objectively, and not the knowledge of God taken actively, as our annotator supposes, is evident from the fruit that is ascribed hereunto, which is the justification of them that have that knowledge. By his knowledge, that is, the 'knowledge of him,' they shall be justified, Phil. iii. 8. So, 'teach me thy fear,' that is, 'the fear of thee;' 'my worship,' that is, 'the worship of me.' No 'knowledge of God' in the land. But the use of this is in the next words.

'My righteous servant shall justify many:' that this term, used thus absolutely, 'My righteous servant,' is not applied to any in the Scripture besides Jesus Christ, hath been declared, especially where that is ascribed to him, which here is spoken of, can it be no otherwise understood: יצדיק 'shall justify,' that is, shall absolve from their sins, and pronounce

them righteous. Grotius would have the word here to signify, 'to make holy and righteous by instruction' and institution, as Dan. xii. 3. and δίκαιος, Rev. xxii. 11. That both these words are to be taken in a forensical signification, that commonly, mostly they are so taken in the Scriptures, that scarce one and another instance can be given to the contrary; that in the matter of our acceptation with God through Christ they can no otherwise be interpreted, hath been abundantly manifested by those who have written of the doctrine of justification at large; that is not now my present business. This I have from the text, to lay in the way of the interpretation of the learned annotator: the reason and foundation of this justification here mentioned, is in the following words, which indeed steer the sense of the whole text. 'For he shall bear their iniquities.' Now what justification of men is a proper effect of another's bearing their iniquities? Doubtless the acquitting of them from the guilt of their sins, on the account of their sins being so borne, and no other. But,

Says our annotator, 'To bear their sins, is to take them away,' by a figurative expression. If this may not be understood, I suppose every one will confess that the annotator hath laboured in vain, as to his whole endeavour of applying this prophecy unto Jeremiah. If by 'bearing our iniquities,' be intended the undergoing of the punishment of those iniquities, and not the delivering men from their iniquities, the whole matter here treated of can relate to none but Jesus Christ; and to him it doth relate in the sense contended for. Now to evince this sense we have all the arguments that any place is capable to receive the confirmation of its proper sense by.

For, 1. The word, as is confessed, signifies properly to 'bear,' or 'carry,' and not to 'take away.' Nor is it ever otherwise used in the Scripture, as hath been declared; and the proper use of a word is not to be departed from, and a figurative admitted without great necessity.

2. The whole phrase of speech of 'bearing iniquity' is constantly in the Scripture used for bearing or undergoing the punishment due to sin, as hath been proved by instances in abundance; nor can any instance to the contrary be produced.

3. The manner whereby Christ 'bore the iniquities of men,' as described in this chapter, namely, by being 'wounded,' 'bruised,' 'put to grief,' will admit of no interpretation, but that by us insisted on. From all which it is evident, how violently the Scripture is here perverted by rendering, 'My righteous servant shall justify many, for he shall bear their iniquities,' by, 'Jeremiah shall instruct many in godliness, and so turn them from their sins.'

Ver. the last. 'Therefore will I divide him a portion with the great, and he shall divide the spoil with the strong, because he hath poured out his soul unto death, and he was numbered with transgressors, and he bare the sins of many, and made intercession for the transgressors.'

A farther fruit of the travail of the Lord Christ in his conquest over all oppositions, in the victory he obtained, the spoils that he made, expressed after the manner of the things of men, with the causes and antecedents of his exaltation, is summarily comprised in these last words. Hereof thus Grotius.

'Dispartiam ei plurimos.'] 'Dabo ei partem in multis: id est, multos servabunt Chaldæi in ejus gratiam,' vide Jer. xxxix. 17. Et fortium dividet spolia;] id est, Nabuzardan Magister militum, capta urbe, de præda ipsi dona mittet. Jer. xl. 5. Oblatus etiam ipsi a Chaldæis locus quantum vellet. Pro eo quod tradidit in mortem animam suam] in Hebræo, Quia effudit in mortem animam suam, id est, periculis mortis semet objecit, colendo, veritatem quæ odium parit. Vide historiam ad hanc rem oppositam, Jer. xxvi. 13. Sic τιθέναι ψυχὴν dici pro periculo mortis semet objicere diximus ad, John x. 11. Et cum sceleratis reputatus est.'] Ita est tractatus quo modo scelerati solent in carcere, catenis et barathro. Et peccata multorum tulit] pessime tractatus fuit permultorum improbitatem uti sup. ver. 5. Et pro transgressoribus rogavit.] פגע est deprecari: Sensus est, eo ipso tempore cum tam dura poteretur a populis, non cessavit ad Deum preces pro eis fundere, vide Jer. xiv. 7.' &c.

'I will divide him a portion with the great,' or many, that is, the Chaldeans shall preserve many for his sake; Jer. xxxix. 17. 'He shall divide the spoil with the strong,' that is, Nabuzardan the chief captain, the city being taken, shall

send him gifts of the prey, Jer. xl. 5. As much land also as he would was offered him by the Chaldeans. 'Because he poured out his soul unto death;' that is, he exposed himself to the dangers of death, by following truth, which begets hatred. See Jer. xxvi. 13. τιθέναι ψυχὴν is spoken for exposing a man's life to danger of death. 'He bare the sin of many,' or was evilly treated by the wickedness of the many. 'And made intercession for the transgressors;' he prayed for the people,' &c.

To run briefly over this exposition,

1. 'I will divide him a portion with the great;' that is, the Chaldees shall save many for his sake. How is this proved? Jer. xxxix. 17, 18. Where God says, 'he will save Ebedmelech, because he put his trust in him.' Such is the issue commonly, when men will wrest the Scripture to their own imaginations. Such are their proofs of what they affirm.

2. 'He shall divide the spoil with the strong;' that is, the city being taken, the captains of the guard gave him victuals, and a reward, and set him at liberty, as we read, Jer. xl. 5.

3. 'Because he poured out his soul to death;' that is, he ventured his life by preaching the truth, although he did not die. For,

4. 'He bare the sin of many:' that is, by the 'wickedness of many he was wronged;' though this expression in the verse foregoing be interpreted, 'he shall take away their sins;' and that when a word of a more restrained signification is used to express bearing, than that here used. At this rate a man may make application of what he will, to whom he will.

Upon the sense of the words, and their accomplishment in and upon the Lord Jesus Christ, I shall not insist. That they do not respect Jeremiah at all, is easily evinced from the consideration of the intolerable wresting of the words, and their sense by the learned annotator, to make the least allusion appear betwixt what befel him, and what is expressed.

To close these animadversions, I shall desire the reader to observe.

1. That there is not any application of these words made

to the prophet Jeremiah, that suits him in any measure, but what may also be made to any prophet, or preacher of the word of God, that met with affliction and persecution in the discharge of his duty, and was delivered by the presence of God with him. So that there is no reason to persuade us, that Jeremiah was peculiarly intended in this prophecy.

2. That the learned annotator, though he profess that Jesus Christ was intended in the letter of this Scripture, yet hath interpreted the whole, not only without the least mention of Jesus Christ, or application of it unto him, but also hath so opened the several words and expressions of it, as to leave no place nor room for the main doctrine of his satisfaction here principally intended. And how much the church of God is beholding to him for his pain and travail herein, the reader may judge.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of the matter of the punishment that Christ underwent, or what he suffered.

HAVING dispatched this digression, I return again to the consideration of the death of Christ, as it was a punishment which shall now be pursued unto its issue.

The third thing proposed to the consideration on this account, was the matter of this punishment that Christ underwent which is commonly expressed by the name of his death.

Death is a name comprehensive of all evil, of what nature, or of what kind soever. All that was threatened, all that was ever inflicted on man: though much of it fall within the compass of this life, and short of death, yet it is evil purely on the account of its relation to death, and its tendency thereunto; which, when it is taken away, it is no more generally, and absolutely evil, but in some regard only.

The death of Christ as comprehending his punishment, be considered two ways.

In itself.

In reference to the law.

he first head, I shall only consider the general evi-

dent concomitants of it, as they lie in the story, which are all set down as aggravations of the punishment he underwent.

In the latter, give an account of the whole, in reference to the law.

1. Of death natural, which in its whole nature is penal (as hath been elsewhere evinced) there are four aggravations whereunto all others may be referred. As, 1. That it be violent or bloody. 2. That it be ignominious or shameful. 3. That it be lingering and painful. 4. That it be legal and accursed. And all these to the height, met in the death of Christ.

1. It was violent and bloody; hence he is said to be
1. Slain, Acts ii. 23; ἀνείλετε, 'ye have slain.'
2. Killed, Acts iii. 15; ἀπεκτείνατε, 'ye have killed.'
3. Put to death; John xviii. 31, 32.
4. Cut off; Dan. ix. 26.

The death of Christ, and the blood of Christ, are, on this account, in the Scripture the same. His death was by the effusion of his blood; and what is done by his death, is still said to be done by his blood. And though he willingly gave up himself to God therein, as he was a sacrifice, yet he was taken by violence and nailed to the cross, as it was a punishment; and the dissolution of his body and soul was by a means no less violent, than if he had been most unwilling thereunto.

2. It was ignominious and shameful. Such was the death of the cross.[a] The death of slaves, malefactors, robbers, pests of the earth, and burdens of human society; like those crucified with him. Hence he is said to be 'obedient to death, the death of the cross,' Phil. ii. 8. that shameful and ignominious death. And when he endured the cross, he despised the shame also; Heb. xii. 2. To be brought

[a] Σκελοποσία, seu crucifragium ut crux ipsa, servorum quasi peculiare supplicium fuit. Lipsius. Sublimes extra ordinem aliquæ statuebantur cruces; si exempla edenda forent in famosa persona, et ob atrox facinus, aut si hoc supplicio veniret afficiendus ille, cujus odium erat apud omnes flagrantissimum. Salmas. de Cruce: which seems to be the case in the cross of Christ: between these of the thieves. Bene addit crucem, nam servorum non civium crucis erat supplicium. Nannius, in Terent. And. Act. 3. Noli minitari, Scio crucem futuram mihi sepulchrum: ibi mei majores sunt siti, pater, avus, proavus, abavus: servus apud Plaut. Mil. Glor. ii. 4. 19. Vid. Trach. Histor. lib. ii. 27. Vulcat in Avid. Cassio. cap. 4. Capitolin. in Macrin. cap. 12. Luc. florus lib. 3. cap. 19.

forth scourged as a malefactor, amongst malefactors, in the eye of the world, made a scorn and a by-word, men wagging the head, and making mouths at him in derision, when he was full of torture, bleeding to death, is no small aggravation of it. Hence the most frequent expression of his death is by the cross, and crucifying.

3. It was lingering. It was the voice of cruelty itself, concerning one who was condemned to die: 'sentiat se mori,' 'let him so die that he may feel himself dying;' and of one, who, to escape torture, killed himself, 'evasit,' 'he escaped me:' sudden death, though violent, is an escape from torture. Such was this of Christ. From his agony in the garden, when he began to die (all the powers of hell being then let loose upon him), until the giving up of the Ghost, it was from the evening of one day to the evening of another; from his scourging by Pilate, after which he was under continual pain, and suffering in his soul, in his body, to his death, it was six hours; and all this while was he under exquisite tortures, as on very many considerations might easily be manifest.

4. It was legal; and so an accursed death. There was process against him by witness and judgment. Though they were indeed all false and unjust, yet, to the eye of the world, his death was legal, and consequently accursed; Gal. iii. 13. 'Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree;' that is, because of the doom of the law, whose sentence is called a curse; Deut. xxvii. 29. such was that of Christ; Isa. liii. 4.

2. As all these aggravations attended his death, as it was death itself, so there was a universality in all the concernments of it, as it was a legal punishment. Briefly to give some instances:

1. There was a universality of efficient causes; whether principal or instrumental. The first great division of causes efficient, is into the Creator and the creatures, and both here concurred.

1. The Creator, God himself, laid it upon him. He was not only 'delivered by his determinate counsel,' Acts ii. 22, 23. iv. 27, 28. not spared by him, but given up to death; Rom. viii. 32. but, it 'pleased him to bruise him, and to put him to grief,' Isa. liii. 10. as also to forsake him; Psal. xxii. so acting in his punishment, by the immission of that

which is evil, and the subtraction of that which is good; so putting the cup into his hand, which he was to drink, and mixing the wine thereof for him, as shall afterward be declared.

2. Of creatures one general division is, into intelligent, and brute or irrational, and both these also in their several ways concurred to his punishment; as they were to do by the sentence and curse of the law.

Intelligeut creatures are distinguished into spiritual and invisible, or visible and corporeal also.

Of the first sort are angels and devils; which agree in the same nature, differing only in qualities, and states or conditions. Of all things, the angels seem to have no hand in the death of Christ; for being not judge, as was God, nor opposite to God as is Satan, nor under the curse of the law, as is mankind, and the residue of the creatures, though they had inestimable benefit by the death of Christ, yet neither by demerit nor efficacy, as is revealed, did they add to his punishment. Only whereas it was their duty to have preserved him being innocent, and in his way from violence and fury, their assistance was withheld.

But from that sort of spiritual invisible creatures, he suffered in the attempts of the devil.

Christ looked on him at a distance in his approach to set upon him: 'The prince of this world,' saith he, 'cometh;' John xiv. 30. He saw him coming with all his malice, fury, and violence, to set upon him, to ruin him if it were possible: and that he had a close combat with him on the cross, is evident from the conquest that Christ there made of him, Col. ii. 15. which was not done without wounds, and blood, when he break the serpent's head, the serpent bruised his heel; Gen. iii. 15.

2. For men; the second rank of intellectual creatures; they had their influence into this punishment of Christ, in all their distributions, that on any account they were cast into.

1. In respect of country or nation, and the privileges thereon attending. The whole world on this account is divided into Jews and Gentiles; and both these had their efficiency in this business; Psal. ii. 1. 'Why did the heathen rage, and the people imagine a vain thing?' Heathens and

people, Gentiles and Jews, are all in it, as the place is interpreted by the apostles, Acts iv. 25, 26. And to make this the more eminent, the great representative of the two people conspired in it; the Sanhedrim of the Jews, and the body of the people in the metropolitical city, on the one hand; and the Romans, for the Gentiles, who then were 'rerum Domini,' and governed οἰκουμένην, as Luke tells us, chap. ii. 1. The whole on both hands is expressed Matt. xx. 18, 19.

2. As to order, men are distinguished into rulers, and those under authority, and both sorts herein concurred.

1. Rulers are either civil or ecclesiastical; both which (notwithstanding all their divisions) conspired in the death of Christ.

1. For civil rulers, as it was foretold, Psal. ii. 2. xxii. 12. so it was accomplished, Acts iv. 25, 26. The story is known of the concurrence of Herod and Pilate in the thing: the one, ruler of the place where he lived, and conversed; the other, of the place, where he was taken and crucified.

2. For ecclesiastical rulers; what was done by the priests, and all the council of the elders, is known. The matter of fact need not be insisted on; indeed, they were the great contrivers and malicious plotters of his death; using all ways and means for the accomplishing of it, Acts iii. 17. in particular Annas, the usurper of the priesthood, seems to have had a great hand in the business, and therefore to him was he first carried.

2. For those under authority: besides what we have in the story, Peter tells the body of the people, Acts ii. 23. that 'they took him, and with wicked hands crucified him, and slew him:' and, chap. iii. 15, 'That they killed the prince of life;' so Zech. xii. 10. not only the house of David, the rulers, but the inhabitants of Jerusalem, the people, are said to pierce him, and thence, 'they who pierced him,' is a periphrasis of the Jews; Rev. i. 7. after, every eye shall see him, there is a distribution into them that pierced him, that is, the Jews, and all the kindreds of the earth, that is, the Gentiles. The very rabble was stirred up to cry 'Crucify him, crucify him,' and did it accordingly; Matt. xxvii. 20. And they all consented as one man in the cry, ver. 22. and that with violence and clamour; ver. 23. 'abjects made mouths at him,' Psal. xxxv. 15. xxii. 6.

3. Distinguish man in relation to himself, either upon a natural or moral account, as his kindred and relations, or strangers, and they will appear to be all engaged; but this is so comprised in the former distinction of Jews and Gentiles, that it need not be insisted on.

2. On a moral account, as they were either his friends or his enemies, he suffered from both.

1. His friends, all his disciples, forsook him, and fled; Matt. xxvi. 56. the worst of them betrayed him, ver. 14. and the best of them denied him, ver. 10. and so there was 'none to help,' Psal. xxii. 11.

And if it were thus with him in the house of his friends, what may be expected from

2. His enemies; their malice and conspiracy, their implacableness and cruelty, their plotting and accomplishment of their designs, take up so great a part of the history of his crucifying, that I shall not need insist on particular instances.

Yea, mankind was engaged, as distinguished into sexes. Of men of all sorts you have heard already; and the tempting, ensnaring, captious question of the maid to Peter manifests, that amongst his persecutors, there were of that sex also, Matt. xxvi. 69.

Of men's distinction by their employments, of soldiers, lawyers, citizens, divines, all concurring to this work; I shall not add any thing to what hath been spoken.

Thus the first order of creatures, those that are intellectual, were universally, at least with a distributive universality, engaged in the suffering of the Lord Jesus; and the reason of this general engagement was, because the curse, that was come upon them for sin, had filled them all with enmity one against another. 1. Fallen man and angels were engaged into an everlasting enmity, on the first entrance of sin; Gen. iii. 15, 16. 2. Men one towards another were filled with malice, and envy, and hatred; Tit. iii. 3.

3. The Jews and Gentiles were engaged by way of visible representation of the enmity which was come on all mankind; John iv. 9. Eph. ii. 15—17. and therefore he who was to undergo the whole curse of the law, was to have the rage and fury of them all executed on him. As I said before, all their persecution of him concerned not his death,

as it was a sacrifice, as he made his soul an offering for sin; but as it was a punishment, the utmost of their enmity was to be executed towards him.

2. The residue of the creatures concurred thus far to his sufferings, as to manifest themselves at that time, to be visibly under the curse and indignation that was upon him, and so withdrew themselves, as it were, from yielding him the least assistance. To instance in general, heaven and earth lost their glory, and that in them which is useful and comfortable to the children of men, without which all the other conveniences and advantages are as a thing of nought. 'the glory of heaven is its light;' Psal. xix. 1, 2. And the glory of the earth, is its stability: he hath fixed the earth, that it shall not be moved.

Now both these were lost at once. The heavens were darkened, when it might be expected, in an ordinary course, that the sun should have shone in its full beauty, Matt. xxvii. 45. Luke xxiii. 44, 45. And the earth lost its stability, and shook or trembled, ver. 51. and the rocks rent, and the graves opened; all evidences of that displeasure against sin, which God was then putting in execution to the utmost; Rom. i. 18.

Thus first in his suffering there was universality of efficient causes.

2. There was a universality in respect of the subject wherein he suffered. He suffered, 1. In his person, 2. In his name; 3. In his friends; 4. In his goods; as the curse of the law extended to all, and that universally in all these.

1. In his person, or his human nature in his person; he suffered in the two essential constituent parts of it; his body, and his soul.

1. His body. In general as to its integral parts; his body was broken, 1 Cor. xi. 24. and crucified; his blood was shed, or poured out.

2. His soul. His soul was made an offering for sin; Isa. liii. 10. And his soul 'was heavy unto death;' Matt. xxvi. 37, 38.

2. In particular: his body suffered in all its concernments, namely, all his senses, and all its parts or members.

1. In all its senses: as to instance,

1. In his feeling; he was full of pain, which made him, as he says, cry for disquietness; and this is comprised in every one of those expressions which say he was broken, pierced, and lived so long on the cross, in the midst of most exquisite torture; until being full of pain, he cried out, and gave up the Ghost; Matt. xxvii. 50.

2. His tasting. When he fainted with loss of blood, and grew thirsty, they gave him 'gall and vinegar to drink,' Matt. xxvii. 34. John xix. 29. Matt. xxvii. 48. not to stupify his senses, but to increase his torment.

3. His seeing. Though not so much in the natural organ of it, as in its use. He saw his mother and disciples standing by, full of grief, sorrow, and confusion, which exceedingly increased his anguish and perplexity; John xix. 25, 26. And he saw his enemies full of rage and horror, standing round about him; Psal. xxii. He saw them passing by, and wagging the head in scorn, Matt. xxix. 39. Psal. xxii. 7, 8.

4. His ears were filled with the reproach and blasphemy, of which he grievously complains; Psal. xxii. 7, 8. which also is expressed in his accomplishment, Matt. xxvii. 39—44. Luke xxiii. 36—38. They reproached him with God, and his ministry, and his profession; as did also one of the thieves that was crucified with him. And,

5. They crucified him in a noisome place, a place of stink and loathsomeness; a place where they cast the dead bodies of men, from whose bones it got the name of Golgotha, a place of dead men's sculls; Matt. xxvi. 33.

2. He suffered in all the parts of his body; especially those, which are most tender and full of sense.

1. For his head, they planted a crown of thorns, and put it on him; and to increase his pain, smote it on (that the thorns might pierce him the deeper) with their staves; Matt. xxvii. 28, 29. as the Jews had stricken him before, chap. xxvi. 68. John xix. 2, 3.

2. His face they spit upon, buffeted, stroke, and plucked off his hair; Isa. l. 6. Matt. xxvi. 67, 68.

3. His back was torn with whips and scourges, Matt. xxvii. 27. John xix. 1. ἐμαστίγωσε; there they made long their furrows.

4. His hands, and feet, and side, were pierced with nails and spears; Psal. xxii. 16.

5. To express the residue of his body, and the condition

of it, when he hung on the cross so long by the soreness of his hands and his feet, says he, 'All my bones are out of joint;' Psal. xxii. 17. and also ver. 14, 15.

Thus was it with his body; the like also is expressed of his soul, for,

1. On his mind was darkness; not in it, but on it, as to his apprehension of the love and presence of God. Hence was his cry, Psal. xxii. 1, 'My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?' Matt. xxvii. 46. Though his faith was upon the whole of the matter prevalent and victorious; Isa. l. 8, 9. yet he had many sore conflicts with the sense and apprehension of God's wrath for sin, and that desertion he was then under, as to any cheering influences of his love and presence.

For the rest of his faculties, he was not only under the pressure of the most perplexing, grievous, and burdensome passions, that human nature is obnoxious unto, as, 1. Heaviness; 'His soul was heavy unto death;' Matt. xxvi. 37.

2. Grief; no 'sorrow like to his;' Lamen. i. 12.

3. Fear; Heb. v. 7. but also was pressed into a condition, beyond what we have words to express, or names of passions or affections to set it forth by. Hence he is said to be in an agony; Luke xxii. 44. to be amazed; Mark xiv. 33. with the like expressions, intimating a condition miserable and distressed beyond what we are able to comprehend or express.

2. In his name, his repute, or credit, he suffered also. He was numbered amongst transgressors; Isa. liii. 11. Psal. xxii. counted a malefactor, and crucified amongst them; a seducer, a blasphemer, a seditious person, a false prophet, and was cruelly mocked and derided on the cross as an impostor, that saved others, but could not save himself; that pretended to be the Messias, the King of Israel, but could not come down from the cross; laid in the balance with Barrabas, a rogue and a murderer, and rejected for him.

3. In his friends. The 'shepherd was smitten, and the sheep scattered;' Zech. xiii. 7. All his friends distressed, scattered, glad to fly for their lives, or to save themselves by doing the things that were worse than death.

4. In his goods, even all that he had; 'they parted his vests, and cast lots for his vesture;' Psal. xxii. 18. Thus he not in any thing go free; that the curse of the law in

all things might be executed on him; the law curses a man in all his concernments; with the immission and infliction of every thing that is evil, and the subtraction of every thing that is good; that is, with 'pæna sensus, et pæna damni,' as they are called.

In reference to the law, I say, that Christ underwent that very punishment that was threatened in the law, and was due to sinners. The same that we should have undergone, had not our surety done it for us; to clear this briefly observe,

1. That the punishment of the law may be considered two ways.

1. Absolutely in its own nature, as it lies in the law, and the threatening thereof. This in general is called death; Gen. iii. 15. Ezek. xv. 4. Rom. v. 12. And by way of aggravation, because of its comprising the death of body and soul, 'death unto death;' 2 Cor. ii. 16. and the second death; Rev. xx. 14. and the curse; Deut. xxvii. 29. and Matt. xxv. 41. and wrath, &c. Hence we are said to be delivered from wrath to come; 1 Thess. i. 10. Rom. ii. 5. wrath, or the day of wrath, and in innumerable other places; all which are set out in many metaphorical expressions by those things which are to the nature of man most dreadful; as of a lake with fire and brimstone; of Tophet, whose pile is much wood, and the like.

Of this punishment in general there are two parts.

1. Loss, or separation from God, expressed in these words, 'Depart from me;' Matt. vii. 23. 'Go ye cursed;' Matt. xxv. 41. as also 2 Thess. i. 9.

2. Sense or pain, whence it is called fire; as 2 Thess. i. 9. Torments, &c. All this we say Christ underwent, as shall be farther manifested.

2. Punishment of the law may be considered relatively to its subject, or the person punished, and that in two regards.

1. In reference to its own attendencies, and necessary consequents, as it falls upon the persons to be punished; and these are two.

1. 'That it be a worm that dieth not;' Matt. ix. 44. Isa. lxvi. 24.

2. That it be a fire, not to be quenched; that it be ever-

lasting, that its torments be eternal; and both these, I say, attend and follow the punishment of the law, on the account of its relation to the persons punished; for,

1. The worm is from the inbeing, and everlasting abiding of a man's own sin; that tormenting anguish of conscience, which shall perplex the damned to eternity, attends their punishment merely from their own sin inherent; this Christ could not undergo. The worm attends not sin imputed, but sin inherent; especially not sin imputed to him who underwent it willingly. It being the cruciating vexation of men's own thoughts, kindled by the wrath of God against themselves, about their own sin.

2. That this worm never dies, that this fire can never be quenched, but abides for ever, is also from the relation of punishment to a finite creature that is no more. Eternity is not absolutely in the curse of the law, but as a finite creature is cursed thereby. If a sinner could at once admit upon himself that which is equal in divine justice to his offence, and so make satisfaction, there might be an end of his punishment in time. But a finite, and every way limited creature, having sinned his eternity in this world, against an eternal and infinite God, must abide by it for ever. This was Christ free from; the dignity of his person was such, as that he could fully satisfy divine justice, in a limited season; after which, God in justice loosed the pains of death, for it was impossible he should be detained thereby, Acts ii. 24. and that because he was able to swallow up death into victory.

2. Punishment, as it relates to the persons punished, may be also considered in respect of the effects which it produceth in them which are not in the punishment absolutely considered, and these are generally two.

1. Repining against God, and blaspheming of him; as in that type of hell; Isa. viii. 20. This is evil, or sin in itself, which punishment is not. It is from the righteous God, who will do no iniquity. This proceeds from men's hatred of God. They hate him in this world, when he doth them good, and blesses them with many mercies; how much more will their hatred be increased, when they shall be cut off from all favour or mercy whatever, and never enjoy one drop of refreshment from him. They hate him, his justice, yea, his

blessedness, and all his perfections. Hence they murmur, repine, and blaspheme him. Now this must needs be infinitely remote from him, who in love to his Father, and his Father's glory, underwent this punishment. He was loved of the Father, and loved him, and willingly drank of this cup, which poisons the souls of sinners with wrath and revenge.

2. Despair in themselves; their hopes being cut off to eternity, there remaining no more sacrifice for sin, they are their own tormentors with everlastingly perplexing despair. But this our Saviour was most remote from; and that because he believed he should have a glorious issue of the trial he underwent; Heb. xii. 2. Isa. l. 8.

But as to the punishment that is threatened in the law, in itself considered, Christ underwent the same that the law threatened, and which we should have undergone. For,

1. The law threatened death; Gen. iii. 15. Ezek. xviii. 4. and he tasted death for us; Heb. ii. 9. Psal. xxii. 7, 8. The punishment of the law is the curse; Deut. xxvii. 29. and he was made a curse; Gal. iii. 13. The law threatened loss of the love and the favour of God, and he lost it; Psal. xxii. 1.

To say that the death threatened by the law was one, and that Christ underwent another, that eternal, this temporal, and so also of the curse, and desertion threatened (besides what shall be said afterward) would render the whole business of our salvation unintelligible, as being revealed in terms equivocal, no where explained.

2. There is not the least intimation in the whole book of God, of any change of the punishment, in reference to the surety from what it was, or should have been, in respect of the sinner. God made all 'our iniquities to meet on him;' that is (as hath been declared), the punishment due to them. Was it the same punishment or another? Did we deserve one punishment, and Christ undergo another? Was it the sentence of the law, that was executed on him, or was it some other thing, that he was obnoxious to? It is said, that he was 'made under the law;' Gal. iv. 4. that sin was 'condemned in his flesh;' Rom. viii. 3. that 'God spared him not;' Rom. viii. 31. that he 'tasted death;' that he was 'made a curse;' all relating to the law: that he suffered more or less there is no mention.

It is strange to me, that we should deserve one punishment, and he who is punished for us, undergo another; yet both of them be constantly described by the same names and titles. If God laid the punishment of our sins on Christ, certainly it was the punishment that was due to them; mention is every where made of a commutation of persons, the just suffering for the unjust, the sponsor for the offender, his name as a surety being taken into the obligation, and the whole debt required of him; but of a change of punishment, there is no mention at all. And there is this desperate consequence that will be made readily, upon a supposal that any less than the curse of the law and death, in the nature of it eternal, was inflicted on Christ, namely, that God indeed is not such a sore revenger of sin, as in the Scripture he is proposed to be; but can pass it by in the way of compositions on much easier terms.

3. The punishment due to us, that is in the 'curse of the law,' consists, as was said, of two parts.

1. Loss, or separation from God.

2. Sense, from the infliction of the evil threatened; and both these did our Saviour undergo.

For the first, it is expressed of him, Psal. xxii. 1. and he actually complains of it himself, Matt. xxvii. 46. and of this cry for a while, he says, 'O my God, I cry in the day-time and thou hearest not;' Psal. xxii. 2. until he gives out that grievous complaint, ver. 15. 'My strength is dried up like a potsherd;' which cry he pressed so long with strong cries and supplications, until he was 'heard and delivered from what he feared;' Heb. v. 7. They who would invent evasions for this express complaint of our Saviour, that he was deserted and forsaken, as that he spake it in reference to his church, or of his own, being left to the power and malice of the Jews, do indeed little less than blaspheme him; and say he was not forsaken of God, when himself complains that he was. Forsaken, I say, not by the disjunction of his personal union; but as to the communication of effects of love and favour, which is the desertion that the damned lie under in hell. And for his being forsaken, or given up to the hands of men, was that it which he complained of? Was whereof he was afraid? Which he was troubled at? he sweat blood under the consideration of? and had

need of an angel to comfort and support him? Was he so much in courage and resolution below those many thousands who joyfully suffered the same things for him? If he was only forsaken to the power of the Jews; it must be so. Let men take heed how they give occasion of blaspheming the holy and blessed name of the Son of God.

[b]Vaninus, that grand Atheist, who was burned for atheism at Tholouse in France, all the way as he went to the stake did nothing but insult over the friars that attended him; telling them, that their Saviour when he was led to death did sweat and tremble, and was in an agony. But he upon the account of reason, whereunto he sacrificed his life, went with boldness and cheerfulness. God visibly confuted his blasphemy, and at the stake he not only trembled and quaked, but roared with horror. But let men take heed how they justify the atheistical thoughts of men, in asserting our blessed Redeemer to have been cast into that miserable and deplorable condition, merely with the consideration of a temporary death, which perhaps the thieves that were crucified with him did not so much tremble at.

2. For 'pæna sensus:' from what hath been spoken it is sufficiently manifest what he underwent on this account. To what hath been delivered before, of his being 'bruised, afflicted, broken' of God from Isa. liii. although he was taken from 'prison, and judgment,' or everlasting condemnation; ver. 8. add but this one consideration of what is affirmed of him, that he 'tasted death for us,' Heb. ii. 9. and this will be cleared. What death was it he tasted? The death that had the curse attending it; Gal. iii. 13. 'He was made a curse;' and what death that was himself declares,

[b] Vidi ego dum plaustro per ora vulgi traducitur, illudentem Theologo e Franciscanis, cujus cura mollire ferocitatem animi obstinati. Lucilius ferocitate contumax, dum in patibulum traditus, monachi solatium aspernatus objectam crucem aversatur, Christoque illudit in hæc eadem verba; illi in extremis præ timore imbellis sudor, ego imperterritus morior. Falso sane imperterritum se dixit sceletus homo, quem vidimus dejectum animo, philosophia uti pessime, cujus se mentiebatur professorem. Erat illi in extremis aspectus ferox et horridus, inquieta mens, anxium quodcunque loquebatur: et quanquam philosophicè mori se clamabat identidem, finisse ut brutum nemo negaverit. Antequam rogo subderetur ignis: jussus sacrilegam linguam cultro submittere, negat, neque exerit, nisi forcipum vi apprehensam carnifex ferro abscindit: non alias vociferatio horridior: diceres mugire ictum bovem, &c. Hic Lucilii Vanini finis, cui quanta constantia fuerit, probat belluinus in morte clamor. Vidi ego in custodia, vidi in patibulo, videram antequam subiret vincula: flagitiosus in libertate, et voluptatum sectator avidus, in carcere Catholicus, in extremis omni philosophiæ præsidio destitutus, amens moritur. Gramon. Histor. Gal. lib. 3. ad An. 1619.

Matt. xxv. 41. where, calling men accursed, he cries 'go into everlasting fire:' you that are obnoxious to the law, go to the punishment of hell; yea, and that curse which he underwent, Gal. iii. 13. is opposed to the blessing of Abraham, ver. 14. or the blessing promised him, which was doubtless life eternal.

And to make it yet more clear, it was by death, that he delivered us from death; Heb. ii. 14, 15. and if he died only a temporal death, he delivered us only from temporal death, as a punishment. But he shews us what death he delivered us from, and consequently what death he underwent for us, John viii. 51. 'He shall never see death; that is, eternal death, for every believer shall see death temporal.

On these considerations it is evident, that the sufferings of Christ in relation to the law, were the very same that were threatened to sinners, and which we should have undergone, had not our surety undertaken the work for us. Neither was there any difference in reference to God the judge, and the sentence of the law, but only this, that the same person who offended, did not suffer: and that those consequences of the punishment inflicted, which attend the offenders' own suffering, could have no place in him; but this being not the main of my present design, I shall no farther insist on it.

Only I marvel, that any should think to implead this truth of Christ's suffering the same that we did, by saying that Christ's obligation to punishment was 'sponsionis propriæ,' ours 'violatæ legis.' As though it were the manner how Christ came to be obnoxious to punishment, and not what punishment he underwent, that is asserted when we say, that he underwent the same that we should have done. But as to say, that Christ became obnoxious to punishment the same way that we do, or did, that is, by sin of his own, is blasphemy: so to say he did not upon his own voluntary undertaking undergo the same, is little less. It is true, Christ was made sin for us, had our sin imputed to him, not his own; was obliged to answer for our fault, not his own; but he was obliged to answer what we should have done: but hereof elsewhere.

CHAP. XXVII.

Of the covenant between the Father and the Son, the ground and foundation of this dispensation of Christ's being punished for us, and in our stead.

THE fourth thing considerable, is the ground of this dispensation of Christ's being punished for us, which also hath influence into his whole mediation on our behalf. This is that compact, covenant, convention, and agreement, that was between the Father and the Son, for the accomplishment of the work of our redemption by the mediation of Christ, to the praise of the glorious grace of God.

The will of the Father, appointing and designing the Son to be the head, husband, deliverer, and redeemer of his elect, his church, his people, whom he did foreknow, with the will of the Son voluntarily, freely undertaking that work, and all that was required thereunto, is that compact (for in that form it is proposed in the Scripture), that we treat of.

It being so proposed, so we call it; though there be difficulty in its explication. Rabbi Ruben, in Galatinus, says of Isa. lxvi. 15. that if the Scripture had not said it, it had not been lawful to have said it, but being written, it may be spoken, "'in fire, or by fire is the Lord judged;' for it is not *Sophet*, that is, 'judging,' but *Misphet*, that is, 'is judged:' which by some is applied to Christ, and the fire he underwent in his suffering. However the rule is safe, that which is written may be spoken; for, for that end was it written: God in his word teaching us how we should speak of him; so it is in this matter.

It is true, the will of God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, is but one. It is a natural property, and where there is but one nature, there is but one will: but in respect of their distinct personal actings, this will is appropriated to them respectively; so that the will of the Father, and the will of the Son, may be considered in this business. Which though essentially one and the same, yet in their distinct personality it is distinctly considered, as the will of the Fa-

ther, and the will of the Son; notwithstanding the unity of essence, that is between the Father and the Son, yet is the work distinctly carried on by them, so that the same God judges and becomes surety, satisfieth and is satisfied, in these distinct persons.

Thus though this covenant be eternal, and the object of it be that which might not have been, and so it hath the nature of the residue of God's decrees in those regards; yet, because of this distinct acting of the will of the Father, and the will of the Son, with regard to each other, it is more than a decree, and hath the proper nature of a covenant, or compact. Hence from the moment of it, I speak not of time, there is a new habitude of will in the Father and Son towards each other, that is not in them essentially; I call it new, as being in God freely, not naturally. And hence was the salvation of men before the incarnation, by the undertaking, mediation, and death of Christ. That the saints under the Old Testament were saved by Christ, at present I take for granted. That they were saved by virtue of a mere decree, will not be said. From hence was Christ esteemed to be incarnate, and to have suffered; or the fruits of his incarnation and suffering could not have been imputed to any; for the thing itself being denied, the effects of it are not.

The revelation of this covenant is in the Scripture, not that it was then constituted, when it is first mentioned in the promises and prophecies of Christ, but then first declared or revealed. Christ was declared to be the Son of God, by the resurrection from the dead; but he was so from eternity. As in other places as shall be evinced, so in Isa. liii. is this covenant mentioned; in which chapter there is this prophetical scheme; the covenant between Father and Son, which was past, is spoken of as to come; and the sufferings of Christ, which were to come, are spoken of as past, as appears to every one that but reads the chapter. It is also signally ascribed to Christ's coming into the world: not constitutively, but declaratively. It is the greatest folly about such things as these, to suppose them then done, when revealed, though revealed in expressions of doing them. These things being premised, I proceed to manifest how this covenant is in the Scripture declared.

Now this convention or agreement, as elsewhere, so it is most clearly expressed, Heb. x. from Psal. xl. 'Lo, I come to do thy will O God.' And what will? ver. 10. 'The will by which we are sanctified, through the offering of the body of Jesus once for all.' The will of God was, that Jesus should be offered; and to this end, that we might be sanctified and saved: it is called the 'offering of the body of Jesus,' in answer to what was said before, 'a body hast thou prepared me;' or a human nature, by a synecdoche. My will, says God the Father, is, that thou have a body, and that that body be offered up, and that to this end, that the children, the elect might be sanctified: says the Son to this, 'Lo, I am come to do thy will.' I accept of the condition, and give up myself to the performance of thy will.

To make this more distinctly evident, the nature of such a compact, agreement, or convention, as depends on personal service, such as this, may be a little considered.

There are five things required to the complete establishing and accomplishing of such a compact and agreement: 1. That there be sundry persons, two at least, namely, a promiser and undertaker, agreeing[b] voluntarily together in counsel and design, for the accomplishment, and bringing about some common end, acceptable to them both, so agreeing together; being both to do somewhat, that they are not otherwise obliged to do, there must be some common end agreed on by them, wherein they are delighted; and if they do not both voluntarily agree to what is on each hand incumbent to do, it is no covenant or compact, but an imposition of one upon the other.

2. That the person promising, who is the principal engager in the covenant, do require something at the hand of the other, to be done or undergone, wherein he is concerned. He is to prescribe something to him, which is the condition, whereon the accomplishment of the end aimed at, is to depend.

3. That he make to him who doth undertake such promises as are necessary for his supportment and encouragement, and which may fully balance in his judgment and esteem, all that is required of him, or prescribed to him.

4. That upon the weighing, and consideration of the

[b] Nec dari quicquam necesse est, ut substantiam capiat obligatio; sed sufficit eos qui negotia gerunt consentire. Institut. l. 3. de oblig. ex consensu.

condition and promise, the duty and reward prescribed and engaged for, as formerly mentioned, the undertaker do voluntarily address himself to the one, and expect the accomplishment of the other.

5. That the accomplishment of the condition, being[c] pleaded by the undertaker, and approved by the promiser, the common end originally designed, be brought about and established.

These five things are required, to the entering into, and complete accomplishment of such a covenant, convention, or agreement, as is built on personal performances; and they are all eminently expressed in the Scripture, to be found in the compact between the Father and the Son, whereof we speak, as upon the consideration of the severals will appear.

On the account of these things, found at least virtually and effectually, in this agreement of the Father and Son, we call it a covenant; not with respect to the Latin word 'fœdus,' and the precise use of it, but to the Hebrew ברית, and the Greek διαθήκη, whose signification and use alone is to be attended to, in the business of any covenant of God; and in what a large sense they are used, is known to all that understand them, and have made inquiry into their import. The rise of the word 'fœdus,' is properly paganish and superstitious; and the legal use of it, strict to a mutual engagement, upon valuable considerations; the form of its entrance, by the sacrifice and killing of a hog, is related in Polybius, Livius, Virgil, and others. The general words used in it were;[d] 'Ita fœde me percutiat magnus Jupiter, ut fœde hunc

[c] "Οπερ ὑπροσχίσθην σοι, ἴχεις προσδικτον; ἴχω· Formula Jur. institut. lib. 3. c. Tollitur. §. item per. Numerius Nigidius interrogavit Aulum Augerium: Quicquid tibi hodierno die, per aquilianam stipulationem spopondi, id ne omne habes acceptum. Respondit Aulus Augerius, habeo, acceptumque tuli. ibid.

[d] Fœcialis sumpto in manibus lapide, postquam de fœdere inter partes convenerat, hæc verba dixit, Si recte ac sine dolo malo, hoc fœdus atque hoc jusjurandum facio, dii mihi cuncta felicia præstent; sin aliter aut ago, aut cogito, cæteris omnibus salvis, in propriis legibus, in propriis laribus, in propriis templis, in propriis sepulchris, solus ego peream, ut hic lapis de manibus meis decidet. Polyb. lib. 3. Audi Jupiter, audi pater patrate, ut illa palam prima postrema, ex illis tabulis recitata sunt sine dolo malo, utque ea his hodie rectissime intellecta sunt; illis legibus populus Romanus prior non deficiet; si prior defecerit publico consilio, dolo malo, tu ille diespiter, populum Romanum sic ferito, ut ego hunc porcum hodie feriam; tantoque magis ferito quanto magis potes, pollesque id ubi dixit, porcum saxo silice percussit. Livius.

Armati, Jovis ante aras, paterasque tenentes
Stabant: et cæsa jungebant fœdera porca.—Virg. Æn. viii. 640.

Ad quem locum Servius: fœdera dicta sunt, a porca fœde et crudeliter occisa: nam cum ante gladiis configeretur, a fecialibus inventum, ut silice feriretur, ea causa quod antiquum Jovis signum, lapidis silicem putaverunt esse.

porcum macto, si pactum fœderis non servavero,' whence is that phrase of one in danger; 'sto inter sacrum et saxum.' The hog being killed with a stone; so 'fœdus' is 'a feriendo.'

Though sometimes even that word be used in a very large sense, for any orderly disposed government; as in the poet:

——Regemque dedit, qui fœdere certo
Et premere, et laxas sciret dare jussus habenas, &c.—Virg. Æn. 1. 62.

But unto the signification and laws hereof, in this business, we are not bound: it sufficeth for our present intendment, that the things mentioned be found virtually in this compact, which they are.

1. There are the Father and the Son, as distinct persons agreeing together in counsel, for the accomplishment of the common end; the glory of God, and the salvation of the elect. The end is expressed, Heb. ii. 9, 10. xii. 1. Now thus it was, Zech. vi. 13. and the 'counsel of peace shall be between them both,' "inter ambos ipsos." That is the two persons spoken of, not the two offices there intimated, that shall meet in Christ; and who are these? The Lord Jehovah, who speaks, and the man whose name is צמח the 'branch,' ver. 12. who is to 'do all the great things' there mentioned. 'He shall grow up,' &c. But the counsel of peace, the design of our peace, is between them both; they have agreed and consented to the bringing about of our peace. Hence is that name of the Son of God, Isa. ix. 6. 'Wonderful Counsellor.' It is in reference to the business there spoken of, that he is so called. This is expressed at the beginning of the verse; 'to us a child is born, to us a Son is given;' to what end that was is known; namely, that he might be a Saviour or a Redeemer; whence he is afterward called the 'everlasting Father, the Prince of peace;' that is, a Father to his church and people, in everlasting mercy; the grand Author of their peace, that procured it for them, and established it unto them. Now as to this work, that he who is אל גבור 'the mighty God,' might be בן נתן 'a Son given, a Child born;' and carry on a work of mercy and peace towards his church, is he called the wonderful Counsellor, as concurring in the counsel and design of his Father, and with him, to this end and purpose. Therefore, when he comes to

suffer in the carrying on of this work, God calls him his fellow, עמיתי, my 'neighbour' in counsel and advise, as David describes[f] his fellow or companion; Psal. lv. 14. 'We took sweet counsel together.' He was the fellow of the Lord of hosts, on this account that they took counsel together about the work of our salvation to the glory of God. Prov. viii. 21 to 31. makes this evident: that it is the Lord Jesus Christ, the eternal word, and wisdom of the Father, who is here intended, was before evinced. What then is here said of him? 'I was daily the delight of God, rejoicing before him, rejoicing in the habitable parts of the earth, and my delight was in the sons of men.' When was this, that the wisdom of God the Father did so rejoice before him, on the account of the sons of men, ver. 24, 25. 'When there was no depth, when there were no fountains abounding with water, before the mountains were settled,' &c. 'whilst as yet he had not made the earth,' &c. But how could this be? Namely, by the counsel of peace, that was between them both, which is the delight of the soul of God, and wherein both Father and Son rejoice.

The first thing then is manifest; that there was a voluntary concurrence, and distinct consent of the Father and Son, for the accomplishment of the work of our peace, and bringing us to God.

2. For the accomplishment of this work, the Father who is principal in the covenant, the promiser, whose love 'sets all on work,' as is frequently expressed in the Scripture, requires of the Lord Jesus Christ his Son, that he shall do that which upon consideration of his justice, glory, and honour, was necessary to be done, for the bringing about the end proposed; prescribing to him a law for the performance thereof; which is called his will so often in Scripture.

What it was that was required, is expressed both negatively and positively.

1. Negatively, that he should not do, or bring about this work, by any of those sacrifices that had been appointed to make atonement 'suo more,' and to typify out what was by him really to be performed. This the Lord Jesus professeth at the entrance of his work when he addresses himself to the doing of that which was indeed required. 'Sacrifice and

[f] Zech. xiii. 7.

burnt-offerings, &c. thou wouldest not have.' He was not to offer any of the sacrifices that had been offered before, as at large hath been recounted: it was the will of God that by them, he, and what he was to do, should be shadowed out and represented; whereupon, at his coming to his work, they were all to be abrogated. Nor was he to bring silver or gold for our redemption, according to the contrivance of the poor convinced sinner, Mic. vii. 6. but he was to tender God another manner of price; 1 Pet. i. 18.

He was to do that which the old sacrifices could not do, as hath been declared. 'For it was not possible that the blood of bulls and goats should take away sins;' Heb. x. 5. ἀφαιρεῖν ἁμαρτίας, quod supra ἀθετεῖν et ἀναφέρειν est extinguere peccata, sive facere ne ultra peccetur; id sanguis Christi facit, tum quia fidem in nobis parit, tum quia Christo jus dat nobis auxilia necessaria impetrandi.' Grot. in Loc. Falsely and injuriously to the blood of Christ. Ἀφαιρεῖν ἁμαρτίας, is no where in the Scripture, to cause men to 'cease to sin;' it never respects properly what is to come, but what is past. The apostle treats not of sanctification, but of justification. The taking away of sins he insists on, is such, as that the sinner should no more be troubled in conscience for the guilt of them: ver. 2. The typical taking away of sins by sacrifices, was by making atonement with God principally, not by turning men from sin, which yet was a consequent of them. The blood of Christ takes away sin, as to their guilt, by justification, and not only as to their filthy sanctification. This purification also by blood, he expounds in his annotations, chap. ix. 14. 'Sanguini autem purgatio ista tribuitur, quia per sanguinem, id est, mortem Christi, secato ejus excitatione, et evectione, gignitur in nobis fides,' Rom. iii. 25. 'quæ deinde fides corda purgat.' Acts xv. 19. The meaning of these words is evident to all that have their senses exercised in these things. The aversion of the expiation of our sins, by the way of satisfaction and atonement, is that which is aimed at. Now because the annotator saw, that the comparison insisted on with the sacrifices of old, would not admit of this gloss. He adds, 'Similitudo autem purgationis legalis, et evangelicæ, non est in modo purgandi sed ineffectu.' Than which nothing is more false, nor more directly contrary to the apostle's discourse, chap. ix. x.

2. Positively, and here, to lay aside the manner how he was to do it, which relates to his office of priest, and prophet, and king, the conditions imposed upon him may be referred to three heads.

1. That he should take on him the nature of those, whom he was to bring to God. This is as it were prescribed to him; Heb. x. 5. 'a body hast thou prepared me;' or 'appointed,' that I should be made flesh, take a body therein to do thy will. And the apostle sets out the infinite love of the Son of God, in that he condescended to this inexpressible exinanition, and eclipsing of his glory; Phil. ii. 6, 7. 'being in the form of God, and equal to God, he made himself of no reputation, but took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of man;' or made a man. He did it upon his Father's prescription, and in pursuit of what God required at his hands. Hence it is said, 'God sent forth his Son, made of a woman;' Gal. iv. 4. and 'God sent his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh;' Rom. viii. 3. and properly in answer to this of the Father's appointing him a body, is it that the Son answers, 'Lo I come to do thy will.' I will do it, I will undertake it; that the great desirable end may be brought about, as we shall see afterward. So Heb. xiv. 15. And though I see no sufficient reason of relinquishing the usual interpretation of σπέρματος Αβραὰμ ἐπιλαμβάνεται, Heb. ii. 16. yet if it be 'apprehendit,' and expressive of the effect; not 'assumpsit,' relating to the way of his yielding us assistance and deliverance, the same thing is intimated.

2. That in this 'body' or human nature, he should be a 'servant,' or yield obedience; hence God calls him his servant; Isa. xlii. 1. 'Behold my servant whom I uphold,' and that this was also the condition prescribed to him, our Saviour acknowledges; Isa. xlix. 5. 'Now saith the Lord that formed me from the womb to be his servant;' and in pursuit hereof, Christ takes upon him the 'form of a servant; Phil. ii. 6. and this is his perpetual profession, 'I come to do the will of him that sent me.'

'And this commandment I have received of my Father.' So 'though he were a Son yet learned he obedience.' All along in the carrying on of his work he professes that this condition was by his Father prescribed him, that he

should be his servant, and yield him obedience, in the work he had in hand. Hence he says, his Father is 'greater than he,' not only in respect of his humiliation, but also in respect of the dispensation whereunto he as the Son of God submitted himself to perform his will, and yield him obedience. And this God declares to be the condition whereon he will deliver man;[h] Job xxxiii. 23. If there be a messenger (a servant) one of a thousand to undertake for him, it shall be so, I will say, deliver man; otherwise not.

3. That he should suffer and undergo what in justice is due to him, that he was to deliver. A hard and great prescription; yet such as must be undergone, that there may be a consistence of the justice and truth of God, with the salvation of man. This is plainly expressed Isa. liii. 10. 'When thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin,' or rather 'if his soul shall make an offering for sin, then he shall see his seed, he shall prolong his days, and the pleasure of the Lord shall prosper in his hands.' As if he should say, if this work be brought about, and if the counsel of peace which we have consented in, be carried on, if my pleasure therein be to prosper, thou must make thy soul an offering for sin. And that this was required of our Saviour, himself fully expresses even in his agony, when praying for the removal of the cup, he submits to the drinking of it, in these words: 'Thy will O Father be done;' this is that, which thou wilt have me do; which thou hast prescribed unto me, even that 'I drink of this cup,' wherein he 'tasted of death,' and which comprised the whole of his sufferings; and this is the third thing in this convention and agreement.

4. Promises are made upon the supposition of undertaking that which was required; and these of all sorts, that might either concern the person that did undertake, or the accomplishment of the work that he did undertake.

1. For the person himself that was to undertake, or the Lord Jesus Christ, seeing there was much difficulty, and great opposition to be passed through, in what he was to do and undergo; promises of the assistance of his Father by his presence with him, and carrying him through all perplexities and trials, are given to him in abundance. Some of these you have Isa. xlii. 4. 'He shall not faint, nor be discouraged,

[g] John xiv. 28. [h] Vid. Cocceium in locum. [i] אם יש עליו מליץ

until he hath set judgment in the earth.' And ver. 6. 'I the Lord have called thee in righteousness, and will hold thy hand, and will keep thee, and give thee a covenant of the people.' Whatever opposition thou mayst meet withal, I will hold thee, and keep thee, and preserve thee, 'I will not leave thy soul in hell, nor suffer thine holy one to see corruption;' Psal. xvi. 3. So Psal. lxxxix. 28. 'My mercy will I keep for him evermore, and my covenant shall stand fast with him.' And hence was our blessed Saviour's confidence in his greatest trial. Isa. l. 5—9. ver. 5, 6. our Saviour expresses his undertaking, and what he suffered herein, ver. 7—9. The assistance that he was promised of his Father in this great trial, on the account whereof he despises all his enemies with full assurance of success; even upon the Father's engaged promise of his presence with him. This is the first sort of promises made to Christ in this convention, which concern himself directly; that he should not be forsaken in his work, but carried through, supported, and upheld, until he were come forth to full success, and had sent 'forth judgment into victory.' Hence in his greatest trial, he makes his address to God himself, on the account of these promises, to be delivered from that 'which he feared;' Heb. v. 7. Who in the days, &c. So Psal. lxxxix. 27, 28.

2. There were promises in this compact that concerned the work itself, that Christ undertook; namely, that if he did what was required of him, not only that he should be preserved in it, but also, that the work itself should thrive and prosper in his hand. So Isa. liii. 10, 11. 'When thou shalt make,' &c. Whatever he aimed at is here promised to be accomplished; the pleasure of the Lord shall prosper; the design of Father and Son for the accomplishment of our salvation, shall prosper. He shall 'see his seed,' a seed of believers shall be raised up, that shall 'prolong their days;' that is, the seed shall prolong, or continue whilst the sun and moon endure: all the elect shall be justified and saved. Satan shall be conquered, and the spoil delivered from him. And this our Saviour comforts himself withal in his 'greatest distress;' Psal. xxii. 30, 31. and for this glory that 'was before him,' the glory of 'bringing many sons to glory,' as promised to him, 'He despised the shame and cross;' Heb. xii. 2. So also Isa. xlii. 1, 2.

And this is the third thing in this compact, he who prescribes the hard conditions of incarnation, obedience, and death, doth also make the glorious promises of preservation, protection, and success. And to make these promises the more eminent, God confirms them solemnly by an oath; he is consecrated an high-priest for evermore, by the 'word of the oath;' Heb. vii. 28. 'The Lord sware and will not repent, thou art a priest for ever,' &c.

4. The Lord Jesus Christ accepts of the condition and the promise, and voluntarily undertakes the work. Psal. iv. 7, 8. 'Then said I, lo, I come to do thy will, yea, I delight to do thy will, O my God; yea, thy law is within my heart.' He freely, willingly, cheerfully, undertakes to do and suffer whatever it was the will of his Father that he should do, or suffer, for the bringing about the common end aimed at. He undertakes to be the Father's servant in this work. And says to the Lord, 'thou art my Lord;' Psal. xvi. 2. thou art he, to whom I am to yield obedience, to submit to thee in this work. 'Mine ear hast thou bored, and I am thy servant.' I am not rebellious, I do not withdraw from it; Isa. l. 8. Hence the apostle tells us that this mind was in him; that whereas he was in the 'form of God, he humbled himself to the death of the cross;' Phil. ii. 8. and so by his own voluntary consent he came under the law of the Mediator, which afterward as he would not, so he could not decline. He made himself surety of the covenant, and so was to pay what he never took. He voluntarily engaged himself into this sponsion; but when he had so done, he was legally subject to all that attended it; when he had put his name into the obligation, he became responsible for the whole debt, and all that he did or suffered, comes to be called obedience which relates to the law that he was subject to: having engaged himself to his Father, and said to the Lord, 'Thou art my Lord, lo, I come to do thy will.'

5. The fifth and last thing is, that on the one side, the promiser do approve and accept of the performance of the condition prescribed, and the undertaker demand, and lay claim to the promises made, and thereupon the common end designed be accomplished and fulfilled. All this also is fully manifest in this compact or convention. God the Father he accepts of the performance of what was to the

Son prescribed. This God fully declares Isa. xlix. 5, 6. 'And now saith the Lord that formed me from the womb to be his servant, to bring Jacob again to him, though Israel be not gathered, yet shall I be glorious in the eyes of the Lord, and my God shall be my strength. And he said, it is a light thing that thou shouldest be my servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to restore the preserved of Israel: I will also give thee for a light to the Gentiles, that thou mayest be my salvation to the ends of the earth.' And eminently ver. 8, 9. 'Thus saith the Lord, in an acceptable time have I heard thee: and in a day of salvation have I helped thee and I will preserve thee and give thee for a covenant of the people, to establish the earth to cause to inherit the desolate heritages. That thou mayest say to the prisoners go forth; to them that are in darkness shew yourselves,' &c. Now I have been with thee and helped thee in thy work and thou hast performed it, now thou shalt do all that thy heart, desires according to my promise. Hence that which was originally spoken of the eternal generation of the Son; Psal. ii. 7. 'Thou art my Son this day have I begotten thee,' is applied by the apostle to his resurrection from the dead. Acts xiii. 33. 'God hath fulfilled his word unto us, in that he hath raised up Jesus from the dead,' as it is also written in Psal. ii. 'Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee.' That is, God by the resurrection from the dead, gloriously manifested him to be his Son, whom he loved, in whom he was well pleased, and who did all his pleasure. So Rom. i. 4. 'He was declared to be the Son of God with power, by the resurrection from the dead.' Then was he declared to be the Son of God. God approving and accepting the work he had done, loosed the pains of death, and raised him again, manifesting to all the world his approbation and acceptation of him and his work. Whence he immediately says to him, Psal. ii. 8. 'Ask of me, and I will give thee the heathen for thine inheritance;' now ask what thou wilt, whatever I have promised, whatever thou didst, or couldest expect upon thy undertaking this work, it shall be done, it shall be granted thee. And,

2. Christ accordingly makes his demand solemnly on earth, and in heaven; on earth John xvii. throughout the whole chapter is the demand of Christ, for the accomplish-

ment of the whole compact, and all the promises that were made to him, when he undertook to be a Saviour, both which concerned himself and his church; see ver. 1. 4—6. 9. 12—16, &c. and in heaven also; he is gone into the presence of God, there to appear for us, Heb. ix. 24. and is able to 'save to the uttermost them that came to God by him, seeing he liveth for ever, to make intercession for them;' Heb. vii. 25. not as in the days of his flesh, with strong cries and supplications, but by virtue of his oblation, laying claim to the promised inheritance in our behalf. And,

3. The whole work is accomplished, and the end intended brought about; for in the death of Christ he 'finished the transgression and made an end of sin, and made reconciliation for iniquity, and brought in everlasting righteousness;' Dan. ix. 24. and of sinful man, God says, deliver him, 'for I have found a ransom;' Job xxxiii. 24. Hence our reconciliation, justification, yea, our salvation, are in the Scripture spoken of, as things actually done and accomplished, in the death and bloodshedding of Jesus Christ, not as though we were all then actually justified and saved, but upon the account of the certainty of the performance, and accomplishment of those things in their due time towards us, and upon us, are these things so delivered; for in reference to the undertaking of Christ in this covenant, is he called the second Adam, becoming a common head to his people, with this difference; that Adam was a common head to all that came of him, necessarily, and as I may so say, naturally, and whether he would or no; Christ is so to his, voluntarily, and by his own consent and undertaking, as hath been demonstrated; now as we all die in Adam federally and meritoriously, yet the several individuals are not in their persons actually dead in sin, and obnoxious to eternal death, before they are by natural generation united to Adam, their first head; so, though all the elect be made alive, and saved federally and meritoriously, in the death of Christ, wherein also a certain foundation is laid of that efficacy, which works all these things in us, and for us, yet we are not *viritim* made partakers of the good things mentioned, before we are united to Christ, by the communication of his Spirit to us.

And this, I say, is the covenant and compact, that was

between Father and Son, which is the great foundation of what hath been said, and shall farther be spoken, about the merit and satisfaction of Christ; here lies the ground of the righteousness of the dispensation treated of; that Christ should undergo the punishment due to us, it was done voluntarily of himself; and he did nothing but what he had power to do, and command from his Father to do; 'I have power,' saith he, 'to lay down my life, and power to take it again; this command have I received of my Father;' whereby the glory both of the love, and justice of God is exceedingly exalted. And,

1. This stops the mouth of the Socinian clamour, concerning the unrighteousness of one man's suffering personally, for another man's sin. It is true, it is so; if these men be not in such relation to one another, that what one doth or suffereth, the other may be accounted to do or suffer; but it is no unrighteousness, if the hand offend, that the head be smitten; but Christ is our head, we are his members. It is true, if he that suffereth hath not power over that wherein he suffers; but Christ had power to lay down his life, and take it again. It is true, if he that is to suffer, or he that is to punish, be not willing, or agreed to the commutation; but here Father and Son as hath been manifested, were fully agreed upon the whole matter. It may be true, if he who suffers cannot possibly be made partaker of any good afterward, that shall balance, and overweigh all his suffering; not, where the cross is endured, and the shame despised, for the glory proposed, or set before him, that suffers; not where he is made law for a season, that he may be crowned with dignity and honour. And,

2. This is the foundation of the merit of Christ. The apostle tells us, Rom. iv. 4. what merit is; it is such an adjunct of obedience, as whereby the reward is reckoned, not of grace, but of debt. God having proposed a law for obedience unto Christ, with promises of such and such rewards, upon condition of fulfilling the obedience required; he performing that obedience, the reward is reckoned to him of debt, or he righteously merited whatever was so promised to him. Though the compact was of grace, yet the reward is of debt. Look then whatever God promised Christ, upon his undertaking to be a Saviour, that, upon

the fulfilling of his will, he merited; that himself should be exalted, that he should be the head of his church, that he should see his seed, that he should justify and save them, sanctify and glorify them, was all promised to him; all merited by him. But of this more afterward.

Having thus fully considered the threefold notion of the death of Christ, as it was a price, a sacrifice, and a punishment, and discovered the foundation of righteousness in all this; proceed we now to manifest, what are the proper effects of the death of Christ, under this threefold notion; now these also answerably are three.

1. Redemption as it is a price.
2. Reconciliation as it is a sacrifice.
3. Satisfaction as it is a punishment. Upon which foundation, union with Christ, vocation, justification, sanctification, and glory are built.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Of redemption by the death of Christ, as it was a price or ransom.

HAVING given before the general notions of the death of Christ, as it is in Scripture proposed, all tending to manifest the way and manner of the expiation of our sins, and our delivery from the guilt and punishment due to them, it remains, that an accommodation of those several notions of it, be made particularly, and respectively, to the business in hand.

The first consideration proposed of the death of Christ, was of it, as a price; and the issue and effect thereof, is redemption. Hence Christ is spoken of in the Old Testament as a redeemer, Job xix. 25. 'I know that my Redeemer lives;' the word there used is גאל whose rise and use is commonly known.

גאל is 'vindicare redimere,' ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι in Greek which is commonly used for 'suum vindicare;' ὅτι ἄν τις κεκλημένος ᾖ, καὶ μηδεὶς ἐπιλάβηται, ἐὰν οὕτω τὶς ἑνιαυτὸν ὁτιοῦν κεκλημένος-----μὴ ἐξέστω τοιούτου κτήματος ἐπιλάβεσθαι μηδὲν τελέσαντος ἐνιαυτοῦ. Plato de Legib. 12. And that may be

the sense of the word ἐπιλάβετο, if not in the effect, yet in the cause; Heb. ii. 16.

The rise and use of this word, in this business of our deliverance by Christ we have, Lev. xxv. 25. 'if any of his kin come to redeem it.' גאלו הקרב 'redimens illud propinquus;' the next who is *goel* too, [*goel* is to] redeem it, or vindicate the possession out of morgage. On this account Boaz tells Ruth, that in respect of the possession of Elimelech, he was *goel;* Ruth iii. 13. a redeemer, which we have translated, a 'kinsman,' because he was to do that office by right of propinquity of blood, or nearness of kin, as is evident from the law before-mentioned. Christ coming to vindicate us into liberty, by his own blood, is called by Job his *goel;* so also is he termed; Isa. xli. 14. גאלך thy 'redeemer,' or thy next kinsman; and chap. xliv. 6. in that excellent description of Christ, ver. 24. chap. xlvi. 4. xlviii. 17. xlix. 26. liv. 5. lix. 20. lx. 16. lxiii. 16. and in sundry other places; neither is the church of God at all beholding to some late expositors, who, to shew their skill in the Hebrew doctors, would impose upon us their interpretations, and make those expressions to signify deliverance in general, and to be referred to God the Father, seeing that the rise of the use of the word plainly restrains the redemption intended, to the paying of a price for it, which was done only by Jesus Christ; so Jer. xxxii. 7, 8. Hence they that looked for the Messiah, according to the promise, are said to look for, or to wait for λύτρωσιν, 'redemption in Israel;' Luke ii. 28. and in the accomplishment of the promise; the apostle tells us, that Christ by his blood obtained for us eternal redemption; Heb. ix. 12. and he having so obtained it, we are justified freely by the grace of God, διά τῆς ἀπολυτρώσεως τῆς ἐν χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, by the redemption that is in Jesus Christ, ἐν for διὰ, 'in him,' for, 'by him,' or wrought by him; and this being brought home to us, we have redemption through his blood, even the forgiveness of sin; Eph. i. 7. Col. i. 14. whence he is said to be 'made unto us,' ἀπολύτρωσις, or 'redemption;' 1 Cor. i. 30.

How this is done, will be made evident, by applying of what is now spoken, to what was spoken of the death of Christ, as a price; Christ giving himself or his life λύτρον and ἀντίλυτρον, a price of redemption, as hath been shewed,

a ransom; those for whom he did it, become to have λύτρωσιν and ἀπολύτρωσιν, redemption thereby, or deliverance from the captivity wherein they were. And our Saviour expresses particularly, how this was done as to both parts, Matt. xx. 28. He came δοῦναι τὴν ψυχὴν λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν, that is, he came to be an ἀντίψυχος, one to stand in the room of others, and to give his life for them.

To make this the more evident and clear, I shall give a description of redemption properly so called, and make application of it in the several parts thereof, unto that under consideration.

Redemption is the deliverance of any one from bondage or captivity, and the misery attending that condition, by the intervention or interposition of a price or ransom, paid by the redeemer, to him by whose authority he is detained, that being delivered, he may be in a state of liberty, at the disposal of the redeemer.

And this will comprise the laws of this redemption, which are usually given. They are on the part of the redeemer.

1. 'Propinquus esto,' 'Let him be near of kin.'

2. 'Consanguinitatis jure redimito,' 'Let him redeem by right of consanguinity.'

3. 'Injusto possessori prædam eripito;' 'Let him deliver the prey from the unjust possessor.'

4. 'Huic pretium nullum solvito;' 'to him let no price be paid.'

5. 'Sanguinem pro redemptionis pretio vero domino offerto;' 'Let him offer, or give his blood to the true Lord for a ransom, or price of redemption.'

2. On the part of the redeemed.

1. 'Libertatis jure felix gaudeto;' 'Let him enjoy his liberty.'

2. 'Servitutis jugum ne iterum sponte suscipito;' 'Let him not again willingly take on him the yoke of bondage.'

3. 'Deinceps servum se exhibeto redemptori;' 'Let him in liberty be a servant to his redeemer.'

The general parts of this description of redemption, Socinus himself consents unto; for whereas Covel had a little inconveniently defined 'to redeem,' saying, 'Redimere aliquem est debitum solvere creditoris ejus nomine, qui solvendo non erat, sicque satisfacere creditori;' which is a proper

description of the payment of another man's debt, and not of his redemption. Socinus, correcting this mistake, affirms, that, 'Redimere aliquem, nihil aliud proprie significat, quam captivum e manibus illius qui eum detinet pretio illi dato liberare.' 'To redeem any one properly, signifies nothing else, but to deliver him out of his hands that detained him captive, by a price given to him who detained him.' Which as to the general nature of redemption, contains as much as what was before given in for the description of it; (Socin. de Jes. Christo Servatore, lib. 1. part. 2. cap. 1.) With the accommodation, therefore, of that description to the redemption which we have by the blood of Christ, I shall proceed: desiring the reader to remember, that if I evince the redemption we have by Christ to be proper, and properly so called, the whole business of satisfaction is confessedly evinced.

1. The general nature of it consists in deliverance; thence Christ is called ὁ ῥυόμενος, 'the deliverer;' Rom. xi. 26. as it is written, 'there shall come out of Sion the deliverer;' the word in the prophet, Isa. lix. 20. is יגאל that we may know what kind of deliverer Christ is; a deliverer by redemption: he gave himself for our sin, ὅπως ἐξέληται ἡμᾶς, Gal i. 4. 'that he might deliver us:' he delivered us; but it is by giving himself for our sin; 1 Thess. i. 10. 'To wait for his Son from heaven, whom he raised from the dead;' Ἰησοῦν τὸν ῥυόμενον ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς τῆς ἐρχομενῆς, 'Jesus, who delivered us from the wrath to come;' so Luke i. 74. Rom. vii. 6. Heb. ii. 15. Col. i. 13.

Now as redemption, because its general nature consists in deliverance, is often expressed thereby; so deliverance, because it hath the effect of redemption, is, or may be called redemption, though it be not properly so, but agree in the end, and effect only: thence Moses is said to be λυτρωτὴς, Acts vii. 35. τοῦτον ὁ Θεὸς ἄρχοντα καὶ λυτρωτὴν ἀπέστειλεν 'Him did God send a prince, and a redeemer:' that is, a deliverer; one whom God used for the deliverance of his people. And because what he did, even the delivery of his people out of bondage, agreed with redemption in its end, the work itself it called redemption, and he is termed therein a redeemer, though it was not a direct redemption that he wrought; no ransom being paid for delivery.

It is pleaded, that God being said to redeem his people in sundry places in the Old Testament, which he could not possibly do, by a ransom, therefore the redemption mentioned in the Scripture, is metaphorical; a mere deliverance: and such is also that we have by Christ without the intervention of any price.

2. Moses, who was a type of Christ and a redeemer, who is so often said to redeem the people, yet as it is known, did it without any ransom, by a mere deliverance; therefore did Christ so also.

Not to trouble the reader with repetition of words, this is the sum of what is pleaded by the Racovian catechism to prove our redemption by Christ, not to be proper, but metaphorical, and so consequently that no satisfaction can be thence evinced.

'E verbo redimendi non posse effici satisfactionem hanc hinc est planum, quod de ipso Deo in novo et in prisco fœdere scribitur, eum redimisse populum suum ex Egypto, eum fecisse redemptionem populo suo; quod Moses fuerit redemptor, Act. vii. 35. Vox ideo redemptionis, simpliciter liberationem denotat.' Rac. Catec. cap. 8. de Christo.

And indeed what there they speak is the sum of the plea of Socinus as to this part of our description of redemption: 'de Jesu Christo Servatore,' lib. i. part. 2. cap. 1, 2, 3.

To remove these difficulties (if they may be so called) I shall only tender the ensuing considerations.

1. That because redemption is sometimes to be taken metaphorically for mere deliverance, when it is spoken of God without any mention of a price or ransom, in such cases as wherein it was impossible that a ransom should be paid, (as in the deliverance of the children of Israel from Egypt and Pharaoh), when it is expressly said to be done by[a] power, and outstretched arm, therefore it must be so understood, when it is spoken of Christ the Mediator, with express mention of a price or ransom, and when it was impossible but that a ransom must be paid, is a loose consequence, not deserving any notice.

2. That all the places of Scripture, where mention is made of God being a redeemer, and redeeming his people, may be referred unto these heads:

[a] Deut. iv. 34.

1. Such as call God the redeemer of his church in general, as the places before-mentioned; and these are all to be referred immediately to the Son of God (the manner of his redemption being described in the New Testament), and so proper redemption is intended in them; Isa. liv. 5, 6. with Eph. v. 25, 26.

2. Such as mention some temporal deliverance, that was typical of the spiritual redemption, which we have by Jesus Christ; and it it called redemption, not so much from the general nature of deliverance, as from its pointing out to us that real and proper redemption, that was typified by it. Such was God's redeeming his people out of Egypt. So there is no mention of redemption in the Scripture, but either it is proper, or receives that appellation from its relation to that which is so.

3. This is indeed a very wretched and cursed way of interpreting Scripture, especially those passages of it which set out the grace of God, and the love of Christ to us; namely, to do it by way of diminution, and lessening; God takes and uses this word that is of use amongst men; namely, of redemption: saith he, 'Christ hath redeemed you with his own blood, he hath laid down a price for you:' for men to come and interpret this, and say he did it not properly, it was not a complete redemption, but metaphorical, a bare deliverance, is to blaspheme God and the work of his love and grace. It is a safe rule of interpreting Scripture, that in places mentioning the love and grace of God to us, the words are to be taken in their utmost significancy. It is a thing most unworthy a good and wise man, to set out his kindness and benefits with great swelling words, of mighty weight and importance, which when the things signified by them come to be considered, must be interpreted by way of minoration; nor will any worthy man do so. Much less can it be once imagined, that God has expressed his love and kindness, and the fruits of it to us, in great and weighty words, that in their ordinary use and significancy contain a great deal more than really he hath done; for any one so to interpret what he hath spoken, is an abomination into which I desire my soul may never enter.

What the redemption of a captive is, and how it is ought about we know. God tells us, that Christ hath

redeemed us, and that with his own blood. Is it not better to believe the Lord, and venture our souls upon it, than to go to God and say, 'this thou hast said, indeed; but it is an improper and metaphorical redemption, a deliverance that we have?' The truth is, it is so far from truth, that God hath delivered the work of his grace, and our benefit thereby, in the death of Christ, in words too big in their proper signification for the things themselves, that no words whatever are sufficient to express it and convey it to our understandings.

3. That Moses, who was a type of Christ in the work of redemption, and is called a redeemer, did redeem the people without the proper payment of a valuable ransom; therefore Christ did so also; to conclude thus, I say, is to say, that the type and things typified must in all things be alike; yea, that a similitude between them in that wherein their relation consists, is not enough to maintain their relation, but there must be such an identity as in truth overthrows it. Christ tells us, that the brazen serpent was a type of him; John iii. 14. 'As Moses lifted up the brazen serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son of man be lifted up;' now if a man should thence argue, that because the brazen serpent was only lifted up, not crucified, nor did shed his blood, therefore Christ was not crucified, nor shed his blood, would he be attended unto? The like may be said of Jonas, who was alive in the belly of the whale, when he was a type of Christ, being dead in the earth; in the general nature of deliverance from captivity, there was an agreement in the corporeal deliverance of Moses and the spiritual of Christ, and here was the one a type of the other; in the manner of their accomplishment, the one did not represent the other; the one being said expressly to be done by power, the other by a ransom.

2. It is the delivery of one in captivity; all men considered in the state of sin, and alienation from God, are in captivity. Hence they are said to be captives, and to be bound in prison; Isa. lxi. 1. and the work of Christ is to bring the prisoners out of prison, and them that sit in darkness (that is in the dungeon), out of the prison house; Isa. xlii. 7. he says to the prisoners 'go forth,' to them that are in darkness, 'shew yourselves;' chap. xlix. 9. as it is eminently

expressed; Zech. ix. 11. 'As for thee also by the blood of the covenant I have sent forth thy prisoners out of the pit wherein there is no water.' Here are prisoners, prisoners belonging to the daughter of Sion, for unto them, the church, he speaks, ver. 9. 'Rejoice greatly, O daughter of Sion;' those other sheep of the fold of Christ not yet gathered when this promise was given, are spoken of. And they are in the pit wherein there is no water; a pit for security to detain them, that they may not escape: and without water, that they may in it find no refreshment. How are these prisoners delivered? By the blood of this covenant, of whom he speaks; see ver. 9. 'Behold thy king cometh unto thee: he is just, and having salvation; lowly, and riding upon an ass, and upon a colt the foal of an ass.' It is a description of Christ when he rode to Jerusalem, to seal and confirm the covenant for the deliverance of the prisoners with his own blood; which is therefore called the blood of the covenant, with which he was sanctified; Heb. x. 29. Hence in the next verse, 'prisoners of hope' is a description of the elect; Zech. ix. 12.

So also are they called captives expressly, Isa. xlix. 25. 'Thus saith the Lord, even the captives of the mighty shall be taken away, and the prey of the terrible shall be delivered;' those who were in their captivity a prey to Satan, that mighty and cruel one, shall be delivered; and who shall do this? 'The Lord thy Saviour, and thy Redeemer, the mighty one of Jacob;' ver. 26. He proclaims liberty to the captives; Isa. lxvii. 1. Luke iv. 18. And this is given in as the great fruit of the death of Christ, that upon his conquest of it he led 'captivity captive;' Psal. lxviii. 18. Eph. iv. 8. that is, either captivity actively, Satan who held and detained his in captivity; or passively, those who were in captivity to him.

Thus being both prisoners and captives, they are said to be in bondage; Christ gives us liberty from that yoke of bondage; Gal. v. 1. and men are in bondage by reason of death all their days; Heb. ii. 14. There is, indeed, nothing that the Scripture more abounds in, than this, that men in the state of sin are in prison, captivity, and bondage; are captives, prisoners and slaves.

Concerning this two things are considerable.

1. The cause of men's bondage and captivity, deserving, or procuring it.

2. The efficient principal cause of it, to whom they are in captivity.

For the first (as it is known) it is sin. To all this bondage and captivity men are sold by sin. In this business sin is considered two ways.

1. As a debt, whereof God is the creditor. Our Saviour hath taught us to pray for the forgiveness of our sins under that notion, Matt. vi. 12. ἄφες ἡμῖν τὰ ὀφειλήματα ἡμῶν, 'remit to us our debts;' and in the parable of the Lord and his servants, Matt. xviii. 27—29. he calls it, τὸ δάνειον, ver. 27. and τὸ ὀφειλόμενον, ver. 30. 'due debt;' all which he expounds by παραπτώματα, ver. 35. 'offences or transgressions.' Debt makes men liable to prison for non-payment, and so doth sin (without satisfaction made) to the prison of hell. So our Saviour expresses it, Matt. v. 25, 26. 'Agree quickly with thine adversary, whiles thou art in the way with him; lest at any time the adversary deliver thee to the judge, and the judge deliver thee to the officer, and thou be cast into prison. Verily I say unto thee, thou shalt by no means come out thence, till thou hast paid the utmost farthing.' On this account, 1. Are men prisoners for sin: they are bound in the prison-house, because they have wasted the goods of their master, and contracted a debt that they are no way able to pay: and if it be not paid for them, there they must lie to eternity. All mankind was cast into prison, for that great debt they contracted in Adam, in their trustee; being there instead of making any earnings to pay the debt already upon them by the law, they contract more, and increase thousands of talents. But this use of the word debt and prison, applied to sin and punishment, is metaphorical.

2. As a crime, rebellion, transgression against God, the great governor, and judge of all the world. The criminalness, rebellion, transgression, the disobedience that is in sin, is more or less expressed by all the words in the original, whereby any sins are signified and called: now for sin considered as rebellion, are men cast into prison, captivity and bondage, by way of judicial process and punishment.

2. For the principal cause of this captivity and imprisonment, it is God: For,

1. He is the creditor to whom these debts are due, Matt. vi. 12. 'Our Father which art in heaven, forgive us our debts;' it is to him that we stand indebted the ten thousand talents; 'against thee only have I sinned,' says David, Psal. li. 4. God hath intrusted us with all we have to sin by, or withal; he hath lent it us, to lay out for his glory, our spending of what we have received upon our lusts, is running into debt unto God; though he doth not reap where he did not sow, yet he requires his principal with advantage.

2. And properly, he is the great King, Judge, and Governor of the world, who hath given his law, the rule of our obedience; and every transgression thereof is a rebellion against him. Hence, to sin, is to rebel, and to transgress, and to be perverse, to turn aside from the way, to cast off the yoke of the Lord, as it is every where expressed. God is the law-giver, James iv. 12. 'who is able to kill and to destroy' for the transgression of it; it is his law which is broken, and upon the breach whereof, he says, 'cursed be every one that hath so done;' Deut. xxix. 29. He is the judge of all the earth; Gen. xviii. 25, 26. yea, 'the Lord is judge himself,' Psal. l. 6. and we shall be judged by his law; James ii. 10—12. and his judgment is, 'that they that commit sin are worthy of death;' Rom. i. 32. and he is the 'king for ever and ever.' Psal. x. 16. He reigneth and executeth judgment. Now who should commit the rebel that offends? who should be the author of the captivity, and imprisonment of the delinquent, but he who is the king, judge, and law-maker?

3. He doth actually do it; Rom. xi. 32. Συνέκλεισε ὁ Θεὸς τοὺς πάντας εἰς ἀπείθειαν· 'God hath shut up all under disobedience:' he hath laid them up close prisoners, for their disobedience: and they shall not go out, until satisfaction be made. In the parable, Matt. xviii. of the lord or master, and his servants, this is evident; and Matt. v. 25. it is the judge, that delivers the man to the officer, to be cast into prison. Look who it is that shall inflict the final punishment upon the captives, if a ransom be not paid for them; he it is, by whose power and authority they are committed, and to whom principally they are prisoners and captives. Now this is God only, he can 'cast both body and soul into hell fire;' Matt. x. 28. and wicked men shall be destroyed from the terror of his presence, andthe power of his glory;

2 Thess. i. 9. In brief, God is the judge, the law is the law of God, the sentence denounced is condemnation from God: the curse inflicted, is the curse of God; the wrath wherewith men are punished, is the wrath of God; he that finds a ransom is God, and therefore it is properly and strictly he, to whom sinners are prisoners and captives; 2. Pet. ii. 4.

And therefore, when in the Scripture at any time, men are said to be in bondage to Satan: it is but as to the officer of a judge, or the jailor: to their sin, it is but as to their fetters, as shall be afterward more fully discovered.

And this removes the first question and answer of the Racovians to this purpose. Socinus 'De Servatore,' expresses himself to the whole business of redemption, in three chapters, lib. 1. part. 2. cap. 1—3. the sum of which, the catechists have laboured to comprise in as many questions and answers. The first is,

'Q. What[b] dost thou answer to these testimonies which witness that we are redeemed of Christ?'

'A. It is hence evident, that satisfaction cannot be confirmed from the word redeeming, because it is written of God himself, both in the Old and New Testament, that he redeemed his people out of Egypt, that he redeemed his people. 2. Because it is written that God redeemed Abraham and David, and that Moses was a redeemer, and that we are redeemed from our iniquities, and our vain conversation, and from the curse of the law; for it is certain, that God made satisfaction to none, nor can it be said, that satisfaction is made either to our iniquities, or our vain conversation, or to the law.'

I say this whole plea is utterly removed by what hath been spoken: For 1. In what sense redemption is ascribed to God and Moses, without the least prejudice of that proper redemption that was made by the blood of Christ, hath been declared, and shall be farther manifested, when we

[b] Quid ad ea testimonia, quæ nos a Christo testantur redemptos, respondes?—R. E verbo redimendi non posse effici satisfactionem hanc, hinc est planum, quod de ipso Deo et in novo, et in prisco fœdere scribitur, eum redimisse populum suum ex Ægypto; eum fecisse redemptionem populo suo; deinde cum scriptum sit, quod Deus redemit Abrahamum et Davidem, et quod Moses fuerit redemptor, et quod simus redempti e nostris iniquitatibus, aut e vana conversatione nostra, et e maledictione legis: certum autem est Deum nemini satisfecisse; nec vero aut iniquitatibus, aut conversationi vanæ, aut legi satisfactum esse dici posse.

come to demonstrate the price that was paid in this redemption.

2. It is true, there is no satisfaction made to our sin and vain conversation, when we are redeemed: but satisfaction being made to him to whom it is due, we are delivered from them. But of this afterward.

3. Satisfaction is properly made to the law, when the penalty which it threatens and prescribes, is undergone, as in the case insisted on it was. In the meantime, our catechists are sufficiently vain, in supposing our argument to lie in the word 'redimere;' though something hath been spoken of the word in the original, yet our plea is from the thing itself.

This Socinus thus expresses.

'[e]There is also required he who held the captive, otherwise he is not a captive. To him in our deliverance, if we will consider the thing itself exactly, many things do answer, for many things do detain us captives; now they are sin, the devil, and the world, and that which followeth sin, the guilt of eternal death, or the punishment of death appointed to us.'

Ans. A lawful captive is detained two ways; directly, and that two ways also, legally, juridically, and authoritatively: so is sinful man detained captive of God. The wrath of God abideth on him, John iii. 36. as hath been declared.

2. Instrumentally, in subservience to the authority of the other. So is man in bondage to Satan, and the law, and fear of 'death to come;' Heb. ii. 14, 15.

3. Consequentially, and by accident; so a man is detained by his shackles, as in the filth of the prison: so is a man captive to sin, and the world; nor are all these properly the detainers of us in captivity, from which we are redeemed, any more than the gallows keeps a malefactor in prison, from which by a pardon and ransom he is delivered.

To proceed with the description of redemption given; it

[e] Requiritur et is, qui captivum detineat: alioqui captivus non esset: huic in liberatione nostra, si exactius rem ipsam considerare velimus, respondent multa. Multa siquidem nos tanquam captivos detinebant: ea autem sunt peccatum, diabolus, mundus, et qui peccatum consequuntur, mortis æternæ reatus, seu mortis æternæ nobis decretum supplicium. De Servator. Lib. 1. Cap. 2.

is the delivery of him who was captive from prison, or captivity, and all the miseries attending that condition.

1. What I mean by the prison, is easily gathered from what hath been delivered concerning the prisoner or captive, and him that holds him captive. If the captive be a sinner as a sinner, and he who hold him captive be God, by his justice making him liable to punishment, his captivity must needs be his obnoxiousness unto the wrath of God on the account of his justice for sin. This are we delivered from by this redemption, that is in the blood of Jesus, Rom. iii. 23—25. 'For all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God: being justified freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus. Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God.' Ver. 23. is the description of the state of our captivity; 'having sinned we are come short of the glory of God;' ὑστεροῦνται they fall short in their race, and are by no means able to come up to a participation of God; our delivery and the means of it, is expressed, ver. 24. Our delivery: we are 'justified freely by his grace;' or delivered from that condition and state of sin, wherein it was impossible for us to reach and attain the glory of God. The procuring cause of which liberty is expressed in the next words, διὰ τῆς ἀπολυτρώσεως, by the redemption or ransom paying that is in the blood of Jesus; that is, the cause of our deliverance from that condition wherein we were: whence and how it is so, is expressed, ver. 25. God sent him forth, for that end, that we might have deliverance through 'faith in his blood,' or by faith be made partakers of the redemption that is in his blood, or purchased by it: and this to 'declare his righteousness;' we have it this way, that the righteousness of God may be declared, whereto satisfaction is made by the death of Christ: for that also is included in the word, 'propitiation,' as shall be afterward proved.

Thus whilst men are in this captivity, the wrath of God abideth on them; John iii. 36. and the full accomplishment of the execution of that wrath is called the 'wrath to come,' 1 Thess. i. 10. which we are delivered from.

In this sense are we said to 'have redemption;' Col. i. 14.

in his blood, or to have deliverance from our captivity by the price he paid; and by his death to be delivered from the fear of death, Heb. ii. 15. or our obnoxiousness thereto; it being the justice or judgment of God, that they which commit sin, are worthy of death; Rom. i. 32. Christ by undergoing it delivered us from it.

Whence is that of the apostle; Rom. viii. 33, 34. 'Who shall lay any thing to their charge, who shall condemn them?' Who should but God? It is God against whom they have sinned, whose the law is, and who alone can pronounce sentence of condemnation on the offenders, and inflict penalty accordingly. Yea, but 'it is God that justifies:' that is, that frees men from their obnoxiousness to punishment for sin in the first sense of it, which is their captivity, as hath been declared; but how comes this about? Why 'it is Christ that died;' it is by the death of Christ that we have this redemption.

2. From all the miseries that attend that state and condition. These are usually referred to three heads.

1. The power of Satan. 2. Of sin. 3. Of the world: from all which we are said to be redeemed; and these are well compared to the jailer, filth and fetters of the prison, wherein the captives are righteously detained.

For the first, Col. i. 13, 14. 'Who hath delivered us from the power of darkness, and hath translated us into the kingdom of his dear Son, in whom we have redemption through his blood, even the forgiveness of sins.' The power of darkness, is the 'power of the prince of darkness, of Satan:' this God delivers us from, ver. 14. by the 'redemption that is in the blood of Christ.' And how? Even as he who delivers a captive from the judge by a price, delivers him also from the jailer who kept him in prison. By his death, which as hath been shewed, was a price and a ransom, he deprived Satan of all his power over us, which is called his destroying of him; Heb. ii. 14. that is, not the devil as to his essence and being, but as to his power and authority over those who are made partakers of his death.

The words of Socinus to this purpose may be taken notice of. Lib. De Servat. 1. part. 2. cap. 2.

'[b]Nothing is wanting in this deliverance, that it might

[b] Nihil in hac liberatione desideratur, ut omnino veræ redemptioni respondeat, nisi

wholly answer a true redemption, but only that he who detained the captive should receive the price: although it seems to some that it may be said, that the devil received the price which intervened in our redemption, as the ancient divines, among whom was Ambrose and Augustine, made bold to speak, yet that ought to seem most absurd; and it is true that this price was received by none. For on that account chiefly is our deliverance not a true, but a metaphorical redemption, because in it there is none that should receive the price. For if that which is in the place of a price, be received (by him who delivers the captive), then not a metaphorical, but a true price had intervened, and thereupon our redemption had been proper.'

1. It is confessed, that nothing is wanting to constitute that we speak of to be a true, proper, and real redemption, but only that the price paid, be received of him that delivered the captives; that this is God we proved, that the price is paid to him, we shall nextly prove.

2. The only reason given why the price is not paid to any, is, because it is not paid to the devil; but was it the law of Satan we had transgressed? Was he the judge that cast us into prison? Was it to him whom we were indebted? Was it ever heard that the price of redemption was paid to the jailer? Whether any of the ancients said so or no, I shall not now trouble myself to inquire, or in what sense they said it; the thing in itself is ridiculous and blasphemous.

2. Sin. 'He redeemed us from all iniquity;' Tit. ii. 14. and we were 'redeemed by the precious blood of Christ from our vain conversation received by tradition from our fathers;' 1 Pet. i. 18, 19. This redeeming us from our sins, respects two things. 1. The guilt of them, that they should not condemn us; and, 2. the power of them, that they should not rule in us. In the place mentioned, it is the latter that is principally intended, which is evident from what was op-

ut is qui captivum detinebat, pretium accipiat: quamvis autem quibusdam videatur, dici posse, diabolum, pretium quod in nostra liberatione intervenit, accepisse, quemadmodum antiquiores Theologi, inter quos Ambrosius, et Augustinus ausi sunt dicere, tamen id perabsurdum videri debet, et recte est neminem id pretium accepisse affirmare. Ea siquidem ratione potissimum, non vera sed metaphorica redemptio, liberatio nostra est; quocirca in ea nemo est, qui pretium accipiat, si enim id quod in ipso pretii loco est acceptum (ab eo scilicet qui captivum hominem detinebat) fuisset, jamnon metaphoricum, sed verum pretium intervenisset, et propterea vera redemptio esset.

posed to the captivity under sin that is spoken of; in the one place, it is 'purchasing to himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works;' Tit. ii. 14. in the other, 'the purifying of our souls in obedience to the truth through the Spirit;' ver. 22. Now we are redeemed from the power of our sin, by the blood of Christ; not immediately, but consequentially; as a captive is delivered from his fetters and filth upon the payment of his ransom. Christ's satisfying the justice of God, reconciling him to us by his death, hath also procured the gift of his Spirit for us, to deliver us from the power of our sin. The foundation of this being laid in the blood of Christ, and the price which thereby he paid, our delivery from our sins belongs to his redemption; and we are therefore said to be redeemed by him from our vain conversation.

And the great plea of our adversary, that this redemption is not proper, because we are 'redeemed from our iniquities, and vain conversation,' to which no ransom can be paid, will then be freed from ridiculous folly, when they shall give an instance of a ransom being paid to the prisoner's fetters before his delivery; whereunto our sins do rather answer, than to the judge.

2. There is a redeeming of us from the guilt of sin, which hath a twofold expression. 1. Of redeeming us from the 'curse of the law;' Gal. iii. 13. and, 2. Of the 'redemption of transgression;' Heb. ix. 15.

For the first, the curse of the law, is the curse due to sin; Deut. xxvii. 29. that is, to the transgression of the law. This may be considered two ways. 1. In respect of its rise and fountain, or its 'terminus a quo:' 2. In respect of its end and effect, or its 'terminus ad quem.'

For the first, or the rise of it; it is the justice of God, or the just and holy will of God, requiring punishment for sin; as the vengeance that is inflicted actually for sin, is called the 'wrath of God;' Rom. i. 18. that is, his justice and indignation against sin. In this sense, to redeem us from the curse of the law, is to make satisfaction to the justice of God, from whence that curse doth arise, that it should not be inflicted on us, and thus it falls in with what was delivered before, concerning our captivity by the justice of God. 2. As it is the penalty itself: so we are delivered

from it, by this ransom paying of Christ, as the punishment which we should have undergone, had not he undertaken for us, and redeemed us.

2. For the ἀπολύτρωσις παραβάσεων, Heb. ix. 15. it can be nothing but making reparation for the injury done by transgression; it is a singular phrase, but may receive some light from that of Heb. ii. 17. where Christ is said to be a high-priest, εἰς τὸ ἱλάσκεσθαι τας ἁμαρτίας τοῦ λαοῦ, to reconcile the sin of the people; that is, to make reconciliation for them, of the sense whereof afterward. 3. He redeems from the world; Gal. iv. 5.

3. The third thing is, That this deliverance from captivity be by the intervention of a price properly so called; that Christ did pay such a price I proved before, which is the foundation of this discourse.

The word λύτρον, and those arising from thence, were specially insisted on. The known use of the word is, 'redemptionis pretium;' so among the best authors of the Greek tongue ξὼντα λαβόντες ἀφῆκαν ἄνευ λύτρων, Zenoph. Hallen. 7. 'they took him away without paying his ransom,' or the price of his redemption; and ἔπεμψε τὰ λύτρα τῷ Ἀννίβα καὶ τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους ἀπέλαβε: says Plutarch, in Fabius: he sent their ransom to Hannibal, and received the prisoners; and from thence λυτρόω is of the same import and signification. So in the argument of the first book of the Iliads, speaking of Chrysis, that he came to the camp, βουλόμενος λυτρώσασθαι τὴν θυγάτερα, 'to pay a price for the redemption of his daughter.' And Arist. Ethic. lib. ix. cap. 2. disputing whether a benefit, or good turn, be not to be repaid, rather than a favour done to any other, gives an instance of a prisoner redeemed; τῷ λυτρωθέντι παρὰ λῃστῶν πότερον τὸν λυσάμενον ἀντιλυτρωτέον, &c. whether he who is redeemed by the payment of a ransom from a robber be to redeem him who redeemed him, if captive, &c. but this is so far confessed, that if it may be evinced, that this price is paid to any, it will not be denied, but that it is a proper price of redemption, as before was discovered.

That the death of Christ is such a price, I proved abundantly, at the entrance of this discourse; it is so frequently and evidently expressed in the Scripture to be such, that it is not to be questioned; I shall not farther insist upon it.

All that our adversaries have to object, is, as was said, that seeing this price is not paid to any, it cannot be a price properly so called, for as for the nature of it, they confess, it may be a price: so Socinus acknowledgeth it. Saith he,

'I[e] understand the proper use of the word to redeem, to be, when a true price is given; true price I call not only money, but whatever is given to him, that delivers the captive, to satisfy him, although many things in the redemption be metaphorical.'

That God detains the captive, hath been proved; that the price is paid to him, though it be not silver and gold, and that, that he might be satisfied, shall be farther evinced. So that we have redemption properly so called; it remains then that we farther manifest, that the price was paid to God.

Although enough hath been said already to evince the truth of this, yet I shall farther put it out of question by the ensuing observations and inferences.

1. To the payment of a price or ransom properly so called, which as is acknowledged is not necessary that it should be money or the like, 1 Pet. i. 18. but any thing that may satisfy him that detains the captive, it is not required that it should be paid into the hand of him that is said to receive it; but only, that it be some such thing as he requires as the condition of releasing the captive. It may consist in personal service, which is impossible to be properly paid into the hand of any. For instance; if a father be held captive, and he that holds him so requires that for the delivery of his father, the son undertake a difficult and hazardous warfare, wherein he is concerned, and he do it accordingly; this son doth properly ransom his father, though no real price be paid into the hand of him that detained him. It is sufficient to prove that this ransom was paid by Christ unto God, if it be proved, that upon the prescription of God, he did that, and underwent that which he esteemed, and was to him a valuable compensation, for the delivery of sinners.

2. The propriety of paying a ransom to any, where it

[e] Propriam enim verbi redimendi significationem intelligo, cum verum pretium intervenit; verum autem pretium voco, non pecuniam tantum sed quicquid ut ei satisfiat qui captivum detinet datur, licet alioqui multa metaphorica in ejusmodi redemptione reperiantur. Socin. de Serv. lib. 1 part. 1. cap. 1.

lies in undergoing the penalty that was due to the ransomed, consists in the voluntary consent of him to whom the ransom is paid, and him that pays it, unto this commutation; which in this business we have firmly evinced. And the price paid by Christ could be no other. For God was not our detainer in captivity as a sovereign conqueror, that came upon us by force and kept us prisoners, but as a just judge and lawgiver, who had seized on us for our transgressions. So that not his power and will was to be treated withal, but his law and justice, and so the ransom was properly paid to him, in the undergoing that penalty which his justice required.

3. There must some differences be allowed between spiritual, eternal, and civil, corporeal, temporal deliverances, which yet doth not make spiritual redemption to be improper; nay, rather the other is said to be improper wherein it agrees not thereunto; the one is spiritual, the other temporal, so that in every circumstance it is not expected that they should agree.

4. There are two things distinctly in God to be considered in this business.

1. His love, his will, or purpose. 2. His justice, law, and truth. In respect of his love, his will, his purpose, or good-pleasure, God himself found out, appointed and provided this ransom. The giving of Christ is ascribed to his love, will, and good pleasure; John iii. 16. Rom. v. 8. viii. 32. 1 John iv. 9, 10. as he had promised by his prophets of old; Luke i. 67. But his law and truth and justice in their several considerations, required the ransom, and in respect of them he accepted it, as hath been shewed at large; so that nothing in the world is more vain, than that of our adversaries; that God procured and appointed this price, therefore, he did not accept it; that is, either God's love or his justice must be denied. Either he hath no justice against sin, or no love for sinners; in the reconciliation of which two, the greatest and most intense hatred against sin, and the most inexpressible love to some sinners in the blood of his only son, lies the great mystery of the gospel which these men are unacquainted withal.

5. That God may be said to receive this price, it was

not necessary that any accession should be made to his riches by the ransom, but that he underwent no loss by our deliverance. This is the difference between a conqueror or a tyrant and a just ruler, in respect of their captives and prisoners. Says the tyrant or conqueror, Pay me so much whereby I may be enriched or I will not part with my prisoner: says the just ruler and judge, Take care that my justice be not injured; that my law be satisfied, and I will deliver the prisoners. It is enough to make good God's acceptance of the price, that his justice suffered not by the delivery of the prisoner; as it did not, Rom. iii. 25. yea, it was exalted and made glorious above all that it could have been, in the everlasting destruction of the sinner.

These things being thus premised, it will not be difficult to establish the truth asserted; namely, that this price or ransom was paid to God. For,

1. A price of redemption, a ransom must be paid to some or other; the nature of the thing requires it. That the death of Christ was a price or ransom, properly so called, hath been shewed before; the ridiculous objection, that then it must be paid to Satan or our sin, hath also been sufficiently removed, so that God alone remains to whom it is to be paid. For unless to some it is paid, it is not a price or ransom.

2. The price of redemption is to be paid to him who detains the captive by way of jurisdiction, right, and law power. That God is he who thus detained the captive, was also proved before. He is the great householder that calls his servants that do, or should serve him, to an account; Matt. xviii. 23, 24. *συνᾶραι λόγον*· and wicked men are *κατάρας τέκνα*, 2 Pet. ii. 14. the children of his curse, obnoxious to it. It is his judgment that they which commit sin are worthy of death; Rom. i. 32. and Christ is a propitiation to 'declare his righteousness;' Rom. iii. 25. And it is his wrath from whence we are delivered by this ransom; Rom. ii. 5. 1 Thess. i. 10. the law was his to which Christ was made obnoxious; Gal. iv. 4. the curse his which he was made; chap. iii. 13. it was his will he came to do and suffer; Heb. x. 5. it was his will that he should drink off the cup of his passion; Matt. xxvi. it pleased him to bruise him; Isa. liii.

he made all our iniquities to meet upon him; ver. 6, so that doubtless this ransom was paid to him; we intend no more by it than what in those places is expressed.

3. This ransom was also a sacrifice, as hath been declared. Look then to whom the sacrifice was offered, to him the ransom was paid. These are but several notions of the same thing. Now the sacrifice he offered to God; Eph. v. 2. to him then also, and only, was this ransom paid.

4. Christ paid this ransom as he was a mediator and surety: now he was the Mediator between God and man, and therefore he must pay this price to one of them, either God or man and it is not difficult to determine whether: 1 Tim. ii. 5, 6. gives us this fully. He is the Mediator, and as such he gave himself *ἀντίλυτρον*, a price of redemption to God.

From this description of redemption properly so called, and the application of it to the redemption made by Jesus Christ, we thus argue:

He who by his own blood and death paid the price of our redemption to God, in that he underwent what was due to us, and procured our liberty and deliverance thereby, he made satisfaction properly for our sins; but when we were captives for sin to the justice of God, and committed thereon to the power of sin and Satan, Christ by his death and blood paid the price of our redemption to God, and procured our deliverance thereby: therefore he made satisfaction to God for our sins.

For the farther confirmation of what hath been delivered, some few of the most eminent testimonies given to this truth, are to be explained and vindicated, wherewith I shall close this discourse of our redemption by Christ. Out of the very many that may be insisted on, I shall choose out only those that follow.

1. Rom. iii. 24, 25. 'Being justified freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in Jesus Christ; whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God.' Redemption in itself, in its effect, in respect of us, with all its causes is here expressed. Its effect in respect of us, is, that we are justified,

freely: δικαιούμενοι δορεὰν, not brought easily, and with little labour to be righteous or honest, as some vainly imagine (Grot. *in locum*), but accepted freely with God, without the performance of the works of the law, whereby the Jews sought after righteousness. 2. The end on the part of God, is, the declaration of his righteousness. 3. The means procuring this end is, the blood of Christ: redemption by Christ, and in his blood.

4. The means of communicating this effect on the part of God, is the setting forth Christ a propitiation: on our part, as to application, it is 'faith in his blood.'

As to the effect of our justification, it shall afterward be considered. The manner, or rise of it rather (for both may be denoted) on the part of God, is δορεὰν, that is, freely: or as it is expounded in the next words, τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι, 'by his grace.' Our redemption and the effects of it are free;' 1. On the part of God, in respect of his purpose and decree, which is called ἐκλογὴ χαριτὸς; Rom. xi. 5. His great design, and contrivance of the work of our salvation and deliverance. This he did 'according to the good pleasure of his will, to the praise of the glory of his grace;' Eph. i. 5, 6, according 'to his good pleasure which he had purposed in himself,' ver. 9. according 'to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will;' ver. 11. And it is free in regard of the love, from whence Christ was sent, John iii. 16. which also is ascribed τῇ χάριτι θεοῦ; Heb. ii. 9. and it is free in respect of us: we do not obtain it by the works of the law, Rom. iv. 6. neither can it be so attained, nor is that required of us; and free on our part, in that nothing of us is required in way of satisfaction, recompense, or ransom. 'He spared not his Son, but with him freely gives us all things;' Rom. viii. δικαιούμενοι δορεὰν, we are justified freely, that is, we are delivered from our bondage without any satisfaction made by us, or works performed by us, to attain it, God having freely designed this way of salvation, and sent Jesus Christ to do this work for us.

'Ad justitiam vero perducuntur etiam sine labore qui ad minores virtutes, id est, philosophicas requiri solet fides enim ejus laboris compendium facit.' τῶν πόνων πωλοῦσιν ἵν πάντα τ' ἀγαθ' οἱ Θεόι. Grot. *in loc.*

'They are brought to righteousness, without that labour that is required for lesser, even philosophical virtues. Faith makes an abridgement of the work.'

The πρῶτον ψεῦδος of the great man, in the whole interpretation of that epistle, as of others of sundry sorts besides himself, is, that to be justified, is to be brought to righteousness by the practice of virtue and honesty (which answers to that the Scripture calls sanctification) with as gross a shutting out of light, as can befall any man in the world. This, with that notion which he hath of faith, is the bottom of this interpretation. But,

2. Let him tell us freely, what instance he can give of this use of the word δορεάν, which here he imposeth on us; that it should signify the facility of doing a thing. And withal, whether these words δικαιούμενοι δορεάν, denote an act of God, or of them that are justified? Whether being justified freely by his grace, be his free justifying of us, as to what is actively denoted, or our easy performance of the works of righteousness? That δορεάν, in this place, should relate to our duties, and signify easily; and not to the act of God accepting us, and import freely, is such a violence offered to the Scripture, as nothing could have compelled the learned man to venture on, but pure necessity of maintaining the Socinian justification.

3. For the philosophical virtues, which the gods sold for labour, they were 'splendida peccata,' and no more.

As to the part of the words, Socinus himself was not so far out of the way, as the annotator; saith he, 'Justificati gratis, sensus est, partam nobis esse peccatorum nostrorum absolutionem (id enim ut scis quod ad nos attinet reipsa justificari est) non quidem per legis opera, quibus illam commeriti sumus, sed gratis per gratiam Dei.' De Servat. lib. 1. part. 2. cap. 2.

2. The end on the part of God, is ἐνδείξις δικαιοσύνης, 'the declaration of his righteousness;' δικαιοσύνη, is properly God's justice as he is a judge. It is true חסד is often rendered by the seventy δικαιοσύνη, and by us from thence, 'righteousness;' which signifies indeed benignity, kindness, and goodness: and so צדקה which is 'righteousness,' is rendered by them sometimes ἔλεος 'mercy,' and the circumstances of the place may sometimes require that signification of the word;

but firstly and properly, it is that property of God, whereby as a judge, he renders to every one according to their ways before him, rewarding those that obey him, and punishing transgressions. This I have[f] elsewhere declared at large. Hence he is, שופט צדק Psal. ix. 4. which as Paul speaks, 2 Tim. iv. 8, is, ὁ δίκαιος κριτής, the 'righteous judge,' so Rom. i. 32, 2 Thess. i, 6, Rev. xv. 4. so Isa. lix. 16. 'And he saw that there was no man, and wondered that there was no intercessor, therefore his arm brought salvation unto him, and his righteousness it sustained him.' His righteousness sustained him in executing vengeance on the enemies of his church. This is the righteousness that God aimed to manifest, and to declare in our redemption by Christ: that he might be just, as the words follow; namely, that he might be known to be just and righteous, in taking such sore vengeance of sin, in the flesh of Jesus Christ his Son; Rom. viii. 3. Hence did God appear to be exceeding righteous, of purer eyes than to behold iniquity. He declared to all the world, what was due to sin, and what must be expected by men, if they are not partakers of the redemption which is in the blood of Jesus Christ; Rom. viii. 3.

Grotius would have δικαιοσύνη here to signify 'goodness' and 'bounty;' which, as we deny not, but that in some places in the Old Testament where it is used by the LXX, it doth, or may do; so we say here, that sense can have no place, which nowhere is direct and proper: for the thing intended by it in that sense, is expressed before in those words δορεὰν τῇ χάριτι αὐτοῦ, and is not consistent with that, that follows, εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν δίκαιον, which represents God, as he is, δίκαιος κριτής, as was spoken before.

Socinus goes another way: says he, 'In Christo, Deus ut ostenderet se veracem et fidelem esse, quod significant verba illa, justitiæ suæ,' &c. Referring it to God's righteousness of verity and fidelity, in fulfilling his promise of forgiveness of sins. But, says Grotius, righteousness cannot be here interpreted, 'de fide in promissis præstandis, quia hæc verba pertinent non ad Judæos tantum, sed ad Gentes etiam, quibus nulla promissio facta est.' 'Because Gentiles are spoken of, and not the Jews only, but to them there was no promise given.' A reason worthy the an-

[f] Diatrib. de Justit. Div.

notations; as though the promise was not made to Abraham, that he should be heir of the world, and to all his seed, not only according to the flesh; and as though the learned man himself did not think the first promise to have been made, and always to have belonged to all and every man in the world. But yet neither will the sense of Socinus stand, for the reasons before given.

But how are these ends brought about, that we should be δικαιούμενοι δορεάν; and yet there should be, ἐνδείξις δικαιοσύνης?

3. *Ans.* The means procuring all this, is the blood of Christ; it is, διὰ τῆς ἀπολυτρώσεως τῆς ἐν χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, 'by the redemption that is in Jesus Christ;' and how that redemption is wrought, he expresseth, when he shews how we are made partakers of it, διὰ τῆς πίστεως ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ αἵματι, 'through faith in his blood.' The redemption wrought and procured by the blood of Christ, is the procuring cause of all this. The *causa* προηγουμένη, is the grace of God, of which before; the *causa* προκαταρκτική, is this blood of Christ; this redemption, as here, is called ἀπολύτρωσίς, Luke xxi. 28. Eph. i. 7. Col. i. 14. λύτρωσις, Luke i. 68. John ii. 38. Heb. ix. 12. λύτρον, Matt. xx. 28. x. 45. ἀντίλυτρον, 1 Tim. ii. 6. and in respect of the effect, ῥύσις Rom. iv. 24. xi. 26. Col. i. 13. 1 Thess. i. 10. This is the procuring cause, as I said, of the whole effect of God's free grace here mentioned; we are justified freely, because we have redemption by the blood of Christ, he obtained it for us by the price of his blood.

I rather abide on the former sense of λύτρον (from whence is ἀπολύτρωσις) to be a price of redemption, than to interpret it by 'lustrum,' and so to refer it to the sacrifices of purification, which belong to another consideration of the death of Christ; and yet the consideration of the blood of Christ, as a sacrifice, hath place here also, as shall be discovered. This is that which is here asserted; we have forgiveness of sins by the intervention of the blood of Christ, obtaining redemption for us, which is that we aim to prove from this place.

Grotius gives this exposition of the words. 'Christus per obedientiam suam (maxime in morte) et preces ei accedentes, hoc a patre obtinuit, ne is humanum genus gravibus peccatis immersum desereret, atque obduraret; sed vi

illis daret ad justitiam perveniendi per Christum: et liberaret, nempe a necessitate moriendi in peccatis, viam patefaciendo per quam exire ista liceret.' 'Christ by his obedience (especially in his death) and the prayers accompanying it, obtained this of his Father, that he should not forsake and harden mankind, drenched in grievous sins, but should give them a way of coming to righteousness by Jesus Christ, and should deliver them from a necessity of dying in their sin, by revealing a way whereby they might escape it.'

1. It is well it is granted, that the death of Christ respected God in the first place, and the obtaining somewhat of him, which the annotator's friends deny.

2. That the purchase of Christ was not for all mankind, that they might be delivered, but for the elect, that they should be delivered, has elsewhere been declared.

3. Christ by his death, did not obtain of his Father, that he should reveal or appoint that way of obtaining deliverance and salvation, which by him we have. This, as the giving of Christ himself, was of the free grace and love of God; nor is the appointment of the way of salvation, according to the covenant of grace, any where assigned to the death of Christ; but to the love of God, sending his Son, and appointing him to be a mediator; though the good things of the covenant be purchased by him.

4. This is all the effect here assigned to the bloodshedding of Jesus Christ; this is the redemption we have thereby. 'He obtained of his Father, that a better way of coming to righteousness, than that of the law, or that of philosophy, might by declared to us.' The mystery of the whole is; Christ by his obedience to God, obtained this, that himself should be exalted to give a new law, and teach a new doctrine, in obedience whereunto we might come to be righteous: which must needs be an excellent explication of these words, 'we have redemption by his blood;' which plainly express the price he paid for us, and the effect that ensued thereon.

Socinus goes another way: says he,

'The[s] intervention of the blood of Christ, though it

[s] Interventus sanguinis Christi, licet Deum ad liberationem hanc a peccatorum nostrorum pœna nobis concedendum movere non potuerit, movit tamen nos ad eam nobis oblatam accipiendam, et Christo fidem habendam. Socin. ubi sup.

moved not God to grant us deliverance from the punishment of sin, yet it moved us to accept of it being offered, and to believe in Christ.'

That is; the blood of Christ, being paid as a price of our redemption, hath no effect in respect of him to whom it is paid, but only in respect of them for whom it is paid; than which imagination nothing can be more ridiculous.

4. The means of application of the redemption mentioned, or participation in respect of us, is faith: It is διὰ πίστεως ἐν αἵματι αὐτοῦ, of this we have no occasion to speak.

5. The means of communication on the part of God, is in these words, ὃν προέθετο ὁ θεὸς ἱλαστήριον; 'whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation.' God set him forth for this end and purpose; the word προέθετο, may design various acts of God: As,

1. His purpose and determination, or decree of giving Christ; whence our translators have in the margin rendered it 'fore-ordained,' as the word is used, Eph. i. 9. ἣν προέθετο ἐν αὐτῷ, 'which he fore-purposed in himself.' Or,

2. God's proposal of him before-hand, in types and sacrifices to the Jews; the preposition πρὸ being often in composition used in that sense in this epistle, chap. iii. 9. xi. 35. xv. 4. Or,

3. For the actual exhibition of him in the flesh, when God sent him into the world. Or,

4. It may refer to the open exposition and publication of him in the world by the gospel; for as we shall afterward shew, the ensuing words hold out an allusion to the ark, which now in Christ the veil being rent, is exposed to the open view of believers: hence John tells us, Rev. xi. 19. when the temple was opened, 'there was seen in it the ark of the testament;' which, as it was not at all in the second temple, the true ark being to be brought in, no more was it to be seen upon the opening of the temple in the first, where it was, being closed in the Holiest of Holies; but now in the ordinances of the gospel, the ark is perspicuous; because θεὸς προέθετο, God hath set it forth to believers.

Now he was set forth ἱλαστήριον, 'a propitiation.' There is none but have observed, that this is the name of the covering of the ark, or the mercy-seat, that is applied to Christ; Heb. ix. 5. but the true reason and sense of it hath scarce

been observed; ours generally would prove from hence, that Christ did propitiate God by the sacrifice of himself, that may have something from the general notice of the word, referred to the 'sacrificia' ἱλαστικὰ (whereof afterward) but not from the particular intimated. The mercy-seat did not atone God for the sins that were committed against the law that was in the ark, but declared him to be atoned and appeased. That this is the meaning of it, that, as the mercy-seat declared God to be atoned, so also is Christ set forth to declare, that God was atoned, not to atone him, Socinus contends at

but to the utter confusion of his cause. For,

this declares God to b placatus,' and 'placatus,'

od was provoked, and so e way was used for his

ent. And,

s is indeed the true im rt of that type, and the

application of it here by our apo le. The mercy-seat declared God to be appeased; bu how? By the blood of the sacrifice that was offered with it, and brought into the holy place; the high-priest never ent into that place, about the worship of God, but it was w h the blood of that sacrifice, which was expressly appointed to make atonement; Lev. xvi. God would not have the mercy-seat once seen, nor any pledge of his being atoned, but by the blood of the propitiatory sacrifice. So it is here; God sets out Jesus Christ as a propitiation; declares himself to be appeased and reconciled; but how? by the blood of Christ; by the sacrifice of himself; by the price of redemption which he paid. This is the intendment of the apostle; Christ by his blood, and the price he paid thereby, with the sacrifice he made, having atoned God, or made atonement with him for us, God now sets him forth, the veil of the temple being rent, to the eye of all believers, as the mercy-seat wherein we may see God fully reconciled to us. And this may serve for the vindication of the testimony to the truth insisted on; and this is the same with 2 Cor. iii. 17.

It would be too long for me to insist in particular, on the vindication of the other testimonies, that are used for confirmation of this truth. I shall give them therefore r in such a way, as that their efficacy to the purand, may be easily discerned.

are bought by Christ, saith the apostle; ἠγοράσθητε,

'ye are bought,' 1 Cor. vi. 20. but this buying may be taken metaphorically for a mere deliverance, as certainly it is, 2 Pet. ii. 1. denying the Lord that bought them: i. e. delivered them, for it is spoken of God the Father. It may be so, the word may be so used, and therefore to shew the propriety of it here, the apostle adds τῆς τιμῆς, 'with a price; ye are bought with a price. To be bought with a price, doth nowhere signify to be barely delivered, but to be delivered with a valuable compensation for our deliverance; but what is this price wherewith we are bought? 1 Pet. i. 18. 'Not with silver or gold,' but τιμίῳ αἵματι χριστοῦ; with the 'precious honourable blood of Christ:' why τίμιον αἷμα, 'the precious blood?' That we may know, that in this business it was valued at a sufficient rate for our redemption; and it did that which in temporal civil redemption is done by silver and gold, which are given, as a valuable consideration for the captive. But what kind of price is this blood of Christ? It is λύτρον Matt. xx. 28. that is, a price of redemption; whence it is said, that 'he gave himself for us;' ἵνα λυτρώσηται ἡμᾶς, Tit. ii. 14. that he might 'fetch us off with a ransom:' but it may be that it is called λύτρον, not that he put himself in our stead, and underwent what was due to us; but that his death was as it were a price, because thereon we were delivered. Nay, but his life was λύτρον properly, and therefore he calls it also ἀντίλυτρον, 1 Tim. ii. 6. ἀντὶ in composition signifies either opposition, as 1 Pet. ii. 25. or substitution and commutation, Matt. ii. 22. in the first sense, here it cannot be taken, therefore it must be in the latter; he was ἀντίλυτρον: that is, did so pay a ransom, that he himself became that which we should have been, as it is expressed, Gal. iii. 13. He 'redeemed us from the curse, being made a curse for us:' to whom he paid this price was before declared, and the apostle expresseth it, Eph. v. 2. What now is the issue of all this? we have redemption thereby; i. 7. 'In whom we have ἀπολύτρωσιν διὰ τοῦ αἵματος αὐτοῦ, redemption by his blood;' as it is again asserted in the same words, Col. i. 14. But how came we by this redemption? He obtained it of God for us, he entered into heaven, αἰωνίαν λύτρωσιν εὑράμενος, having 'found, or obtained everlasting redemption for us;' by the price of his blood he procured this deliverance at the hand of God. And that we may know that this effect of the death

of Christ is properly towards God, what the immediate issue of this redemption is, is expressed. It is 'forgiveness of sins;' Eph. i. 7. Col. i. 13. Rom. iii. 24, 25.

And this is as much as is needful to the first notion of the death of Christ, as a price and ransom, with the issues of it, and the confirmation of our first argument from thence for the satisfaction of Christ.

CHAP. XXIX.

Of reconciliation by the death of Christ as it is a sacrifice.

THE next consideration of the death of Christ, is of it as a sacrifice; and the proper effect thereof is reconciliation by his death as a sacrifice.

1. Reconciliation in general, is the renewal of lost friendship and peace between persons at variance. To apply this to the matter treated of, the ensuing positions are to be premised.

1. There was at first in the state of innocency, friendship and peace between God and man. God had no enmity against his creature: he approved him to be good: and appointed him to walk in peace, communion, confidence, and boldness with him; Gen. iii. Nor had man, on whose heart the law and love of his Maker was written, any enmity against his Creator, God, and rewarder.

2. That by sin there is division, separation and breach of peace and friendship introduced between God and the creature; Isa. lix. 2. 'Your iniquities have separated between you and your God, and your sins have hid his face from you;' Isa. lxiii. 10. 'They rebelled against him, therefore he was turned to be their enemy and fought against them.' 'There is no peace to the wicked, saith my God;' Isa. xlviii. 22. and therefore it is that upon a delivery from this condition we are said (and not before) to 'have peace with God;' Rom. v. 1.

3. That by this breach of peace and friendship with God, God was alienated from the sinner, so as to be angry with him, and to renounce all peace and friendship with him, considered as such, and in that condition. 'He that believeth not,

the wrath of God abides on him;' John iii. 36. And therefore by nature, and in our natural condition, we are 'children of wrath;' Eph. ii. 3. that is, obnoxious to the wrath of God, that abides upon unbelievers; that is, unreconciled persons.

4. This enmity on the part of God, consists

1. In the purity and holiness of his nature, whence he cannot admit a guilty defiled creature to have any communion with him; he is a God of purer eyes than to behold iniquity; Heb. i. 13. And sinners cannot serve him because he is a 'holy God, a jealous God, that will not forgive their transgressions nor their sins;' Josh. xxiv. 19.

2. In his will of punishing for sin, Rom. i. 32. 'It is the judgment of God, that they which commit sin are worthy of death;' and this from the righteousness of the thing itself; 2 Thess. i. 6. 'It is a righteous thing with God to recompense tribulations to sinners: he is not a God that hath pleasure in iniquity;' Psal. v. 4—6.

3. In the sentence of his law, in the establishing and execution whereof his truth and honour were engaged; 'In the day thou eatest thou shalt die;' Gen. ii. 17. 'And cursed is every one that continueth not,' &c. Deut. xxvii. 29. And of this enmity of God against sin and sinners, as I have elsewhere at large declared, there is an indelible persuasion abiding on the hearts of all the sons of men, however by the stirrings of lust and craft of Satan, it may be more or less blotted in them. Hence,

4. As a fruit and evidence of this enmity, God abominates their persons, Psal. i. 4—6. rejects and hates their duties and ways, Prov. xv. 8, 9. and prepares wrath and vengeance for them to be inflicted in his appointed time; Rom. ii. 5. All which make up perfect enmity on the part of God.

2. That man was at enmity with God as on his part, I shall not need to prove; because I am not treating of our reconciliation to God, but of his reconciliation to us.

5. Where there is such an enmity as this, begun by offence on the one part, and continued by anger and purpose to punish on the other, to make reconciliation is properly to propitiate, and turn away the anger of the person offended, and thereby to bring the offender into favour with him

again, and to an enjoyment of the same, or a friendship built on better conditions than the former. This description of reconciliation doth God himself give us, Job xlii. 7—9. 'And it was so, that after the Lord had spoken these words unto Job, the Lord said unto Eliphaz the Temanite, My wrath is kindled against thee, and against thy two friends: for ye have not spoken of me the thing that is right, as my servant Job hath. Therefore take unto you now seven bullocks and seven rams, and go to my servant Job, and offer up for yourselves a burnt-offering, and my servant Job shall pray for you, for him will I accept, lest I deal with you after your folly, in that you have not spoken of me the thing that is right, like my servant Job,' &c. The offenders are Eliphaz and his two friends; the offence is their folly in not speaking aright of God. The issue of the breach is, that the wrath or anger of God was towards them; reconciliation is the turning away of that wrath; the means whereby this was to be done, appointed of God, is the sacrifice of Job for atonement.

This then is that which we ascribe to the death of Christ, when we say that as a sacrifice we were reconciled to God by it; or that he made reconciliation for us. Having made God our enemy by sin (as before), Christ by his death turned away his anger, appeased his wrath, and brought us into favour again with God: before the proof of this, I must needs give one caution as to some terms of this discourse, as also remove an objection that lies at the very entrance against the whole nature of that which is treated of.

For the first, when we speak of the anger of God, his wrath, and his being appeased towards us, we speak after the manner of men, but yet by the allowance of God himself; not that God is properly angry, and properly altered from that state and appeased, whereby he should properly be mutable and be actually changed; but by the anger of God, which sometimes in Scripture signifyeth his justice from whence punishment proceeds, sometimes the effects of anger or punishment itself, the obstacles before-mentioned on the part of God, from his nature, justice, law, and truth are intended; and his being appeased towards us, his being satisfied as to all the bars so laid in the way from receiving

us to favour, without the least alteration in him, his nature, will, or justice: and according to the analogy hereof, I desire that whatever is spoken of the anger of God, and his being appeased or altered, which is the language wherein he converseth with us, and instructs us to wisdom, may be measured and interpreted.

2. The objection I shall propose in the words of Crellius. 'Si in eo sita est dilectio, quod Deus nos dilexerit et filium suum miserit ἱλασμόν pro peccatis nostris, quomodo Christus morte sua demum iram Dei adversus nos incensam placarit? nam cum dilectio illa Dei quæ plane fuit summa, causa fuit cur Deus filium suum charissimum miserit, necesse est ut iram jam suam adversus nos deposuerit: nonne aliter eodem tempore et impense amabit, et non amabit? si Deus etiam tum potuit nobis irasci, cum filium suum charissimum supremæ nostræ felicitatis causa morti acerbissimæ objiceret, quod satis magnum argumentum erit, ex effectu ejus petitum, unde cognoscamus Deum nobis non irasci amplius.' Crell. Defen. Socin. con. Grot. part 6.

To the same purpose Socinus himself. 'Demonstravi non modo Christum Deo nos, non autem Deum nobis reconciliasse, verum etiam Deum ipsum fuisse qui hanc reconciliationem fecerit.' Socin. de Servator. lib. 1. part. 1. cap. 1.

'If this be the chiefest and highest love of God, that he sent Christ his only Son to be a propitiation for our sins; how then could Christ by his death appease the wrath of God, that was incensed against us? For seeing that God's love was the cause of sending Christ, he must needs before that have laid aside his anger: for otherwise, should he not intensely love us, and not love us at the same time? And if God could then be angry with us, when he gave up his Son to bitter death for our everlasting happiness, what argument or evidence at any time can we have from the effect of it, whence we may know, that God is not farther angry with us?'

To the same purpose is the plea of the catechist, cap. 8. 'De Morte Christi.' Quest. 31, 32.

Ans. The love wherewith God loved us, when he sent his Son to die for us, was the most intense and supreme in its own kind; nor would admit of any hatred or enmity in God towards us, that stood in opposition thereunto. It is

every where set forth as the most intense love; John iii. 16. Rom. v. 7, 8. 1 John iv. 10. Now this love of God, is an eternal free act of his will: his purpose, Rom. ix. 11. 'his good pleasure,' his purpose that he purposed in himself, as it is called; it is his προθεσις, πρόγνωσις; 1 Pet. i. 2. εὐδοκία, as I have elsewhere distinctly declared; a love that was to have an efficacy by means appointed: but for a love of friendship, approbation, acceptation, as to our persons and duties, God bears none unto us, but as considered in Christ, and for his sake. It is contrary to the whole design of the Scripture, and innumerable particular testimonies, once to fancy a love of friendship, and acceptation towards any in God, and not consequent to the death of Christ.

2. This love of God's purpose and good pleasure, this 'charitas ordinativa,' hath not the least inconsistency with those hinderances of peace and friendship, on the part of God, before-mentioned; for though the holiness of God's nature, the justice of his government, the veracity of his word, will not allow that he take a sinner into friendship and communion with himself, without satisfaction made to him, yet this hinders not, but that in his sovereign good-will and pleasure, he might purpose to recover us from that condition, by the holy means which he appointed. God did not love us, and not love us, or was angry with us, at the same time, and in the same respect. He loved us, in respect of the free purpose of his will, to send Christ to redeem us, and to satisfy for our sin; he was angry with us, in respect of his violated law and provoked justice by sin.

3. God loves our persons, as we are his creatures; is angry with us, as we are his sinners.

4. It is true, that we can have no greater evidence and argument of the love of God's good-will and pleasure in general, than in sending his Son to die for sinners; and that he is not angry with them, with an anger of hatred, opposite to that love; that is, with an eternal purpose to destroy them; but for a love of friendship and acceptation, we have innumerable other pledges and evidences, as is known, and might be easily declared.

These things being premised, the confirmation of what was proposed ensues.

1. The use and sense of the words, whereby this doctrine

of our reconciliation is expressed, evinces the truth contended for, ἱλάσκεσθαι, καταλάσσειν and ἀποκαταλάσσειν, which are the words used in this business, are as much as 'iram avertere,' 'to turn away anger;' so is 'reconciliare, propitiare,' and 'placare,' in Latin: 'Impius, ne audeto placare iram Deorum,' was a law of the Twelve Tables: ἱλάσκομαι, 'propitior, placor,' ἱλασμὸς, 'placio, exoratio;' Gloss. vetus; and in this sense is the word used; ὅσα μέντοι πρὸς ἱλασμοὺς θεῶν ἢ ὁράτων ἀποτροπὰς συνηγόρευον οἱ μαντεῖς. Plut. in Fabio: to 'appease their gods, and turn away the things they feared.' And the same author tells us of a way taken, ἐξιλάσασθαι τὸ μηνίμα θεοῦ, to 'appease the anger of God.' And Xenophon useth the word to the same purpose; πολλὰ μὲν πέμπων ἀναθήματα χρυσᾶ πολλὰ, δὲ ἀργυρᾶ πάμπολλα δὲ θύων, ἐξιλασάμην ποτὲ αὐτον. And so also doth Livy use the word 'reconcilio: non movit modo talis oratio regem, sed etiam reconciliavit Annibali. Bell. Macedon.' And many more instances might be given. God then being angry and averse from love of friendship with us, as hath been declared, and Christ being said thus to make reconciliation for us with God, he did fully turn away the wrath of God from us, as by the testimonies of it will appear.

Before I produce our witnesses in this cause, I must give this one caution; it is not said any where expressly, that God is reconciled to us, but that we are reconciled to God. And the sole reason thereof is, because he is the party offended, and we are the parties offending. Now the party offending, is always said to be reconciled to the party offended, and not on the contrary; so Matt. v. 23, 24. 'If thy brother have ought against thee, go and be reconciled to him;' the brother being the party offended, he that had offended, was to be reconciled to him by turning away his anger: and in common speech, when one hath justly provoked another, we bid him go and reconcile himself to him; that is, do that which may appease him, and give an entrance into his favour again. So is it in the case under consideration; being the parties offending, we are said to be reconciled to God, when his anger is turned away, and we are admitted into his favour. Let now the testimonies speak for themselves.

Rom. v. 10. 'When we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son;' καταλλάγημεν τῷ Θεῷ, we were reconciled to God, or 'brought again into his favour.' Amongst the many reasons that might be given to prove the intention of this expression to be, 'that we were reconciled to God,' by the averting of his anger from us, and our accepting into favour; I shall insist on some few from the context.

1. It appears from the relation that this expression bears to that of ver. 8. 'whilst we were yet sinners Christ died for us;' with which this upon the matter is the same, 'we are reconciled to God by the death of his Son.' Now the intent of this expression, 'Christ died for us sinners,' is, he died to bring us sinners into the favour of God; nor will it admit of any other sense; so is our being reconciled to God by the death of his Son: and that this is the meaning of the expression, 'Christ died for us,' is evident from the illustration given to it by the apostle; ver. 6, 7. 'Christ died for the ungodly.' How? as one man dieth for another; that is, to deliver him from death.

2. From the description of the same thing in other words; ver. 9. 'being justified by his blood.' That it is the same thing upon the matter that is here intended, appears from the contexture of the apostle's speech, 'whilst we were yet enemies Christ died for us; much more being justified by his blood.' And, 'if when we were enemies we were reconciled to God;' the apostle repeats what he had said before; 'if when we were enemies Christ died for us,' and 'we were justified by the blood of Christ;' that is, 'if when we were enemies we were reconciled to God.' Now to be justified, is God's reconciliation to us, his acceptation of us into favour, not our conversion to him, as is known and confessed.

3. The reconciliation we have with God, is a thing tendered to us, and we do receive it; ver. 11. καταλλαγὴν ἐλάβομεν, 'we have received the reconciliation or atonement.' Now this cannot be spoken in reference to our reconciliation to God, as on our side, but of his to us, and our acceptation with him. Our reconciliation to God is our conversion; but we are not said to receive our conversion, or to have our

conversion tendered to us; but to convert ourselves, or to be converted.

4. The state and condition from whence we are delivered by this reconciliation, is described in this, that we are called enemies, 'being enemies we were reconciled.' Now enemies in this place are the same with sinners. And the reconciliation of sinners, that is, of those who had rebelled against God, provoked him, were obnoxious to wrath, is certainly the procuring of the favour of God for them. When you say, such a poor conquered rebel, that expected to be tortured and slain, is by means of such a one reconciled to his prince; what is it that you intend? Is it that he begins to like and love his prince only, or that his prince lays down his wrath and pardons him?

5. All the considerations before insisted on, declaring in what sense we are saved by the death of Christ, prove our reconciliation with God, to be our acceptation with him not our conversion to him.

2 Cor. v. 18—21. Is a place of the same importance with that above-mentioned, wherein the reconciliation pleaded for is asserted, and the nature of it explained. 'And all things are of God, who hath reconciled us to himself by Jesus Christ, and hath given to us the ministry of reconciliation, to wit, that God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them, and hath committed unto us the word of reconciliation. Now then we are ambassadors for Christ, as though God did beseech you by us, we pray you in Christ's stead be ye reconciled to God. For he hath made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him.'

There is in the words a twofold reconciliation.

1. Of God to man, ver. 18. 'God hath reconciled us to himself by Jesus Christ.'

2. Our reconciliation to God, in the acceptance of that reconciliation, which we are exhorted to.

The first is that inquired after; the reconciliation whereby the anger of God by Christ is turned away, and those for whom he died are brought into his favour; which comprises the satisfaction proposed to confirmation. For,

1. Unless it be that God is so reconciled and atoned, whence is it that he is thus proclaimed to be a Father to-

wards sinners as he is here expressed? Out of Christ he is a consuming fire to sinners, and everlasting burnings, Isa. xxxiii. 14. 'Being of purer eyes than to behold inquity;' Hab. i. 13. 'Before whom no sinner shall appear or stand;' Psal. v. 4, 5. So that where there is no sacrifice for sin, there 'remains nothing to sinners, but a certain fearful looking for of judgment and fiery indignation that shall consume the adversaries;' Heb. x. 26, 27. How comes then this jealous God, this holy God, and just Judge, to command some to beseech sinners to be reconciled to him? the reason is given before. It is because he reconciles us to himself by Christ, or in Christ. That is by Christ his anger is pacified, his justice satisfied and himself appeased, or reconciled to us.

2. The reconciliation mentioned, is so expounded in the cause and effect of it, as not to admit of any other interpretation.

1. The effect of God's being reconciled, or his reconciling the world to himself, is in those words; 'Not imputing to them their trespasses.' God doth so reconcile us to himself by Christ, as not to impute our trespasses to us. That is, not dealing with us according as justice required for our sins upon the account of Christ's remitting the penalty due to them; laying away his anger, and receiving us to favour. This is the immediate fruit of the reconciliation spoken of; if not, the reconciliation itself, non-imputation of sin, is not our conversion to God.

2. The cause of it is expressed, ver. 21. 'He made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin.' How comes it to pass that God the righteous Judge doth thus reconcile us to himself, and not impute to us our sins? It is because he hath made Christ to be sin for us; that is, either a sacrifice for sin, or as sin, by the imputation of our sin to him. He was made sin for us, as we are made the righteousness of God in him. Now we are made the righteousness of God by the imputation of his righteousness to us. So was he made sin for us by the imputation of our sin to him. Now for God to reconcile us to himself by imputing our sin to Christ, and thereon not imputing them to us, can be nothing but his being appeased and atoned towards us, with his receiving us to his favour, by and upon the account of the death of Christ.

3. This reconciling of us to himself, is the matter com-

mitted to the preachers of the gospel, whereby, or by the declaration whereof, they should persuade us to be reconciled to God. He hath committed to us, τὸν λόγον τῆς καταλλαγῆς· this doctrine concerning reconciliation mentioned; 'We therefore beseech you to be reconciled to God.' That which is the matter whereby we are persuaded to be reconciled to God, cannot be our conversion itself, as is pretended. The preachers of the gospel are to declare this word of God, viz. 'that he hath reconciled us to himself,' by the blood of Christ, the blood of the new testament that was shed for us, and thereon persuade us to accept of the tidings, or the subject of them, and to be at peace with God. Can the sense be, we are converted to God, therefore be ye converted? This testimony then speaks clearly to the matter under debate.

3. The next place of the same import is, Eph. ii. 12—16. 'That at that time ye were without Christ, being aliens from the commonwealth of Israel, and strangers from the covenant of promise, having no hope, and without God in the world. But now in Christ Jesus ye who sometimes were far off, are made nigh by the blood of Christ. For he is our peace, who hath made both one, and hath broken down the middle wall of partition between us. Having abolished in his flesh the enmity, even the law of commandments contained in ordinances, for to make in himself of twain one new man, so making peace. And that he might reconcile both unto God in one body by the cross having slain the enmity thereby.'

Here is mention of a twofold enmity.

1. Of the Gentiles unto God.

2. Of the Jews and Gentiles, among themselves.

1. Of the Gentiles unto God; ver. 12. Consider them as they are there described, and their enmity to God is sufficiently evident. And what in that estate was the respect of God unto them? What is it towards such persons as there described? 'The wrath of God abideth on them;' John iii. 36. 'they are children of wrath;' Eph. ii. 3. So are they there expressly called: 'he hateth all the workers of iniquity;' Psal. v. 5. and will by no means 'acquit the guilty;' Exod. xxxiv. 7. Yea, he curseth those families that call not on his name.

2. Of the Jews and Gentiles among themselves: which

is expressed, both in the thing itself, and in the cause of it: it is called enmity, and said to arise from, or be occasioned and improved by, the law of commandments contained in ordinances; the occasion, improvement, and management of this enmity between them, see elsewhere.

2. Here is mention of a twofold reconciliation.

1. Of the Jews and Gentiles among themselves; ver. 14, 15. 'He is our peace, and hath made both one, slaying the enmity, so making peace.'

2. Of both unto God; ver. 16. 'that he might reconcile both unto God.'

3. The manner whereby this reconciliation was wrought; in his body by the cross.

The reconciliation unto God is that aimed at: this reconciliation is the reconciling of God unto us, on the account of the blood of Christ, as hath been declared. The bringing of us into his favour, by the laying away of his wrath and enmity against us: which appears,

1. From the cause of it expressed: that is, the body of Christ, by the cross; or the death of Christ. Now the death of Christ was immediately for the forgiveness of sins. 'This is the blood of the new testament that was shed for many for the forgiveness of sins.' It is by shedding of his blood, that we have remission or forgiveness. That this is by an atoning of God, or our acceptance into favour, is confessed.

2. From the expression itself: ἀποκαταλλάξῃ ἐν ἑνὶ σώματι τῷ θεῷ. Τῷ θεῷ denotes one party in the business of reconciliation. He made peace between them both; between the Gentiles on the one hand, and the Jews on the other; and he made peace between them both, and God; Jews and Gentiles on the one hand, and God on the other: so that God is a party in the business of reconciliation, and is therein reconciled to us; for our reconciliation to him, is mentioned in our reconciliation together, which cannot be done without our conversion.

3. From the description of the enmity given ver. 12. which plainly shews (as was manifested), that it was on both sides. Now this reconciliation unto God is by the removal of that enmity. And if so, God was thereby reconciled, and atoned, if he hath any anger or indignation against sin, or sinners.

4. Because this reconciliation of both to God, is the great cause and means of their reconciliation among themselves. God, through the blood of Christ, or on the account of his death, receiving both into favour, their mutual enmity ceased, and without it never did, nor ever will. And this is the reconciliation accomplished by Christ.

The same might be said of the other places; Col. i. 20, 21. But I shall not need to multiply testimonies to the same purpose. Thus we have reconciliation by Christ, in that he hath made atonement or satisfaction for our sins. The observations given on these texts, being suited to obviate the exceptions of Socinus treating of this subject, in his book 'de Servatore,' without troubling the reader with the repetition of his words.

That which in the next place I thought to do, is to prove that we have this reconciliation by the death of Christ as a sacrifice. But because I cannot do this to my own satisfaction, without insisting, first, on the whole doctrine of sacrifices in general; secondly, on the institution, nature, end, and efficacy, of the sacrifices of the Aaronical priesthood; thirdly, the respect and relation that was between them, and the sacrifice of Christ, both in general and in particular; and from all these considerations at large deducing the conclusion proposed; and finding that this procedure would draw out this treatise to a length, utterly beyond my expectation, I shall not proceed in it; but refer it to a peculiar discourse on that subject.

That which I proposed to confirmation at the entrance of this discourse, was the satisfaction made by the blood of Christ. This being proposed under several considerations hath thus far been severally handled: that his death was a price, that we have redemption thereby properly so called, was first evinced. That truth standing, the satisfaction of Christ is sufficiently established, our adversaries themselves being judges. The sacrifice that he offered in his death hath also been manifested. Hereof is the reconciliation now delivered, the fruit and effect. This also is no less destructive of the design of these men: what they have to object against that which hath been spoken, shall have the next place in our discourse.

Thus then our catechists to this business, in the 31st and

32d questions of the 8th chapter, which is about the death of Christ.

'Q. What[h] say you then to those places, that affirm that he reconciled us to God?

'A. 1. That[i] the Scripture nowhere says, that God was reconciled to us by Christ. But this only, that by Christ, or the death of Christ we are reconciled, or reconciled to God, as may appear from all those places, where reconciliation is treated of. Wherefore from those places, the satisfaction cannot be proved. 2. Because it is evident in the Scripture, that God reconciled us to himself, which evinceth the opinion of the adversaries, to be altogether false; 2 Cor. v. 18. Col. i. 20. 22.

Ans. 1. Whether there be any mention of such a reconciliation, as whereby the anger of God is turned away, and we received into favour, in the Scripture, the reader will judge from what hath been already proposed, and thither we appeal. It is not about words and syllables that we contend, but things themselves. The reconciliation of God to us by Christ, is so expressed, as the reconciliation of a judge to an offender, of a king to a rebel, may be expressed.

2. If Christ made reconciliation for us, and for our sins an atonement, he made the satisfaction for us which we plead for.

3. It is true, God is said to reconcile us to himself; but always by Christ, by the blood of Christ: proposing himself as reconciled thereby, and declaring to us the atonement, that we may turn unto him.

They add.

'Q. But[i] what thinkest thou of this reconciliation?

'A. That Jesus Christ shewed a way to us, who by reason of our sins were enemies to God, and alienated from him, how we ought to turn unto God, and by that means be reconciled to him.'

[h] Ad hæc vero, quod nos Deo reconciliarit quid affers?—Primum, nusquam scripturam asserere, Deum nobis a Christo reconciliatum; verum id tantum, quod nos per Christum aut mortem ejus, simus reconciliati, vel Deo reconciliati, ut ex omnibus locis, quæ de hac reconciliatione agunt, videre est. Quare nullo modo ex iis omnibus locis ea satisfactio extrui potest, deinde vero quod aperte in Scripturis extat, Deum nos sibi reconciliasse, id opinionem adversariorum prorsus falsam esse evincit; 2 Cor. v. 18. Col. i. 20. 23.

[i] Quid vero de hac reconciliatione sentis?—Christum Jesum nobis, qui propter peccata nostra Dei inimici eramus, et ab eo abalienati, viam ostendisse, quemadmodum nos ad Deum converti, atque, ad eum modum ei reconciliari oporteat.

Ans. I suppose there was never a more perverse description of any thing, part, or parcel of the gospel, by any men fixed on. Some of the excellencies of it may be pointed out.

1. Here is a reconciliation between two parties, and yet a reconciliation but of one; the other excluded.

2. An enmity on one side only, between God and sinners, is supposed, and that on the part of the sinners; when the Scriptures do much more abound in setting out the enmity of God against them as such; his wrath abiding on them, as some will find one day to their eternal sorrow.

3. Reconciliation is made nothing but conversion, or conversion to God; which yet are terms and things, in the Scriptures every where distinguished.

4. We are said to be enemies to God, 'propter peccata nostra,' when the Scripture says every where, 'that God is an enemy to us,' 'propter peccata nostra.' He hateth and is angry with sinners, 'his judgment is that they which commit sin, are worthy of death.'[k]

5. Here is no mention of the death and blood of Christ, which in every place in the whole Scripture where this reconciliation is spoken of, is expressly laid down as the cause of it; and necessarily denotes the reconciliation of God to us by the averting of his anger, as the effect of it.

6. Did Christ by his death shew us a way, whereby we might come to be reconciled to God, or convert ourselves? What was that way? Is it, that God lays punishment, and affliction, and death, on them who are no way liable thereunto? What else can we learn from the death of Christ, according to these men? The truth is, they mention not his death, because they know not how to make their ends hang together.

This is the sum of what they say. We are reconciled to God, that is, we convert ourselves, by the death of Christ; that is, not by his death, but according to the doctrine he teacheth; and this is the sum of the doctrine of reconciliation, Christ teacheth us a way how we should convert ourselves to God. And so much for reconciliation.

[k] Rom. i. 32.

CHAP. XXX.

The satisfaction of Christ, on the consideration of his death, being a punishment, farther evinced; and vindicated from the exceptions of Smalcius.

THE third consideration of the death of Christ, was of it, as it was penal, as therein he underwent punishment for us, or that punishment, which for sin was due to us. Thence directly is it said to be satisfactory. About the word itself, we do not contend; nor do our adversaries except against it; if the thing itself be proved that is intended by that expression, this controversy is at end. Farther to open the nature of satisfaction, then, by what is said before about bearing of sins, &c. I see no reason; our aim in that word is known to all, and the sense of it obvious. This is made by some the general head of the whole business. I have placed it on the peculiar consideration of Christ's bearing our sins, and undergoing punishment for us. What our catechists say to the whole, I shall briefly consider.

Having assigned some causes and effects of the death of Christ, partly true in their own place, partly false; they ask, Q. 12.

'Is[a] there no other cause of the death of Christ?

'A. None at all. As for that which Christians commonly think, that Christ by his death, merited salvation for us, and satisfied fully for our sins, that opinion is false (or deceitful), erroneous, and very pernicious.'

That the men of this persuasion are bold men, we are not now to learn. Only this assertion, that there is no other cause of the death of Christ, but what they have mentioned, is a new experiment thereof.

If we must believe that these men know all things, and the whole mind of God, so that all is false and pernicious, that lies beyond their road and understanding, there may be some colour for this confidence. But the account we have already taken of them, will not allow us to grant them this plea.

[a] Non est etiam aliqua alia mortis Christi causa?—Nulla prorsus; etsi nunc vulgo Christiani sentiunt, Christum morte sua nobis salutem meruisse, et pro peccatis nostris plenarie satisfecisse, quæ sententia fallax est et erronea, et admodum perniciosa. Cat. Racov. de Mor. Christi cap. 8. q. 12.

2. Of the merit of Christ, I have spoken briefly before. His satisfaction is the thing opposed chiefly. What they have to say against it, shall now be considered; as also how this imputation, or charge, on the common faith of Christians, about the satisfaction of Christ, to be false, erroneous, and pernicious, will be managed.

'Q. 13. How[b] is it false, or deceitful?

'A. That it is false (or deceitful) and erroneous is hence evident; that not only there is nothing of it extant in the Scripture, but also, that it is repugnant to the Scriptures and sound reason.'

For the truth of this suggestion, that it is not extant in Scripture, I refer the reader to what hath been discoursed from the Scripture about it already. When they, or any for them, shall answer, or evade the testimonies that have been produced, or may yet be so (for I have yet mentioned none of those which immediately express the dying of Christ for us, nor his being our Mediator and surety in his death) they shall have liberty, for me, to boast in this manner. In the meantime we are not concerned in their wretched confidence. But let us see how they make good their assertion by instances.

'Q. 14. Shew that in order?

'A. That it is not in the Scripture, this is an argument, that the assertors of that opinion do never bring evident Scriptures for the proof of it; but knit certain consequences, by which they endeavour to make good what they assert: which as it is meet to admit, when they are necessarily deduced from Scripture, so it is certain they have no force, when they are repugnant to the Scripture.'

But what is it that we do not prove by express Scripture, and that in abundance? That our iniquity was laid upon Christ; that he 'was bruised, grieved, wounded, killed for us;' that he 'bare our iniquities,' and that in his 'own body on the tree,' that he was 'made sin for us,' and a curse; that we

[b] Qua ratione?—Quod ad id quod fallax sit et erronea, attinet, id hinc perspicuum est, quod non solum de ea nihil extet in scripturis, verum etiam Scripturis et sanæ rationi repugnat?

[c] Demonstra id ordine?—Id non haberi in Scripturis argumento est, quod istius opinionis assertores nunquam perspicuas scripturas afferunt, ad probandam istam opinionem: verum quasdam consecutiones nectunt, quibus quod asserunt efficere conantur; quas ut admittere æquum est, cum ex Scripturis necessario adstruuntur, ita ubi Scripturis repugnantur, eas nullum vim habere certum est. Quest. 15.

deserved death, and he 'died for us;' that he made 'his soul an offering for sin, laid down his life a price and ransom for us,' or in our stead; that we are thereby 'redeemed and reconciled to God;' that our 'iniquities being laid on him,' and he bearing them (that is the punishment due to them), 'we have deliverance;' God being atoned, and his wrath removed, we prove not by consequence, but by multitudes of express testimonies. If they mean that the word 'satisfaction' is not found in Scripture in the business treated of, we tell them that כֹּפֶר, is, and λύτρον, ἀντίλυτρον, and λύτρωσις, ἀπολύτρωσις, καταλλαγὴ (all words of a cognate significancy thereto, and of the same importance as to the doctrine under consideration), are frequently used. It is indeed a hard task to find, satisfaction, the word, in the Hebrew of the Old Testament, or the Greek of the New. But the thing itself is found expressly a hundred times over; and their great master doth confess, that it is not the word, but the thing itself, that he opposeth. So that without any thanks to them at all, for granting, that consequences from Scripture may be allowed to prove matters of faith, we assure them our doctrine is made good by innumerable express testimonies of the word of God, some whereof have been by us now insisted on; and moreover, that if they and their companions did not wrest the Scriptures to strange and uncouth senses, never heard of before amongst men professing the name of Christ, we could willingly abstain wholly from any expression, that is not ῥητῶς found in the word itself. But if by their rebellion against the truth, and attempts to pervert all the expressions of the word, the most clear and evident, to perverse and horrid abominations, we are necessitated to them, they must bear them unless they can prove them not to be true.

Let the reader observe, that they grant, that the consequences we gather from Scripture would evince that which we plead and contend for, were it not but that they are repugnant to other Scriptures. Let them then manifest the truth of their pretension by producing those other Scriptures, or confess that they are self-condemned.

Wherefore they ask,

'Q. How[d] is it repugnant to the Scriptures?

[d] Qui vero Scripturæ repugnat?—Ad eum modum, quod Scripturæ passim, Deum

'A. In this sort, that the Scriptures do every where testify, that God forgives sin freely; 2 Cor. v. 19. Rom. iii. 24, 25. but principally under the new covenant; Eph. ii. 8. Matt. xviii. 23. Now nothing is more opposite to free remission, than satisfaction; so that if a creditor be satisfied, either by the debtor himself, or by any other in the name of the debtor, he cannot be said to forgive freely.'

If this be all that our consequences are repugnant unto in the Scripture, we doubt not to make a speedy reconciliation. Indeed there was never the least difference between them. Not to dwell long upon that which is of an easy despatch.

1. This objection is stated solely to the consideration of sin as a debt, which is metaphorical. Sin properly is an offence, a rebellion, a transgression of the law, an injury done, not to a private person, but a governor in his government.

2. The two first places mentioned, 2 Cor. v. 18—20. Rom. iii. 24, 25. do expressly mention the payment of this debt by Christ as the ground of God's forgiveness, remission, and pardon; the payment of it, I say, not as considered metaphorically, as a debt, but the making an atonement and reconciliation for us, who had committed it, considered as a crime and rebellion, or transgression.

3. We say, that God doth most freely forgive us, as Eph. ii. 8. Matt. xviii. 23. without requiring any of the debt at our hands, without requiring any price or ransom from us or any satisfaction at our hands; but yet he forgives us for Christ's sake, setting forth him to be a propitiation through faith in his blood; he laying down his life a ransom for us, God not sparing him, but giving him up to death for us all.

4. The expression of another satisfying in the name of the debtor, intends either one procured by the debtor, and at his entreaty undertaking the work, or one graciously given, and assigned to be in his stead, by the creditor. In the first sense it hath an inconsistency with free remission, in the latter, not at all.

The truth is, men that dream of an opposition between

peccata hominibus gratuito remittere, testentur, 2 Cor. v. 19. Rom. iii. 24, 25. potissimum vero sub N. Fœdere, Eph. ii. 8. Matt. xviii. 23, &c. At remissioni gratuitæ nihil adversatur magis, quam satisfactio. Cui enim creditori satisfit, vel ab ipso debitore, vel ab alio debitoris nomine, de eo dici non potest vere, eum debitum gratuito ex ipsa gratia remisisse.

the satisfaction made by Christ, the surety, and Mediator of the new covenant, and free remission made to us, are utterly ignorant of the whole mystery of the gospel, nature of the covenant, and whole mediation of Christ; advancing carnal imaginations against innumerable testimonies of the Scripture, witnessing the blessed conspiration between them, to the praise of the glorious grace of God. But they say,

That it is contrary to[e] reason also, because it would hence follow, 'that Christ underwent eternal death, if he satisfied God for our sins: seeing it is manifest, that the punishment we deserved by our sins, was eternal death. Also it would follow, that we should be more bound to Christ, than to God himself, as to him who had shewn us greater favour in satisfaction; but God receiving satisfaction, afforded us no favour.'

What little relief this plea will afford our adversaries, will quickly appear. For,

1. I have proved that Christ underwent that death that was due unto sinners, which was all that justice, law, or reason required. He underwent it, though it was impossible for him to be detained by it.

2. If the Racovians do not think us obliged to God, for sending his Son out of his infinite and eternal love to die for us, causing all our iniquities to meet on him, justifying us freely (who could do nothing for our own delivery) through the redemption that is in the blood of Christ, we must tell them, that (we bless his holy name) we are not of that mind; but finding a daily fruit of his love and kindness, upon our souls, do know that we are bound unto him eternally, to love, praise, serve, honour, and glorify him, beyond what we shall ever be able to express.

2. For the inquiry made, and comparison instituted, between our obligation to the Father and the Son, or which of them we are most beholden to, we profess we cannot speak unto it. Our obligation to both, and either respectively, is such, that if our affections were extended immeasurably to what they are, yet the utmost and exactest height of them

[e] Cedo qui istud rationi repugnet?—Id quidem hinc perspicuum est, quod sequeretur Christum æternam mortem subiisse, si Deo pro peccatis nostris satisfecisset: cum constet pœnam quam homines peccatis meruerant æternam mortem esse: deinde consequeretur, nos Christo, quam Deo ipsi devinctiores esse, quippe qui satisfactione multum gratiæ nobis ostendisset; Deus vero exacta satisfactione, nulla prorsus gratia nos prosecutus fuisset.

would be due to both, and each of them respectively. We are so bound to one, as we cannot be more to the other; because to both in the absolutely highest degree. This we observe in the Scriptures, that in mentioning the work of redemption, the rise, fountain, and spring of it is still assigned to be in the love of the Father: the carrying of it on in the love and obedience of the Son, and so we order our thoughts of faith towards them. The Father being not one whit the less free and gracious to us, by loving us upon the satisfaction of his Son, than if he had forgiven us (had it been possible) without any satisfaction at all.

And thus is this article of the Christian faith, contrary to Scripture, thus to reason. They add,

'Q. How[f] also is it pernicious?

'A. In that it openeth a door unto men to sin, or at least incites them to sloth in following after holiness. But the Scripture witnesseth that this amongst others is an end of the death of Christ, that he might redeem us from our iniquity and deliver us from this evil world that we might be redeemed from our vain conversation, and have our consciences purged from dead works, that we might serve the living God; Tit. ii. 14. Gal. i. 4. 1 Pet. i. 18. Heb. ix. 14.'

That the deliverance of us from the power and pollution of our sin, the purifying of our souls and consciences, the making of us a peculiar people of God, zealous of good works, that we might be holy and blameless before him in love, is one eminent end of the death of Christ, we grant. For this end by his death, did he procure the Spirit to quicken us, 'who were dead in trespasses and sins,' sprinkling us with the pure water thereof, and giving us daily supplies of grace from him, that we might grow up in holiness before him, until we come to the measure in this life assigned to us in him.

But that the consideration of the cross of Christ, and the satisfaction made thereby, should open a door of licentiousness to sin, or encourage men to sloth in the ways of godliness, is fit only for them to assert, to whom the gospel is folly.

[f] Cedo etiam, qui hæc opinio est perniciosa?—Ad eum modum, quod hominibus fenestram ad peccándi licentiam aperiat, aut certe ad socordiam in pietate colenda eos invitet. Scriptura vero testatur, cum inter alios Christi mortis finem esse, ut redimeremur ab omni iniquitate, ex hoc seculo nequam eriperemur, et redimeremur ex vana conversatione a patribus tradita, et mundaremur conscientia a mortuis operibus ad serviendum Deo viventi. Tit. ii. 14. Gal. i. 4. 1 Pet. i. 18. Heb. ix. 14.

What is it, I pray, in the doctrine of the cross, that should thus dispose men to licentiousness and sloth? Is it that God is so provoked with every sin, that it is impossible, and against his nature to forgive it, without inflicting the punishment due thereto? Or is it that God so loved us, that he gave his only Son to die for us, or that Christ loved us, and washed us in his own blood? Or is it that God for Christ's sake doth freely forgive us? Yea, but our adversaries say, that God freely forgives us; yea, but they say it is without satisfaction. Is it then an encouragement to sin, to affirm that God forgives us freely for the satisfaction, of his Son? And not to say, that he forgives us freely without satisfaction? Doth the adding of satisfaction, whereby God to the highest manifested his indignation and wrath against sin; doth that, I say, make the difference, and give the encouragement? Who could have discovered this but our catechists and their companions? Were this a season for that purpose, I could easily demonstrate that there is no powerful or effectual motive to abstain from sin, no encouragement or incitation unto holiness, but what riseth from, or relateth unto, the satisfaction of Chirst.

And this is that which they have to make good their charge against the common faith, that it is false, erroneous, and pernicious. Such worthy foundations have they of their great superstruction, [or rather so great is their confidence, and so little is their strength for the pulling down of the church built upon the rock.

They proceed to consider what testimonies and proofs (they say) we produce for the confirmation of the truth contended for. What (they say) we pretend from reason (though indeed it be from innumerable places of Scripture), I have vindicated not long since to the full in my book of the[g] vindictive Justice of God, and answered all the exceptions given thereunto; so that I shall not translate from thence what I have delivered to this purpose, but pass to what follows.

Question twelve they make this inquiry.

'Q. Which[h] are the Scriptures out of which they endeavour to confirm their opinion?

[g] De Justit. divin. Diatrib.

[h] Quæ vero sunt Scripturæ e quibus illi opinionem suam adstruere conantur? Eæ, quæ testantur Christum vel pro peccatis nostris mortuum, deinde, quod nos redemit,

'A. Those which testify that Christ died for us, or for our sins, also that he redeemed us, or that he gave himself or his life a redemption for many; then, that he is our Mediator: moreover, that he reconciled us to God, and is a propitiation for our sin. Lastly, from those sacrifices, which as figures shadowed forth the death of Christ.'

So do they huddle up together those very many express testimonies of the truth we plead for, which are recorded in the Scripture. Of which I may clearly say, that I know no one truth in the whole Scripture, that is so freely and fully delivered; as being indeed of the greatest importance to our souls. What they except in particular against any one of the testimonies that may be referred to the heads before recounted (except those which have been already spoken to), shall be considered in the order wherein they proceed.

They say then,

'For what belongeth unto those testimonies wherein it is contended that Christ died for us, it is manifest that satisfaction cannot necessarily be therein asserted, because the Scripture witnesseth that we ought even to lay down our lives for the brethren; 1 John iii. 16. And Paul writes of himself, Col. i. 14. 'Now I rejoice in my affliction for you, and fill up the remainder of the affliction of Christ for his body which is the church.' But it is certain, that neither do believers satisfy for any of the brethren; nor did Paul make satisfaction to any for the church.

'Q. 23. What then is the sense of these words, 'Christ died for us?

'That these words, 'for us,' do not signify in our place

aut dedit semetipsum et animam suam redemptionem pro multis: tum quod noster Mediator est. Porro quod nos reconciliarit Deo, et sit propitiatio pro peccatis nostris; Denique ex illis sacrificiis, quæ mortum Christi, seu figuræ adumbraverunt.

i Quod attinet ad illa testimonia in quibus habetur Christum pro nobis mortuum, ex iis satisfactionem adstrui necessario non posse hinc manifestum est, quod Scriptura testetur, etiam nos pro fratribus animas ponere debere, 1 John iii. 16. et Paulus de se scribat, Col. i. 24. nunc gaudeo &c. Certum autem est, nec fideles pro fratribus cuiquam satisfacere, neque Paulum cuiquam pro ecclesia satisfecisse.

At horum verborum, Christum pro nobis esse mortuum, qui sensus est?—Is, quid hæc verba [pro nobis] non significent loco vel vice nostri, verum propter nos, uti etiam Apostolus expresse loquitur, 1 Cor. viii. 11. Quod etiam similia verba indicant, cum Scriptura loquitur, pro peccatis nostris mortuum esse Christum; quæ verba eum sensum habere nequeunt, loco seu vice nostrorum peccatorum mortuum esse; verum propter peccata nostra esse mortuum; uti Rom. iv. 25. manifeste Scriptum legimus. Ea porro verba (Christum pro nobis mortuum esse) hanc habent vim, eum idcirco mortuum, ut nos salutem æternam, quam is nobis cælitus attulit amplecteremur, et consequemur, quod qua ratione fiat, paulo superius accepisti.

or stead, but for us, as the apostle expressly speaks, 1 Cor. viii. 11. which also alike places do shew, where the Scripture saith, that Christ died for our sins; which word cannot have this sense, that Christ died instead of our sins, but that he died for our sins, as it is expressly written, Rom. iv. 25. Moreover these words, 'Christ died for us,' have this sense, that he therefore died, that we might embrace and obtain that eternal salvation which he brought to us from heaven, which how it is done you heard before.'

Ans. Briefly to state the difference between us about the meaning of this expression 'Christ died for us,' I shall give one or two observations upon what they deliver, then confirm the common faith, and remove their exceptions thereto.

1. Without any attempt of proof they oppose 'vice nostri,' and 'propter nos,' as contrary and inconsistent; and make this their argument, that Christ did not die 'vice nostri,' because he died 'propter nos.' When it is one argument whereby we prove that Christ died in our stead, because he died for us, in the sense mentioned, 1 Cor. viii. 11. where it is expressed by διὰ, because we could no otherwise be brought to the end aimed at.

2. Our sense of the expression is evident from what we insist upon, in the doctrine in hand. 'Christ died for us;' that is, he underwent the death and curse that was due to us, that we might be delivered therefrom.

3. The last words of the catechists are those wherein they strive to hide the abomination of their hearts in reference to this business. I shall a little lay it open.

1. Christ, say they, 'brought us eternal salvation from heaven;' that is, 'he preached a doctrine in obedience whereunto, we may obtain salvation.' So did Paul.

2. 'He died that we might receive it;' that is, rather than he would deny the truth which he preached, he suffered himself to be put to death. So did Paul; and yet he was not crucified for the church.

3. It is not indeed the death of Christ, but his resurrection that hath an influence into our receiving of his doctrine, and so our obtaining salvation. And this is the sense of these words, 'Christ died for us.'

For the confirmation of our faith from this expression, 'Christ died for us,' we have,

1. The common sense, and customary usage of human kind as to this expression. Whenever one is in danger, and another is said to come and die for him, that he may be delivered, a substitution is still understood. The ἀντίψυχοι of old, as Damon and Pythias, &c. make this manifest.

2. The common usage of this expression in Scripture confirms the sense insisted on. So David wished that he had died for his son Absolom, that is, 'died in his stead,' that he might have lived; 2 Sam. xviii. 33. And that supposal of Paul, Rom. i. 11. of one daring to die for a good man, relating (as by all expositors on the place is evinced) to the practice of some in former days, who to deliver others from death, had given themselves up to that whereunto they were obnoxious, confirms the same.

3. The phrase itself, of ἀπέθανε, or ἀπέθανεν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, which is used, Heb. ii. 9. 1 Pet. i. 21. Rom. v. 6—8. 2 Cor. v. 14. sufficiently proves our intention, compared with the use of the preposition in other places; especially being farther explained by the use of the preposition ἀντὶ, which ever denotes a substitution, in the same sense and business, Matt. xx. 28. x. 45. 1 Tim. ii. that a substitution and commutation is always denoted by this preposition (if not an opposition which here can have no place); 1 Pet. iii. 9. Rom. xii. 14. Matt. v. 38. Luke xi. 13. Heb. xii. 16. 1 Cor. xi. 15. amongst other places are sufficient evidences.

4. Christ is so said to die ἀντὶ ἡμῶν, so as that he is said in his death to have 'our iniquities laid upon him,' to 'bear our sin in his own body on the tree,' to be made sin and a curse for us, to offer himself a 'sacrifice for us,' by his death, his blood, to pay a price or ransom for us, to redeem, to reconcile us to God, to do away our sins in his blood, to free us from wrath, and condemnation, and sin. Now whether thus to 'die for us,' be not to die in our place and stead, let angels and men judge.

5. But, say they, this is all that we have to say in this business. 'Yet we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren;' and Paul saith, 'that he filled up the measure of the affliction of Christ, for his body's sake the church,' but nei-

ther the one, nor the other did make satisfaction to God by their death, or affliction. But,

1. If all we had to plead for the sense of this expression, 'Christ died for us,' depended solely on the sense and use of that word ὑπὲρ, then the exception would have this force in it. The word is once or twice used in another sense, in another business; therefore the sense of it contended for in this business, cannot be such as you seek to maintain. But,

1. This exception at best, in a cause of this importance, is most frivolous, and tends to the disturbance of all sober interpretation of Scripture.

2. We are very far from making the single sense of the preposition, to be the medium, which in the argument from the whole expression we insist on.

2. The passage in 1 John iii. 16. being a part of the apostles persuasive to love, charity, and the fruits of them, tending to the relief of the brethren, in poverty and distress, disclaims all intendment and possibility of a substitution or commutation, nor hath any intimation of undergoing that which was due to another, but only of being ready to the utmost to assist and relieve them. The same is the condition of what is affirmed of Paul; of the measure of affliction, which in the infinite wise providence, and fatherly care of God, is proportioned to the mystical body of Christ's church, Paul underwent his share for the good of the whole. But that Paul, that any believers were crucified for the church, or died for it, in the sense that Christ died for it, that they redeemed it to God by their own blood, it is notorious blasphemy once to imagine. The meaning of the phrase, 'He died for our sins,' was before explained. Christ then dying for us, 'being made sin for us,' 'bearing our iniquity,' and 'redeeming us by his blood,' died in our place and stead, and by his death made satisfaction to God for our sin.

Also that Christ made satisfaction for our sin, appears from hence, that he was our Mediator. Concerning this, after their attempt against proper redemption by his blood, which we have already considered, Q. 28. they inquire,

'Q. What[k] say you to this, that Christ is the Mediator of a new covenant between God and man? and answer.

'A. Seeing it is read, that Moses was a mediator, Gal. iii. 19. (namely of the old covenant between God and the people of Israel) and it is evident, that he no way made satisfaction to God; neither from hence, that Christ is the Mediator of God and man, can it be certainly gathered, that he made any satisfaction to God for our sin.'

I shall take leave before I proceed, to make a return of this argument to them from whom it comes, by a mere change of the instance given. Christ, they say, our high-priest, offered himself to God in heaven. Now Aaron is expressly said to be a high-priest, and yet he did not offer himself in heaven, and therefore it cannot be certainly proved, that Christ offered himself in heaven, because he was a high-priest. Or thus: David was a king, and a type of Christ; but David reigned at Jerusalem, and was a temporal king: it cannot therefore be proved, that Christ is a spiritual king from hence, that he is said to be a king. This argument I confess Faustus Socinus could not answer when it was urged against him by Sidelius. But for the former, I doubt not but Smalcius would quickly have answered, that it is true; it cannot be necessarily proved, that Christ offereth himself in heaven, because he was a high-priest, which Aaron was also, but because he was such a high-priest, as entered into the heavens to appear personally in the presence of God for us, as he is described to be. Until he can give us a better answer to our argument, I hope he will be content with this of ours to his. It is true, it doth not appear, nor can be evinced necessarily, that Christ made satisfaction for us to God, because he was a mediator in general, for so Moses was who made no satisfaction; but because it is said, that he was such a mediator between God and man, as gave his life a price of redemption for them for whom with God he mediated, 1 Tim. ii. 6. it is most evident and undeniable; and hereunto Smalcius is silent.

What remains of this chapter in the catechists, hath been

[k] Quid ad hæc dicis, quod Christus sit Mediator inter Deum et homines, aut N. fœderis?—Cum legatur Moses fuisse Mediator, Gal. iii. 19. (puta inter Deum et populum Israel aut prisci fœderis) neque eum satisfecisse Deo ullo modo constet, ne hinc quidem quod mediator Dei et hominum Christus sit, colligi certo poterit, eum satisfactionem aliquam, qua Deo pro peccatis nostris satisfieret peregisse.

already fully considered; so to them and Mr. B. as to his 12th chapter about the death of Christ, what hath been said may suffice. Many weighty considerations of the death of Christ in this whole discourse, I confess are omitted; and yet more perhaps have been delivered, than by our adversaries' occasion hath been administered unto. But this business is the very centre of the new covenant, and cannot sufficiently be weighed. God assisting, a farther attempt will ere long be made for the brief stating all the several concernments of it.

CHAP. XXXI.

Of election and universal grace: Of the resurrection of Christ from the dead.

Mr Biddle's intention in this 13th chapter, being to decry God's eternal election, finding himself destitute of any Scripture that should to the least outward appearance speak to his purpose, he deserts the way and method of procedure imposed on himself, and in the very entrance falls into a dispute against it, with such arguments as the texts of Scripture after-mentioned, give not the least colour or countenance unto. Not that from me he incurs any blame for using any arguments whereby he supposeth he may further or promote his cause, is this spoken; but having at the entrance professed against such a procedure, he ought not upon any necessity to have transgressed the law, which to himself he had prescribed. But as the matter stands, he is to be heard to the full, in what he hath to offer. Thus then he proceeds:

'Q. Those Scriptures which you have already alleged, when I enquired for whom Christ died, intimate the universality of God's love to men: yet, forasmuch as this is a point of the greatest importance, without the knowledge and belief whereof, we cannot have any true and solid ground of coming unto God (because if he from eternity intended good only to a few, and those few are not set down in the Scriptures, which were written, that we through the comfort of

them might have hope, no man can certainly, yea, probably infer, that he is in the number of those few, the contrary being ten thousand to one more likely); what other clear passages of Scripture have you, which shew, that God, in sending Christ, and proposing the gospel, aimed not at the salvation of a certain elect number, but of men in general?

'A. John iii. 16, 17. vi. 33. iv. 42. 1 John iv. 14. John xii. 46, 47. Mark xvi. 15, 16. Col. i. 22. i. 18. 1 Tim. ii. 1—3. 2 Pet. iii. 9. 2 Cor. v. 19. 1 John ii. 1, 2.'

1. That God is good to all men, and bountiful, being a wise, powerful, liberal provider for the works of his hands, in and by innumerable dispensations, and various communications of his goodness to them; and may in that regard, be said to have a universal love for them all, is granted. But that God loveth all, and every man alike, with that eternal love, which is the fountain of his giving Christ for them, and to them, and all good things with him, is not in the least intimated by any of those places of Scripture, where they are expressed for whom Christ died; as elsewhere hath been abundantly manifested.

2. It is confessed, that this is a point of the greatest importance (that is, of very great), without the knowledge and belief whereof we cannot have any true and solid ground of coming unto God; namely, of the love of God in Christ; but that to know the universality of his love is of such importance, cannot be proved, unless that can be numbered which is wanting, and that weighed in the balance which is not.

3. We say not, that God from all eternity intended good only to a few, &c. He intended much good to all, and every man in the world, and accordingly in abundance of variety accomplisheth that his intention towards them; to some in a greater, to some in a lesser measure, according as seems good to his infinite wisdom and pleasure, for 'which all things were made and created;' Rev. iv. 11. And for that particular eminent good of salvation by Jesus Christ, for the praise of his glorious grace, we do not say that he intended that from eternity, for a few absolutely considered; for these will appear in the issue to be a 'great multitude, which no man can number;' Rev. vii. 9. but that in comparison of them who shall everlastingly come short of his glory, we say that they are but a 'little flock,' yea, 'few they

are that are chosen,' as our Saviour expressly affirms, whatever Mr. B. be pleased to tell us to the contrary.

4. That the granting that they are but few that are chosen (though many be called), and that 'before the foundation of the world' some are chosen to be holy and unblameable in love through Christ, having their 'names written in the book of life,' is a discouragement to any to come to God, Mr. B. shall persuade us, when he can evince that the secret and eternal purpose of God's discriminating between persons, as to their eternal conditions, is the great ground and bottom of our approach unto God; and not the truth and faithfulness of the promises which he hath given, with his holy and righteous commands. The issue that lies before them who are commanded to draw nigh to God is, not whether they are elected or no, but whether they will believe or no, God having given them eternal and unchangeable rules; 'He that believes shall be saved, and he that belives not, shall be damned;' though no man's name be written in the Scripture, he that believes hath the faith of God's veracity, to assure him that he shall be saved. It is a most vain surmisal, that as to that obedience which God requires of us, there is any obstruction laid by this consideration, that they are but few which are chosen.

5. This is indeed the only true and solid ground of coming unto God by Christ, that God hath infallibly conjoined faith and salvation, so that whosoever believes shall be saved; neither doth the granting of the pretended universality of God's love, afford any other ground whatever; and this is not in the least shaken or impaired by the effectual love and purpose of God for the salvation of some. And if Mr. B. hath any other true and solid ground of encouraging men to come to God by Christ, besides and beyond this which may not on one account or other, be educed from it or resolved into it (I mean of God's command and promise), I do here beg of him to acquaint me with it, and I shall give him more thanks for it, if I live to see it done, than as yet I can persuade myself to do on the account of all his other labours which I have seen.

6. We say, though God hath chosen some only to salvation by Christ, yet that the names of those some are not expressed in Scripture; the doing whereof would have been

destructive to the main end of the word, the nature of faith, and all the ordinances of the gospel; yet God having declared that whosoever believeth shall be saved, there is sufficient ground for all and every man in the world, to whom the gospel is preached, to come to God by Christ, and other ground there is none, nor can be offered by the assertors of the pretended universality of God's love. Nor is this proposition, 'he that believes shall be saved,' founded on the universality of love pleaded for, but the sufficiency of the means for the accomplishment of what is therein asserted: namely, the blood of Christ, who is believed on.

Now because Mr. B. expresseth, that the end of his asserting this universality of God's love, is to decry his eternal purpose of election; it being confessed that between these two, there is an inconsistency: without entering far into that controversy, I shall briefly shew what the Scripture speaks to the latter, and how remote the places mentioned by Mr. B. are, from giving countenance to the former in the sense wherein by him who asserts it it is understood.

For the first, methinks a little respect and reverence to that testimony of our Saviour, 'many are called, but few are chosen,' might have detained this gentleman from asserting with so much confidence, that the persuasion of God's choosing but a few, is an obstruction of men's coming unto God. Though he looks upon our blessed Saviour as a mere man, yet I hope, he takes him for a true man, and one that taught the way of God aright. But a little farther to clear this matter.

1. Some are chosen from eternity, and are under the purpose of God, as to the good mentioned. 2. Those some, are some only, not all; and therefore as to the good intended, there is not a universal love in God, us to the objects of it, but such a distinguishing one as is spoken against. Eph. i. 4, 5. 'According as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy, and without blame before him in love: having predestinated us to the adoption of children by Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will.' Here are some chosen, and consequently an intention of God concerning them, expressed; and this from eternity, or before the foundation of the world; and this to the good of holiness, adoption, salvation;

and this is only of some, and not of all the world, as the whole tenor of the discourse being referred to believers, doth abundantly manifest.

Rom. viii. 28—30. 'And we know, that all things work together for good, to them that are the called according to his purpose. For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn amongst many brethren. Moreover, whom he did predestinate, them he also called: and whom he called, them he also justified: and whom he justified, them he also glorified.' The good here intended is glory, that the apostle closes withal; 'whom he justified, them he also glorified.' The means of that end, consists in vocation and justification: the persons to be made partakers of this end, are not all the world, but the 'called according to his purpose;' the designation of them so distinguished, to the end expressed, is from the purpose, foreknowledge, and predestination of God, that is, his everlasting intention. Were it another man, with whom we have to do, I should wonder that it came into his mind, to deny this eternal intention of God towards some for good; but nothing is strange from the gentlemen of our present contest. They are but some which are 'ordained to eternal life;' Acts xiii. 48. but some, that are 'given to Christ;' John xvii. 6. 'A remnant according to election;' Rom. xi. 5. one being chosen, when another was rejected, before 'they were born, or had done either good or evil, that the purpose of God, according to election might stand;' Rom. ix. 11, 12. and those who attain salvation, are 'chosen thereunto, through sanctification of the Spirit, and belief of the truth;' 2 Thess. ii. 13. All that is intended by them, whom Mr. B. thinketh to load with the opinion he rejects, is but what in these and many other places of Scripture, is abundantly revealed. God from all eternity, according to the purpose of his own will, or the purpose which is according to election, hath chosen some, and appointed them to the obtaining of life and salvation by Christ, to the praise of his glorious grace. For the number of these, be they few or more, in comparison of the rest of the world, the event doth manifest.

Yet farther to evidence that this purpose of God, or intention spoken of, is peculiar and distinguishing, there is ex-

press mention of another sort of men, who are not thus chosen, but lie under the purpose of God, as to a contrary lot and condition. 'The Lord hath made all things for himself; yea, even the wicked for the day of evil;' Prov. xvi. 4. They are persons, 'whose names are not written in the Lamb's book of life;' Rev. xiii. 8. 'Being of old ordained to condemnation;' Jude iv. being as 'natural brute beasts, made to be taken and destroyed;' 2 Pet. ii. 12. And therefore, the apostle distinguisheth all men into those who 'are appointed to wrath,' and those who are appointed to the obtaining of life by Jesus Christ; 1 Thess. v. 9. An instance of which eternally discriminating purpose of God, is given in Jacob and Esau, Rom. ix. 11, 12. which way and procedure therein of God, the apostle vindicates from all appearance of unrighteousness, and stops the mouths of all repiners against it, from the sovereignty and absolute liberty of his will, in dealing with all the sons of men as he pleaseth; ver. 14—21. Concluding that in opposition to them, whom God hath made 'vessels of mercy, prepared unto glory;' there are also 'vessels of wrath fitted to destruction;' ver. 22, 23.

Moreover, in all eminent effects and fruits of love, in all the issues and ways of it, for the good of, and towards the sons of men, God abundantly manifests, that his eternal love, that regards the everlasting good of men, as it was before described, is peculiar, and not universally comprehensive of all, and every one of mankind.

In the pursuit of that love, he gave his Son to die; 'For God commendeth his love to us, in that whilst we were yet sinners, Christ died for us;' Rom. v. 8. 'Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins;' 1 John iv. 10. Now though he died not for the Jews only, but for all, for the whole world, or men throughout the whole world, yet that he died for some only of all sorts throughout the world, even those who are so chosen, as is before-mentioned, and not for them who are rejected, as was above declared, himself testifies; John xvii. 9. 'I pray for them, I pray not for the world, but for them which thou hast given me, thine they were, and thou gavest them me;' ver. 6. 'And for their sakes I sanctify myself;' ver. 17. Even as he had said before, that he

came to give his life 'a ransom for many;' Matt. xx. 28. which Paul afterward abundantly confirms; affirming, that God 'redeemed his church with his own blood;' Acts xx. 28. Not the world, as contradistinguished from his church, nor absolutely; but his church throughout the world. And to give us a clearer insight into his intendment, in naming the church in this business, he tells us, they are God's elect whom he means; Rom. viii. 32—34. 'He that spared not his Son, but delivered him up to death for us all, how shall he not with him, freely give us all things? Who shall lay any thing to the charge of God's elect? It is God that justifieth: Who is he that condemneth? It is Christ that died, yea, rather that is risen again, who is even at the right hand of God, who also maketh intercession for us.' They are the elect for whom God gave his Son, and that out of his love, which the apostle eminently sets out ver. 32. those to whom with his Son he gives all things, and who shall on that account never be separated from him.

Farther, to manifest that this great fruit and effect of the love of God, which is extended to the whole object of that love, was not universal. 1. The promise of giving him was not so; God promised Christ to all, for and to whom he giveth him. 'The Lord God of Israel by him visited and redeemed his people, raising up a horn of salvation for them in the house of his servant David, as he spake by the mouth of his holy prophets, which have been since the world began;' Luke i. 68—70. In the very first promise of him, the seed of the serpent (as are all reprobate unbelievers) are excluded from any interest therein; Gen. iii. 15. And it was renewed again, not to all the world, but to 'Abraham and his seed;' Gen. xii. 2, 3. Acts ii. 39. iii. 25. And for many ages, the promise was so appropriated to the 'seed of Abraham;' Rom. ix. 5. with some few, that joined themselves to them, Isa. lvi. 3—5. that the people of God prayed for a curse on the residue of the world, Jer. x. 25. as they which were 'strangers from the covenant of promise;' Eph. ii. 12. they belonged not to them. So that God made not a promise of Christ to the universality of mankind; which sufficiently evinceth, that it was not from a universal, but a peculiar love that he was given. Nor

2. When Christ was exhibited in the flesh, according to

the promise, was he given to all, but to the church; Isa. ix. 6. neither really as to their good; nor ministerially for the promulgation of the gospel to any, but to the Jews. And therefore, when he came to his own, though his 'own received him not;' John i. 11. yet, as to the ministry which he was to accomplish, he professed he was not 'sent but to the lost sheep of Israel;' and gives order to them whom he sent forth to preach in his own lifetime, not to go into the 'way of the Gentiles, nor to enter into any city of the Samaritans;' Matt. x. 5. yea, when he had been lifted up, to draw all men to him, John iii. 14. and chap. xii. 32. and being ascended had broken down the partition wall, and took away all distinction of Jew and Gentile, circumcision and uncircumcision, having died not only for that nation of the Jews, (for the remnant of them according to the election of grace, Rom. xi.) but that he 'might gather together in one the children of God' that were scattered abroad; John xi. 52. whence the language and expressions of the Scripture as to the people of God are changed, and instead of Judah and Israel, they are expressed by the 'world;' John iii. 16. the 'whole world,' 1 John ii. 1, 2. and 'all men;' 1 Tim. iv. 6. in opposition to the Jews only, some of all sorts being now taken into grace and favour with God; yet neither then doth he do what did remain, for the full administration of the covenant of grace towards all; namely, the pouring out of his Spirit with efficacy of power to bring them into subjection to him; but still carries on, though in a greater extent and latitude, a work of distinguishing love, taking some and refusing others. So that being 'exalted, and made a Prince and a Saviour,' he gives not repentance to all the world, but to them whom he redeemed to God by his blood, out of every 'kindred and tongue and people and nation;' Rev. v. 9.

It appears then, from the consideration of this first most eminent effect of the love of God, in all the concernments of it, that that love, which is the foundation of all the grace and glory, of all the spiritual and eternal good things, whereof the sons of men are made partakers, is not universal, but peculiar and distinguishing.

Mr. Biddle being to prove his former assertion of the universality of God's love, mentions sundry places, where God is said to love the world, and to send his Son to be the

Saviour, of the world; John iii. 16, 17. vi. 33. iv. 42. 1 John iv. 14. John xii. 46, 47. 1 John ii. 1, 2. The reason of which expression the reader was before acquainted with. The benefits of the death of Christ being now no more to be confined to one nation, but promiscuously to be imparted to the children that were scattered abroad throughout the world in every kindred, tongue, and nation, under heaven, the word 'world,' being used to signify men living in the world, sometimes more, sometimes fewer, seldom or never, 'all' (unless a distribution of them into several sorts comprehensive of the universality of mankind be subjoined), that word is used to express them, who in the intention of God and Christ are to be made partakers of the benefits of his mediation. Men of all sorts throughout the world, being now admitted thereunto: as was before asserted.

2. The benefit of redemption being thus grounded upon the principle of peculiar, not universal love, whom doth God reveal his will concerning it unto? and whom doth he call to the participation thereof? If it be equally provided for all, out of the same love, it is all the reason in the world that all should equally be called to a participation thereof, or at least so be called, as to have it made known unto them. For a physician to pretend that he hath provided a sovereign remedy for all the sick persons in a city, out of an equal love that he bears to them all, and when he hath done, takes care that some few know of it, whereby they may come and be healed, but leaves the rest in utter ignorance of any such provision that he hath made, will he be thought to deal sincerely in the profession that he makes of doing of this, out of an equal love to them all? Now not only for the space of almost four thousand years did God suffer incomparably the greatest part of the whole world, to 'walk in their own ways, not calling them to repent,' Acts xiv. 16. winking at that long time of their ignorance, wherein they worshipped stocks, stones, and devils; all that while making known his word unto Jacob, his statutes and judgments unto Israel, not dealing so with any nation, whereby they knew not his judgments; Psal. cxlvii. 19, 20. so in the pursuit of his eternal love, calling a few only, in comparison, leaving the bulk of mankind in sin, without hope or God in the world; Eph. ii. 12. but even also since the giving out of a commission and

express command, not to confine the preaching of the word, and calling of men, to Judea, but to go into all the world and to preach the gospel to every creature; Mark xvi. 15. whereupon it is shortly after said, to be preached to every creature under heaven; Col. i. 22. the apostle thereby 'warning every man and teaching every man, that they might present every man to Jesus Christ;' Col. i. 28. namely, of all those to whom he came and preached, not the Jews only, but of all sorts of men under heaven, and that on this ground, that God would have 'all men to be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth,' 1 Tim. ii. 3, 4. be they of what sort they will, kings, rulers, and all under authority; yet even to this very day, many whole nations, great and numerous sit in darkness and in the shadow of death, having neither in their own days, nor in the days of their forefathers, ever been made partakers of the glorious gospel of Jesus Christ, whereby alone life and immortality are brought to light, and men are made partakers of the love of God in them. So that yet we have not the least evidence of the universal love pleaded for. Yea,

3. Whereas, to the effectual bringing of men 'dead in trespasses and sins' to a participation of any saving spiritual effect of the love of God in Christ, besides the promulgation of the gospel and the law thereof, which consisteth in the infallible connexion of faith and salvation according to the tenor of it; Matt. xvi. 16. 'He that believeth shall be saved;' which is accompanied with God's command to believe, wherein he declares his will for their salvation, upon the terms proposed, approving the obedience of faith, and giving assurance of salvation thereupon; 1 Tim. ii. 1—4. there is moreover required the operation of God by his Spirit with power; to evince that all this dispensation is managed by peculiar distinguishing love, this is not granted to all, to whom the commanding and approving word doth come, but only to them who are the called according to his purpose; Rom. viii. 28. that is, to them who are predestinated; ver. 30. for them he calls, so as to justify and glorify them thereupon.

4. Not then to insist on any other particular effects of the love of God, as sanctification, justification, glorification; this in general may be affirmed, that there is not any

one good thing whatsoever, that is proper and peculiar to the covenant of grace, but it proceeds from a distinguishing love, and an intention of God towards some only therein.

5. It is true that God inviteth many to repentance, and earnestly inviteth them by the means of the word, which he affords them, to turn from their evil ways, of whom all the individuals are not converted, as he dealt with the house of Israel (not all the world, but), those who had his word and ordinances, Ezek. xviii. 31, 32. affirming that it is not for his pleasure, but for their sins, that they die; but that this manifests a universal love in God in the way spoken of, or any thing more than the connexion of repentance and acceptation with God, with his legal approbation of turning from sin, there is no matter of proof to evince.

6. Also, he is not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance, 2 Pet. iii. 9. even all those towards whom he exercises patience and long-suffering for that end (which, as the apostle there informs, is to usward) that is, to believers, of whom he is speaking. To them also it is said, that he doth not 'afflict willingly nor grieve the children of men,' Lam. iii. 33. even his church, of which the prophet is speaking: although this also may be extended to all; God never afflicting or grieving men, but it is for some other reason and cause, than merely his own will; their destruction being of themselves. David indeed tells us, that the 'Lord is gracious, full of compassion; slow to anger, and of great mercy: that the Lord is good to all, and his tender mercies are over all his works;' Psal. cxlv. 8, 9. But he tells us withal, whom he intends by the 'all' in this place, even the generation which 'praise his works and declare his mighty acts;' ver. 4. those who 'abundantly utter the memory of his great goodness, and sing of his righteousness;' ver. 7. or his saints, as he expressly calls them; ver. 10. The word he there mentions, is the word of the kingdom of Christ over all, wherein the tender mercies of God are spread abroad, in reference to them that do enjoy them. Not but that God is good to all, even to his whole creation, in the many unspeakable blessings of his providence, wherein he abounds to[illegible]s them in all goodness, but that is not here intended. [illegible]at Mr. B. hath fruitlessly from these texts of Scripture, [illegible]avoured to prove a universality of love in God, incon-

sistent with his peculiar love, purpose, and intention of doing good, in the sense declared to some only.

And thus have I briefly gone through this chapter, and by the way taken into consideration all the texts of Scripture, which he there wrests to confirm his figment, on the goodness of the nature of God, of the goodness and love to all, which he shews in great variety, and several degrees, in the dispensation of his providence throughout the world, of this universal love, and what it is in the sense of Mr. B. and his companions, of its inconsistency with the immutability, prescience, omnipotence, fidelity, love, mercy, and faithfulness of God; this being not a controversy peculiar to them, with whom in this treatise I have to do, I shall not farther insist.

As I have in the preface to this discourse given an account of the rise and present state of Socinianism, so I thought in this place to have given the reader an account of the present state of the controversy about grace, and free-will, and the death of Christ, with especial reference to the late management thereof amongst the Romanists, between the Molinists and Jesuits on the one side, with the Jansenians, or Bayans on the other; with the late ecclesiastical and political transactions in Italy, France, and Flanders, in reference thereunto, with an account of the books lately written on the one side and the other, and my thoughts of them; but finding this treatise grown utterly beyond my intention, I shall defer the execution of that design to some other opportunity, if God think good to continue my portion any longer in the land of the living.

The 14th chapter of the catechist, is about the resurrection of Christ. What are the proper fruits of the resurrection of Christ, and the benefits we receive thereby, and upon what account our justification is ascribed thereto, whether as the great and eminent confirmation of the doctrine he taught, or as the issue, pledge, and evidence of the accomplishment of the work of our salvation by death, it being impossible for him to be detained thereby, is not here discussed; that which the great design of this chapter appears to disprove, is, Christ's raising himself by his own power; concerning which this is the question:

'Did Christ rise by his own power; yea, did he raise him-

self at all? or was he raised by the power of another? and did another raise him? What is the perpetual tenor of the Scripture to this purpose?'

In answer hereunto, many texts of Scripture are rehearsed, where it is said, that 'God raised him from the dead, and that he was raised by the power of God.'

But we have manifested, that Mr. B. is to come to another reckoning, before he can make any work of this argument; God raised him, therefore he did not raise himself: when he hath proved that he is not God, let him freely make such an inference and conclusion as this: in the meantime, we say, because 'God raised him from the dead,' he raised himself; for he is 'God over all blessed for ever.'

2. It is true, that Christ is said to be raised by God, taken personally for the Father, whose joint power, with his own, as that also of the Spirit, was put forth in this work of raising Christ from the dead. And for his own raising himself, if Mr. B. will believe him, this business will be put to a short issue: he tells us, that 'he laid down his life, that he might take it up again. No man,' saith he, 'taketh it from me, I have power to lay it down of myself, and I have power to take it again;' John x. 17, 18. And speaking of the temple of his body, he bade the Jews destroy it, and, 'that he would raise it again within three days:' which we believe he did, and if Mr. B. be otherwise minded, we cannot help it.

CHAP. XXXII.

Of justification and faith.

This chapter, for the title and subject of it, would require a large and serious consideration; but by Mr. Biddle's loose procedure in this business (whom only I shall now attend), we are absolved from any strict inquiry into the whole doctrine that is concerned herein. Some brief animadversions upon his questions, and suiting of answers to them, will be all that I shall go forth unto. His first is,

'Q. How many sorts of justification or righteousness are there?'

This question supposeth righteousness and justification

to be the same: which is a gross notion for a Master of Arts. Righteousness is that which God requires of us, justification is his act concerning man, considered as vested or indued with that righteousness which he requires: righteousness is the qualification of the person to be justified; justification the act of him that justifies. A man's legal honesty in his trial, is not the sentence of the judge pronouncing him so to be, to all ends and purposes of that honesty. But to his question Mr. B. answers from Rom. x. 5. 'the righteousness which is of the law,' and Phil. iii. 9. 'the righteousness which is of God by faith.'

It is true, there is this twofold righteousness that men may be partakers of; a righteousness consisting in exact, perfect, and complete obedience yielded to the law, which God required of man under the covenant of works, and the righteousness which is of God by faith, of which afterward. Answerable hereunto there is, hath been, or may be, a twofold justification: the one consisting in God's declaration of him, who performs all that he requires in the law, to be just and righteous, and his acceptation of him according to the promise of life, which he annexed to the obedience, which of man he did require; and the other answers that righteousness which shall afterward be described. Now though these two righteousnesses agree in their general end, which is acceptation with God, and a reward from him, according to his promise; yet in their own natures, causes, and manner of attaining, they are altogether inconsistent and destructive of each other: so that it is utterly impossible they should ever meet in and upon the same person.

For the description of the first, Mr. B. gives it in answer to this question.

'How is the rihgteousness which is of the law described?

'A. Moses describeth the righteousness which is of the law, that the man that doeth those things shall live by them; Rom. x. 5.'

This description is full and complete. 'The doing of the things of the law,' or all the things the law requireth, to this end that a man may live by them, or a keeping of the commandments that we may enter into life, makes up this righteousness of the law. And whatsoever any man doth, or may do, that is required by the law of God (as believing,

trusting in him, and the like), to this end, that he may live thereby, that it may be his righteousness towards God, that thereupon he may be justified, it belongs to this righteousness of the law here described by Moses. I say, whatever is performed by man in obedience to any law of God to this end, that a man may live thereby, and that it may be the matter of his righteousness, it belongs to the righteousness here described: and of this we may have some use, in the consideration of Mr. B.'s ensuing queries. He adds,

'Q. What speaketh the righteousness which is of faith?

'A. Rom. x. 8, 9. The word is nigh thee, even in thy mouth, and in thy heart: that is, the word which we preach; that if thou shalt confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and shalt believe in thine heart that God hath raised him from the dead, thou shalt be saved.'

The object of justifying faith; namely, Jesus Christ as dying and rising again from the dead to the obtaining of eternal redemption, and bringing in everlasting righteousness, is in these words described. And this is that which the righteousness of faith is said to speak; because Christ dying and rising is our righteousness. He is made so to us of God, and being under the consideration of his death and resurrection received of us by faith, we are justified.

His next question is,

'Q. In the justification of a believer is the righteousness of Christ imputed to him, or is his own faith counted for righteousness?

'A. Rom. iv. 5. His faith is counted for righteousness.'

What Mr. B. intends by faith, and what by accounting of it for righteousness, we know full well. The justification he intends by these expressions is the plain old Pharisaical justification, and no other: as shall elsewhere be abundantly manifested. For the present, I shall only say, that Mr. Biddle doth most ignorantly oppose the imputing of the righteousness of Christ to us, and the accounting of our faith for righteousness, as inconsistent. It is the accounting of our faith for righteousness, and the righteousness of works, that is opposed by the apostle. The righteousness of faith and the righteousness of Christ are every way one and the same; the one denoting that whereby we receive it, and are made partakers of it, the other that which is re-

ceived, and whereby we are justified. And indeed there is a perfect inconsistency between the apostle's intention in this expression, 'to him that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifies the ungodly, his faith is accounted to him for righteousness,' taken with his explication of it, that we are made 'partakers of the righteousness of Christ by faith,' and therein he is made 'righteousness to them that believe,' with Mr. B.'s interpretation of it, which is (as shall be farther manifested), 'to him that worketh and believes on him that justifies the righteous, his obedience is his righteousness.' But of this elsewhere.

The next question and answer is about Abraham and his justification, which being but an instance exemplifying what was spoken before, I shall not need to insist thereon. Of his believing on God only, our believing on Christ, which is also mentioned, I have spoken already, and shall not trouble the reader with repetition thereof.

But he farther argues:

'Q. Doth not God justify men because of the full price Christ paid to him in their stead, so that he abated nothing of his right, in that one drop of Christ's blood was sufficient to satisfy for a thousand worlds? If not, how are they saved?

'A. Being justified freely; Rom. iii. 24. Eph. i. 17.'

That Christ did pay a full price or ransom for us, that he did stand in our stead, that he was not abated any jot of the penalty of the law that was due to sinners, that on this account we are fully acquitted, and that the forgiveness of our sins is by the redemption that is in his blood, hath been already fully and at large evinced. Let Mr. B. if he please, attempt to evert what hath been spoken to that purpose.

The expression about 'one drop of Christ's blood,' is a fancy or imagination of idle monks, men ignorant of the righteousness of God, and the whole nature of the mediation which our blessed Saviour undertook; wherein they have not the least communion. The close of the chapter is,

'Q. Did not Christ merit eternal life and purchase the kingdom of heaven for us?

'A. The gift of God is eternal life; Rom. vi. 23. It is

your Father's good pleasure to give you the kingdom; Luke xii. 32.'

Eternal life is the gift of God, in opposition to any merit of ours, and in respect of his designation of him, who is eternal life, to be our Mediator, and purchaser of it; yet that Christ did not therefore obtain by his blood, for us 'eternal redemption;' Heb. ix. 12. that he did not purchase us to himself; Tit. ii. 14. or that the merit of Christ for us, and the free grace of God unto us, are inconsistent, our catechist attempts not to prove. Of the reconciliation of God's purpose and good pleasure, mentioned, Luke xii. 32. with the satisfaction and merit of the Mediator, I have spoken also at large already.

I have thus briefly passed through this chapter, although it treateth of one of the most important heads of our religion, because (the Lord assisting) I intend the full handling of the doctrine opposed in it, in a just treatise to that purpose.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Of keeping the commandments of God: and of perfection of obedience, how attainable in this life.

THE title of the 16th chapter in our catechist, is, of keeping the commandments, and having an eye to the reward, of perfection in virtue and godliness to be attained; and of departing from righteousness and faith. What the man hath to offer on these several heads, shall be considered in order. His first question is,

'Q. Are the commandments possible to be kept?

'A. His commandments are not grievous; John v. 3. My yoke is easy, and my burden light; Matt. xi. 30.'

1. I presume it is evident to every one, at the first view, that there is very little relation between the question and the answer thereunto suggested. The inquiry is of our strength and power: the answer speaks to the nature of the commands of God. It never came sure into the mind of any living, that the meaning of this question, 'Are the commandments possible to be kept?' is, 'Is there an absolute impossibility from the nature of the commands of God them-

selves that they cannot be kept by any?' Nor did ever any man say so, or can without the greatest blasphemy against God. But the question is, what power there is in man to keep those commandments of God; which certainly the texts insisted on by Mr. B. do not in the least give an answer unto.

2. He tells us not, in what state or condition he supposes that person to be, concerning whom the inquiry is made, whether he can possibly keep the commandments of God or no: whether he speaks of all men in general, or any man indefinitely, or restrainedly of believers. Nor,

3. Doth he inform us, what he intends by keeping the commands of God. Whether an exact, perfect, and every way complete keeping of them, up to the highest degree of all things, in all things, circumstances, and concernments of them: or whether the keeping of them in a universal sincerity, accepted before God, according to the tenor of the covenant of grace, be intended. Nor,

4. What commandments they are, which he chiefly respects, and under what consideration: whether all the commands of the law of God as such; or whether the gospel commands of faith and love, which the places from whence he answers do respect. Nor,

5. What he means by the impossibility of keeping God's commands, which he intends to deny; that which is absolutely so from the nature of the thing itself, or that which is so only in some respect, with reference to some certain state and condition of man.

When we know in what sense the question is proposed, we shall be enabled to return an answer thereunto, which he that hath proposed it here, knew not how to do: in the meantime, to the thing itself intended, according to the light of the premised distinctions, we say that all the commandments of God, the whole law is excellent, precious, not grievous in itself, or its own nature, but admirably expressing the goodness, and kindness, and holiness of him that gave it, in relation to them to whom it was given, and can by no means be said, as from itself and upon its own account, to be impossible to be kept. Yet,

2. No unregenerate man can possibly keep, that is, hath in himself a power to keep any one of all the command-

ments of God, as to the matter required, and the manner wherein it is required. This impossibility is not in the least relating to the nature of the law, but to the impotency, and corruption of the person lying under it.

3. No man though regenerate, can fulfil the law of God perfectly, or keep all the commandments of God, according to the original tenor of the law, in all the parts and degrees of it; nor ever any man did so, since sin entered into the world; for it is impossible that any regenerate man should keep the commandments of God, as they are the tenor of the covenant of works. If this were otherwise, the law would not have been made weak by sin, that it should not justify.

4. That it is impossible, that any man though regenerate, should by his own strength fulfil any one of the commands of God, seeing 'without Christ we can do nothing,' and it is 'God who works in us to will and to do of his good pleasure.'

5. That to keep the commandments of God, not as the tenor of the covenant of works, nor in an absolute perfection of obedience and correspondency to the law; but sincerely and uprightly, unto acceptation, according to the tenor of the covenant of grace, and the obedience it requires, through the assistance of the Spirit and grace of God, is not only a thing possible, but easy, pleasant, and delightful.

Thus we say,

1. That a person regenerate by the assistance of the Spirit and grace of God, may keep the commandments of God, in yielding to him, in answer to them, that sincere obedience, which in Jesus Christ, according to the tenor of the covenant of grace, is required: yea, it is to him an easy and pleasant thing so to do.

2. That an unregenerate person should keep any one of God's commandments as he ought, is impossible, not from the nature of God's commands, but from his own state and condition.

3. That a person, though regenerate, yet being so but in part, and carrying about him a body of death, should keep the commands of God, in a perfection of obedience, according to the law of the covenant of works, is impossible from the condition of a regenerate man, and not from the nature

of God's commands. What is it now that Mr. B. opposes? Or what is that he asserts?

I suppose he declares his mind in his lesser catechism, chap. vii. Q. 1. where he proposes his question in the words of the ruler amongst the Jews; 'What good shall a man do that he may have eternal life?' An answer of it follows in that of our Saviour, Matt. xix. 17—19. 'If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments.

The intendment of this inquiry must be the same with his that made it, as his argument in the whole is; or the answer of our Saviour, is no way suited thereunto. Now it is most evident, that the inquiry was made according to the principles of the Pharisees, who expected justification by the works of the law, according to the tenor of a covenant of works, to which presumption of theirs, our Saviour suits his answer: and seeing they sought to be justified, and saved, as it were, by the works of the law, to the law he sends them. This then being Mr. B.'s sense, wherein he affirms that it is possible to keep the commandments, so as for doing good, and keeping them, to enter into life, I shall only remit him, as our Saviour did the Pharisees to the law: but yet I shall withal pray, that our merciful Lord, would not leave him to the foolish choice of his own darkened heart, but in his due time, by the blood of the covenant, which yet he seems to despise, send him forth of the 'prison wherein is no water.'

'Q. 2. But though it be possible to keep the commandments, yet is it not enough, if we desire and endeavour to keep them; although we actually keep them not? And doth not God accept the will for the deed?

'A. 1 Cor. vii. 19. Matt. vii. 21. 24. 26. James i. 25. Rom, ii. 10. John xiii. 17. Luke xi. 24. 2 Cor. v. 10. Matt. xvi. 27. Rev. xxii. 21. Matt. xix. 18, 19. In all which places, there is mention of doing the will of God, of keeping the commandments of God.'

The aim of this question, is to take advantage at what hath been delivered by some, not as an ordinary rule for all men to walk by, but as an extraordinary relief for some in distress. When poor souls, bowed down under the sense of their own weakness and insufficiency for obedience, and the exceeding unsuitableness of their best performances to

the spiritual and exact perfection of the law of God (things which the proud Pharisees of the world are unacquainted withal), to support them under their distress, they have been by some directed to the consideration of the sincerity that was in their obedience, which they did yield, and guided to examine that, by their desires and endeavours. Now as this direction is not without a good foundation in the Scripture; Nehemiah, describing the saints of God by this character, that they desire to fear the name of God; Neh. i. 11. and David every where professing this, as an eminent property of a child of God, so they who gave it, were very far from understanding such desires, as may be pretended as a colour for sloth and negligence, to give countenance to the souls and consciences of men in a willing neglect of the performance of such duties, as they are to press after; but such they intend, as had adjoined to them, and accompanying of them, earnest, continual, sincere, endeavours (as Mr. B. acknowledgeth) to walk before God in all well-pleasing, though they could not attain to that perfection of obedience that is required. And in this case, though we make not application of the particular rule of accepting the will for the deed, to the general case, yet we fear not to say, that this is all the perfection which the best of the saints of God in this life attain to: and which, according to the tenor of that covenant wherein we now walk with God in Jesus Christ, is accepted. This is all the doing or keeping of the commandments that is intended in any of the places quoted by Mr. B. unless that last: wherein our Saviour sends that proud Pharisee, according to his own principles to the righteousness of the law which he followed after, but could not attain. But of this more afterward. He farther argues:

'Q. Though it be not only possible but also necessary to keep the commandments, yet is it lawful so to do that we may have a right to eternal life, and the heavenly inheritance? May we seek for honour, and glory, and immortality, by well-doing? is it the tenor of the gospel that we should live uprightly in expectation of the hope hereafter? and finally, ought we to suffer for the kingdom of God, and not as some are pleased to mince that matter from the kingdom of God? Where are the testimonies of Scripture to this purpose?

'A. Rev. xxii. 14. Rom. ii. 6—8. Tit. ii. 11. 13. 2 Thess. i. 5.'

Ans. 1. In what sense it is possible to keep the commandments, in what not, hath been declared. 2. How it is necessary, or in what sense, or for what end, Mr. B. hath not yet spoken, though he supposeth he hath; but we will take it for granted that it is necessary for us so to do; in that sense, and for that end and purpose, for which it is of us required. 3. To allow then the gentleman the advantage of his captious procedure by a multiplication of entangled queries; and to take them in that order wherein they lie.

To the first, 'whether we may keep the commandments that we may have right to eternal life.' I say, 1. Keeping of the commandments in the sense acknowledged may be looked on in respect of eternal life, either as the cause procuring it, or as the means conducing to it. 2. A right to eternal life may be considered in respect of the rise and constitution of it, or of the present evidence and last enjoyment of it. There is a twofold right to the kingdom of heaven; a right of desert according to the tenor of the covenant of works; and a right of promise according to the tenor of the covenant of grace. I say, then, that it is not lawful, that is, it is not the way, rule, and tenor of the gospel, that we should do or keep the commandments, so that doing or keeping should be the cause procuring and obtaining an original right, as to the rise and constitution of it, or a right of desert to eternal life. This is the perfect tenor of the covenant of works and righteousness of the law, 'do this and live; if a man do the work of the law he shall live thereby;' and, 'if thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments:' which if there be any gospel or new covenant confirmed in the blood of Christ, is antiquated as to its efficacy, and was ever since the entrance of sin into the world; as being ineffectual for the bringing of any soul unto God; Rom. viii. 3. Heb. viii. 11, 12. This, if it were needful, I might confirm with innumerable texts of Scripture, and the transcription of a good part of the epistles of Paul in particular. 3. The inheritance which is purchased for us by Christ, and is the gift of God, plainly excludes all such confidence in keeping the commandments, as is pleaded for. For my part, I willingly ascribe to obedience

[redacted] (in reference to eternal [redacted] of Christ, and the free donation [redacted]. 4. As a means appointed of [redacted] we ought to walk, for the coming [redacted] inheritance so fully purchased and [redacted] of the right given us thereto [redacted] giving actual admission to the [redacted] and to testify our free acceptation on that account, so we ought [redacted] commandments; that is, walk in holiness [redacted] shall see God. This is all that [redacted] Christ speaks not there to unbe[redacted] must do to be justified and saved; [redacted] and sanctified ones; shewing [redacted] and the means of it to the re[redacted] purchase made by his blood.

[redacted] 'May we seek for honour and [redacted] by well-doing?' which words are [redacted] here are used in a law sense, and [redacted] righteousness of God, in rewarding [redacted] nature, or the moral law, accord[redacted] of works. This is evident [redacted] the apostle in that place, which [redacted] and Gentiles, of sin against the [redacted] of the obtaining the glory of [redacted] from ver. 10. where salva[redacted] the very terms wherein the [redacted] expressed by Mr. B. in the chap[redacted] direct opposition whereunto, the [redacted] success of the gospel; chap. i. 17. [redacted] the words into a gospel sense, [redacted] way appointed for us to walk in, [redacted] mentioned, and consider glory, [redacted] reward of our obedience, pur[redacted] promised of God on that ac[redacted] sought, 'by patient continuing in [redacted], honour, and immortality;' that [redacted] the way, and use of the means [redacted] of the inheritance purchased [redacted], with the limitations before in

part mentioned: as 1. That of ourselves we can do no good; 2. That the ability we have to do good, is purchased for us by Christ. 3. This is not so full in this life, as that we can perfectly, to all degrees of perfection, do good, or yield obedience to the law. 4. That which by grace we do yield and perform, is not the cause procuring or meriting of that inheritance: which 5. As the grace whereby we obey, is fully purchased for us by Christ, and freely bestowed upon us by God.

His next is, 'Is it the tenor of the gospel that we should live uprightly in expectation of the hope hereafter?' Doubtless, neither shall I need to give any answer at all to this part of the inquiry but what lies in the words of the Scripture, produced for the proof of our catechist's intention. 'The grace of God that bringeth salvation hath appeared to all men, teaching us that, denying ungodliness and worldly lusts, we should live soberly, righteously, and godly in this present world; looking for the blessed hope and a glorious appearance of the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ;' Tit. ii. 11—13. Christ the great God our Saviour, having promised an inheritance to us with himself, at his glorious appearance, raiseth up our hearts with a hope and expectation thereof; his grace or the doctrine of it, teacheth us to perform all manner of holiness and righteousness all our days; and this is the tenor and law of the gospel, that so we do; but what this is to Mr. Biddle's purpose I know not.

His last attempt is upon the exposition of some (I know not whom) who have minced the doctrine so small, it seems, that he can find no relish in it; saith he, 'finally ought we to suffer for the kingdom of God, or from the kingdom of God?' his answer is, 2 Thess. i. 5. 'That you may be counted worthy of the kingdom of God, for which you also suffer.' I confess 'suffering from the kingdom of God,' is something an uncouth expression; and those who have used it to the offence of this gentleman, might have more commodiously delivered what they did intend. But the 'kingdom of God' being sometimes taken for that rule of grace which Christ hath in the hearts of believers, and thereupon being said to be within us, and the word, 'from,' denoting the principle of obedience in suffering, there is a truth in the expression,

and that very consistent with suffering for the kingdom of God, which here is opposed unto it. To suffer from the kingdom of God, is no more, than to be enabled to suffer from a principle of grace within us, by which Christ bears rule in our hearts; and in this sense we say that no man can do or suffer any thing so, as it shall be acceptable unto God, but it must be from the kingdom of God: for they that are in the flesh cannot please God, even their sacrifices are an abomination to him. This is so far from hindering us, as to suffering for the kingdom of God, that is, to endure persecution for the profession of the gospel (for in the place of the apostle cited denotes the procuring occasion, not final cause) that without it so we cannot do; and so the minced matter hath I hope a savoury relish recovered unto it again.

His next questions are: 1. 'Have you any examples of keeping the commandments under the law? what saith David of himself? Psal. xviii. 20—24. And,

2. 'Have you any example under the gospel? 1 John iii. 10. Because we keep his commandments.'

All this trouble is Mr. B. advantaged to make from the ambiguity of this expression of keeping the commandments. We know full well what David saith of his obedience, and what he said of his sins; so that we know his keeping of the commandments was in respect of sincerity, as to all the commandments of God, and all the parts of them: but not as to his perfection in keeping all or any of them. And he who says 'we keep his commandments,' says also, that 'if we say we have no sin, we lie and deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us.'

He adds, 'Have you not examples of the choicest saints who obeyed God in hope of the reward both before, under, and after the law?' Heb. xi. 8—10. 24—26. xii. 12. Tit. i. 1, 2.

To obey in hope of eternal life, is either to yield obedience, in hope of obtaining eternal life, as a reward procured by, or proportioned to that obedience; and so no saint of God since the fall of Adam, did yield obedience to God, or ought to have so done: or to obey in hope of eternal life, is to carry along with us, in our obedience, a hope of the enjoyment of the promised inheritance in due time, and be encouraged and strengthened in obeying thereby.

Thus the saints of God walk with God, in hope and obedience at this day; and they always did so from the beginning. They have hope in and with their obedience, of that whereunto their obedience leads, which was purchased for them by Christ.

'Q. Do not the Scriptures intimate that Christians may attain to perfection of virtue and godliness, and that it is the intention of God and Christ, and his ministers, to bring them to this pitch? Rehearse the texts to this effect.

'A. Eph. i. 4.'

Not to make long work of that, which is capable of a speedy despatch; by virtue and godliness, Mr. B. understands that universal righteousness and holiness, which the law requires; by perfection in it, an absolute, complete answerableness to the law, in that righteousness and holiness, both as to the matter wherein they consist, and the manner how they are to be performed; that Christians may attain, expresses a power that is reducible into act. So that the intention of God and the ministers, is not that they should be pressing on towards perfection, which it is confessed, we are to do, whilst we live in this world, but actually in this life, to bring them to an enjoyment of it. In this sense, we deny that any man in this life, 'may attain to a perfection of virtue and godliness.' For,

1. All our works are done out of faith; 1 Tim. i. 5. Gal. v. 6. now this faith is the faith of the forgiveness of sins by Christ, and 'that purifieth the heart;' Acts xv. 8, 9. But the works that proceed from faith for the forgiveness of sins by Christ, cannot be perfect absolutely in themselves, because in the very rise of them, they expect perfection and completeness from another.

2. Such as is the cause, such is the effect; but the principle or cause of the saints obedience in this life is imperfect; so therefore is their obedience. That our sanctification is imperfect in this life, the apostle witnesseth; 2 Cor. iv. 16. 1 Cor. xiii. 9.

3. Where there is flesh and spirit, there is not perfection: for the flesh is contrary to the Spirit, from whence our perfection must proceed if we have any: but there is flesh and Spirit in all believers, whilst they live in this world; Gal. v. 17. Rom. vii. 14.

4. They that are not without sin, are not absolutely perfect; for to be perfect, is to have no sin; but the saints in this life are not without sin; 1 John i. 8. Matt. vi. 12. James iii. 2. Eccles. vii. 21. Isa. lxiv. 6. but to what end should I multiply arguments or testimonies to this purpose? If all the saints of God have acknowledged themselves sinners all their days, always deprecated the justice of God, and appealed to mercy in their trial before God, if all our perfection by the blood of Christ, and we are justified not by the works of the law, but grace, this pharisaical figment may be rejected as the foolish imagination of men ignorant of the righteousness of God, and of him who is 'the end of the law for righteousness to them that do believe.'

But take perfection as it is often used in the Scripture, and ascribed to men of whom yet many great and eminent failings are recorded (which certainly were inconsistent with perfection absolutely considered) and so it denotes two things: 1. Sincerity, in opposition to hypocrisy. And 2. Universality, as to all the parts of obedience, in opposition to partiality, and halving with God. So we say, perfection is not only attainable by the saints of God, but is in every one of them; but this is not such a perfection as consists in a point, which if it deflects from, it ceases to be perfection; but such a condition as admits of several degrees, all lying in a tendency to that perfection spoken of; and the men of this perfection, are said to be perfect or upright in the Scripture; Psal. xxxvii. 14. cxix. 100, &c.

Not then to insist on all the places mentioned by Mr. B. in particular, they may all be referred to four heads: 1. Such as mention an unblamableness before God in Christ, which argues a perfection in Christ, but only sincerity in us; or 2. Such as mention a perfection in 'fieri,' but not in 'facto esse,' as we speak; a pressing towards perfection, but not a perfection obtained, or here obtainable; or 3. A comparative perfection in respect of others; or a perfection of sincerity, accompanied with universality of obedience, consistent with indwelling sin and many transgressions. The application of the several places mentioned to these rules, is easy, and lies at hand, for any that will take the pains to consider them. He proceeds,

'If works be so necessary to salvation, as you have before

shewed from the Scripture, how cometh it to pass that Paul saith, We are justified by faith without works? Meant he to exclude all good works whatsoever, or only those of the law? How doth he explain himself? Rom. ii. 2. 28. We are justified by faith, without the works of the law.'

Ans. 1. How, and in what sense works are necessary to salvation, hath been declared, and therefore I remit the reader to its proper place.

2. A full handling of the doctrine of justification was waved before, and therefore I shall not here take it up, but content myself with a brief removal of Mr. B.'s attempts to deface it. I say then,

3. That Paul is very troublesome to all the Pharisees of this age, who therefore turn themselves a thousand ways to escape the authority of the word and truth of God (by him fully declared and vindicated against their forefathers), labouring to fortify themselves with distinctions, which, as they suppose, but falsely, their predecessors were ignorant of; Paul then, this Paul, denies all works, all works whatsoever, to have any share in our justification before God, as the matter of our righteousness, or the cause of our justification. For,

1. He excludes all works of the law, as is confessed. The works of the law are the works that the law requires. Now there is no work whatever that is good or acceptable to God, but it is required by the law; so that in excluding works of the law, he excludes all works whatever.

2. He expressly excludes all works done by virtue of grace, and after calling; which, if any, should be exempted from being works of the law. For though the law requires them, yet they are not done from a principle, nor to an end of the law; these Paul excludes expressly; Ephes. viii. 9, 10. 'By grace we are saved, not of works.' What works? Those which 'we are created unto in Christ Jesus.'

3. All works, that are works, are excluded expressly, and set in opposition to grace in this business; Rom. xi. 5, 6. 'If it be of grace, it is no more of works, otherwise grace is no more grace; but if it be of works, it is no more grace, otherwise work is no more work;' and Rom. iv. 3—5.

4. All works are excluded that take off from the absolute freedom of the justification of sinners by the redemption

that is in Christ; Rom. iii. 17—27. Now this is not peculiar to any one sort of works, or to any one work, more than to another, as might be demonstrated; but this is not a place for so great a work, as the thorough handling of this doctrine requires. He adds,

'Can you make it appear from elsewhere, that Paul intended to exclude from justification, only the perfect works of the law, which leave no place for either grace or faith, and not such works as include both, and that by a justifying faith he meant a working faith, and such a one as is accompanied with righteousness?

'A. Eph. ii. 8—10. Rom. iv. 3—5. Rom. xi. 5, 6. iv. 14—16. Gal. v. 6. Rom. i. 17, 18.'

Ans. 1. Still Paul and his doctrine trouble the man as they did his predecessors. That Paul excluded all works of what sort soever, from our justification, as precedaneous causes or conditions thereof, was before declared. Mr. B. would only have it, that the perfect works of the law only are excluded, when if any works take place in our justification with God, those only may be admitted, for certainly, if we are justified or pronounced righteous for our works, it must be for the works that are perfect, or else the judgment of God is not according to truth. Those only it seems are excluded, that only may be accepted; and imperfect works are substituted as the matter of a perfect righteousness; without which, none shall stand in the presence of God. But,

2. There is not one text of Scripture mentioned by Mr. B. whence he aims to evince his intention, but expressly denies what he asserts; and sets all works whatever in opposition to grace, and excludes them all, from any place in our justification before God. So that the man seems to have been infatuated by his pharisaism, to give direction for his own condemnation. Let the places be considered by the reader.

3. The grace mentioned as the cause of our justification, is not the grace of God, bringing forth good works in us, which stand thereupon in opposition to the works of the law, as done in the strength of the law, but the free favour and grace of God towards us in Christ Jesus, which excludes all works of ours whatever, as is undeniably manifest; Rom. iv. 4. xi. 5, 6.

4. It is true, justifying faith is a living faith, purging the heart, working by love, and bringing forth fruits of obedience; but that its fruits of love and good works have any causal influence into our justification, is most false. We are justified freely by grace, in opposition to all fruits of faith whatever, which God hath ordained us to bring forth. That faith whereby we are justified, will never be without works, yet we are not justified by the works of it, but freely by the blood of Christ; how, and in what sense we are justified by faith itself, what part, office, and place, it hath in our justification, its consistency in its due place and office, with Christ's being our righteousness, and its receiving of remission of sins, which is said to be our blessedness, shall elsewhere, God assisting, be manifested.

What then hath Mr. B. yet remaining to plead in this business? the old abused refuge of opposing James to Paul, is fixed on. This is the beaten plea of Papists, Socinians, and Arminians. Saith he,

'What answer then would you give to a man, who wresting the words of Paul in certain places of his Epistles to the Romans and Galatians should bear you in hand, that all good works whatever, are excluded from justification and salvation, and that it is enough only to believe? James ii. 20—26.'

Ans. 1. He that shall exclude good works from salvation, so as not to be the way and means appointed of God, wherein we ought to walk, who seek and expect salvation from God; and affirms that it is enough to believe, though a man bring forth no fruits of faith or good works; if he pretend to be of that persuasion, on the account of any thing delivered by Paul, in the Epistles to the Romans or Galatians, doth wrest the words and sense of Paul, and is well confuted by that passage mentioned out of James.

But he that excluding all works from justification in the sense declared, affirming that it is by faith only, without works; and affirms, that the truth and sincerity of that faith, with its efficacy in its own kind for our justification, is evinced by works, and the man's acceptation with God thereon justified by them, doth not wrest the words nor sense of Paul, and speaks to the intendment of James.

2. Paul instructs us at large, how sinners come to be justified before God, and this is his professed design in his

Epistles to the Romans and Galatians. James professedly exhorting believers to good works, demands of them, how they will acquit themselves before God and man to be justified; and affirms that this cannot be done, but by works. Paul tells us what justification is; James describes justifying faith by its effects; but of this also elsewhere. To all this he subjoins:

'I would know of you, who is a just or righteous man? Is it not such a one as apprehendeth, and applieth Christ's righteousness to himself, or at most desires to do righteously; is not he accepted of God?

'A. 1 John iii. 7—10. 1 John ii. 29. Acts x. 34, 35. Ezek. xviii. 5—9.'

Ans. 1. He to whom God imputes righteousness, is righteous. This he doth to him, 'who works not, but believes on him who justifies the ungodly;' Rom. iv. 5—7. there is then a righteousness without the works of the law; Phil. iii. 10. To apprehend and apply Christ's righteousness to ourselves, are expressions of believing unto justification, which the Scripture will warrant; John i. 12. 2 Cor. i. 30. He that believeth, so as to have Christ made righteousness to him, to have righteousness imputed to him, to be freely justified by the redemption that is in the blood of Jesus, he is just: and this state and condition, as was said, is obtained by applying the righteousness of Christ to ourselves; that is, by receiving him, and his righteousness by faith, as tendered unto us in the offer and promises of the gospel.

Of desiring to do righteously, and what is intended by that expression, I have spoken before. But,

2. There is a twofold righteousness, a righteousness imputed whereby we are justified, and a righteousness inherent, whereby we are sanctified. These Mr. B. would oppose, and from the assertion of the one, argue to the destruction of the other; though they sweetly, and eminently comply in our communion with God. The other righteousness was before evinced. Even our sanctification also is called righteousness, and we are said to be just in that respect.

1. Because our faith and interest in Christ is justified thereby to be true, and such as will abide the fiery trial.

2. Because all the acts of it are fruits of righteousness; Rom vi. 19. 22.

3. Because it stands in opposition to all unrighteousness, and he that doth not bring forth the fruit of it, is unrighteous.

4. With men, and before them it is all our righteousness; and of this do the places mentioned by Mr. Biddle treat, without the least contradiction or colour of it, to the imputed righteousness of Christ, wherewith we are righteous before God.

The intendment of the last query in this chapter, is to prove the apostacy of saints; or that true believers may fall away totally and finally from grace. I suppose it will not be expected of me, that I should enter here into a particular consideration of the places by him produced, having lately at[a] large gone through the consideration of the whole doctrine opposed; wherein not only the texts here quoted by Mr. B. but many others, set off by the management of an able head, and dexterous hand, are at large considered; thither therefore I refer the reader.

It might perhaps have been expected, that having insisted so largely as I have done, upon some other heads of the doctrine of the gospel corrupted by Mr. B. and his companions, that I should not thus briefly have passed over this important article of faith, concerning justification: but besides my weariness of the work before me, I have for a defensative farther to plead, that this doctrine is of late become the subject of very many polemical discourses; to what advantage of truth, time will shew, and I am not willing to add oil to that fire. 2. That if the Lord will, and I live, I intend to do something purposely, for the vindication and clearing of the whole doctrine itself; and therefore am not willing occasionally to anticipate here, what must in another order and method be insisted on; to which for a close, I add a desire, that if any be willing to contend with me about this matter, he would forbear exceptions against these extemporary animadversions, until the whole of my thoughts lie before him, unless he be of the persons principally concerned in this whole discourse, of whom I have no reason to desire that respect or candour.

[a] Doctrine of the Saints' Perseverance Vindicated.

CHAP. XXXIV.

Of prayer;

And whether Christ prescribed a form of prayer to be used by believers: and of praying unto him, and in his name under the Old Testament?

THE first question is,

'Q. Is prayer a Christian duty?

'A. Pray without ceasing; 1 Thess. v. 17.'

If by a Christian duty, a duty whereunto all Christians are obliged is understood, we grant it a Christian duty. The commands for it, encouragements to it, promises concerning it, are innumerable; and the use and benefit of it, in our communion with God, considering the state and condition of sin, emptiness, want, temptation, trials that here we live in, inestimable. If by a Christian duty it be intended that it is required only of them who are Christians, and is instituted by something peculiar in Christian religion, it is denied. Prayer is a natural acknowledgement of God, that every man is everlastingly and indispensably obliged unto, by virtue of the law of his creation, though the matter of it be varied according to the several states and conditions whereunto we fall, or are brought. Every one that lives in dependancy on God, and hath his supplies from him, is by virtue of that dependance obliged to this duty, as much as he is to own God to be his God. He proceeds:

'Q. How ought men to pray? A. Lifting up holy hands without wrath and doubting; 1 Tim. ii. 8.'

The inquiry being made of the manner of acceptable prayer, the answer given respecting only one or two particulars, is narrow and scanty. The qualification of the person praying, the means of access to God, the cause of acceptation with him, the ground of our confidence in our supplications, the efficacy of the Spirit of grace as promised, are either all omitted, or only tacitly intimated. But this, and many of the following questions, with the answers, being in their connexion capable of a good and fair interpretation, though all be not expressed that the Scripture gives, in answer to such questions, and the most material requisite of

prayer in the Holy Ghost be omitted, yet drawing to a close I shall not farther insist upon them; having yet that remaining, which requires a more full animadversion.

'Q. Did not Christ prescribe a form of prayer to his disciples, so that there remaineth no doubt touching the lawfulness of using a form?

'A. Luke xi. 1—4.'

Ans. If Christ prescribed a form of prayer to his disciples, to be used as a form by the repetition of the same words; I confess it will be out of question, that it is lawful to use a form: but that it is lawful not to use a form, or that a man may use any prayer but a form, on that supposition, will not be so easily determined. The words of Christ are, 'When you pray, say, Our Father' &c. If in this prescription, not the matter only, but the words also are intended, and that form of them which follows is prescribed to be used, by virtue of this command of Christ, it will be hard to discover on what ground we may any otherwise pray, seeing our Saviour's command is positive, 'When you pray, say, Our Father,' &c.

That which Mr. B. is to prove is, that our Saviour hath prescribed the repetition of the same words ensuing, and when he hath done so, if so he can do, his conclusion must be, that that form ought to be used, not at all that any else may. If our Saviour have prescribed us a form, how shall any man dare to prescribe another? Or can any man do it without casting on his form the reproach of imperfection and insufficiency? Our Saviour hath prescribed us a form of prayer to be used as a form by the repetition of the same words; therefore we may use it, yea, we must, is an invincible argument, on supposition of the truth of the proposition. But our Saviour hath prescribed us such a form, &c. therefore we may use another, which he hath not prescribed, hath neither shew nor colour of reason in it.

But how will Mr. B. prove that Christ doth not here instruct his disciples in what they ought to pray for, and for what they ought in prayer to address themselves to God, and under what considerations they are to look on God in their approaches to him and the like, only, but also that he prescribes the words there mentioned by him to be repeated by them in their supplications. Luke xi. he bids them say,

'Our Father,' &c. which at large Matt. vi. is, 'pray, after this manner:' οὕτως to this purpose. I do not think the prophet prescribes a form of words, to be used by the church when he says, 'Take with you words, and turn to the Lord, and say unto him, take away iniquity;' Hos. xiv. 2. but rather calls them to fervent supplication for the pardon of sin, as God should enable them to deal with him. And though the apostles never prayed for any thing, but what they were for the substance directed to by this prayer of our Saviour, yet we do not find, that ever they repeated the very words here mentioned, or once commanded or prescribed the use of them, to any of the saints in their days, whom they exhorted to pray so fervently and earnestly. Nor in any of the rules and directions, that are given for our praying, either in reference to ourselves, or him, by whom we have access to God, is the use of these words at any time in the least recommended to us, or recalled to mind, as a matter of duty.

Our Saviour says, 'When ye pray, say, Our Father;' on supposition of the sense contended for, and that a form of words is prescribed, I ask whether we may at any time pray, and not say so; seeing he says, When you pray, say: whether we may say any thing else, or use any other words? Whether the saying of these words be a part of the worship of God? Or whether any promise of acceptation be annexed to the saying so? Whether the Spirit of grace and supplication be not promised to all believers? And whether he be not given them to enable them to pray, both as to matter and manner? And if so, whether the repetition of the words mentioned by them, who have not the Spirit given them for the ends before mentioned, be available? And whether prayer by the Spirit where these words are not repeated, as to the letters and syllables, and order wherein they stand, be acceptable to God? Whether the prescription of a form of words, and the gift of a spirit of prayer be consistent? Whether the form be prescribed because believers are not able to pray without it? Or because there is a peculiar holiness, force, and energy in the letters, words, and syllables, as they stand in that form? And whether to say the first of those be not derogatory to the glory of God, and efficacy of the Spirit, promised and given to believers; and the second, assert the using of a charm in the worship of God? Whe-

ther in that respect 'Pater noster' be not as good as 'Our Father?' Whether innumerable poor souls are not deluded and hardened by satisfying their consciences in, and with the use of this form never knowing what it is to pray in the Holy Ghost? And whether the asserting this form of words to be used, have not confirmed many in their atheistical blaspheming of the Holy Spirit of God, and his grace in the prayers of his people? And whether the repetition of these words, after men have been long praying for the things contained in them, as the manner of some is, be not so remote from any pretence or colour of warrant in the Scipture, as that it is in plain terms ridiculous? When Mr. Biddle, or any on his behalf, hath answered these questions, they may be supplied with more of the like nature and importance.

Of our address with all our religious worship to the Father, by Jesus Christ the Mediator, how and in what manner we do so, and in what sense he is himself the ultimate object of divine worship, I have spoken before; and therefore I shall not need to insist on his next question, which makes some inquiry thereabout. That which follows is all that in this chapter needs any animadversion. The words are these:

'Q. Was it the custom during the time that Christ conversed on the earth (much less before he came into the world) to pray unto God in the name of Christ, or through Christ? Or did it begin to be used after the resurrection and exaltation of Christ? What saith Christ himself concerning this?

'A. John xvi. 24—26.'

The time of the saints in this world are here distinguished into different seasons: that before Christ's coming in the flesh, the time of his conversation on earth, and the time following his resurrection and exaltation. What was the custom in these several seasons of praying to God in the name of Christ, or through him, is inquired after; and as to the first and second it is denied, granted as to the latter, which is farther confirmed in the answer to the last question, from Heb. xiii. 20, 21. Some brief observations will disentangle Mr. B.'s catechumens, if they shall be pleased to attend unto them.

1. It is not what was the custom of men to do, but what was the mind of God that they should do, that we inquire

after. 2. That Jesus Christ, in respect of his divine nature, wherein he is one with his Father, was always worshipped and invocated, ever since God made any creatures to worship him, hath been formerly declared. 3. That there is a twofold knowledge of Christ the Mediator: one in general, *in thesi*, of a Mediator, the Messiah promised, which was the knowledge of the saints under the Old Testament. 2. Particular, *in hypothesi*, that Jesus of Nazareth was that Messiah, which also was known, and is to the saints under the New Testament. 4. That as to an explicit knowledge of the way and manner of salvation, which was to be wrought, accomplished, and brought about by the Messias, the promised seed Jesus Christ, and the address of men unto God by him, it was much more evidently and clearly given after the resurrection and the ascension of Christ, than before: the Spirit of revelation being then poured out in a more abundant manner than before. 5. There is a twofold praying unto God in the name of Christ. One in express words, clear and distinct intention of mind, insisting on his mediation, and our acceptance with God on his account. The other implied in all acts of faith, and dependance on God, wherein we rely on him, as the means of our access to God.

I say, these things being premised, 1. That before Christ's coming into the world, the saints of the Old Testament did pray, and were appointed of God to pray in the name of Jesus Christ, inasmuch as in all their addresses unto God they leaned on him (as promised to them), through whom they were to receive the blessing, and to be blessed; believing that they should be accepted on his account. This was virtually prayer to God in the name of Christ, or through him. This is evident from the tenor of the covenant wherein they walked with God; in which they were called to look to the seed of the woman, to expect the blessing in the seed of Abraham: speaking of the seed as of one and not of many; as also by all their types and sacrifices wherein they had by God's institution respect to him, with Abraham, by faith even as we; so that whether we consider the promise, on the account whereof they came to God, which was of Christ, and of blessing in him; or the means whereby they came, which were sacrifices, and types of him; or the confidence wherein they came, which was of atone-

ment and forgiveness of sin by him, it is evident, that all their prayers were made to God in the name of Christ, and not any upon any other account. And one of them is express in terms to this purpose; Dan. ix. 17. If they had any promise of him, if any covenant in him, if any types representing him, if any light of him, if any longing after him, if any benefit by him or fruit of his mediation, all their worship of God was in him, and through him.

2. For them who lived with him in the days of his flesh, their faith and worship was of the same size and measure with theirs that went before; so was their address to God in the same manner, and on the same account; only in this was their knowledge enlarged, that they believed, that, that individual person was he who was promised, and on whom their fathers believed. And therefore, they prayed to him for all mercies spiritual and temporal, whereof they stood in need, as to be saved in a storm, to have their faith increased, and the like, though they had not expressly, and clearly made mention of his name in their supplications. And that is the sense of our Saviour in the place of John insisted on, 'Hitherto ye have asked nothing in my name;' that is, expressly, and in direct application of the promises made in the Messiah unto him, though they had their access to God really and virtually, by and through him, in all the ways before expressed. And indeed, to evidence the glory of the presence of the Spirit, when poured forth upon them with a fulness of gifts and graces, such things are recorded of their ignorance and darkness in the mysteries of the worship of God, that it is no great wonder, if they who were then also to be detained under the judaical pedagogue for a season, had not received as yet, such an improvement of faith, as to ask and pray in the name of Jesus Christ as exhibited, which was one of the great privileges reserved for the days of the gospel. And this is all that Mr. B. gives occasion unto in this chapter.

CHAP. XXXV.

Of the resurrection of the dead, and the state of the wicked at the last day.

In his last chapter, Mr. Biddle strives to make his friends amends for all the wrong he had done them in those foregoing. Having attempted to overthrow their faith, and to turn them aside from the simplicity of the gospel; he now informs them, that the worst that can happen to them, if they follow his counsel, is but to be annihilated, or utterly deprived of their being, body and soul, in the day of judgment. For that everlasting fire, those endless torments, wherewith they have been so scared and terrified formerly by the catechisms and preachings of men that left and forsook the Scripture, it is all but a fable, invented to affright fools and children. On this account he lets his followers know, that if rejecting the eternal Son of God, and his righteousness, they may not go to heaven, yet as to hell, or an everlasting abode in torments, they may be secure; there is no such matter provided for them, nor any else. This is the main design in this chapter, whose title is, 'Of the resurrection of the dead, and the last judgment, and what shall be the final condition of the righteous and wicked thereupon.'

The first questions lead only to answers, that there shall be a resurrection of the dead in general; that they shall be raised and judged by Christ, who hath received authority from God to that purpose, that being the last great work that he shall accomplish by virtue of his mediatory kingdom committed to him. Some snares seem to be laid in the way in his questions, being captiously proposed; but they have been formerly broken in pieces in the chapters of the Deity of Christ, and his person; whither I remit the reader if he find himself entangled with them.

I shall only say by the way, that if Mr. B. may be expounded by his[a] masters, he will scarce be found to give so

[a] Deinde negant resurrectionem carnis; hoc est, hujus ipsius corporis, quod carne ac sanguine præditum est, etsi fateantur corpora esse resurrectura, h. e. ipsos homines fideles; qui tunc novis corporibus cælestibus induendi sunt. Compendiolum Doctrin. Eccles. in Polon.

clear an assent to the resurrection of the dead, as is here pretended; that is to a raising again of the same individual body, for the substance, and all substantial parts. This his masters think not possible; and therefore reject it, though it be never so expressly affirmed in the Scripture. But Mr. Biddle is silent of this discovery made by his masters, and so shall I be also.

That wherewith I am to deal he enters upon in this question. 'Shall not the wicked and unbelievers live for ever, though in torments, as well as the godly and faithful? or is eternal life peculiar to the faithful? A. John iii. 36.'

The assertion herein couched is, that the[q] wicked shall not live for ever in torments: and the proof of it is, because eternal life is promised only to the faithful; yea, 'he that hath not the Son shall never see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him;' John iii. 36. As to the assertion itself we shall attend farther unto it instantly.

When[c] Socinus first broached this abomination, he did it with the greatest cunning and sleight that possibly he could use; labouring to insinuate it insensibly into the minds of men; knowing full well how full of scandal the very naming of it would prove; but the man's success was in most things beyond his own imagination.

For the proof insinuated, life, and eternal life in the gospel, as they are mentioned as the end and reward of our obedience, are not taken merely physically, nor do express only the abode, duration, and continuance of our being, but our continuance in a state and condition of blessedness and glory. This is so evident, that there is no one place, where life to come, or eternal life, are spoken of simply in the whole

[q] Itaque negant cruciatus impiorum et diabolorum duraturos esse in æternum, verum omnes simul penitus esse abolendos; adeo ut mors et infernus ipse dicantur conjiciendi in stagnum illud ardens; Ap. 10. Rationem addunt, quod absurdum sit, Deum irasci in æternum; et peccata creaturarum finita, pœnis infinitis mulctare: præsertim cum hinc nulla ipsius gloria illustretur. Compen. Doct. Eccles. in Polon.

[c] Nam quod ais, ea ibi, tum de Christianorum resurrectione, tum de morte impiorum passim contineti, quæ a multis sine magna offensione, tum nostris tum aliis, legi non possint; scio equidem ea ibi contineri, sed meo judicio nec passim, nec ita aperte (cavi enim istud quantum potui) ut quisquam vir pius facile offendi possit, adeo ut quod nominatim attinet ad impiorum mortem, in quo dogmate majus est multo offensionis periculum, ea potius ex iis colligi possit, quæ ibi disputantur, quam expresse literis consignata extet; adeo ut lector, qui alioqui sententiam meam adversus Puccium de mortalitate primi hominis, quæ toto libro agitatur, quæque ob non paucos quos habet fautores parum aut nihil offensionis parere potest, probandam censeat, prius sentiat doctrinam istam sibi jam persuasam esse, quam suaderi animadvertat. Faust. Socin. Epist. ad Johan. Volkel. 6. p. 491.

New Testament, but as they are a reward, and a blessed condition to be obtained by Jesus Christ. In this sense we confess the wicked and impenitent shall never see life, nor obtain eternal life, that is, they shall never come to a fruition of God to eternity; but that therefore they shall not have a life or being, though in torments, is a wild inference. I desire to know of Mr. B. whether the evil angels shall be consumed or no, and have an utter end? If he say they shall, he gives us one new notion more: if not, I ask him whether they shall have eternal life or no? If he says they shall not enjoy eternal life in the sense mentioned in the Scripture; I shall desire him to consider, that men also may have their being preserved and yet not be partakers of eternal life in that sense wherein it is promised.

The proof insisted on by Mr. Biddle, says, that the wrath of God abides upon unbelievers, even then when they do not see life; now if they abide not, how can the wrath of God abide on them? doth God execute his wrath upon that which is not? if they abide under wrath, they do abide. Under wrath doth not diminish from their abiding, but describes its condition.

Death and life in Scripture, ever since the giving of the first law, and the mention made of them therein, as they express the condition of man in way of reward or punishment, are not opposed naturally, but morally; not in respect of their being (if I may so say) and relation, as one is the privation of the other in the way of nature; but in respect of the state and condition which is expressed by the one and the other, viz. of blessedness or misery. So that as there is an eternal life, which is as it were a second life, a life of glory following a life of grace, so there is an eternal death, which is the second death, a death of misery following a death of sin.

The death that is threatened and which is opposed to life, and eternal life, doth not any where denote annihilation, but only a deprivation and coming short of that blessedness which is promised with life, attended with all the evils which come under that name, and are in the first commination. Those who are dead in trespasses and sins, are not nothing, though they have no life of grace. But Mr. Biddle proceeds, and saith,

'Though this passage which you have quoted seems clearly to prove that eternal life agreeth to no other men but the faithful, yet, since the contrary opinion is generally held among Christians, I would fain know of you whether you have any other places that affirm that the wicked die directly, and that a second death, are destroyed and punished with everlasting destruction, are corrupted, burnt up, devoured, slain, pass away, and perish?

'A. Rom. vi. 23. viii. 13. Rev. xxi. 6. 8. ii. 10, 11. 1 Thess. v. 3. 2 Pet. iii. 7. 2 Thess. i. 7—9 .Gal. vi. 8. 2 Pet. ii. 12. 1 Cor. iii. 17. Heb. x. 39. Matt. iii. 12. Heb. x. 26, 27. Luke xix. 27. 1 John ii. 17. 2 Cor. ii. 15, 16.'

1. How well Mr. R. hath proved his intention by the place of Scripture before-mentioned, hath been in part discovered, and will in our process yet farther appear. The ambiguity of the word 'life,' and 'eternal life' (which yet is not ambiguous in the Scripture, being constantly used in one sense and signification, as to the purpose in hand), is all the pretence he hath for his assertion besides that, his proof that unbelievers do not abide, lies in this, that the wrath of God abides on them.

2. This is common with this gentleman and his masters; Christians generally think otherwise, but we say thus; so slight do they make of the common faith which was once delivered to the saints. But he may be pleased to take notice, that not only Christians think so, but assuredly believe that it shall be so, having the express word of God to bottom that their faith upon. And[d] not only Christians believe it, but mankind generally in all ages consented to it; as might abundantly be evinced.

3. But let the expressions wherewith Mr. B. endeavours to make good this his monstrous assertion of the annihilation of the wicked and unbelievers at the last day, be particularly considered, that the strength of his conclusion, or rather the weakness of it, may be discovered.

The first is that they are said to die, and that the second death; Rom. vi. 23. viii. 13. Rev. xxi. 6. 8. ii. 10, 11. but how now will Mr. B. prove that by dying is meant the annihilation of body and soul? There is mention of a natural

[d] Καὶ τὸ ἀναζιώσκεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων τοὺς ζῶντας γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς εἶναι, καὶ ταῖς μὲν ἀγαθαῖς ἄμεινον εἶναι, ταῖς κακαῖς κάκιον. Plato in Phædo.

death in Scripture, which, though it be a dissolution of nature, as to its essential parts of body and soul, yet it is an annihilation of neither; for the soul abides, and Mr. B. professes to believe that the body shall rise again. There is a spiritual death in sin also mentioned, which is not a destruction of the dead person's being, but a moral condition wherein he is. And why must the last death be the annihilation pretended? As to a coming short of that which is the proper life of the soul in the enjoyment of God, which is called life absolutely, and eternal life, it is a death. And as to any comfortable attendances of a being continued, it is a death. That it is a total deprivation of being, seeing those under it are to eternity to abide under torments (as shall be shewed), there is no colour.

2. It is called 'destruction;' and 'perdition,' and 'everlasting destruction;' 1 Thess. v. 3. 2 Pet. iii. 7. 2 Thess. i. 7—9. True, it is a destruction as to the utter casting men off all and every thing wherein they had any hope or dependance; a casting them eternally off from the happiness of rational creatures, and the end which they ought to have aimed at; that is, they shall be destroyed in a moral, not a natural sense; to be cast for ever under the wrath of God, I think, is destruction, and therefore it is called 'everlasting destruction,' because of the punishment which in that destruction abideth on them. To this are reduced the following expressions of utterly perishing, and the like; Gal. vi. 8. 2 Pet. ii. 12. 1 Cor. iii. 17. 2 Pet. iii. 16.

3. 'Burning up the chaff with unquenchable fire,' is mentioned, Matt. iii. 12. but if this burning of the chaff do consume it, pray what need it be done with 'fire that cannot be quenched?' When it hath done its work, it will surely be put out. The expression is metaphorical, and the allusion is not in the consumption of chaff in the fire, but in the casting it into the fire; or the setting fire unto it. So the fiery indignation is said, to 'devour the adversaries;' not that they shall no more be, but that they shall never see happiness any more. All these expressions being metaphorical, and used to set out the greatness of the wrath and indignation of God against impenitent sinners, under which they shall lie for ever. The residue of the expressions collected are of the same importance. Christ's punishment of unbelievers

at the last day, is compared to a king saying, 'bring hither mine enemies, and slay them before me;' Luke xix. 27. because as a natural death is the utmost punishment that men are able to inflict, which cuts men off from hopes and enjoyments, as to their natural condition, so Christ will lay on them the utmost of his wrath, cutting them off from all hopes and enjoyments as to their spiritual and moral condition. It is said, the 'fashion of this world passeth away;' 1 John ii. 17. because it can give no abiding continuing refreshment to any of the sons of men; when he that doth the will of God hath an everlasting continuance in a good condition, notwithstanding the intervening of all troubles, which are in this life. But that wicked men have not their being continued to eternity, nothing is here expressed.

A very few words will put an issue to this controversy, if our blessed Saviour may be accepted for an umpire; saith he, Matt. xxv. 46. 'And these shall go away into everlasting punishment, but the righteous into life eternal:' certainly he that shall be everlastingly punished, shall be everlastingly. His punishment shall not continue, when he is not. He that hath an end, cannot be everlastingly punished. Again, saith our Saviour, in hell the 'fire shall never be quenched; where the worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched;' Matt. ix. 43, 44. which he repeats again, ver. 46. and, that Mr. B. may not cause any to hope the contrary, again ver. 48. This adds to the former miracle, that men should be punished and yet not be; that they shall be punished by the stings of a worm to torment them when they are not, and the burning of a fire, when their whole essence is consumed. So also Isa. lxvi. 24. their torments shall be endless, and the means of their torments continued for ever; but for themselves, it seems, they shall have an end, as to their being; and so nothing shall be punished with an everlasting worm, and a fire never to be quenched. Nay, which is more, there shall be amongst them 'weeping, and wailing, and gnashing of teeth;' Matt. viii. 12. the utmost sorrow and indignation expressible, yea, beyond expression; and yet they shall not be. God threatens men with death and destruction, and describes that death and destruction to consist in the abiding under his wrath in endless torments; which inexpressible sorrow evidently

shews that death is not a consumption of them as to the continuance of their being, but a deprivation of all the good of life natural, spiritual, and eternal; with an infliction of the greatest evils that they can be capacitated to endure and undergo, called their destruction and perdition.[e]

What hath been the intention and design of Mr. B. in this his catechism, which I have thus far considered, I shall not judge. There is one lawgiver, to whom both he and I must give an account of our labour, and endeavours in this business: That the tendency of the work itself is to increase infidelity and sin in the world, I dare aver. Let this chapter be an instance, and from the savour that it hath, let a taste be taken of the whole; and its nature be thereby estimated. That the greatest part of them to whom the mind of God, as revealed in Scripture, is in some measure made known, are not won and prevailed upon by the grace, love, and mercy, proclaimed therein, and tendered through Christ, so as to give up themselves in all holy obedience unto God, I suppose will be granted. That these men are yet so overpowered by the terror of the Lord therein discovered, and the threats of the wrath to come, as not to dare to run out to the utmost, that the desperate thoughts of their own hearts, and the temptations of Satan meeting in conjunction, would carry them out unto, as it hath daily and manifold experiences to evince it; so the examples of men so awed by conviction, mentioned in the Scripture, do abundantly manifest. Now what is it among all the considerations of the account that men are to make and the judgment which they are to undergo, which doth so amaze their souls, and fill them with horror and astonishment, so strike off their hands when they are ready to stretch them out to violence and uncleanness; or so frequently makes their conception of sin abortive, as this of the eternity of their punishment, which impenitent sinners must undergo. Is not this that which makes bitter the otherwise sweet morsels that they roll under their tongues;

[e] A. Ita jocaris, quasi ego dicam, eos esse miseros, qui nati non sunt, et non eos miseros, qui mortui sunt. M. Esse ergo eos dicis. A. Immo, quia non sunt, cum fuerint, eos miseros esse M. Pugnantia te loqui non vides? quid enim tam pugnat, quam non modo miserum, sed omnino quidquam esse, qui non fit. A. Quoniam me verbo premis, posthac non ita dicam, miseros esse, sed tantum, miseros, ob id ipsum quia non sunt. M. Non dicis igitur, miser est. M. Crassus, sed miser Crassus. A. Ita plane. M. Quasi non necesse sit, quicquid isto modo pronunties, id aut esse, aut non esse, an tu dialecticis ne imbutus quidem es, &c. Cicer. Tuscul. Quest. Lib. 1.

and is an adamantine chain to coerce and restrain them, when they break all other cords, and cast all other bonds behind them? yea, hath not this been from the creation of the world[f] the great engine of the providence of God for the preserving of mankind from the outrageousness and unmeasurableness of iniquity and wickedness, which would utterly ruin all human society, and work a degeneracy in mankind into a very near approximation unto the beasts that perish; namely, by keeping alive in the generality of rational creatures, a prevailing conviction of an abiding condition of evil doers in a state of misery? To undeceive the wretched world, and to set sinful man at liberty from this bondage and thraldom, to his own causeless fears, Mr. B. comes forth and assures them all that the eternity of torments is a fable, and everlasting punishment, a lie; let them trouble themselves no more, the worst of their misery may be past in a moment; it is but annihilation, or rather perdition of soul and body, and they are for ever freed from the wrath of the Almighty. Will they not say, 'Let us eat and drink for to-morrow we shall die?' Down we lie of a season. God, it seems, will see us once again and then farewell for ever. Whether ever there were a more compendious way of serving the design of Satan, or a more expedient engine to cast down and demolish the banks and bounds given to the bottomless lust and corruption of natural men, that they may overflow the world with a deluge of sin and confusion, considering the depraved condition of all men by nature, and the rebellion of the most against the love and mercy of the gospel, I much doubt. But who is more fit to encourage wicked men to sin and disobedience, than he who labours also to pervert the righteous and obedient from their faith?

To close this whole discourse, I shall present Mr. Biddle's catechumens with a shorter catechism than either of his, collected out of their master's questions, with some few

[f] Hæc Cæsar disseruit, credo falsa existimans ea qua de infernis memorantur diverso itinere malos a bonis loca tetra, inculta, fœda atque formidolosa habere. Cato apud Salust. Bell. Catilin.

inferences, naturally flowing from them; and it is as follows.

'Q. 1. What is God?

'A. God is a Spirit, that hath a body, shape, eyes, ears, hands, feet, like to us.

'Q. 2. Where is this God?

'A. In a certain place in heaven, upon a throne, where a man may see from his right hand to his left.

'Q. 3. Doth he ever move out of that place?

'A. I cannot tell what he doth ordinarily, but he hath formerly come down sometimes upon the earth.

'Q. 4. What doth he do there in that place?

'A. Among other things, he conjectures at what men will do here below.

'Q. 5. Doth he then not know what we do?

'A. He doth what we have done, but not what we will do.

'Q. 6. What frame is he in, upon his knowledge and conjecture?

'A. Sometimes he is afraid, sometimes grieved, sometimes joyful, and sometimes troubled.

'Q. 7. What peace and comfort can I have in committing myself to his providence, if he knows not what will befall me to-morrow?

'A. What is that to me, see you to that.

'Q. 8. Is Jesus Christ God?

'A. He is dignified with the title of God, but he is not God.

'Q. 9. Why then was he called the only begotten Son of God?

'A. Because he was born of the Virgin Mary.

'Q. 10. Was he Christ the Lord then when he was born?

'A. No, he became the Lord afterward.

'Q. 11. Hath he still in heaven a human body?

'A. No, but he is made a Spirit, so that being not God but man, he was made a God; and being made a God, he is a Spirit, and not a man.

'Q. 12. What is the Holy Ghost?

'A. A principal angel.

'Q. 13. Did death enter by sin, or was mortality actually caused by sin?

'A. No.

'Q. 14. Why is Christ called a Saviour?

'A. Because at the resurrection he shall change our vile bodies.

'Q. 15. On what other account?

'A. None that I know of.

'Q. 16. How then shall I be saved from sin and wrath?

'A. Keep the commandments, that thou mayest have a right to eternal life.

'Q. 17. Was Christ the eternal Son of God in his bosom, revealing his mind from thence, or was he taken up into heaven, and there taught the truths of God as Mahomet pretended?

'A. He ascended into heaven, and talked with God, before he came and shewed himself to the world.

'Q. 18. What did Christ do as a prophet?

'A. He gave a new law.

'Q. 19. Wherein?

'A. He corrected the law of Moses.

'Q. 20. Who was it that said of old, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour and hate thine enemy?

'A. God in the law of Moses, which Christ corrects.

'Q. 21. Is Christ to be worshipped because he is God?

'A. No, but because he redeemed us.

'Q. 22. May one that is a mere creature be worshipped with divine or religious worship?

'A. Yes.

'Q. 23. How can Christ being a mere man, and now so far removed from the earth, understand and hear all the prayers and desires of the hearts of men, that are put up to him all the world over?

'A. I cannot tell, for God himself doth not know that there are such actions, as our free actions are, but upon inquiry.

'Q. 24. Did Christ give himself for an offering and sacrifice to God in his death?

'A. No, for he was not then a priest.

'Q. 25. Did Christ by his death make reconciliation for our sins, the sins of his people, bear their iniquities that they might have peace with God?

'A. No, but only died that they might turn themselves to God.

'Q. 26. Did he so undergo the curse of the law and was so made sin for us; were our iniquities so laid on him, that he made satisfaction to God for our sins?

'A. No, there is no such thing in the Scripture.

'Q. 27. Did he merit or procure eternal life for us by his obedience and suffering?

'A. No, this is a fiction of the generality of Christians.

'Q. 28. Did he redeem us properly with the price of his blood, that we should be saved from wrath, death, and hell?

'A. No, there is no such use or fruit of his death and blood-shedding.

'Q. 29. If he neither suffered in our stead, nor underwent the curse of the law for us, nor satisfied justice by making reconciliation for our sins, nor redeemed us by the price of his blood, what did he do for us; on what account is he our Saviour?

'A. He taught us the way to heaven, and died to leave us an example.

'Q. 30. How then did he save them, or was he their Saviour, who died before his teaching and dying?

'A. He did not save them, nor was their Saviour, nor did they ask any thing in his name, or received any thing on his account.

'Q. 31. Did Christ raise himself according as he spake of the temple of his body, destroy this temple and the third day I will raise it again?

'A. No, he raised not himself at all.

'Q. 32. Hath God from eternity loved some even before they did any good, and elected them to life and salvation to be obtained by Jesus Christ?

'A. No, but he loved all alike.

'Q. 33. Did God in the sending of Christ aim at the salvation of a certain number of his elect?

'A. No, but at the salvation of men in general whether ver any be saved or no.

'Q. 34. Are all those saved for whom Christ died?

'A. The least part of them are saved.

'Q. 35. Is faith wrought in us by the Spirit of God, or are we converted by the efficacy of his grace?

'A. No, but of ourselves we believe and are converted, and then we are made partakers of the Spirit and his grace.

'Q. 36. Are all true believers preserved by the power of God unto salvation?

'A. No, many of them fall away and perish.

'Q. 37. Is the righteousness of Christ imputed to us for our justification?

'A. No, but our own faith and works.

'Q. 38. Are we to receive or apprehend Christ and his righteousness by faith, that we may be justified through him?

'A. No, but believe on him that raised him from the dead, and without that, it suffices.

'Q. 39. Are we able to keep all God's commandments?

'A. Yes.

'Q. 40. Perhaps in our sincere endeavours; but can we do it absolutely and perfectly?

'A. Yes, we can keep them perfectly.

'Q. 41. What need a man then to apprehend Christ's righteousness and apply it to himself by faith?

'A. None at all, for there is no such thing required.

'Q. 42. What shall become of wicked men after the rerection?

'A. They shall be so consumed body and soul, as not at all to remain in torments.'

OF

THE DEATH OF CHRIST,

AND

OF JUSTIFICATION:

THE

DOCTRINE CONCERNING THEM FORMERLY DELIVERED VINDICATED FROM THE ANIMADVERSIONS OF MASTER R. B.

OF this task I would complain if I durst; but I know not how it may be taken; and whether it may not occasion another apology. So are writings of this nature, as waves that thrust on one another. 'Books,' says one, 'are like good turns; they must be new covered, or it will rain through.' I was in some hope to have escaped this trouble. But [a] *πόνος πόνω πόνον φέρει.* And Chrysostom tells us, that [b] *πολλῆς γέμει ταραχῆς ἡ ζωὴ, καὶ θορύβων μεστὸς ὁ παρῶν βιὸς ἐστιν.* I desire to be content with my portion, being better yet than that of [c] Livius Drusius, who complained 'uni sibi nec puero quidem unquam ferias contigisse;' so it be in and about things of real use, and advantage to the souls of men, I can be content with any pains that I have strength to answer. But this is an evil, which every one who is not stark blind may see in polemical writings; almost their constant end, is *λογομαχία, περιαυτολογία, ἀπολογία,* whence saith the apostle, *γίνεται φθόνος, ἔρις, βλασφημίαι, ὑπόνοιαι πονηραὶ, παραδιατριβαὶ.* Having through the providence of God (whether on my part necessarily or wisely I know not *θεὸς οἶδα*), engaged in public, for the defence of some truths of the gospel (as I believe), I was never so foolish, as to expect an escape without opposition. He that

[a] Sophocles. [b] Chrysost. Con. 1. *περὶ προνοίας.*
[c] Sueton. in vit. Tib.

puts forth a book, sentences his reason to the gantelope: every one will strive to have a lash at it in its course, and he must be content to bear it. It may be said of books of this kind, as he said of children[d] (things often compared), *τὸ γίνεσθαι πατέρα παιδων, λύπη, φόβος, φροντὶς.* 'Anxiety, fear, and trouble, attend their authors.' For my own part, as I provoked no man causelessly in any of my writings, defended no other doctrine professedly but the common faith of the Protestant churches, of which I found the saints of God in possession, when I came first acquainted with them; so I have from the beginning resolved, not to persist in any controversy, as to the public debate of it, when once it begins to degenerate into a strife of words, and personal reflections; so much the more grievous is it to me, to engage in this now in hand, of the necessity whereof I shall give the reader a brief account. That as to the matter of the contest between Mr. B. and myself, Mr. B. is my witness, that I gave not the occasion of it; so as to the manner of its handling, that I carried not on the provocation, I appeal to all that have read my treatise, which is now animadverted on. The same person, 'et initium dedit, et modum abstulit.' Some freedom of expression, that perhaps I might righteously have made use of, to prevent future exacerbations I designedly forbore. I know that some men must have *βύσσινα ῥήματα.* Expressions[e] concerning them, had need be *μυροβρεχεῖς·* or like the letters, that men print one of another, which are oftentimes answerable to that of Augustus to Mæcenas; 'vale mel gemmeum, medulliæ ebur ex Hetruria, lasera-rietinum, adamas supernas, Tiberinum margaritum, cilniorum smaragde, jaspis figulorum, berille Porsennæ, carbunculum Italiæ,' *καὶ ἵνα συντέμω παντα,* &c. I hoped therefore this business had been at an issue; others also were of the same mind; especially considering that he had almost professed against proceeding farther in this controversy in some other treatises and apologies. For my own part, I must profess my thoughts arose only from his long silence. The reason of this I knew could not be that of him in the poet,[f] *φιλεῖ γὰρ ὄκνειν πρᾶγμ' ανὴρ πράσσων μέγα·* seeing he

[d] Menander. [e] *Τὴν κενοδοξίαν ὡς τελεσταῖον χιτῶνα ἡ ψυχὴ πέφυκεν ἀποτίθεσθαι.*
[f] Sophocles.

could have done it as speedily as have written so much paper. The expressions in his books seemed to me, as the fermentation of a spirit, that at one time or other would boil over. I confess I was something delivered from the fear of it, when not long before the publishing of his confession and apology, I met with him, and had occasion of much conference with him at London, even about justification; and he made not the least mention of this confutation of me, which he hath now published; but φιλλικοῖς ἔνειδεν ὄμμασιν· but though this present contest might have been easily prevented (as the reader will instantly perceive), yet I presume the book was then wholly printed, and Mr. B. was not to lose his pains, nor the world the benefit thereof, nor the printer his ink and paper, for so slight a cause, as the preventing of the aspersion of me for an Antinomian.

But 'jacta est alea,' now it is out, we must make the best of it; and I hope the reader will excuse me in what follows, ὡς οὐχ' ὑπάρχων αλλὰ τιμωρούμενος.

But why must my arguments be answered, and myself confuted? Two reasons hereof are given. The first by very many insinuations; namely, that I have delivered dangerous doctrines, such as subvert the foundation of the gospel, plain antinomianism; and these two positions are laid down to be confuted, viz. first, That the elect are justified from eternity, or from the death of Christ, before they believe. Secondly, That justification by faith, is but in *foro conscientiæ*, or in our own feeling, and terminated in conscience, and not in *foro Dei:* farther, then, conscience may be so called; and my arguments for them are answered; chap. viii. p. 189. But what should a man do in this case? I have already published to Mr. B. and all the world, that I believe neither of these propositions; must I take my oath of it, or get compurgators, or must we have no end of this quarrel? Let Mr. B. prove any such thing, out of any thing I have written, and as Nonius says, out of Nævius, 'ei dum vivebo, fidelis ero.' I am sure this minds me of that passage in the Jewish liturgy, 'placeat tibi domine liberare me a lite difficili, et ab adversario difficili, sive is ad fœdus tuum pertineat, sive non pertineat.' The following examination of the particulars excepted against by Mr. B. will make this

evident, whence it will appear, that[g] μικρὰ πρόφασις ἐστι τοῦ πρᾶξαι κακῶς· yea but,

Secondly,[h] two or three reverend brethren told him, that to that part which he hath considered, it was necessary I should be confuted; who these reverend brethren are I know not; I presume they may be of those friends of Mr. B. that blame him for replying to Mr. Blake, but say for all the rest with whom he hath dealt (of whom I am forced to be one) that it is no matter, they deserved no better. Whoever they are, they might have had more mercy than not a little to pity poor men under the strokes of a heavy hand. Nor do I know what are the reasons of the brethren, why my name must be brought on this stage; nor perhaps is it meet they should be published. It may[i] be it is necessary that Mr. Owen should be confuted among Antinomians, and that ἐκ τρίποδος. But what if it should appear in the issue, that Mr. Owen hath deserved better at their hands, and that this advice of theirs might have been spared? But not to complain of I know not whom, to those reverend advisers I shall only say, εἶδε πᾶν ἔχει καλῶς, τῷ, παιγνίῳ, δότε κρῶτον, καὶ πάντες ὑμεῖς μετὰ χαρᾶς, ποππύσατε· but if it appear in the issue, that I was charged with that which I never delivered, nor wrote, and that my arguments to one purpose, are answered in reference to another, and that this is the sum of Mr. B.'s discourse against me, I shall only recommend to them some verses of old Ennius, as I find them in Aus. Pop.

Nam qui lepide postulat alterum frustrari
Quem frustatur, frustra eum dicit frustra esse,
Nam qui sese frustrari quem frustra sentit.
Qui frustatur is frustra est, si non, ille est frustra.

What then shall I do? I am imposed on to lay the foundation of all antinomianism (as Mr. Burgess is also), to maintain justification from eternity, or at least in the cross of Christ, of all that should believe; and justification by faith to be but the sense of it in our consciences (which last I know better and wiser men than myself that do, though I do not) and so reckoned amongst them that overthrow the whole gospel, and place the righteousness of Christ in the

[g] Menander. [h] Mr. B.'s Preface.
[i] Αὐτῷ κακὰ τεύχει ἀνὴρ, ἄλλῳ κακὰ τεύχων· ἡδε κακὴ βουλὴ τῷ βουλεύσαντι κακίστη.

room of our own believing and repentance, rendering them useless.

Shall I undertake to confute Mr. B.'s book, at least wherein we differ, and so acquit myself both from Antinomianism and Socinianism in the business in hand? But, 1. The things of this discourse are such, and the manner of handling them of that sort, that Mr. B. heartily in the close of his book,[k] begs pardon for them, who have necessitated him to spend so much time to so little purpose; *καὶ ταῦτα πράσσων φόσκ' ἀνὴρ οὐδὲν ποιῶν.* As I see not yet the necessity of his pains, so I desire his reverend advisers may thank him for this intercession, for I suppose myself (at least), not concerned therein. But this I can say, that I am so far from engaging into a long operose contest, in a matter of such importance and consequence, as the subject of that book is represented to be, that I would rather burn my pens and books also, than serve a provocation so far, as to spend half that time therein, which the confutation of it would require from so slow and dull a person as myself.

2. He hath in his preface put such terrible conditions upon those that will answer him, that I know no man but must needs be affrighted with the thoughts of the attempt. He requires, that whoever undertake this work, be of a stronger judgment, and a more discerning head, than he; that he be a better proficient in these studies than he; that he be freer from prejudice than he; that he have more illumination and grace than he: that is, that he be a better, wiser, more holy, and learned man, than Mr. B. Now if we may take Mr. B.'s character, by what he discourseth of his mortification and sincerity, his freedom from prejudice, &c.; as there is no reason but that we should; I profess I know not where to find his match, much less any to excel him, with whom I might intercede for his pains in the consideration of this treatise; for as for myself, I am seriously so far from entertaining any such thoughts, in reference to Mr. B. that I dare not do it in reference to any one godly minister that I know in the world; yea, I am sure that I am not in respect of all the qualifications mentioned, put together, to be preferred before any one of them. If it be said, that it is not requisite that a man should know this of himself, but

[k] Page 462.

only that he be so indeed; I must needs profess, that being told beforehand that such he must be, if he undertake this work, I am not able to discern how he should attempt it, and not proclaim himself, to have an opinion of his own qualifications, answerable to that which is required of him.

3. It is of some consideration, that a man that doth not know so much of him as I do, would by his writings take him to be *immitis* and *immisericors* a very Achilles, that will not pardon a man in his grave; but will take him up, and cut him in a thousand pieces. I verily believe, that if a man (who had nothing else to do), should gather into one heap all the expressions, which in his late books, confessions, and apologies, have a lovely aspect towards himself, as to ability, diligence, sincerity, on the one hand, with all those which are full of reproach and contempt towards others, on the other, the view of them could not but a little startle a man of so great modesty, and of such eminency in the mortification of pride as Mr. B. is. But,

Οὐθεὶς ἐσ αὐτοῦ τὰ κακὰ συνορᾷ
Σαφῶς ἑτέρου δ' αἰχμαποῦντος ὄψεται.

Had I not heard him profess how much he valued the peace of the church, and declare what his endeavours for it were, I could not but suppose upon evidences which I am unwilling to repeat together, that a humour of disputing and quarrelling, was very predominant in the man: however, though a profession may pass against all evidences of fact to the contrary whatever; yet I dare say that he lives not at ἀπραγόπολις.

That he hath been able to discern the positions he opposes in the beginning of his eighth chapter to be contained in any writings of mine, as maintained by me, I must impute to such a sharp sightedness, as was that of Caius Caligula; to whom, when he inquired of Vitellius whether he saw him not embracing the moon, it was replied, 'si solis (domine) vobis diis licet invicem videre.'[1]

What shall I then do? Shall I put forth a creed, or an apology, to make it appear that indeed I am not concerned in any of Mr. Baxter's contests? But,

1. I dare not look upon myself of any such consideration to the world, as to write books to give them an account of

[1] Dio.

myself (with whom they very little trouble their thoughts); to tell them my faith and belief, to acquaint them when I am well and when I am sick, what sin I have mortified most, what books I have read, how I have studied, how I go, and walk, and look, what one of my neighbours says of me, and what another, how I am praised by some and dispraised by others, what I do and what I would have others do, what diligence, impartiality, uprightness, I use, what I think of other men: so dealing unmercifully with perishing paper, and making books by relating to myself, worthy,

> Deferri in vicum vendentem thus, et odores,
> Et piper, et quicquid chartis amicitur ineptis.[m]

And I should plainly shew myself *αλαζονοχαυνοφλύαρος*.

2. I know there is no need of any such thing; for all that know me, or care to know me, know full well, that in and about the doctrine of justification by faith, I have no singular opinion of my own, but embrace the common known doctrine of the reformed churches, which by God's good assistance in due time, I shall farther explicate and vindicate from Papists, Socinians, and Arminians; I cannot complain, that [n]*ἐγὼ εἶμι μόνος τῶν ἡμῶν ἐμος*. I have companions and counsellors. And in truth it is very marvellous to some, that this learned person, who hath manifested so great a tenderness on his own behalf, as to call their books monsters, and themselves liars, who charged his opinion about justification with a coincidence with that of the Papists, should himself so freely impute antinomianism to others; an opinion which he esteems as bad, if not every way worse than that of the Papists about justification; but 'contenti simus hoc Catone;' which is all I shall say, though some would add;

> Homine imperito nunquam quidquam injustius
> Qui nisi quod ipse facit nihil rectum putat.

3. I must add, if for a defensative of myself, I shou[ld] here transcribe and subscribe some creed already publishe[d] I must profess, it must not be that of Mr. B. (p. 12, 13 [which] which he calls the Worcestershire profession of faith; an[d] t as for other reasons, so especially for the way of del[i]ng the doctrine of the Trinity, which but in one expre[s]s at most differs from the known confession of the Soc[i]s: and in sundry particulars, gives so great a counte[n]

[m] Hor. Epis. ii. 1. 269. [n] Apollidorus.

nance to their abominations. For instance, the first article of it is, 'I believe that there is one only God, the Father, infinite in being,' &c. which being carried on towards the end, and joined to the profession of consent, as it is called, in these words, 'I do heartily take this one God, for my only God and chiefest good, and this Jesus Christ for my only Lord, Redeemer, and Saviour;' evidently distinguishes the Lord Jesus Christ our Redeemer, as our Lord, from that one true God; which not only directly answers that question of Mr. Biddle's, 'How many Lords of Christians are there in distinction from this one God?' but in terms falls in with that which the Socinians profess to be the 'tessera' of their sect and churches, as they call them, which is, that they believe in the 'one true living God the Father, and in his only Son Jesus Christ our Lord.' Nor am I at so great an indifferency in the business of the procession of the Holy Ghost, as to those expressions of 'from,' and 'by the Son,' as that confession is at; knowing that there is much more depends on these expressions as to the doctrine of the Trinity, than all the confessionists can readily apprehend. But yet here, that we may not have occasion to say, Λεπτολόγων ἀπολογιῶν φεῦ πληθύος! I do freely clear the subscribers of that confession from any sinister opinion of the Trinity, or the Deity of Jesus Christ, though as to myself I suppose my reasons abundantly sufficient to detain me from a subscription of it. But if this course be not to be insisted on, shall I,

3. Run over all the confessions of faith, and common places which I have, or may have here at Oxford, and manifest my consent with them in the matter under question? I confess this were a pretty easy way to make up a great book; but for many reasons it suits not with my judgment, although I could have the advantage of giving what they positively deliver in abundance as their main *thesis* and foundation, without cutting off discourses from their connexion and coherence, to give them a new face and appearance, which in their own proper place they had not, or to gather up their concessions to the adversaries to one purpose, and applying them to another: and therefore I shall wholly wave that way of procedure, although I might by it, perhaps, keep up some good reputation with the orthodox.

To have passed over then this whole business in silence, would have seemed to me much the best course, had I not seen a man of so great integrity and impartiality, as Mr. B. (who so much complains of want of candour and truth in others) counting it so necessary to vindicate himself from imputations, as to multiply books and apologies to that end and purpose, and that under the chains of very strong importunities and entreaties, to turn the course of his studies and pains to things more useful; wherein his labours (as he says), have met with excessive estimation and praises. And may doubtless well do so, there being (as he informs us) 'too few divines that are diligently and impartially studious of truth; and fewer that have strong judgments, that are able to discern it, though they do study it,' (Pref.) which, though Mr. B. arrogates not to himself, yet others may do well to ascribe to him. I hope then he will not be offended, if in this I follow his steps, though 'haud passibus æquis:' and 'longo post intervallo.' Only in this I shall desire to be excused, if seeing the things of myself are very inconsiderable, and whatever I can write on that account being like the discourses of men returning 'e lacu furnoque,' that I multiply not leaves to no purpose. I shall then desire,

1. To enter my protest, that I do not engage with Mr. B. upon the terms and conditions by him prescribed in his preface; as though I were wiser, or better, or more learned than he; being fully assured, that a man more unlearned than either of us, and less studied, may reprove and convince us of errors; and that we may deal so with them, who are much more learned than us both.

2. To premise, that I do not deliver my thoughts and whole judgment in the business of the justification of a sinner: which to do, I have designed another opportunity, εἰ θεὸς θέλει, καὶ ζήσω, and shall not now prevent myself.

These things being premised, I shall,

1. Set down what I have delivered concerning the three heads, wherein it is pretended the difference lies between us.

2. Pass through the consideration of the particular places, where Mr. B. is pleased to take notice of me and my judgment and arguments, as to the things of the contests, wherein he is engaged: and this course I am necessitated to; because as Mr. B. states the controversies he pur-

sues in the beginning of the eighth chapter, I profess myself wholly unconcerned in them.

The things then that I am traduced for the maintaining and giving countenance unto, are,

1. The justification of the elect from eternity.

2. Their justification at the death of Christ, as dying and suffering with him.

3. Their absolution in heaven before their believing.

4. That justification by faith, is nothing but a sense of it in the conscience.

5. That Christ suffered the *idem*, which we should have done; and not only *tantundem*. Of all which very briefly.

1. For the first, I neither am, nor ever was of that judgment; though, as it may be explained, I know better, wiser, and more learned men than myself, that have been, and are. This I once before told Mr. B. and desired him to believe me: Of the death of Christ, p. 33. [Works, vol. v. p. 599.] if he will not yet do it, I cannot help it.

2. As to the second, I have also entreated Mr. B. to believe that it is not my judgment in that very book on which he animadverts; and hoped I might have obtained credit with him, he having no evidence to the contrary: let the reader see what I deliver to this purpose, pp. 34, 35. [pp. 601, 602.] In what sense I maintain that the 'elect died and rose with Christ,' see pp. 82—84. [pp. 638—640.]

3. The third, or absolution in heaven before believing. What I mean hereby I explain, pp. 77—79. [pp. 634, 635.] Let it be consulted.

It was, on I know not what grounds, before by Mr. B. imposed on me, that I maintained justification upon the death of Christ before believing: which I did with some earnestness reject, and proved by sundry arguments, that we are not changed in our state and condition before we do believe. Certainly never was man more violently pressed to a warfare, than I to this contest.

4. That justification by faith is nothing but a sense of it in conscience, I never said, I never wrote, I never endeavoured to prove. What may a man expect from others who is so dealt withal by a man whose writings so praise him, as Mr. B.'s do?

5. For the last thing, what I affirm in it, what I believe

in it, what I have proved, the preceding treatise will give an account to the reader. And for my judgment in these things, this little at present may suffice. Mr. B.'s animadversions, in the order wherein they lie, shall nextly be considered.

The first express mention that I am honoured withal is towards the end of his preface, occasioned only by a passage in my brief proem to Mr. Eyres's book of justification. My words as by him transcribed are: 'For the present I shall only say, that there being too great evidence of a very welcome entertainment and acceptation, given by many to an almost pure Socinian justification, and exposition of the covenant of grace,' &c. To which Mr. B. subjoins: 'But to be almost an error, is to be a truth. There is but a thread between truth and error, and that which is not near to that error, is not truth, but is liker to be another error, in the other extreme. For truth is one straight line, error is manifold, even all that swerves from that line in what space or degree soever.'

'Malum omen!' and the worse because of choice; whether this proceed [n] παρὰ τὴν τοῦ ἐλέγχου ἄγνοιαν, or whether it be τὸ ἐκ σημείου (ἀσυλλόγιστον γαρ καὶ τοῦτο) it matters not; but I am sure it is sophistical. The doctrine of justification, which I reflected on; I did not say was near to error, or almost an error, but near to Socinianism or almost Socinian: if Mr. B. takes error and Socinianism to be terms convertible, I must crave liberty to dissent. That which is almost error, is true: but that which is almost Socinianism may be quite an error, though not an error quite so bad, as that of the Socinians concerning the same matter. He that shall deny the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, and maintain that our performance of new obedience is the matter of our justification before God, according to the tenor of the new covenant, and yet grant the satisfaction of Christ, and assign it a place (some or other) in the business of our justification, his doctrine is but almost Socinian, and yet in my judgment is altogether an error. And so the heat of this first conflict is allayed, 'Pulveris exigui jactu:' its foundation having been only ἀμετρία ἀνθολκῆς.

But notwithstanding this seeming discharge, perhaps it may be said, that indeed this was not a honest insinuation;

[n] Arist Rhet. lib. 2. cap. 26.

there being no such doctrines abroad amongst us, as hold any blamable correspondency with the Socinian doctrine of justification; and it is not an ingenuous and candid way of proceeding, to seek to oppress truths, or at least opinions, that are managed with a fair and learned plea, with names of public abomination, with which indeed they have no communion. I confess this is an unworthy course, a path wherein I am not desirous to walk: I shall therefore, from their own writings, give the reader a brief summary in some few propositions, of the doctrine of the Socinians concerning justification, and then nakedly without deprecating his censure, leave him to judge of the necessity and candour of my forementioned expressions. They say then, that,

1. Justifying faith, or that faith whereby we are justified, is our receiving of Christ, as our Lord and Saviour, trusting in him, and yielding obedience to him.

'Credere in Jesum Christum, nihil aliud est, quam Jesu Christo confidere, et idcirco ex ejus præscripto vitam instituere. Socin. Justificat. Synop. 2. p. 17. Fides est fiducia per Deum in Christum, unde apparet, eam in Christo fidem duo comprehendere: unum, ut non solum Deo, verum et Christo confidamus: deinde ut Deo obtemperemus, &c. Catech. Racov. cap. 9. de fide Volkel. de vera Religione, lib. 4. cap. 3. p. 179, 180. Smalc. refut. Thes. Franz. disput. 4. p. 103. et. disp. 6. p. 184. Credere in Christum nihil aliud est; quam illi confidere, hoc est, ipsi, sub spe promissionum, ab eo nobis factarum, obedire, &c. Smalc. Refut. Thes. Franz. disp. 7. p. 209. Fides in Christum, est, fiduciam in eum collocare, et credere illum esse omnibus obtemperantibus sibi æternæ salutis causam. Si proprie et stricte sumatur ab obedientia differt. Sed per metonymiam quandam synechdochiam, sæpe tam late sumitur, ut omnia pietatis et justitiæ opera comprehendat. Schlichting. Comment. in cap. 11. ad Heb. p. 519. Quid est credere in nomen Christi? Res. eum excipere, ejus dictis fidem habere, ei confidere, ei denique obtemperare. Dialog. Anon. de Justifi. p. 4. Ex his quæ hactenus dicta sunt, satis intelligi potest, etiamsi verissimum sit, quemadmodum scriptura apertissime testatur, nos per mortem Christi, perque sanguinis ejus fusionem servatos esse, nostraque peccata deleta fuisse, non tantum hoc ipsum credere, esse eam fidem in Christum, qua, ut Sacræ literæ

docent, justificamur, id quod multi et olim putarunt, et hodie putant, adeoque similiter credunt: longe enim aliud est, istud credere, et sub spe vitæ æternæ ab ipso consequendæ, Christo obedire; quod necessario requiri ad jutificationem nostram, antea a nobis demonstratum est. Fragment. de Justifi. Faust. Socin. Opusc. p. 115.' That,

2. Faith in justifying is not to be considered as a hand whereby we lay hold on the righteousness of another, or as an instrument, as though righteousness were provided for us, and tendered unto us, which would overthrow all necessity of being righteous in ourselves.

'Patet quam inepte Meisnerus fidem vocet causam instrumentalem, qua justificationem (seu justitiam) apprehendamus, seu recipiamus; patet denique quam falso (qui error ex priore consequitur) fidem, quæ virtus aut opus est, justificare neget. Quid magis perversum, et Sacris literis adversum dici potuit? Parum nobis fuerat, omnes reliquas virtutes, et pia opera, a comparanda nobis salute excludere, nisi etiam ipsam in Deo fidem, virtutum omnium matrem et reginam, de suo solio deturbatam, tam fœda ignominia notasset fidem perverse prorsus intelligitis, non enim tanquam conditionem adipiscendæ justificationis consideratis, sed tanquam instrumentum vel manum, &c. Jo. Schlichting. disput. pro Faust. Socin. ad Meisner. p. 129—131. De eo quod homo justitiam accipiat, nihil legitur in Sacris Literis, et si id explicetur ex mente adversariorum, ridicula est fabula; fides vero non est accurate loquendo causa instrumentalis, sed causa sine qua non (efficiens) justificationis nostræ; Smal. Refut. Thes. Franz. disp. 4. p. 103.'

3. Nor yet doth faith, repentance, or obedience, procure our justification, or is the efficient or meritorious cause thereof.

'Ut autem cavendum est, ne ut hodie plerique; faciunt, vitæ sanctimoniam atque innocentiam, effectum justificationis nostræ coram Deo esse dicamus; sic diligenter cavere debemus, ne ipsam vitæ sanctitatem atque innocentiam, justificationem nostram coram Deo esse credamus, neve illam nostræ justificationis coram Deo causam efficientem, aut impulsivam esse affirmemus. Sed tantummodo, &c. Socin. Justifi. Synop. 2. p. 14. Fides justificationem non meretur, neque est ejus causa efficiens; non ignoramus fidei nostræ

nequaquam esse ea merita, quibus justificatio qua sempiterna continetur felicitas, tanquam merces debita, sit tribuenda. Hinc porro consequitur, fidem istam, quamvis obedientiam et pietatem in se comprehendat, nequaquam tamen per se, et principaliter efficere, ut justificationis beneficium consequamur. Volkel. de vera Relig. lib. 4. cap. 3. p. 181. Smal. Refut. Thes. Franz. disput. 4, 5. 7. obedientia nostra quam Christo præstamus, nec efficiens, nec meritoria causa est nostræ justificationis. Socin. Thes. de Justif. p. 17. vide Anonym. Dialog. de Justif. p. 32.'

4. But the true use of our faith and repentance, as to our justification before God, is, that they are the 'causa sine qua non,' or the condition whereby according to the appointment of God, we come to be justified, and so is imputed to us.

'Diligenter cavere debemus, ne vitæ sanctitatem et innocentiam, justificationem nostram coram Deo esse credamus, neve illam nostræ coram Deo justificationis causam efficientem, aut impulsivam esse affirmemus, sed tantummodo causam sine qua eam justificationem nobis non contingere decrevit Deus. Socin. Synop. Justif. 2. p. 14. Id a nobis revera exegit, ut in Christum credamus, vitam emendaremus (quam conditionem salva sanctitate et majestate sua non poterat non exigere). Crel. de Causis mort. Christi. p. 5. Interim tamen sic habendum est, cum Deus non nisi illis, qui fidem virtutemque pro sua virili parte colunt, vitam sempiternam designaverit, fiduciam istam ne quidem causam meritoriam, aut principaliter efficientem, sed causam sine qua non (ut loquuntur) justificationis nostræ esse. Volkel. de vera Relig. lib. 4. cap. 3. p. 181. Quod vero ad nos pertinet, non aliter reipsa justi coram Deo habemur, et delictorum nostrorum veniam ab ipso consequimur, quam si in Jes. Christ. credamus. Socin. Justif. Synop. 2. p. 11.

'Itaque nemo justificatus est coram Deo, nisi prius Christo confidat, eique obediat. Quæ obedientia sunt illa opera ex quibus nos justificari Jacobus Apostolus affirmat. Socin. Thes. de Justif. p. 14. Sunt enim opera nostra, id est, ut dictum fuit, obedientia, quam Christo præstamus, licet nec efficiens nec meritoria, tamen causa (ut vocant) sine qua non justificationis coram Deo, atque æternæ salutis nostræ, id ibid. imputatur nobis a Deo id quod revera in nobis est, non aliquid quod a nobis absit, vel in alio sit,

nempe quod firmiter in animo decreverimus nihil dubitantes de Dei promissionibus, neque considerantes nostram infirmitatem nos propositum fidei certamen decurrere velle. Anonym. Dialog. de Justifi. p. 29. (hæc vero corrigit Faustus Socin. Notæ in Dial. p. 64. beatitatem et remissionem peccatorum nobis imputari asserens). Certum est ex Sacris literis requiri ad hoc, ut quis consequatur apud Deum remissionem peccatorum, et ita corum Deo justificetur, ut de illo merito dici possit, quod pactum Dei servet. Fragment. de Justif. Apparet Paulum absolute intelligere opera quæcunque tandem illa sunt. Quod tamen non eam vim habet, ut a causa justificationis nostræ omnium quæcunque opera, et quocunque modo considerata, excludere velit. Sed sensus ipsius est, nulla esse opera quæ tanti sint, ut propter ipsorum meritum justificari possimus. Quando scilicet nemo est, qui perfectissime et integerrime per totam vitam, ea opera faciat, quæ sub Vetere sive sub Novo Testamento præscripta sunt, id quod tamen omnino requiritur, sive requiretur ad hoc, ut pro ipsa opera tanquam ejus rei aliquo modo meritoria, justificatio contingeret. Diximus autem aliquo modo meritoria, ut ab ipsis operibus excludamus, non modo absolutum et maxime proprium meritum, quod oritur ex ipsa operum præstantia per se considerata. Sed etiam illud, quod minus proprie et respective meritum est, quod ex solo Dei promisso oritur ac proficiscitur, adeo ut nemo nec per illud, neque per hoc meritum, suorum operum justificationem, et absolutionem a peccatis suis, adipiscatur, &c. vid. Plu. fragm. de Justificat. Faust. Socin. p. 110. Cum Paulus negat nos ex operibus justificari, considerat opera tanquam meritoria, et sua ipsorum vi hominem justificantia, et consequenter ejusmodi, quibus si ad Dei præceptum examinentur, nihil prorsus desit; at Jacobus operum nomine eam obedientiam intelligit; sine qua Deus hominem sibi carum habere non vult; seu mavis opera ejusmodi sine quibus dici nequeat, ulla ratione hominem Deo obedire: ex hac collatione ipsorum duorum Pauli et Jacobi locorum, et sententiarum, manifestum est, quemadmodum ad justificationem nostram non requiritur necessario perfecta obedientia mandatorum Dei, sic ad eandem justificationem omnino requiri, ut Dei mandata ita conservaremus, ut merito dici possit nos Deo obedientes esse. Fragm. Faust. p. 221.'

5. That our justification is our absolution from the guilt of sin, and freedom from obnoxiousness unto punishment for it, and nothing else. Our regeneration is the condition of our absolution, and in them both, in several respects is our righteousness.

'Justificatio est cum nos Deus pro justis habet, quod ea ratione facit, cum nobis et peccata remittit, et jus vitæ donat. Catech. Racov. cap. 11. de Justificat. Justificatio nihil aliud est, quam peccatorum remissio. Schlichting. contra Trinit. p. 147. Justificatio nostra coram Deo, ut uno verbo dicam, nihil aliud est quam a Deo pro justis haberi: hoc vero fit per absolutionem peccatorum. Socin. Synop. Justif. 2. p. 11. Justificatio nihil aliud est, quam pro justo habere, itemque peccata remittere et condonare. Id. p. 13, 14. Quæro primum quid sit Justificatio? R. Peccatorum absolutio. Anon. (ni fallor Ostorod) dial. de Justifi. p. 2. Hic tacite continetur ea sententia, quam nos supra ab initio attigimus, et non obscure refutavimus, justificationem, videl. a justo faciendo dici, et a justitia ac sanctitate qua quis sit præditus; cum tamen certissimum sit, justificationem in Sacris literis aliud nihil significare, quam justum pronuntiare, sive ut justum tractare. Faust. Socin. notæ in Dial. de Justif. p. 60. Sed manifestum est Paulum negare, non modo ex operibus legis, sed simpliciter, ex operibus nos justificari; itaque alia ratione omnino est hic nodus solvendus, et dicendum, Paulum, operum nomine non quælibet opera intelligere, nec quolibet modo accepto, sed quæ sua vi hominem justum coram Deo reddere possunt, cum negat nos ex operibus justificari, qualis est absoluta et perpetua per totum vitæ curriculum legis divinæ observatio. Faust. Socin. notæ in Dial. de Justif. p. 74.

'Formalis itaque (ut ita loquar) justificatio nostra coram Deo fuit, et semper erit, propter carnis nostræ infirmitatem, remissio peccatorum nostrorum, non autem impletio divinæ legis, quod Paulus operari vocat. Veruntamen nulli re ipsa conceditur ista remissio, nisi Deo confisus fuerit, seque ipsi regendum et gubernandum tradiderit. Faust. Socin. Epist. ad Virum Clariss. de Fide et Operibus.'

6. That the way whereby we come to obtain this absolution is this: Jesus Christ the only Son of God, being sent by him to reveal his love and grace to lost sinful man-

kind, in that work yielding obedience unto God even unto death, was for a reward of that obedience exalted, and had divine authority over them for whom he died committed to him, to pardon and save them, which accordingly he doth, upon the performance of the condition of faith and obedience by him prescribed to them, at once effecting a universal conditional application of all: actually justifying every individual upon the performance of the condition.

'Ipsi Jesu, tantam in cœlo et terra, tanquam obedientiæ scilicet usque ad mortem crucis insigne præmium, potestatem dedit, ut eis, &c. Socin. Synop. Justific. 1. p. 4. Interea tamen haudquaquam negamus, Christi mortem, conditionem quandam fuisse remissionis peccatorum nobis concedendæ: quatenus conditio fuit Christo imposita, sine qua potestatem obtinere ex Dei decreto non potuit, peccata nobis remittendi, et nos ab æterno interitu vindicandi. Crel. de Caus. mort. Christ. p. 8. (Paulus ea a fide opera removet, quæ perpetuam perfectissimamque, per omnem vitæ cursum obedientiam continent. Jacobus ergo ea intelligit. Volkel de vera Relig. lib. 4. cap. 3. p. 180. ad 461.) vide plura.

'Quia nos Christus ab æterna morte liberavit, et ut nos liberare posset, mortuus est, jure dicitur eum pro nobis, et pro peccatis nostris mortuum esse, et sanguinem ipsius nos emundare a peccatis: neque enim nos dicimus, Christum ob hoc vel solum vel principale obedivisse, ut nos ad se imitandum extimularet, sed constantissime affirmamus, illum ideo parti suo obedientem, et pro nobis mortuum fuisse, ut potestatem divinam, interveniente morte sua, consecutus, salutem nostram administrare, et tandem reipsa perficere posset. Smal. Refut. Thes. Fran. disp. 4. p. 108. Quamvis autem certissimum ac testatissimum sit, Jesum Christum Dei filium sanguinem suum in remissionem peccatorum nostrorum fudisse: Tamen ipsa mors Christi per se sine Resurrectione, &c. Socin. Thes. de Justific. Thes. 3. vid. Fragm. de Justificat. p. 115.'

7. That as to good works, and their place in this business, Paul speaks of the perfect works of the law, and legal manner of justifying, which leave no place for grace or pardon: James of gospel works of new obedience, which leave place for both.

'Sola fides justificat, at non quatenus sola, præsertim si de plena et permanente justificatione loquamur, quatenus quibusvis bonis operibus opponitur. Hoc est particula exclusiva sola, non quævis opera, sed opera de quibus Apostolus loquitur, opera legis, opera plena, ob quæ non secundum gratiam justificatio imputatur, sed secundum debitum tribuitur, excludit. Non excludit autem ullo pacto opera ex fide provenientia, cum Jacobus expertissime doceat, hominem justificari ex operibus, non ex fide tantum: Schlichting. ad Meisner. disput. pro Socin. pp. 290, 291. In iis locis, ubi Apostolus fidem operibus opponit, de operibus ejusmodi agit, quæ et perfectam et perpetuam obedientiam continent, qualem sub lege Deus ab hominibus requirebat: verum non de iis operibus, quæ obedientiam, quam Deus a nobis qui in Christum credidimus, requirat, comprehendunt. Racov. Catech. cap. 9. de Fide. Hinc jam demum intelligo non bona opera, quæ Deus ipse præparavit, sed legis opera a justificatione nostra excludi. Anonym. Dial. de Justif. p. 47.'

8. That the denial of our faith and obedience to be the condition of our justification, or the asserting that we are justified by the obedience of Christ imputed to us, is the ready way to overthrow all obedience, and drive all holiness and righteousness out of the world.

'Quod Christus factus sit nobis a Deo justitia. 1 Cor. i. 3. id minime eo sensu dici, quasi loco nostri legem impleverit, sic ut nobis deinceps ipsius justitia imputetur, &c. Schlichting. ad Meisn. disput. pro Socin. p. 277. Tertius error est, Deum imputare credentibus innocentiam et justitiam Christi. Non innocentiam, non justitiam Christi Deus imputat credentibus, sed fidem illorum illis imputat pro justitia. Smal. refut. Thes. Franz. disput. 4. p. 104. alterum est extremum, quod vulgo receptum est, non sine summa animarum pernicie; videlicet, ad justificationem nostram nihil prorsus bona opera pertinere, nisi quatenus sunt ipsius justificationis effecta. Ubi qui ita sentiunt, &c. idem.'

9. That as the beginning, so the continuance of our justification, depends on the condition of our faith, repentance, and obedience, which are not fruits consequent of it; but conditions antecedent to it. Socin. Thes. de Justificat. p. 18. Fragmenta de Justific. p. 113. And therefore in the first place we are to be solicitous about what is within us, about our

sanctification, before our absolution or justification. Socin. Epist. ad Ch. MN. de Fide et Operibus. 'Sic tandem apparet vestigationem nostram circa ea esse debere, quæ in nobis invenientur, cum justificati sumus.—Quocirca diligenter primum vestigare debemus an res istæ, sive utraque, sive una tantum, et utra (si modo res diversæ sint) ad nos justificandos pertineat, ac deinde quid sint, aut quales esse debeant, ne erremus, nobisque videamur illas habere, cum tamen longe ab eis absimus. Quod enim ad misericordiam Dei attinet, Christique personam, una cum iis omnibus quæ idem Christus pro nobis fecit, et facturus est, quamvis hæ sunt veræ, et præcipuæ causæ justificationis nostræ, tamen aut jam illarum sumus, erimusve participes, antequam intra nos certum aliquid sit, et sic supervacaneum est de illis cogitare, quatenus per ea justificari velimus: aut illarum, nec jam sumus, nec futuri erimus participes, nisi prius intra nos certum aliquid sit, et sic de hoc accurate quærere debemus, id autem nihil est, præter fidem et opera. Socin.'

10. As to the death of Christ, our sins were the impulsive cause of it, and it was undergone for the forgiveness of sins, and occasioned by them only, and is in some sense, the condition of our forgiveness.

'Causa impulsiva externa sunt peccata nostra, quod itidem aperte sacræ literæ docent, dum aiunt, Christum propter peccata nostra percussum, vulneratum, et traditum esse. Crel. de Caus. mort. Chris. p. 2.'

'Q. What was the procuring cause of Christ's death?

'A. He was delivered for offences;' Biddle's Cat. chap. 12. p. 69. Though some (not of them) say, that his death was rather occasioned, than merited by sin; as they speak sometimes. 'Finis ideo mortis Christi, ut Sacræ Literæ sat aperte docent, est remissio peccatorum nostrorum, et vitæ nostræ emendatio, ad quorum finem priorem vel solum, vel potissimum, illi loquendi modi referendi sunt: cum dicitur Christum mortuum esse pro peccatis nostris, seu pro nobis. Crel. de Caus. mort. Christ. p. 1.'

11. That absolution and pardon of sin are by no means the immediate effects of the death of Christ.

'Cum Sacræ Scripturæ asserunt Christum aut pro peccatis nostris, aut pro nobis esse mortuum, aut sanguinem ejus esse effusum in remissionem peccatorum, et siqua sint

his similia, eorum verborum ea vis non est, ut significent omnino effectum illum, qui morti Christi in his locutionibus tribuitur, proxime fuisse ex ea consecutos. Crell. de Caus. mort. Christi. p. 35.'

And now let the Christian reader judge, whether I had any just occasion for the expressions above-mentioned or no; if he be resolved that those words had better been omitted, I shall only profess myself in a very great readiness to pass by such mistakes in others, but leave myself to his censure.

And with this touch by the way am I (as far as I have observed) dismissed to the eighth chapter; where all that I am concerned in will receive an equally speedy despatch.

In the entrance of that chapter, Mr. B. lays down two propositions that he rejects, and another that he intends to prove.

Those he rejects were before mentioned, and my concernment in them spoken to.

That which he proposes unto confirmation, is,

'The justification by faith, so called in the Scripture, is not the knowledge or feeling of justification before given, or a justification in and by our own conscience, or terminated in conscience; but is somewhat that goes before all such justification as this is, and is indeed a justification before God.'

There is but one expression in all this proposition that I am concerned in; which the reader may easily discover to be plucked into the *thesis* by head and ears; and that is, 'terminated in conscience.' What it is I intend by that expression, or what inconsistency it hath with that Mr. B. asserts in pretended opposition unto it, he doth not explain. Now I say, that in the sense, wherein I affirm that justification is terminated in conscience, I may yet also affirm, and that suitably to the utmost intention of mine in that expression, that justification by faith is not a knowledge or feeling of justification before given, nor a justification in, or by our own consciences; but somewhat that goes before all such justification as this is, and is a justification before God. I am then utterly unconcerned in all Mr. B.'s arguments ensuing, but only those that prove and evince that our justification before God is not terminated in our con-

sciences: which when I can find them out, I will do my endeavour to answer them, or renounce my opinion. I find, indeed, in some of his following conclusions the words mentioned; but I suppose he thought not himself that they were any way influenced from his premises. I know he will not ask, what I mean then 'by terminated in conscience;' seeing it would not be honourable for him to have answered a matter before he understood it. But upon this expression chiefly is it, that I am enrolled into the troop of Antinomians.

——'Ο δὲ ὁρῶν τοὺς νόμους
Λίαν ἀκριβῶς συκοφάντης φαίνεται.

But that is in the matter of laws; these are but words. Now though I have just cause to abstain from calling in associates in my judgment, lest I should bring them under the suspicion of Antinomianism; though not of the ruder sort, p. 190. or at least of laying the foundation of antinomianism, which Mr. Burgess after all his pains against them, is said to do; (Præf.) but the best is, that he does it superficially and without proof; (Præf.) And although I cannot come up to the judgment of the man, whom I shall name; yet, being he is deservedly of good esteem in the judgment of others, and particularly of Mr. B. for his opposition to the Antinomians, I will for once make use of his authority for my shield in this business; and see if in this storm I can lie safe behind it. It is Mr. Rutherford, who in his learned exercitations, De gratia. Exercit. 1. cap. 2. Tit. 'Quomodo justificamur fide;' having treated of the matter of justification, p. 44. thus proceeds: 'Dicent ergo Arminiani, nos hic justificationem sumere pro sensu et notitia justificationis: ideoque homines fide justificantur, idem valet, ac homines tum demum justificantur, quando credunt, hoc est, sentiunt se justificari, cum antea essent justificati. Nugæ et tricæ siculæ! nam justificari est plus quam sentire se justificari: nam (1.) est actus Dei absolventis terminatus in cónscientia hominis, citati et tracti ad tribunale tremendi judicis; qui actus ante hoc instans non terminabatur in conscientia,' &c. Now if this man be an Antinomian, I am sure he much mistakes himself; and yet he says justification may be terminated in conscience, and yet not be a sense of an antecedent justification, nor from eternity.

But how it may fare with him, I cannot guess; Mr.

Pemble and Dr. Twiss *(quanta nomina)*, are in the next page recounted as the assertors of the position here opposed by Mr. B. and indeed as to some part of it they are; but yet, if I durst say it, they were not Antinomians: but Mr. B. knows these things better than I.

But what say I to the whole position? p. 190. 'One learned man (so am I called, that the sacrifice may not fall without some flowers on its head; which I professedly shake off, and dare not own my name amongst them who are or ought to be so styled) saith, that absolution in heaven, and justification differ as part and whole, and that justification is terminated in conscience, and so makes a longer work of justification than they, that say it is *simul* and *semel*, or than I, whom Mr. Cr. blames for it; and so that whole begun in eternal absolution, or from Christ's death, and ended in conscience, should contain eminent and transient acts together, and no small number of our own, as there described.'

Ans. Though I do not perfectly understand the coherence of these words, yet the intendment of them being more obvious (and being myself in great haste), I shall not stay to make any farther inquiry thereabout.

What I mean by absolution in heaven, the reader if he please may see, chap. xii. pp. 75—78. [pp.633—635.) of that treatise, whence Mr. B. urges these expressions. It is neither eternal absolution, nor absolution from Christ's death (if *from* denote a simulty of time, and not a connexion in respect of causality, in which sense Mr. B. will not deny that absolution is from Christ's death), but an absolution at the time of actual justification, when God gives Christ to us, and with him all things, that I intend.

That by asserting this absolution in heaven, and justification to differ as part and whole, and justification to be terminated in conscience, I make longer work of it, than those, who say it is *simul* and *semel*, is said; *simul* and *semel*, refer unto time, I expressly affirm, as Mr. B. knows (or ought to have known), that there is in these things an order of nature only. At the same time wherein God absolves us in heaven, the term of the stipulation for our deliverance being accomplished, by reckoning Christ to us, or in making him righteousness to us, he infuses a principle of life into our

souls, whereby radically, and virtually the whole is accomplished.

That actual justification should contain permanent and transient acts together, and that it is so by me described, is affirmed by a failure of Mr. B.'s memory. Having made this entrance and progress, adding the judgment of some, whom he calls most learned and judicious (as he is 'perspicax ingeniorum arbiter'); he concludes his first section in these words: 'so that howsoever some by plausible words would put a better face on it, the sense of all seems to be the same, that justification by faith is the revelation of God in, and by the conscience, that we are formerly justified; and so their justification by faith, is the same that we commonly call the assurance or knowledge of our justification, in some degrees at least, I prove the contrary:' and so falls he into his arguments.

That this is my sense, I profess I knew not before; and should be sorry I should dwell so little at home, that Mr. B. should know me, and my mind, better than I do myself. I look upon him as my friend: and,

Τὰ τῶν φίλων κοινὰ, οὐ μόνον τὰ χρήματα,
Καὶ νοῦς δὲ, καὶ φρονήσεως κοινωνία.

But yet he may possibly be mistaken; for the present I will make bold to deny this to be my sense, and refer the reader for evidence to be given to my negation, unto that chapter of my book, whence Mr. B. gathers my sense and meaning. Let them then that are concerned look to his following arguments (especially those two whom he affirms to have more wit than the rest, p. 204.) and woe be to them, if they find as many distinct mediums as there are figures hung up as signs of new arguments. For my own part, whatever my thoughts are to the whole business pleaded about, I shall not (be they as mean and base as can be imagined), cast them away in such a scambling chase as this. Only whereas p. 205. speaking to somebody (I know not whom), whom he acknowledges to have some learning and wit, he says, 'that the act of the promise, law, or grant, constituting right, giving title, remitting the obligation to punishment, in itself, is totally distinct from the act of declaring this to ourselves, which is said to be terminated in conscience, and is before it, and may be without it,' &c. I shall, if it please him,

desire that it may only with a little alteration be thus rendered; The act of the promise (not that I approve that expression, but at present it will serve the turn) giving right &c. is complete justification by faith, and is in itself totally distinct from, and in order of time before any act of God justifying terminated in our consciences, and proved with one clear testimony or argument speaking to the terms and sense of the proposition, and I shall confess myself, as to what I have as yet published of my judgment about this business, to be concerned in the discourse; and so passing through the pikes of fifty-six arguments, I come to the ninth chapter, where I am again called to an account. Three things doth Mr. B. propose to confirmation in this chapter.

'1. That the elect are not justified from eternity.

'2. That they are not justified at Christ's death.

'3. Not while they are infidels and impenitent.'

Any man living would wonder how I should come to stand in his way in this chapter. But strong currents sometimes pass their bounds in their courses, and bear all before them. Real, or reputed success gives great thoughts and pretexts for any thing, *αἱ γὰρ εὐπραξίαι δειναὶ συγκρύψαι καὶ συσκιάσαι τοιαῦτα ὀνείδη* (Demost. Olymp). In the very treatise which Mr. B. considers in these imputations, I have expressly denied, (and in particular to Mr. B.) that I maintain any one of these; if he should send but his servant, and tell me, that he is not to be found in such an opinion, I would believe him. But 'quid verba audiat facta cum videat?' If I do maintain them indeed, must I be believed upon my denial? but, 'en tabulas!' let my book traduced be consulted. I dispute as well as I can against justification from eternity; and that I cannot do it like Mr. B. is my unhappiness, not my crime; I hope every one must not be sentenced to be of an opinion which he cannot confute so learnedly, as another more learned man may. For justification at the death of Christ (though I must assure the reader, that I have other thoughts of the great transaction of the business of our salvation in the person of our representative, than are consistent with Mr. B.'s principles, or than I have yet published, wherein I have the consent of persons as eminently insighted in the mystery of the gospel, as any I know in the world), I directly affirm, and endeavour to prove, that the elect are not

then actually justified; but notwithstanding what is done for them, until their own actual believing, they are obnoxious to the law, &c. as at large chap. xii. p. 75. [p. 631.] of that treatise, which includes the last particular also.

But we must proceed, 'non qua eundum est sed qua itur;' in the entrance of his ninth chapter, Mr. B. attempts to prove, that the elect are not justified from eternity, and concludes his discourse: 'The words of one that writes this way are these. Here two things may be observed.

1. 'What we ascribe to the merit of Christ, viz. the accomplishment of the condition, which God required to make way, that the obligation which he had freely put upon himself might be in actual force: and so much I leave to himself to consider how rightly doth Mr. B. assign to our works; *Thes.* 26.

'And all know, that a condition as such, is no cause, but an antecedent, or 'causa sine qua non.' And is not the death of Christ here fairly advanced, and his merits well vindicated? My constant affirmation is, and still was, that man's works are not in the least degree truly and properly meritorious, and that they are such mere conditions of our salvation (not of our first justification), as that they are no causes of any right we have (no not to a bit of bread, much less) to heaven. Do not these men well defend the honour of Christ's merits then, if they give no more to them, than I do to man's works? that is, not to be the meritorious cause so much as of an hour's temporal mercy; that is, to be properly no merit at all. It seems to me therefore that they do by their doctrine of eternal justification or pardon, not only destroy justification by faith, but also all the merits of Christ, and leave nothing for them to do, for the causing of our pardon or justification before God. Nay, whether this learned man can make Christ's sufferings, and obedience, so much as a bare condition, let them consider that read him affirming, that conditions properly must be uncertain, and nothing is so to God: therefore there can be no condition with God, therefore Christ's death could be no more.'

En cor Zenodoti, en jecur Cratetis.

What is most admirable in this discourse I know not.

1. I am suggested to maintain justification from eternity: I amone that write that way: I am one that by the doctrine

of justification from eternity, overthrow justification by faith, and the merits of Christ. What I shall say more to this business I know not: the comœdian tells me all that I can say is in vain.

> Ne admittam culpam ego meo sum promus pectori
> Suspicio est in pectore alieno sita.
> Nam nunc ego te si surripuisse suspicer
> Jovi coronam de capite e capitolio
> Quod in culmine astat summo; si non id feceris.
> Atque id tamen mihi lubeat suspicarer,
> Qui tu id prohibere me potes ne suspicer? Plaut.

2. Methinks it had been equal, that Mr. B. who requires (δεινῶς) that men judge not any thing in his aphorisms, but according as it is interpreted, in this his confession, should have interpreted this passage of mine, by the analogy of what I have written in the same book about the death of Christ and merit thereof. He would have found (and in these things doth my soul live) that all the mercy, grace, or privileges whatever, of what sort soever, that in this life we are made partakers of, all the glory, honour, and immortality that we are begotten anew to a hope of, is by me every where ascribed to the death of Christ, and the merit thereof, as the sole *causa* προκαταρτικὴ of them all. The making out of this takes up the greatest part of my writings and preaching. I can truly say, that I desire to know nothing but Christ, and him crucified. And I shall labour to make the honour, glory, exaltation, and triumph of the cross of Christ, the whole of my aim and business in this world. May I be convinced of speaking, uttering, writing, any one word to the derogation of the honour, efficacy, power of the death and merits of our dear Lord Jesus, I shall quickly lay my mouth in the dust, and give myself to be trampled on by the feet of men, which perhaps on other accounts I am only meet for. It is only that Christ may have the pre-eminence in all things, that I will voluntarily contend with any living. That as a king, and priest, and prophet, he may be only, and all in his church, is the design of my contesting.

But is not this expression to the derogation of his merits? I say if it be, I disavow it, condemn it, reject it. If the intendment of the expression be not, that the Lord Jesus Christ, by the performance of what was prescribed to him of his Father, that he might save us to the utmost, according

to the compact between Father and Son, did merit, purchase, and procure for us all the grace, mercy, salvation, promised in the new covenant, I desire here to condemn it. But if that be the sense of it (as the words immediately going before, with the whole tenor of the discourse, do undeniably evince), I would desire Mr. B. a little to reflect upon his dealings with other men, upon their pretended mistakes, in representing him and his judgment to the world. All the advantage that is given to this harangue is from the ambiguity of the word condition. It is evident that I take it here in a large sense for the whole prescription of obedience unto the Lord Jesus, whereupon the promise of all the good things, that are the fruits of his death, is made to him, which being grounded in voluntary compact, and laid thereby in due proportion, gives rise to merit properly and strictly so called. If the reader desire farther satisfaction herein, let him but read that very treatise which Mr. B. excepts against, where he will find abundantly enough for the clearing of my intendment. Or to him, that loses his time in perusing this appendix, I shall recommend the foregoing treatise, for the same purpose.

3. For what Mr. B. ascribes to our works, I shall not (for my part) much trouble myself whilst I live, being little or not at all concerned therein. He is not for me to deal with.

Τίκτει τοὶ κόρος ὕβριν ὁτ' ὃν πολὺ ὄλβος ἕπηται. Theog.

If I dispute in print any more (as I hope I shall not), it shall be with them, that understanding my meaning, will fairly, closely, and distinctly debate the thing in difference, and not insisting on words and expressions to no purpose (especially if their own haste allows them not oftentimes to speak congruously) shall press and drive the things themselves to their issue.

——Dabitur ignis tamenetsi ab inimicis petam.

Mr. B. proceeds in his second section to prove, that all the elect are not justified at the death of Christ. In this passage one expression of mine, about the sense of Rom. iv. 5. is taken notice of; but that relates to a business of a greater importance than to be now mentioned. Something Mr. B. discourses about the state and condition of the elect in reference to the death of Christ: some texts to that pur-

pose he considers; but so jejunely, so much below the majesty of the mystery of grace in this particular, that I shall not make his discourse an occasion of what may be offered on that account. Something I have spoken in the former treatise, concerning the transaction of the compact and agreement, that was between the Father and Son, about the salvation of the elect. Of their interest and concernment therein, with the state of his body, of those that were given him, on that account, God assisting, hereafter.

But, p. 228. from words of mine, which from several places of my treatise are put together, he makes sundry inferences, and opposes to them all two conclusions of his own, p. 229.

'This man (says he) seems to judge, that the name of complete justification is proper to that in conscience, and not to be given to any before: he seems also to judge, that justification hath degrees and parts at many hundred or thousand years distanced one from another; or else absolution at least hath, which we have hitherto taken for the same thing with justification: for he calls that in conscience complete justification: so saith he, absolution in heaven and justification differ as part and whole;' so he:

'Egregie Cordatus homo Catus Eliu' Sextus!'

It seems Mr. B. knows not what my judgment is, by his repeating, that, 'it seems this is his judgment;' he might have staid from his confutation of it, until he had known it: it is not for his honour that he hath done otherwise.

I deny that it is my judgment, that the name of complete justification is proper to that in conscience. Nor do I know of any proper or complete justification in conscience; I only said, complete justification is terminated in conscience. If Mr. B. know not what I mean thereby, let him stay a little, and I shall explain myself.

It is most false, that I judge justification to have degrees and parts at a hundred or thousand years distance; unless under the name of justification you comprise all the causes and effects of it, and then it reaches from everlasting to everlasting.

That absolution in heaven (as I call it) is before our actual believing in order of time, I have nowhere said, but

only in order of nature; and that Mr. B. hath not disproved.

What Mr. B. thinks of absolution and justification to be the same, is no rule to us; when he proves it, so it is: but to what I and others have said, Mr. B. opposes two conclusions, p. 229. whereof the first is,

'1. We did neither really, nor in God's account die with Christ when he died, nor in him satisfy God's justice, nor fulfil the law.' The second,

'2. Though Christ was given for the elect more than for others, yet is he no more given to them than to others; before they are born, or before they have faith.'

The first of these, he saith, (he means the first of them before-mentioned, which the first of these is set down in opposition unto), is of so great 'moment, and is the heart and root of so many errors, yea of the whole body of antinomianism, that I had rather write as great a volume as this,' &c.

What it is that I intended by dying with Christ, Mr. Baxter does not know, nor guess near the matter. The consideration of God's giving the elect to Christ, of his constitution to be a common person, a Mediator and surety, of the whole compact and covenant between Father and Son, of his absolution as a common person, of the sealing, confirmation, and the establishment of the covenant of grace by his death, of the economy of the Holy Spirit founded therein, of the whole grant made upon his ascension, must precede the full and clear interpretation of that expression. For the present it may suffice; I have not said that we did satisfy God's justice in him, or satisfy the law in him, so that we should be (personally considered), the principals of the satisfaction or obedience; nor that we so died in him, as to be justified, or absolved actually upon his death, before we are born; so that I shall not be concerned at all if Mr. Baxter's thoughts should incline him to write a volume as big as this, about his confession, which is no small content tome.

For the second; 'that Christ was given to the elect more than others,' I say not; because I say, that he was not given, as a Mediator, price, and ransom, for any other at all. When

the demonstrations that 'Christ died for all,' which Mr. Baxter hath somewhile talked of, are published, I may perhaps find cause (if I see them) to change my mind: but as yet I do not suppose that I shall so do. That he is given to any before they are born, I have not said; though they are given to him before they are born; or that he is given to them in order of time before they do believe; but this I say, that faith and forgiveness of sin is given them for his sake: which, when Mr. Baxter disproves, or pretends so to do, I shall farther consider it, as being a matter of importance: with his strife of words (if I can choose) I shall no more trouble myself.

This process being made; sect. 3. Mr. Baxter lays down the conclusion as contrary to them before, which (as he informs me), are maintained by myself and others.

'No man now living, was justified, pardoned, or absolved actually from the guilt of sin and obligation to death at the time of Christ's death or undertaking, or from eternity, or at any time before he was born, or did believe.'

After I know not how many arguments brought forth to confirm this position, my arguments against it are produced and answered; but what the learned man means I profess I know not: unless 'disputandi prurigine abreptus,' he cares not what he says, nor against whom, so he may multiply arguments and answers, and put forth books one upon another. In that very book of mine which he animadverts upon, I use sundry of those very arguments, which here he useth, to prove the same assertion for the substance of it, as Mr. Baxter hath here laid down. And this I had assured him, as to a former mistake of his. My words are, p. 33. [p. 599.] 'as for evangelical justification, whereby a sinner is completely justified, that it should precede believing, I have not only not asserted, but positively denied, and disproved by many arguments: to be now traduced as a patron of that opinion, and my reasons for it publicly answered, seems to me somewhat uncouth.' Farther now to acquit myself from that, which nothing but self-fulness, oscitancy, and contempt of others, can possibly administer any suspicion of, I shall not turn aside.

Yea, but I have said, 'that the elect upon the death of Christ, have a right to all the fruit of the death of Christ, to

be enjoyed in the appointed season;' because this is made the occasion of so many outcries of Antinomianism, and I know not what, I shall direct the reader to what I have affirmed in this case, and leave it with some brief observations to his judgment, having somewhat else to do, than to engage myself in a long wordy contest with Mr. Baxter; who knowing not of any difference between himself and me would very fain make one, wherein he may possibly find his labour prevented hereafter, and a real difference stated between us, if any of his rare notions fall in my way.

The discourse is, p. 69. lin. 23. unto p. 72. lin. 24.

The sum of all is this; upon the death of Christ, that is, on the consideration of the death of Christ; upon his undertaking (for surely I suppose it will be granted, that his death was no less effectual upon his undertaking to them who died before his incarnation, than afterward upon his actual accomplishment of that undertaking) to be a Mediator and Redeemer, it becomes just, right, and equal, that all the good things which are the fruits of his death should be in a due and appointed season made out to them for whom he died, in their several generations.

What says Mr. Baxter to this? 1. Suppose this be so, yet they are not actually absolved, but only have a right to it; who said they were? do I offer to make any such conclusion? do I dispute against Mr. Baxter's position, or for justification upon, or at the death of Christ, or his undertaking? 'homini homo quid interest?'

But I say, there being such a right to these good things, they have a right to them. 'Crimen inauditum Caie-Cæsar!' Did I not also say how I understood that expression? though I used it to make out the thing I intended, yet did I not say directly, that that right was not subjectively in them; that is, that it was not actionable as I expressed it; that they could not plead it; but it was as above? Yea, but then this is no more but *non injustum est* this is false, as I have shewed. Many divines think, that this was the estate between God and sinners antecedently to the consideration of the death of Christ, or might have been without it, viz. that it was not unjust with God to pardon and save them: by the death of Christ there is a *jus* of another nature obtained; even such as I have described in the treatise

Mr. Baxter opposeth: but then God doth not give those good things to us upon condition; I say he doth not, taking condition in its strict and proper sense in respect of God; though he hath made one thing to be the condition of another. All graces are alike absolutely purchased for us; but not alike absolutely received by us: the economy of the gospel requires another order: the first grace, Mr. Baxter confesseth, is bestowed upon us absolutely, and without condition; and this grace is the condition of the following privileges, as to the order of communication: and all the difference between us is about the sense of the word condition in that place, which, when I have nothing else to do, I will write a volume as big as this is about.

This is that I say, Christ hath purchased all good things for us; these things are actually to be conferred upon us in the time and order by God's sovereign will determined and disposed. This order, as revealed in the gospel, is, that we believe and be justified, &c. Faith whereby we believe is bestowed on us absolutely, always without condition, sometimes without outward means. This faith, by the constitution of God, is attended with the privileges contended about; which are no less purchased for us by Christ, than faith itself. Yea, the purchase of our justification or acceptation with God, is, in order of nature, antecedent in consideration to the purchase of faith for us: if Mr. Baxter hath a mind to oppose any thing of this (which is all that as yet to this business I have declared), let him do it when he pleaseth; and if it be *tantidem* (as he speaketh), I shall give him a farther account of my thoughts about it: but he would know what I mean by Christ's undertaking for the elect; let him consider what I have delivered about the covenant between the Father and Son in this business, and he will know at least what I intend thereby; he will see how Christ, being then only God, did undertake the business to do it, not as God only; and withal the wideness of that exception, that the prophecy of Isaiah was written a long time after, and could not give any such right as is pretended. A right is given there in respect of manifestation, not constitution. Isaiah, in that prophecy, speaks of things to come as past, ver. 5, 6. and of things past and present, as to come; it reveals, not constitutes, a covenant. But he saith, we use to distinguish be-

tween the undertaking and accomplishment: divines use to say, that upon man's fall Christ undertook satisfaction, but it was in the fulness of time that he accomplished it; how, therefore, he accomplished it in the undertaking, I do not well see. 2. But that he did perfectly accomplish what he undertook I easily grant. But how you learned divines distinguish I know not: this I know, that such poor men as myself do believe, that, as to the efficacy of satisfaction and merit, Christ's undertaking was attended with no less than his actual accomplishment of what he undertook; or we know not how to grant salvation to the saints under the Old Testament: it was concerning their efficacy as to merit, not their distinction between themselves, that I spake.

These things being premised, Mr. B. proceeds to answer my arguments, which were produced to prove, that upon the death of Christ, there was a right obtained for the elect to all the benefits of his death; this right residing in the justice of God, or in the equalling of these things by divine constitution (as I fully declared in the place by Mr. B. opposed): upon the interposing of some expressions in the process of my discourse, of the grant being made to the elect, and mentioning of their right, which in what sense they were to be taken I expressly declared, Mr. B. takes advantage to answer them all with this intendment put upon them, that they aimed to prove a subjective personal right, which at any time they may plead, when the utmost that my words can be extended unto is, that they have it *ex fœdere* not *realiter;* for the subject of it, I place elsewhere. Now if Mr. B. will send me word, that he supposes he hath answered my arguments, as they were proposed to my own purpose, I will promise, if I live, to return him an answer. In the mean time I shall have no itch to be scribbling to no purpose; 'ego me, tua causa, ne erres, non rupturus sum;' yet of the whole he may for the present be pleased to receive the ensuing account, both as to the nature of a *jus* and its application.

For the description of *jus*, Mr. B. relies on Grotius, and something also he mentions out of Sayrus. Grotius, in the first chapter of his book 'De jure Belli et Pacis,' in the sections transcribed (in part) by Mr. B. and some others, expresses (in his way) the distinction given at the beginning

both of the Institutions and Digests about *jus* and those also which they handle under the head 'de statu.' So do all men commonly that write of that subject; how exactly this is done by Grotius, those who are learned in the law will judge; for my part, I am so far at liberty, as not to be concluded by his bare affirmation either as to law or gospel. Yet neither doth he exclude the right by me intended; he tells us, indeed, that *facultas*, which the lawyers call *sui* is that which properly and strictly he intends to call *jus*. But the other member of the distinction he terms *aptitudo*, which though in a natural sense it respects the subject immediately, yet he tells you, that in the sense of Michael Ephesius, which he contradicts not, it is but τὸ πρέπον, 'id quod convenit,' which respects only the order of things among themselves. And though out of Aristotle he calls it also ἀξιά, yet that word (as he also afterward expounds it out of Cicero) is of much a lower signification than many imagine. This τὸ πρέπον, is that which I assert; and Sayrus's definition of *jus ad rem* may also be allowed.

But for others; *jus*, artificially is, *ars boni et æqui*; Ponz. de lamiis num. 14. Tom. 11. jus Gregor. p. 2. and D. D. cap. 1. Celsus. though some dispute against this definition, as Conanus, Comment. Jur. Civil. lib. 1. cap. 1. That which is *æquum* is the subject of it. So the Comedian, 'quid cum illis agat, qui neque jus, neque bonum, neque æquum sciunt.' Terent. Heauton. all termes æquipollent. And in this sense, one that is not born may have a *jus*, if it be in a thing that is profitable to him; 'quod dicimus eum qui nasci speratur pro superstite esse, tunc verum est, cum de ipsius jure quæritur, alias non prodest, nisi natus sit.' Paulus de verbor. significat. which one interpretation will overbear with me a hundred modern exceptioners, if they should deny that a man may be said to have a right unless he himself be the immediate subject of the right, as if it were a natural accident inherent in him: so is it in the case proposed by Cicero, in Secundo de Inventione. 'Pater-familias cum liberorum nihil haberet, uxorem autem haberet, in Testamento ita scripsit. Si mihi filius genitus fuerit unus, pluresve, hic mihi hæres esto.' The father dies before the son is born; a right accrues to him that is not born. Such a right I say there is, although this right is not immediately

actionable. Gaius tells us, that 'actio est prosecutio juris sui.' This *jus suum*, is that which Grotius calls *facultas*, and is *jus proprie et stricte dictum*. And this *jus suum* I did not intend, in that I said it was not actionable; and, therefore, whereas Conanus says, that 'nullum est jus, cui non sit aut a natura, aut a lege data quædam obligatio, tanquam comes et adjutrix,' Comment. juris Civil. lib. 2. cap. 1. which obligation is the foundation of action: it is evident, that he intends *jus proprie et stricte dictum;* for Gaius distinguisheth between *jus utendi, fruendi*, and *jus obligationis*, D. lib. 1. 1. 8. which he could not do, if all and every right had an obligation attending it. And such is that right whereof we speak; if any one thinks to plead it, he will be like him whom the lawyers call, 'agentem sine actione,' of whom they dispute, 'an liceat ei experiri,' and whether his plea be to be admitted; concerning which the variety of cases and opinions are repeated by Menochius de Arbit. Judic. lib. 1. Qu. 16. 2.

And such a *jus* as this, ariseth 'ex contractibus innominatis; for as 'jus ex innominato contractu oritur, quum ex parte debentis, implere id quod convenerat, impletum est,' Ludovic. Roman. Consul. 86. p. 23. so 'ex contractu innominato, non transeunt actiones sine mandato,' as Bartholus tells us; for though the covenant between Father and Son, whence this right ariseth, be not in itself of the nature of a 'contractus innominatus, do ut des,' yet to them it is of that import. Hence the Socinians, who are skilled in the law, though they wholly suspend the actual obtaining of remission of sins upon the fulfilling of the conditions required, do yet grant, that a plenary *jus* or right of obtaining forgiveness of sins was given to all in the death of Christ; 'jam vero quidnam mediator fœderis, ab una paciscentium parte legatus, et ipsius sponsor constitutus, ac quoddam veluti testamentum ejus nomine constituens, qua talis est, aliud præstat, quam ut jus alteri parti, et jus quidem plenum largiatur, ad fœderis hujus, aut testamenti promissa consequenda; obstringit nimirum atque obligat promissorem qui ipsum obligaverat ad servanda fœderum promissa, eaque rata prorsus habenda.' Crellius de causis mortis Christi, p. 9. So, in the common speech of the ancients, Budæus tells us, that 'bonum jus dicere,' is as much as that which is now

vulgarly expressed, 'requesta tua rationabilis est:' if there be an equity in the thing, there is a *jus* belonging to the person. Any thing that made it equitable that a man should be regarded, they called his *jus:* whence is his complaint in Plautus, finding himself every way unworthy; 'sine modo et modestia sum, sine bono jure, atque honore:' Bachid. and Paulus, in lib. 3. ff. de servitut. urb. præd. 'Ne jus sit vicino invitis nobis altius ædificare.' It were very facile, both from lawyers and most approved authors, to multiply instances of this large acceptation of the word *jus,* or right. And whether the grant of the Father, and purchase of the Mediator before mentioned, be not sufficient to constitute or denominate such a *jus* or right in them, for whom, and whose profit and benefit the grant is made, I question not. Again consider that of Paulus. lib. 11. ad Edict. D. D. de verb. signif. Tit. 16. 'Princeps bona concedendo, videtur etiam obligationem concedere;' which adds a propriety to the 'jus' as was shewed before. Yet that it should be presently actionable doth not follow: 'Actio est jus persequendi in judicio, quod sibi debetur;' Institut. lib. 4. de action. Every 'jus ad rem,' is not 'jus persequendi in judicio:' whence is the gloss of Aldobrondinus on that place: 'nec facias magnam vim ibi: quia cum multas habeat significationes hæc dictio jus, ut ff. de inst. et jus l. p. et, si, hoc est unum de significatis ejus, ut dicatur jus agendi vel persequendi:' besides it must be, *quod sibi debetur,* that is actionable; the obligation whence that *debitum* arises, being, as the lawyers speak, *mater actionis;* but yet even 'debere' itself is of so large and various signification in the law, both in respect to things and persons, as will not admit of any determinate sense unless otherwise restrained, ff. de verbor. signif. b. pecuniæ § 8. si. Yea, and on the other side, sometimes a plea may lie where there is no *debitum:* 'quandoque ago etiam ad id quod mihi non debetur; R. de pact. l. si pacto quo pœnam; nam ibi non ago ad id quod est debitum, sed ad id quod ex nudo pacto convenit:' that Mr. B. may know what to do with his schemes of actions, produced on the account of my assertions.

This for the word, and my use of it; I hope in the things of God about words, I shall not much contend. I had rather indeed insist on the propriety of words, in the originals, their

use in the law, and amongst men, so all be regulated by the analogy of faith, than to square the things of God to the terms and rules of art and philosophy, to which, without doubt, they will not answer. Let any man living express any doctrine of the gospel whatever, in the exactest manner, with artificial philosophical terms, and I will undertake to shew that in many things the truth is wrested and fettered thereby, and will not bear an exact correspondence with them; yet hence are many of our learned strifes, which as they have little of learning in them, so for my part I value them not at a nutshell, properly so called.

This being premised, his answers to my arguments may very briefly be considered.

My first argument is, It is *justum*, that they should have the fruits of the death of Christ bestowed on them: therefore they have *jus* unto them; for, 'jus est quod justum est.'

Mr. B. denies the consequence, and says, though it be 'justum,' yet they may not be subjects of this *jus:* to this I have answered, by shewing what is *jus* in general, and what is their *jus* and where fixed.

2. He questions the antecedent; for the confirmation whereof, and its vindication from his exceptions, I refer the reader to what I had written of the covenant, between the Father and the Son, some good while before I saw Mr. Baxter's animadversions, or that they were public.

My second is, That which is procured for any one, thereunto he hath a right; the thing that is obtained, is granted by him of whom it is obtained, and that to them, for whom it is obtained. To this is answered,

1. In the margin; 'That I should make great changes in England, if I could make all the lawyers believe this strange doctrine:' but of what the lawyers believe, or do not believe, Mr. B. is no competent judge, be it spoken without disparagement, for the law is not his study. I who (perhaps) have much less skill than himself, will be bound at any time to give him twenty cases, out of the civil and canon law, to make good this assertion; which if he knows not that it may be done, he ought not to speak with such confidence of these things. Nay, amongst our own lawyers (whom perhaps he intends) I am sure he may be informed, that if a man inter-

cede with another to settle his land by conveyance to a third person, giving him that conveyance to keep in trust, until the time come, that he should by the intention of the conveyer enjoy the land, though he for whom it is granted, have not the least knowledge of it, yet he hath such a right unto the land thereby created, as cannot be disannulled.

But 2. He says, 'That the fruits of the death of Christ, are procured for us, *finaliter* not *subjective*.'

Ans. They are procured for us *objective*, are granted, 'ex ad æquatione rerum,' and may make us subjects of the right, though not of the things themselves, which it regards; may, I say, though I do not say it doth. The following similitudes of my horse, and a king, have no correspondency with this business at all; of the right of horses, there is nothing in the law: in the latter, there is nothing omitted in the comparison, but merit, and purchase, which is all.

3. All the fruits of the death of Christ are obtained and procured by his merit for them for whom he died.

Mr. B. '1. Not all, not the same measure of sanctification for one as for another: not faith for all for whom he died, as for his elect.

'2. He procured it for us as the *finis cui*, not subjects of the present right.'

Ans. 1. The substance of the fruits of the death of Christ, and the ultimate end, belongs to his purchase: the measure and degrees of them to the Father's sovereign disposal, *ad ornatum universi*.

2. It is most false, that Christ did not purchase faith for all, for whom he died.

3. What our right is, hath been before delivered; the *finis cui*, and subject of a present right, are not very accurately opposed.

4. The nature of merit infers an attendant right: Rom. iv. 4.

Mr. B. 'If this be your debt, you may say, Lord I have merited salvation in Christ, therefore it is mine of debt. Christ hath of debt the right to pardon you, you have no debt, &c.'

Ans. Very good; but I use no forms of prayer of other men's composing; who said, it was our debt; who says our right is actionable. The whole here intended, is, that Christ

meriting pardon of sins for the elect, it is just they should obtain it in the appointed season: such another prayer as that here mentioned, doth Mr. B. afterward compose in a suitableness as he supposes to my principles; but what may he not do, or say?

4. He for whom a ransom is paid, hath a right to his liberty by virtue of that payment.

Mr. B. 'All unproved, and by me unbelieved. If you pay a sum to the Turk for a thousand slaves, thereby buying them absolutely into your own power, I do not believe that they have any more right to freedom, than they had before. If a prince pay a ransom for some traitors to the king his father, thereby purchasing to himself a dominion or a propriety over them, so that they are absolutely his, yet I think it gives them no more right than they had before.'

Ans. 1. I suppose it is not yet determined, that this business is to be regulated absolutely according to what Mr. B. thinks or believes. For I must needs say, that whether he believes it or no, I am still of the same mind that I was.

He for whom a ransom is paid, hath a right to a deliverance; as to him, to whom the ransom was paid: if Mr. B. believes not this, let him consult the civil lawyers, with whom he is so conversant: Tit. de pact.

2. I say, that the law of redemption requires, that the redeemed be at the disposal of the redeemer, where he hath no plea *jure postiliminii;* and it is most certain, that Christ hath a dominion over his elect (for a propriety over them I understand not), yet, that dominion is the proximate end of the death of Christ, under the notion of a ransom, price, or purchase (which yet are of various considerations also), is the πρῶτον ψεῦδος of this discourse.

Having given this specimen of Mr. B.'s answers to my instances, as an addition to the former explication given of my judgment in this business, I shall not farther trouble the reader with the consideration of what of that same kind ensues.

To tell the whole truth, I expressed the effects of the death of Christ, in the manner above-mentioned, to obviate that stating of his satisfaction, and the use of it, which I had observed to be insisted on by the remonstrants in their apology, and in other writings of theirs, but especially by Epis-

copius. For some time, I met not with any great opposition made to the expressions of their imaginations in this business, but only what was briefly remarked by the Leyden professors in their 'specimina.' Of late I find Voetius reckoning it among the principal controversies, that we have with the enemies of the cross of Christ. I shall set down his words about it, and leave them to the consideration of them who may think themselves concerned in them.

His words in his disputation, 'de merito Christi,' An. 1650, are; 'Secunda controversia capitalis, quæ Christianismo cum quibusdam heterodoxis (Remonstrantibus scilicet in Belgio, viris, si non Socinianæ, saltem dubiæ Theologiæ) intercedit, est de merito Christi pro nobis, hoc est, vice, et loco nostro, et sic in bonum nostrum actualiter præstito, seu de satisfactione plena ac proprie a Christo sponsore, loco nostro justitiæ divinæ præstita: illi satisfactionem et meritum sic accipiunt, quasi nihil aliud sit, quam partis offensæ talis placatio qua offenso hactenus satisfit, ut in gratiam redire velit cum eo qui offendit, et per quam Christus Deo Patri jus et voluntatem acquisiverit novum fœdus ineundi cum hominibus.' So he.

The expression of our dying with Christ is fallen upon again, p. 226. of which he desires leave to speak as confidently as myself; truly I thought he had not been to ask leave for that now. But why may he not use it without leave as well as others? Some perhaps will say, 'mira edepol sunt si hic in ventrem, sumpsit confidentiam,' to consider what he hath written already. But with this leave he falls a conjecturing at what I mean by that expression, to no purpose at all, as may be seen by what I have delivered concerning it. The like I may say to the passage by the way mentioned, of the right which ariseth from the decree of God. It seems to me, that what God hath decreed to do for any, that is, or may be, a real privilege to him; it is *jus, ex justitia condecentiæ*, that in the appointed season, he should receive it. If Mr. Baxter be otherwise minded I cannot help it; 'habeo aliquid magis ex memet, et majus,' than that I should attend to the disputes thereabout; nor will I stand in his way if I can choose, for he seems to cry—'ad terram dabo, et dentilegos omnes mortales faciam quemque offendero.'

After this I find not myself particularly smitten, until he

comes to the close of the chapter to talk of 'idem' and 'tantidem;' unless it be in his passage, p. 274. That which makes me suspect that I am there intended, is, his former imputation of some such thing unto me; namely, that I should say, that the deputation of Christ in our stead, is an act of pardon. But I suppose that I have so fully satisfied him as to that surmise, by shewing that not only my sense, but my expressions were, not, that the deputation of Christ was our pardon, but that the freedom of pardon did in part depend thereon, that I will not take myself in this place to be concerned; because I cannot do it and prevent the returnal of a charge of some negligence on this person, whose writings seem sufficiently to free him from all just suspicion thereof. In the close of this discourse (with the method of a new line) Mr. Baxter falls upon the consideration of the payment made by Christ in our stead, or the penalty that he underwent for us; and pleads, that it was not the *idem* that was due to us, but *tantundem*. Although some say this difference is not *tantidem*, as some speak, it seems, yet he is resolved of the contrary, and that this one assertion is the bottom of all Antinomianism. Seeing I profess myself to be contrary minded, I suppose it will be expected that I should consider what is here to the purpose in hand insisted on by Mr. B. What I intend by paying the *idem*, or rather undergoing the 'idem,' that we should have done, I have so fully elsewhere expressed, that I shall not stay the reader with the repetition of it. But, says Mr. Baxter, this subverts the substance of religion: ἰδοὺ ῥὸδος, ἰδοὺ πήδημα. Now you shall have the proofs of it; the *idem*, saith he, 'is the perfect obedience, or the full punishment of the man himself, and in case of personal disobedience, it is personal punishment that the law requires; that is, *suplicium ipsius delinquentis*.

Ans. But, the *idem* that we should pay, or undergo, is perfect obedience to the law, and proportionable punishment by the God's [Divine] constitution, for disobedience. This Christ paid, and underwent; that the man himself should undergo it is the law originally; but the undergoing or doing of it, by another, is the undergoing of the *idem*, I think. It is personal punishment that the law originally requires; but he that undergoes the punishment (though he be not

personally disobedient), which the law judgeth to him that was personally disobedient, undergoes the *idem* that the law requires.

The *idem* is *suppliciam delinquenti debitum* by whoever it be undergone, not *supplicium ipsius delinquentis* only.

He proceeds: 'The law never threatened a surety, nor granteth any liberty of substitution: that was an act of God above the law; therefore Christ did not undergo the idem.' I deny the consequence. Nor is the least shadow of proof made of it. The question is not whether Christ be the sinner, but whether he underwent that which was due to the sinner.

He adds: 'If therefore the thing due was paid, it was we ourselves morally or legally, that suffered.' I know not well what is meant by morally; but however I deny the consequence; the thing itself was paid by another for us, and the punishment itself was undergone by another, in our stead.

That which follows, falls with that which went before, being built thereon. 'It could not be ourselves legally,' saith he, 'because it was not ourselves naturally.' Though for the security of the hypothesis opposed, there is no need of it, yet I deny his proposition, also, if taken universally. A man may be accounted to do a thing legally by a sponsor, though he do it not in his own person.

But he says, 'If it had been ourselves legally, the strictest justice could not have denied us a present deliverance, 'ipso facto,' being no justice can demand any more than the 'idem quod debitur' (as Mr. Baxter's printer speaks). But 1. It is supposed, that all legal performance of any thing, by any one, must be done in his own person.

2. It supposes, that there is such an end as deliverance assigned, or assignable, to the offender's own undergoing of the penalty, which is false.

3. The reasons and righteousness of our actual deliverance at the time, and in the manner prescribed by God, and as to the last revealed in the gospel, upon Christ's performance of personal obedience, and undergoing the penalty due to us in our stead; which are founded in the economy of the Trinity, voluntarily engaged into for the accomplishing

the salvation of the elect, I have elsewhere touched on, and may, if I find it necessary, hereafter handle at large.

That which is feared in this business is, that if the 'idem' be paid, then according to the law, the obligation is dissolved, and present deliverance follows. But if by the law, be meant the civil law, whence these terms are borrowed, it is most certain, that any thing, instead of that which is in the obligation, doth, according to the rules of the law dissolve the obligation; and that whether it be paid by the principal debtor, or delinquent, or any for him. The beginning of that section, 'quibus modis tollitur obligatio,' lib. 3. Instit. will evince this sufficiently. The title of the section is, 'Si solvitur id quod debetur, vel aliud loco illius, consentiente creditore, omnis tollitur obligatio, tum rei principalis, quam fide-jussoris.' The words of the law itself are more full. 'Tollitur autem omnis obligatio solutione ejus quod debetur; vel siquis consentiente creditore aliud pro alio solverit; nec interest quis solverit, utrum ipse qui debet, an alius pro eo: liberatur enim et alio solvente, sive sciente, sive ignorante debitore, vel invito, et solutio fiat. Si fide-jussor solverit, non enim ipse solus liberatur, sed reus.' So that there is no difference in the law, whether 'solutio' be 'ejusdem' or 'tantidem;' and this is the case in the things that are 'ex maleficio, aut quasi;' as may be seen at large in the commentators on that place.

To caution all men against the poison of Antinomian doctrines, now so strenuously opposed by Mr. Baxter, and to deliver students from the unhappy model of theology, which the men of the preceding contests have entangled themselves and others withal, Mr. B. seriously advises them to keep in their minds, and carefully to distinguish between the will of God's purpose, and his precepts or law, his determining and commanding will, in the first place; the ignorance whereof it seems, confounded the theology of Doctor Twiss, Pemble, and others.

Nextly, that they would carefully distinguish between the covenant between the Father and the Son about the work of his mediation, and the covenant of grace and mercy confirmed to the elect in his blood.

Now if these two distictions, as carefully heeded, and as warily observed as we are able, will prove such an antidote

against the infection, for my part, in all probability, I shall be secure, having owned them ever since I learned my catechism.

Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ταῦτα·

And so am I dismissed. This may perhaps be the close of this controversy; if otherwise, I am indifferent; on the one side it will be so: I delight not in these troubled waters. If I must engage again in the like kind, I shall pray that he from whom are all my supplies, would give me a real humble frame of heart, that I may have no need with many pretences, and a multitude of good words, to make a cloak for a spirit breaking frequently through all with sad discoveries of pride and passion; and to keep me from all magisterial insolence, pharisaical supercilious self-conceitedness, contempt of others, and every thing that is contrary to the rule whereby I ought to walk.

If men be in haste to oppose what I have delivered about this business, let them (if they please, I have no authority to prescribe them their way) speak directly to the purpose, and oppose that which is affirmed, and answer my reasons in reference to that end only for which by me they are produced and insisted on.

Because I see some men have a desire to be dealing with me, and yet know not well what to fix upon, that I may deliver them from the vanity of contending with their own surmises, and if it be possible, to prevail with them to speak closely, clearly, and distinctly to the matter of their contests, and not mix heterogeneous things in the same discourse, I will briefly shrive myself for their satisfaction.

First, then, I do not believe that any man is actually justified from eternity; because of that of the apostle, Rom. viii. 28—30. but yet what is the state of things, in reference to the economy of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, engaged in from eternity for the salvation of sinners, with that fountain union, that is between Christ and his body in their predestination, I shall desire a little more time to deliver myself unto.

2. I do believe that there was a covenant, compact, or agreement between Father and Son for the salvation of the elect by his mediation, which, upon sin's entering into the world, had an efficacy and effect of the very same nature

with that, which it hath when he hath actually accomplished what was on his part required for the end proposed to him; and that therefore in the Old Testament his death is spoken of sometimes as past, Isa. liii. 4—6. and that to make this covenant in its constitution to be contemporary to its revelation, or the promises of it to be then made to Christ, when the church is acquainted that those promises are made, is a wide mistake.

But under what consideration the elect lie unto God, upon the transaction of this original covenant with the Mediator, I desire liberty for awhile as above.

3. I do not believe that the elect, that live after the death of Christ, are all actually in their own persons justified and absolved at his death; because 'the wrath of God abides on men that believe not;' John iii. 36. But yet what to the advantage of the church is enwrapped in the discharge of their great representative, who died in their stead (for that I believe also, and not only for their good) I desire respite for my thoughts as formerly.

4. I do believe that Christ underwent the very same punishment for us, for the nature and kind of it, which we were obnoxious unto, and should have undergone, had not he undertaken for us, and paid the *idem* that we should have done; 2 Cor. v. 12. Gal. iii. 13.

5. I believe that upon the death of Christ, considering what hath been said before concerning the compact and agreement between God and the Mediator, about that matter, it became just and righteous, with reference to God's justice, as supreme Governor and moderator of the creatures, and all their concernments, that those for whom he died, should all be made partakers of all the good things, which Christ by his death procured for them, in the season appointed by the sovereign will of God. But that this right, though indissoluble, is so actually vested in them, as to be actionable in the gospel without faith, I believe not.

6. I believe that all spiritual blessings, mercies, privileges whatever, are fruits of the death of Christ, and that notwithstanding the order wherein they stand one to another, they all depend immediately on its casuality; though 're spectu termini' they have not a natural immediation.

7. I profess that we are absolved, pardoned, and justified

for Christ's sake, and therefore that Christ is reckoned to us, or made righteousness to us, in order of nature antecedently to all those things, which for his sake we do receive, and are made partakers of with and by him, &c.

For a close of all, I must profess, that I will not contend with any man, who discovers in himself such a resolution θέσιν διαφυλάττειν, that if he be pressed, rather than let it go, he will go backward, and attempt ἀκίνητα κινεῖν, and to question common received principles; knowing the multitude of errors and abominations that the church of God hath been pestered withal by men of this principle and practice. Hence are the beginnings of men modest, but their endings desperate: hence is Arminianism ended in Episcopianism; and Arianism in Socinianism, and in many, Socinianism in Mahometanism and Atheism. If I find this resolution and spirit in any man, he shall rather enjoy his own present conceits, than by me be precipitated into worse abominations. Nor shall I (the Lord assisting) be unmindful of that of the apostle, 1 Tim. vi. 3—5. Εἴ τις ἑτεροδιδασκαλεῖ, καὶ μὴ προσέρχεται ὑγιαίνουσι λόγοις τοῖς τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ, καὶ τῇ κατ' εὐσέβειαν διδασκαλία, τετύφωται, μηδὲν ἐπιστάμενος, ἀλλὰ νοσῶν περὶ ζητήσεις καὶ λογομαχίας, ἐξ ὧν γίνεται φθόνος, ἔρις, βλασφημίαι, ὑπόνοιαι πονεραὶ, παραδιατριβαὶ, &c. as also that of the same apostle, Tit. iii. 9. Μωρὰς δὲ ζητήσεις, καὶ γενεαλογίας, καὶ ἔρεις, καὶ μάχας νομικὰς περιΐστασο· εἰσὶ γὰρ ἀνωφελεῖς καὶ μάταιοι. If I must contend with any, as I am resolved for the matter προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, so for the manner of handling it, it shall not be my endeavour to cloud and darken things easy, trite, common in themselves, with new, dark, artificial expressions, but rather to give plainness and perspicuity to things hard and difficult, confirming them with the authority of Scripture, opened by the import of the words insisted on, and design of the Holy Ghost in their contexture. Nor will I contend with any, whose motto is that of him in Plautus; 'dicat quod quisque vult, ego de hac sententia non dimovebor:' or that hath thoughts of his own notions, like those of him in Nævius, who cried out, 'primum quod dicebo recte, secundum quod dicebo eo melius.' And as my aim is to know Christ and him crucified, to exalt him, and ascribe to him the pre-eminence in all things, to discover the whole of our

salvation, and glory of God thereby, centered in his person and mediation, with its emanation from thence, through the efficacy of the eternal Spirit, and all our obedience to receive life, power, and vigour from thence only, knowing that it is the obedience of faith, and hath its foundation in blood and water; so I equally abhor all doctrines that would take self out of the dust, make something of that which is worse than nothing, and spin out matter for a web of peace and consolation from our own bowels, by resolving our acceptation with God into any thing in ourselves; and those, that by any means would intercept the efficacy of the death and cross of Christ from its work of perpetual and constant mortification in the hearts of believers; or cut off any obligation unto obedience or holiness, that by the discovery of the will of God, either in the law or gospel, is put upon the redeemed ones of the Lord.

Τὰς δὲ μωρὰς καὶ ἀπαιδεύτους ζητήσεις παραίτου, εἰδὼς ὅτι γεννῶσι μάχας· 2 Tim. ii. 23.

A REVIEW

OF THE

ANNOTATIONS OF HUGO GROTIUS,

IN REFERENCE UNTO

THE DOCTRINE OF THE DEITY AND SATISFACTION OF CHRIST:

WITH

A DEFENCE OF THE CHARGE FORMERLY LAID AGAINST THEM.

A

SECOND CONSIDERATION

OF THE

ANNOTATIONS OF HUGO GROTIUS.

HAVING in my late defence of the doctrine of the gospel, from the corruptions of the Socinians, been occasioned to vindicate the testimonies given in the Scripture to the Deity of Christ, from their exceptions, and finding that Hugo Grotius, in his Annotations, had (for the most part) done the same things with them, as to that particular, and some other important articles of the Christian faith, that book of his being more frequent in the hands of students, than those of the Socinians, I thought it incumbent on me, to do the same work in reference to those Annotations, which it was my design to perform towards the writings of Socinus, Smalcius, and their companions and followers. What I have been enabled to accomplish by that endeavour, with what service to the gospel hath been performed thereby, is left to the judgment of them who desire ἀληθεύειν ἐν ἀγάπῃ. Of my dealing with Grotius I gave a brief account in my epistle to the governors of the university, and that with reference to an apology made for him, not long before. This hath obtained a new apology under the name of a Second Defence of Hugo Grotius; with what little advantage either to the repute of Grotius, as to the thing in question, or of the apologist himself, it is judged necessary to give the ensuing account: for which I took the first leisure hour I could obtain, having things of greater weight, daily incumbent on me. The only thing of importance by me charged on those Annotations of Grotius, was this; that the texts of Scripture both in the Old Testament and New, bearing witness to the Deity and satisfaction of Christ, are in them wrested to other senses and significations, and the testimonies given to those grand truths, thereby eluded. Of those of the first kind I excepted one, yet with some doubt, lest his expres-

sions therein, ought to be interpreted according to the analogy of what he had elsewhere delivered: of which afterward.

Because that which concerns the satisfaction of Christ will admit of the easiest despatch, though taking up most room, I shall in the first place insist thereon. The words of my charge on the Annotations, as to this head of the doctrine of the Scripture are these. The condition of these famous Annotations as to the satisfaction of Christ is the same. Not one text in the whole Scripture, wherein testimony is given to that sacred truth, which is not wrested to another sense, or at least the doctrine in it, concealed and obscured by them.

This being a matter of fact, and the words containing a crime charged on the Annotations, he that will make a defence of them, must either disprove the assertion by instances to the contrary, or else granting the matter of fact, evince it to be no crime. That which is objected in matter of fact, 'aut negandum est aut defendendum,' says Quintilian: lib. 5. cap. de Refut. and 'extra hæc in judiciis fere nihil est.' In other cases, 'patronus, neget, defendat, transferat, excuset, deprecetur, molliat, minuat, avertat, despiciat, derideat;' but in matters of fact, the two first only have place. Aristotle allows more particulars for an apologist to divert unto, if the matter require it: he may say of what is objected, ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἐστιν, ἤ, ὡς οὐ βλαβερὸν, ἢ οὐ τούτῳ, ἢ ὡς οὐ τηλικοῦτο, ἢ οὐκ ἄδικον, ἢ οὔ μέγα, ἢ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν, ἢ οὐκ ἔχον μέγεθος. (Rhet. lib. iii. cap. 15.) all which in a plain matter of fact may be reduced to the former heads. That any other apology can or ought to take place in this, or any matter of the same importance, will not easily be proved. The present apologist takes another course. Such ordinary paths are not for him to walk in. He tells us of the excellent book that Grotius wrote 'de Satisfactione Christi,' and the exposition of sundry places of Scripture, especially of divers verses of Isa. liii. given therein; and then adds sundry inducements to persuade us, that he was of the same mind in his Annotations. And this is called a defence of Grotius. The apologist, I suppose, knows full well, what texts of Scripture they are, that are constantly pleaded for the satisfaction of Christ, by them who do believe that doctrine. I shall also for once take it for granted, that he might with-

out much difficulty, have obtained a sight of Grotius's Annotations; to which I shall only add, that probably if he could from them have disproved the assertion before-mentioned, by any considerable instances, he is not so tender of the prefacers credit, as to have concealed it on any such account. But the severals of his plea for the Annotations in this particular, I am persuaded are accounted by some, worthy consideration; a brief view of them will suffice.

The signal place of Isa liii. he tells us, he hath heard taken notice of by some (I thought it had been probable the apologist might have taken notice of it himself), as that wherein his Annotations are most suspected; therefore on that he will fasten awhile. Who would not now expect that the apologist should have entered upon the consideration of those Annotations, and vindicated them from the imputations insinuated: but he knew a better way of procedure, and who shall prescribe to him, what suits his purpose and proposal?

This, I say, is the instance chosen to be insisted on; and the vindication of the Annotations therein, by the interpretation given in their author's book 'de Satisfactione Christi' is proposed to consideration. That others, if not the apologist himself, may take notice of the emptiness of such precipitate apologies, as are ready to be tumbled out, without due digestion or consideration, I shall not only compare the Annotations and that book as to the particular place proposed, and manifest the inconsistency of the one with the other; but also to discover the extreme negligence and confidence, which lie at the bottom of his following attempt, to induce a persuasion, that the judgment of the man of whom we speak, was not altered (that is, as to the interpretation of the Scriptures relating to the satisfaction of Christ), nor is others [different] in his Annotations, than in that book; I shall compare the one with the other, by sundry other instances, and let the world see how in the most important places contested about, he hath utterly deserted the interpretations given of them by himself in his book 'de Satisfactione,' and directly taken up that which he did oppose.

The apologist binds me in the first place to that of Isa. liii. which is ushered in by the 1 Pet. ii. 24.

From 1 Pet. ii. 24. (says the apologist) Grotius informs

us, 'that Christ so bare our sins, that he freed us from them, so that we are healed by his stripes.'

This, thus crudely proposed, Socinus himself would grant it, is little more than barely repeating the words; Grotius goes farther, and contends that ἀνήνεγκεν the word there used by the apostle, is to be interpreted, 'tulit sursum eundo, portavit,' and tells us that Socinus would render this word 'abstulit,' and so take away the force of the argument from this place. To disprove that insinuation, he urges sundry other places in the New Testament, where some words of the same importance are used, and are no way capable of such a signification. And whereas Socinus urges to the contrary, Heb. ix. 28. where he says ἀνηνεγκεῖν ἁμαρτίας signifies nothing but 'auferre peccata,' Grotius disproves that instance, and manifests that in that place also it is to be rendered by 'tulit,' and so relates to the death of Christ.

That we may put this instance given us by the apologist, to vindicate the Annotations from the crime charged on them to an issue, I shall give the reader the words of his Annotations on that place: it is as follows:

Ὃς τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν αὐτὸς ἀνήνεγκεν, &c.] ἀνήνεγκεν 'hic est, abstulit, quod sequentia ostendunt, quomodo idem verbum sumi notavimus,' Heb. ix. 28. 'eodem sensu' ἆιρει ἁμαρτίαν, John i. 29. et נשא et סבל Isa. liii. 4. 'ubi Græci' φέρει 'vitia nostra ita interfecit, sicut qui cruci affiguntur interfici solent. Simile loquendi genus, Col. ii. 14. vide Rom. vi. 6. Gal. ii. 20. 24. 'est autem hic μετάληψις; non enim proprie Christus cum crucifigeretur, vitia nostra abstulit. Sed causas dedit per quas auferrerentur. Nam crux Christi fundamentum est prædicationis; prædicatio vero pœnitentiæ, pœnitentia vero aufert vitia.'

How well the annotator abides here by his former interpretation of this place, the apologist may easily discover: 1. There he contends that ἀνήνεγκε is as much as 'tulit,' or 'sursum tulit:' and objects out of Socinus, that it must be 'abstulit,' which quite alters the sense of the testimony. Here he contends with him, that it must be 'abstulit.' 2. There, Heb. ix. 28. is of the same importance with this 1 Pet. ii. 24. as there interpreted: here, as here; that is in a quite contrary sense, altogether inconsistent with the

other. 3. For company סבל used Isa. liii. is called into the same signification, which in the book 'de Satisfactione,' he contends is never used in that sense, and that most truly. 4. Upon this exposition of the words, he gives the very sense contended for by the Socinians; 'non enim proprie Christus cum crucifigeretur vitia nostra abstulit, sed causas dedit per quas auferrerentur:' what are these causes; he adds them immediately, 'Nam crux Christi fundamentum est prædicationis, prædicatio vero pœnitentiæ, pœnitentia vero aufert vitia.' He that sees not the whole Socinian poison wrapped up and proposed in this interpretation, is ignorant of the state of the difference as to that head, between them and Christians. 5. To make it a little more evident, how constant the annotator was to his first principles, which he insisted on in the management of his disputes with Socinus about the sense of this place, I shall add the words of Socinus himself, which then he did oppose. 'Verum animadvertere oportet primum in Græco, verbum, quod interpretes verterunt pertulit, est ἀνηνεγκεῖν, quod non pertulit sed abstulit vertendum erat, non secus ac factum fuerit in epistola ad Hebræos, cap. ix. 28. ubi idem legendi modus habetur, unde constat ἀνηνεγκεῖν ἁμαρτίας non perferre peccata, sed peccata tollere, sive auferre, significare.' Socin. de Jes. Christ. Serv. lib. 2. cap. 6.

What difference there is between the design of the annotator, and that of Socinus, what compliance in the quotation of the parallel place of the Hebrews, what direct opposition and head is made in the Annotations against that book 'de Satisfactione,' and how clearly the cause contended for in the one, is given away in the other; needs no farther to be demonstrated. But if this instance makes not good the apologist's assertion, it may be supposed that that which follows, which is ushered in by this, will do it to the purpose; let then that come into consideration.

This is that of Isa. liii. Somewhat of the sense which Grotius in his book 'de Satisfactione' contends for in this place, is given us by the apologist.

The eleventh verse of the chapter which he first considers (in my book) p. 14, he thus proposes and expounds: 'justificabit servus meus justus multos et iniquitates ipsorum hajulabit, in Heb. est:' יסבל הוא ועונתם vox autem עון iniqui

tatem significat, atque etiam iniquitatis pœnam, 2 Reg. vii. 9. vox autem סבל est sustinere, bajulare, quoties autem bajulare ponitur cum nomine peccati aut iniquitatis, id in omni lingua et maxime in Hebraismo significat pœnas ferre,' with much more to this purpose. The whole design of the main dispute in that place, is, from that discourse of the prophet to prove, that Jesus Christ 'properly underwent the punishment due to our sins, and thereby made satisfaction to God for them.'

To manifest his constancy to this doctrine, in his Annotations he gives such an exposition of that whole chapter of Isa. liii. as is manifestly and universally inconsistent with any such design in the words, as that which he intends to prove from them in his book 'de Satisfactione.' In particular (to give one instance of this assertion) he contends here that סבל, is as much as 'bajulare, portare,' and that joined with 'iniquity' (in all languages, especially in the Hebrew), that phrase of 'bearing iniquity,' signifies to undergo the punishment due to it; in his Annotations on the place, as also in those on 1 Pet. ii. 24. he tells you the word signifies 'auferre,' which with all his strength he had contended against. Not to draw out this particular instance into any greater length, I make bold to tell the apologist (what I suppose he knows not), that there is no one verse of the whole chapter, so interpreted in his Annotations, as that the sense given by him, is consistent with, nay is not repugnant to, that which from the same verses he pleads for in his book 'de Satisfactione Christi.' If notwithstanding this information, the apologist be not satisfied, let him if he please consider what I have already animadverted on those Annotations, and undertake their vindication. These loose discourses are not at all to the purpose in hand, nor the question between us, which is solely, whether Grotius in his Annotations have not perverted the sense of those texts of Scripture, which are commonly and most righteously pleaded as testimonies given to the satisfaction of Christ. But as to this particular place of Isaiah, the apologist hath a farther plea, the sum whereof (not to trouble the reader with the repetition of a discourse so little to the purpose) comes to this head; that Grotius in his book 'de Satisfactione Christi,' gives the mystical sense of the chapter, under which consi-

deration, it belongs to Christ and his sufferings; in his Annotations the literal, which had its immediate completion in Jeremiah, which was not so easily discoverable or vulgarly taken notice of. This is the sum of his first observation on this place, to acquit the annotator of the crime charged upon him. Whether he approve the application of the prophecy to Jeremiah or no, I know not. He says, Grotius so conceived. The design of the discourse seems to give approbation to that conception. How the literal sense of a place should come to be less easily discovered than the mystical, well I know not. Nor shall I speak of the thing itself concerning the literal and mystical sense supposed to be in the same place and words of Scripture, with the application of the distinction to those prophecies which have a double accomplishment in the type and thing or person typified (which yet hath no soundness in it), but to keep to the matter now in hand, I shall make bold for the removal of this engine applied by the apologist, for the preventing all possible mistake, or controversy about the annotator's after-charge in this matter, to tell him, that the perverting of the first literal sense of the chapter, or giving it a completion in any person whatsoever, in a first, second, or third sense, but the Son of God himself, is no less than blasphemy; which the annotator is no otherwise freed from, but by his conceiving a sense to be in the words, contrary to their literal importance, and utterly exclusive of the concernment of Jesus Christ in them. If the apologist be otherwise minded, I shall not invite him again to the consideration of what I have already written in the vindication of the whole prophecy from the wretched corrupt interpretation of the annotator (not hoping that he will be able to break through that discouragement he hath from looking into that treatise, by the prospect he hath taken of the whole by the epistle), but do express my earnest desire, that by an exposition of the severals of that chapter, and their application to any other (nor by loose discourses foreign to the question in hand), he would endeavour to evince the contrary; if on second thoughts he find either his judgment or ability not ready or competent for such an attempt, I heartily wish he would be careful hereafter of ingenerating apprehensions of that nature in the minds of others, by any such discourses as this.

I cannot but suppose that I am already absolved from a necessity of any farther procedure, as to the justifying my charge against the Annotations, having sufficiently foiled the instance produced by the apologist for the weakening of it. But yet lest any should think, that the present issue of this debate, is built upon some unhappiness of the apologist in the choice of the particulars insisted on; which might have been prevented, or may yet be removed, by the production of other instances; I shall for their farther satisfaction, present them with sundry other, the most important testimonies given to the satisfaction of Christ, wherein the annotator hath openly prevaricated, and doth embrace and propose those very interpretations, and that very sense, which in his book, 'de Satisfactione Christi,' he had strenuously opposed.

Page 8. of his book 'de Satisfactione,' he pleads the satisfaction of Christ, from Gal. ii. 21. laying weight on this, that the word δωρεὰν, signifies the want of an antecedent cause, on the supposition there made. In his Annotations he deserts this assertion, and takes up the sense of the place given by Socinus, 'de Servatore,' lib. 2. cap. 24. His departure into the tents of Socinus on Gal. iii. 13. is much more pernicious, p. 25—27. urging that place and vindicating it from the exceptions of Socinus, he concludes, that the apostle said Christ was made a curse; 'quasi dixerit Christum factum esse τῷ Θεῷ ἐπικατάρατον: hoc est pœnæ a Deo irrogatæ, et quidem ignominiosissimæ obnoxium.' To make good this, in his Annotations, he thus expounds the words; 'duplex hic figura; nam et κατάρα pro κατάρατος, quomodo circumcisio pro circumcisis: et subauditur ὡς: nam Christus ita cruciatus est, quasi esset Deo κατάρατος, quo nihil homini pessimo in hac vita pejus evenire poterat;' which is the very interpretation of the words given by Socinus which he opposed; and the same that Crellius insists upon in his vindication of Socinus against him. So uniform was the judgment of the annotator, with that of the author of the book 'de Satisfactione Christi.'

Pages 32, 33, &c. are spent in the exposition and vindication of Rom. iii. 25, 26. that expression εἰς ἔνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ, manifesting the end of the suffering of Christ, is by him chiefly insisted on. That by δικαιοσύνη is there intended that justice of God, whereby he punisheth

sin, he contends and proves from the nature of the thing itself, and comparing the expression with other parallel texts of Scripture; Socinus had interpreted this of the righteousness of Christ's fidelity and veracity, lib. 2. 'de Servatore,' cap. 2. (ut ostenderet se veracem et fidelem esse);' but Crellius in his vindication of him, places it rather on the goodness and liberality of God; which is, saith he, the righteousness there intended. To make good his ground, the annotator thus expounds the meaning of the words; 'vocem δικαιοσύνης malim hic de bonitate interpretari, quam de fide in promissis præstandis, quia quæ sequuntur non ad Judæos solos pertinent, sed etiam ad gentes, quibus promissio nulla facta erat.' He rather (he tells you) embraces the interpretation of Crellius than of Socinus; but for that which himself had contended for, it is quite shut out of doors; as I have elsewhere manifested at large.

The same course he takes with Rom. v. 10. which he insists on p. 26. and 2 Cor. v. 18—21. concerning which he openly deserts his own former interpretation, and closes expressly with that which he had opposed, as he doth in reference to all other places where any mention is made of reconciliation; the substance of his annotations on those places, seeming to be taken out of Socinus, Crellius, and some others of that party.

That signal place of Heb. ii. 17. in this kind, deserves particularly to be taken notice of; cap. 7. p. 141. of his book 'de Satisfactione,' he pleads the sense of that expression, εἰς τὸ ἱλάσκεσθαι τὰς ἁμαρτίας τοῦ λαοῦ, to be ἱλάσκεσθαι Θεὸν περὶ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν: and adds, 'significat ergo ibi expiationem quæ fit placando:' But Crellius's defence of Socinus had so possessed the man's mind before he came to write his Annotations, that on that place he gives us directly his sense, and almost his words, in a full opposition to what he had before asserted: ἱλάσκεσθαι ἁμαρτίας, 'hoc quidem loco, ut ex sequentibus apparet, est auferre peccata, sive purgare a peccato, id est, efficere ne peccetur, vires suppeditando pro modo tentationum.' So the annotator on that place; endeavouring farther to prove his interpretation. From Rom. iv. last, cap. i. p. 47. of his book 'de Satisfactione,' he clearly proves the satisfaction of Christ; and evinces that to be the sense of that expression, 'traditus

propter peccata nostra,' which he thus comments on in his Annotations; 'poterat dicere qui et mortuus est, et resurrexit ut nos a peccatis justificaret, id est, liberaret. Sed amans ἀντίθετα morti conjunxit peccata, quæ sunt mors animi, resurrectioni autem adeptionem justitiæ, quæ est animi resuscitatio: mire nos et a peccatis retrahit et ad justitiam ducit: quod videmus Christum mortem non formidasse pro doctrina sua peccatis contraria, et ad justitiam nos vocanti testimonio; et a Deo suscitatum, ut eidem doctrinæ summa conciliaretur authoritas.' He that sees not, not only that he directly closes in with what before he had opposed, but also, that he hath here couched the whole doctrine of the Socinians, about the mediation of Christ and our justification thereby, is utterly ignorant of the state of the controversy between them and Christians.

I suppose it will not be thought necessary for me to proceed with the comparison instituted. The several books are in the hands of most students, and that the case is generally the same in the other places pleaded for the satisfaction of Christ, they may easily satisfy themselves. Only because the apologist seems to put some difference between his Annotations on the Revelations (as having received their lineaments and colours from his own pencil), and those on the Epistles which he had not so completed; as I have already manifested, that in his Annotations on that book, he hath treacherously tampered with, and corrupted the testimonies given to the Deity of our blessed Saviour, so shall I give one instance from them also, of his dealing no less unworthily with those that concern his satisfaction.

Socinus in his second book against Covet, second part, and chap. 17. gives us this account of those words of the Holy Ghost, Rev. i. 5. 'who hath loved us, and washed us in his own blood: Johannes in Apocalyp. chap. i. 5. alia metaphora seu translatione (quæ nihil aliud est quam compendiosa quædam comparatio), utens, dixit de Christo et ejus morte, qui dilexit nos et lavit nos a peccatis in sanguine suo, nam quemadmodum aqua abluuntur sordes corporis, sic sanguine Christi, peccata, quæ sordes animi sunt absterguntur. Absterguntur, inquam, quia animus noster ab ipsis mundatur,' &c. This interpretation is opposed and exploded by Grotius, lib. 'de Satis.' c. 10. pp. 208, 209. The

substance of it being, that Christ washed us from our sins by his death, in that he confirmed his doctrine of repentance and newness of life thereby, by which we are turned from our sins; as he manifests in the close of his discourse: 'hoc sæpius urgendum est,' saith Socinus, 'Jesum Christum ea ratione peccata nostra abstulisse, quod effecerit, ut a peccando desistamus.' This interpretation of Socinus, being reinforced by Crellius, the place falls again under the consideration of Grotius, in those Annotations on the Revelations; which as the apologist tell us, received their very lineaments and colours from his own pencil. There then he gives us this account thereof, καὶ λούσαντι ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν ἐν τῷ αἵματι αὐτοῦ· 'Sanguine suo, id est, morte tolerata, certos nos reddidit veritatis eorum quæ docuerat, quæ talia sunt, ut nihil sit aptius ad purgandos a vitiis animos. Humidæ naturæ, sub qua est sanguis, proprium est lavare. Id vero per egregiam ἀλληγορίαν ad animum transfertur. Dicitur autem Christus suo sanguine nos lavisse; quia et ipse omnia præstitit quæ ad id requirebantur et apparet secutum in plurimis effectum.' I desire the apologist to tell me what he thinks of this piece thus perfected, with all its lineaments and colours, by the pencil of that skilful man; and what beautiful aspect he supposeth it to have. Let the reader, to prevent farther trouble in perusing transcriptions of this kind, consider Rev. xiii. 8. p. 114. Heb. ix. 25. to the end; which he calls an illustrious place in the same page and forward; 1 John ii. 2. p. 140. Rom. v. 10, 11. p. 142, 143. Eph. ii. 16. p. 148, 149. Col. i. 20—22. Tit. 14. p. 156. Heb. ix. 14, 15. p. 157, 158. Acts xx. 28. and many others; and compare them with the Annotations on those places, and he will be farther enabled to judge of the defence made of the one, by the instance of the other; I shall only desire that he who undertakes to give his judgment of this whole matter, be somewhat acquainted with the state of the difference, about this point of the doctrine of the gospel, between the Socinians and us; that he do not take 'auferre peccata,' to be 'ferre peccata;' 'nostri causa,' to be 'nostra vice,' and 'nostro loco:' *causa* προηγουμένη, to be προταρκτική: 'libe ratio a jugo peccati,' to be 'redemptio a reatu peccati:' 'su bire pœnas simplicitur,' to be 'subire pœnas nobis debitas: to be λύτρον, and כפר in respect of the event, to be so as to

the proper nature of the thing; 'offerre seipsum in cœlo,' to be as much as 'offerre seipsum in cruce,' as to the work itself; that so he be not mistaken to think that, when the first are granted, that the latter are so also. For a close of the discourse relating to this head, a brief account may be added, why I said not positively, that he had wrested all the places of Scripture giving testimony to the satisfaction of Christ, to another sense; but that he had either done so, or else concealed or obscured that sense in them.

Though I might give instances from one or two places in his Annotations on the Gospels, giving occasion to this assertion, yet I shall insist only on some taken from the Epistle to the Hebrews, where is the great and eminent seat of the doctrine of Christ's satisfaction. Although in his Annotations on that Epistle, he doth openly corrupt the most clear testimonies given to this truth, yet there are some passages in them, wherein he seems to dissent from the Socinians. In his Annotations on chap. v. 5. he hath these words; 'Jesus quidem sacerdotale munus suum aliquo modo erat auspicatus; cum semet patri victimam offerret.' That Christ was a priest when he was on the earth, was wholly denied by Socinus, both in his book 'de Servatore,' and in his Epistle to Niemojevius, as I have shewed elsewhere. Smalcius seems to be of the same judgment in the Racovian catechism. Grotius says, 'Sacerdotale munus erat aliquo modo auspicatus;' yet herein he goes not beyond Crellius, who tells us: 'mortem Christus subiit duplici ratione, partim quidem ut fœderis mediator seu sponsor, partim quidem ut sacerdos, Deo ipsum oblaturus: de Causis mortis Christi,' p. 6. And so Volkelius, fully to the same purpose; 'Partes' saith he, 'muneris sacerdotis, hæc sunt potissimum; mactatio victimæ, in tabernaculum ad oblationem peragendam, ingressio, et ex eodem egressio: Ac mactatio quidem mortem Christi, violentam sanguinis profusionem continet:' De Relig. lib. 3. cap. 47. p. 145. and again: 'Hinc colligitur solam Christi mortem nequaquam illam perfectam absolutamque ipsius oblationem (de qua in Epistola ad Hebræos agitur) fuisse, sed principium et præparationem quandam ipsius sacerdotii in cælo demum administrandi extitisse,' ibid. So that nothing is obtained by Grotius's 'munus sacerdotale aliquo modo erat auspicatus,' but what is granted

by Crellius and Volkelius. But in the next words, 'cum semet offerret patri victimam,' he seems to leave them; but he seems only so to do. For Volkelius acknowledgeth that he did slay the sacrifice in his death, though that was not his complete and perfect oblation, which is also afterward affirmed by Grotius; and Crellius expressly affirms the same. Nor doth he seem to intend a proper, expiatory, and satisfactory sacrifice in that expression; for if he had, he would not have been guilty of such an ἀκυρολογία, as to say, 'semet obtulit patri.' Besides, though he do acknowledge elsewhere, that this 'victima' was ΠΨΝ, and ὑπὲρ ἁμαρτιῶν, yet he says in another place, (on ver. 3.) 'Sequitur Christum quoque obtulisse pro se ὑπὲρ ἁμαρτιῶν' giving thereby such a sense to that expression, as is utterly inconsistent with a proper expiatory sacrifice for sin. And which is yet worse, on chap. ix. 14. he gives us such an account why expiation is ascribed to the blood of Christ, as is a key to his whole interpretation of that epistle: 'Sanguini,' saith he, 'purgatio ista tribuitur: quia per sanguinem, id est, mortem Christi, secuta ejus excitatione et evectione, gignitur in nobis fides, quæ deinde purgat corda.' And therefore, where Christ is said to offer himself by the eternal Spirit, he tells us, 'Oblatio Christi hic intelligitur illa, quæ oblationi legali in adyto factæ respondet, ea autem est, non oblatio in altari crucis facta, sed in adyto cælesti:' So that the purgation of sin is an effect of Christ's presenting himself in heaven only; which how well it agrees with what the apostle says, chap. i. 3. the reader will easily judge. And to manifest that this was his constant sense, on those words, ver. 26. εἰς ἀθέτησιν ἁμαρτίας, διὰ τῆς θυσίας αὐτοῦ, he thus comments: εἰς ἀθέτησιν ἁμαρτίας· 'Ut peccatum in nobis extinguatur; fit autem hoc per passionem Christi, quæ fidem nobis ingenerat, quæ corda purificat.' Christ confirming his doctrine by his death, begets faith in us, which doth the work. Of the 28th verse of the same chapter, I have spoken before. The same he affirms again, more expressly, on chap. x. 3. and verses 9. 12. he interprets the oblation of Christ, whereby he took away sin, to be the oblation or offering himself in heaven, whereby sin is taken away by sanctification, as also in sundry other places, where the expiatory sacrifice of Christ

on earth, and the taking away of the guilt of sin by satisfaction, is evidently intended. So that notwithstanding the concession mentioned, I cannot see the least reason to alter my thoughts of the Annotations, as to this business in hand.

Not farther to abound *in causa facili*, in all the differences we have with the Socinians, about Christ's dying for us, concerning the nature of redemption, reconciliation, mediation, sacrifice, the meaning of all the phrases and expressions, which in those things are delivered to us, the annotator is generally on the apostate side throughout his Annotations; and the truth is, I know no reason why our students should with so much diligence and charge, labour to get into their hands the books of Socinus, Crellius, Smalcius, and the rest of that crew, seeing these Annotations, as to the most important heads of Christian religion, about the Deity, sacrifice, priesthood, and satisfaction of Christ, original sin, free will, justification, &c. afford them the substance and marrow of what is spoken by them; so that as to these heads, upon the matter, there is nothing peculiar to the annotator, but the secular learning which in his interpretations he hath curiously and gallantly interweaved. Plautus makes sport in his Amphitruo with several persons, some real, some assumed, of such likeness one to another, that they could not discern themselves by any outward appearance; which caused various contests and mistakes between them. The Poet's fancy raised not a greater similitude between Mercury and Sosia, being supposed to be different persons, than there is a dissimilitude between the author of the book 'de Satisfactione Christi,' and of the Annotations, concerning which we have been discoursing, being one and the same. Nor was the contest of those different persons so like one another, so irreconcilable, as are these of this single person, so unlike himself in the several treatises mentioned. And I cannot but think it strange, that the apologist could imagine no surer measure to be taken of Grotius's meaning in his Annotations than his treatise of the 'Satisfaction of Christ' doth afford, there being no two treatises that I know, of any different persons whatever, about one and the same subject, that are more at variance. Whether now any will be persuaded by the apologist to believe, that Grotius was constant

in his Annotations to the doctrine delivered in that other treatise, I am not solicitous.

For the reinforced plea of the apologist, that these Annotations were not finished by him, but only collections that he might after dispose of, I am not concerned in it; having to deal with that book of Annotations that goes under his name; if they are none of his, it is neither on the one hand or other, of any concernment unto me. I say not this, as though the apologist had in the least made good his former plea, by his new exceptions to my evidence against it, from the printer's preface to the volume of Annotations on the Epistles. He says, 'what was the *opus integrum* that was commended to to the care of ὁ δεῖνα?' and answers himself, 'not that last part or volume of Annotations, but *opus integrum*, the whole volume or volumes that contained his *ἀνέκδοτα adversaria* on the New Testament.' For how ill this agrees with the intention and words of the prefacer, a slight inspection will suffice to manifest. He tells us, that Grotius had himself published his Annotations on the Gospels, five years before; that at his departure from Paris, he left a great part of this volume (that is this on the Acts and Epistles) with a friend; that the reason why he left not *opus integrum* that is, the whole volume, with him, was because the residue of it was not so written, as that an amanuensis could well understand it. That therefore in his going towards Sweden, he wrote that part again with his own hand, and sent it back to the same person (that had the former part of the volume committed to him) from Hamburgh. If the apologist read this preface, he ought, as I suppose to have desisted from the plea insisted on. If he did not, he thought assuredly he had much reason to despise them, with whom he had to do. But as I said, herein am I not concerned.

The consideration of the charge on the Annotations, relating to their tampering with the testimonies given in the Scripture to the Deity of Christ, being another head of the whole, may now have place.

The sum of what is to this purpose by me affirmed, is, that in the Annotations on the Old and New Testament, Grotius hath left but one place giving testimony clearly to the Deity of Christ. To this assertion I added both a limitation, and also an enlargement, in several respects. A limitation that

I could not perceive he had spoken of himself, clearly on that one place. On supposition that he did so, I granted that perhaps one or two places more, might accordingly be interpreted. That this one place is John i. 1. I expressly affirmed; that is the one place wherein, as I say, he spake not home to the business. The defence of the apologist in the behalf of Grotius, consists of sundry discourses. First, to disprove that he hath left more than that one of John free from the corruption charged; he instances in that one of John i. 1. wherein as he saith, he expressly asserts the Deity of Christ: but yet wisely foreseeing, that this instance would not evade the charge, having been expressly excepted (as to the present inquiry), and reserved to farther debate; he adds the places quoted by Grotius in the exposition of that place; as Prov. viii. 21—27. Isa. xlv. 12. xlviii. 13. 2 Pet. iii. 5. Col. i. 16. from all which he concludes, that the Annotations have left more testimonies to the Deity of Christ untampered withal and unperverted, than my assertion will allow; reckoning them all up again, section the 10th, and concluding himself a successful advocate in this case, or at least under a despair of ever being so in any, if he acquit not himself clearly in this. If his failure herein be evinced by the course of his late writings, himself will appear to be most concerned; I suppose, then, that on the view of this defence, men must needs suppose that in the Annotations on the places repeated, and mustered a second time by the apologist, Grotius does give their sense as bearing witness to the Deity of Christ. Others may be pleased to take it for granted without farther consideration; for my part being a little concerned to inquire, I shall take the pains to turn to the places, and give the reader a brief account of them.

For Prov. viii. his first note on the wisdom there spoken of is; 'Hæc de ea sapientia quæ in lege apparet exponunt Hæbræi, et sane ei, si non soli, at præcipue hæc attributa conveniunt.' Now if the attributes here mentioned, agree either solely or principally to the wisdom that shines in the law, how they can be the attributes of the person of the eternal Son of God, I see not. He adds no more to that purpose, until he comes to the 22d verse, the verse of old contested about with the Arians. His words on that are: 'Græcum Aquilæ, est, ἐκτέσατό με, ut et Symmachi et Theo-

dosionis, respondetque, bene Hæbræo קנני, et Chaldæus habet ברה, et LXX. ἔκτισε, sensu non malo, si creare sumas pro facere ut appareat: viæ Dei sunt operationes ipsius; sensum hujus loci et sequentium non male exprimas cum Philone de Coloniis; ὁ λογὸς ὁ πρεσβύτερος τῶν γένεσιν εἰληφὼτων, οὗ καθάπερ οἴακος ἐνειλημένος ὁ τῶν ὅλων γυβερνήτης πεδαλιουχεῖ τὰ σύμπαντα, καὶ ὁτε ἐκοσμοπλάστει χρησάμενος ὀργάνῳ τούτῳ πρὸς τὴν ἀνυπαίτιον τῶν ἀποτελουμένων σύστασιν.

On verse 27, he adds 'aderam, id est, ἦν πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν, ut infra John Evang. i. 1.' What clear and evident tesimony by this exposition is left in this place to the Deity of Christ, I profess myself as ignorant as I was before I received this direction by the apologist. He tells us, that קנני is rendered not amiss by the Chaldee ברה, and the LXX. ἔκτισε, though he knew that sense was pleaded by the Arians, and exploded by the ancient doctors of the church. To relieve this concession, he tells us that 'creare,' may be taken for 'facere ut appareat,' though there be no evidence of such a use of the word in Scripture, nor can he give any instance thereof. The whole interpretation runs on that wisdom that is a property of God, which he manifested in the works of creation: of the Son of God, the essential wisdom of God, subsisting with the Father, we have not one word: nor doth that quotation out of Philo relieve us in this business at all. We know in what sense he used the word ὁ λόγος; how far he and the Platonics, with whom in this expression he consented, were from understanding the only begotten Son of God, is known. If this of Philo has any aspect towards the opinion of any professing themselves Christians, it is towards that of the Arians, which seems to be expressed therein. And this is the place chosen by the apologist to disprove the assertion of none being left, under the sense given them by the Annotations, bearing clear testimony to the Deity of Christ; his comparing אני שם ibi ego, which the Vulgar renders 'aderam,' with ἦν πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν, seems rather to cast a suspicion on his intention in the expression of that place of the Evangelist, than in the least to give testimony to the Deity of Christ in this. If any one be farther desirous to be satisfied, how many clear unquestionable evidences of the Deity of Christ are slighted by these Annotations on this chapter, let him consult my vindication

of the place in my late 'Vindiciæ Evangelicæ,' where he will find something tendered to him to that purpose. What the apologist intended by adding these two places of Isaiah, chap. xlv. 12. and the xlviii. 13. (when in his Annotations on those places, Grotius not once mentions the Deity of Christ, nor any thing of him, nor hath occasion so to do, nor doth produce them in this place to any such end or purpose, but only to shew that the Chaldee paraphrase doth sundry times, when things are said to be done by God, render it, that they were done by the word of God), as instances to the prejudice of my assertion, I cannot imagine.

On that of Peter, 2 Epistle iii. 5. τῷ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγῳ, he adds indeed, 'vide quæ diximus ad initium Evangelii Johannis:' but neither doth that place intend the natural Son of God, nor is it so interpreted by Grotius.

To these he adds in the close; Col. i. 16. in the exposition whereof in his Annotations, he expressly prevaricates, and goes of to the interpretation insisted on by Socinus and his companions, which the apologist well knew. Without farther search upon what hath been spoken, the apologist gives in his verdict concerning the falseness of my assertion before-mentioned, of the annotator's speaking clear and home to the Deity of Christ but in one, if in one place of his Annotations. But,

1. What one other place hath he produced, whereby the contrary, to what I assert, is evinced? Any man may make apologies at this rate as fast as he pleases.

2. As to his not speaking clearly in that one, notwithstanding the improvement made of his expressions by the apologist, I am still of the same mind as formerly. For although he ascribes an eternity, τῷ λόγῳ, and affirms all things to be made thereby; yet considering how careful he is, of ascribing an ὑπόστασις, τῷ λόγῳ, how many Platonic interpretations of that expression he interweaves in his expositions, how he hath darkened the whole counsel of God in that place about the subsistence of the Word, its omnipotency and incarnation, so clearly asserted by the Holy Ghost therein, I see no reason to retract the assertion opposed. But yet as to the thing itself, about this place I will not contend: only it may not be amiss to observe, that not only the Arians, but even Photinus himself acknowledged that

the world was made τῷ Θεοῦ λώγῳ, that how little is obtained towards the confirmation of the Deity of Christ by that concession, may be discerned.

I shall offer also only at present, that ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ, is threefold, λόγος ὑποστατικὸς, ἐνδιάθετος, and προφορικὸς. The λόγος ὑποστατικὸς or οὐσιώδης is Christ, mentioned John i. 1. his personal or eternal subsistence, with his omnipotency, being there asserted. Whether Christ be so called any where else in the New Testament may be disputed: Luke i. 2. (compared with 1 John i. 1.) 2 Pet. i 16. Acts xx. 32. Heb. iv. 12. are the most likely to give us that use of the word. Why Christ is so termed, I have shewed elsewhere. That he is called דבר Psal. xxxiii. 6. is to me also evident. מלה is better rendered ῥῆμα, or λέξις, than λόγος. Where that word is used, it denotes not Christ: though 2 Sam. xxiii. 2. where that word is, is urged by some to that purpose. He is also called דבר Hag. ii. 5. so perhaps in other places. Our present Quakers would have that expression of the word of God, used nowhere in any other sense: so that destroying that, as they do, in the issue they may freely despise the Scripture, as that which they say is not the word of God, nor any where so called. Λόγος ἐνδιάθετος amongst men, is that which Aristotle calls, τὸν ἔσω λόγον· λόγος ἐν νῷ λαμβανόμενος, says Hesychius. Λόγος ἐνδιάθετος is that which we speak in our hearts, says Damascen. de Orthod. Fid. lib. 1. cap. 18. So Psal. xiv. 1. אמר נבל בלבו. This as spoken in respect of God, is that egress of his power, whereby according to the eternal conception of his mind, he worketh any thing. So Gen. i. 2. 'God said, Let there be light, and there was light.' Of this word of God the Psalmist treats, cxlvii. ver. 18. 'he sendeth out דברו and melteth the ice,' and Psal. cxlviii. 8. the same word is used. In both which places the Septuagint renders it by ὁ λόγος. This is that which is called ῥῆμα τῆς δυνάμεως, Heb. i. 3. xi. 3. where the apostle says, the heavens were made ῥήματι Θεοῦ, which is directly parallel to that place of 2 Pet. iii. 5. where it is expressed τῷ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγῳ: for though ῥῆμα more properly denotes λόγον προφορικὸν, yet in these places, it signifies plainly that egress of God's power for the production and preservation of things, being a pursuit of the eternal conception of his mind, which is λογος ενδιάθετος.

Now this infinite, wise, and eternal conception of the mind of God, exerting itself in power, wherein God is said to speak, 'he said, Let there be light,' is that which the Platonics, and Philo with them, harped on, never once dreaming of a co-essential and hypostatical word of God, though the word ἀπόστασις occur amongst them. This they thought was unto God, as in us, λόγος ἐνδιάθετος or ὁ ἔσω, πρὸς νοῦν and particularly it is termed by Philo, φωνὴ τῆς διανοίας εὑρυνομένη· de Agric. That this was his ὁ λόγος is most evident. Hence he tells us, οὐδὲν ἂν ἕτερον εἶποι τὸν νοητὸν εἶναι κόσμον ἢ Θεοῦ λόγον ἤδη κοσμοποιοῦνος. οὐδε γὰρ ἡ νοητὴ πόλις ἕτερόν τι ἐστὶν, ἢ ὁ τοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος λογισμὸς, ἤδη τὴν νοητὴν πόλιν κτίζειν διανουμένου. Μωσέως γὰρ τὸ δόγμα τοῦτό, οὐκ ἐμὸν· de Mund. Opific. and a little after, τὸν δὲ ἀόρατον καὶ νοητὸν θεῖον λόγον, εἰκόνα λέγει Θεοῦ· καὶ ταύτης εἰκόνα τὸν νοητὸν φῶς ἐκεῖνο, ὃ θείου λόγοῦ γέγονεν εἰκὼν τοῦ διερμηνεύσαντος τὴν γένεσιν αυτοῦ· et ἐστιν ὑπερουράνιος ἀστὴρ. The whole tendency of his discourse is, that the word of God, in his mind, in the creation of the world, was the image of himself; and that the idea or image of the things to be made, but especially of light. And whereas (if I remember aright, for I cannot now find the place) I have said somewhere, that Christ was λόγος ἐνδιάθετος, though therein I have the consent of very many learned divines, and used it merely in opposition τῷ προφορικῷ; yet I desire to recall it: nor do I think there is any propriety in that expression of ἔμφυτος used of Christ, but only in those of ὑποστάτικος and οὐσιωδης, which the Scripture (though not in the very terms) will make good. In this second acceptation, τοῦ λόγοῦ, Photinus himself granted that the world was made by the word of God. Now if it be thought necessary, that I should give an account of my fear that nothing but ὁ λόγος in this sense, decked with many platonical encomiums, was intended in the Annotations on John i. (though I confess much, from some quotations there used, may be said against it) I shall readily undertake the task; but at present in this running course, I shall add no more.

But now, as if all the matter in hand were fully despatched, we have this triumphant close attending the former discourse and observations.

'If one text acknowledged to assert Christ's eternal divi-

nity' (which one was granted to do it, though not clearly), 'will not suffice to conclude him no Socinian' (which I said not he was, yea, expressly waved the management of any such charge); 'if six verses in the Proverbs, two in Isaiah, one in St. Peter, one in St. Paul, added to many in the beginning of St. John' (in his Annotations, on all which he speaks not one word to the purpose), 'will not yet amount to above one text; or lastly, if that one may be doubted of also, which is by him interpreted to affirm Christ's eternal subsistence with God before the creation of the world' (which he doth not so interpret, as to a personal subsistence), 'and that the whole world was created by him; I shall despair of ever being a successful advocate for any man;' from which condition I hope some little time will recover the apologist.

This is the sum of what is pleaded in chief, for the defence of the Annotations: wherein what small cause he hath to acquiesce, who hath been put to the labour and trouble of vindicating near forty texts of Scripture, in the Old Testament and New, giving express testimony to the Deity of Christ from the annotator's perverse interpretations, let the reader judge. In the 13th section of the apologist's discourse, he adds some other considerations to confirm his former vindication of the Annotations.

1. He tells us, that he 'professeth not to divine what places of the Old Testament, wherein the Deity of Christ is evidently testified unto, are corrupted by the learned man, nor will he upon the discouragement already received make any inquiry into my treatise.'

But what need of divination? The apologist cannot but remember at all times, some of the texts of the Old Testament that are pleaded to that purpose; and he hath at least as many encouragements to look into the Annotations, as discouragements from casting an eye upon that volume as he calls it, wherein they are called to an account. And if he suppose he can make a just defence for the several places so wrested and perverted, without once consulting of them, I know not how by me he might possibly be engaged into such an inquiry. And therefore I shall not name them again, having done somewhat more than name them already.

But he hath two suppletory considerations, that will

render any such inquiry or inspection needless. Of these the first is,

'That the word of God being all and every part of it of equal truth, that doctrine which is founded on five places of divine writ, must by all Christians be acknowledged to be as irrefragably confirmed, as a hundred express places would be conceived to confirm it.'

Ans. It is confessed, that not only five, but any one express text of Scripture, is sufficient for the confirmation of any divine truth. But that five places have been produced out of the Annotations by the apologist for the confirmation of the great truth pleaded about, is but pretended, indeed there is no such thing. The charge on Grotius was, that he had depraved all but one: if that be no crime, the defence was at hand; if it be, though that one should be acknowledged to be clear to that purpose, here is no defence against that which was charged, but a strife about that which was not. Let the places be consulted, if the assertion prove true, by an induction of instances, the crime is to be confessed, or else the charge denied to contain a crime. But,

Secondly, he says, 'That this charge upon inquiry will be found in some degree, if not equally, chargeable on the learnedest and most valuable of the first reformers, particularly upon Mr. Calvin himself, who hath been as bitterly and unjustly accused and reviled upon this account (witness the book intitled 'Calvino Turcismus') as ever Erasmus was by Bellarmine and Beza, or as probably Grotius may be.'

Though this at the best be but a diversion of the charge, and no defence, yet, not containing that truth which is needful to countenance it, for the end for which it is proposed; I could not pass it by. It is denied (which in this case until farther proof must suffice) that any of the learnedest of the first reformers, and particularly Mr. Calvin, are equally chargeable, or in any degree of proportion with Grotius, as to the crime insisted on. Calvin being the man instanced in, I desire the apologist to prove that he hath in all his commentaries on the Scripture, corrupted the sense of any texts of the Old Testament or New, giving express testimony to the Deity of Christ, and commonly pleaded to that end and purpose. Although I deny not, but that he differs from

the common judgment of most, in the interpretation of some few prophetical passages, judged by them to relate to Christ. I know what Genebrard and some others of that faction, raved against him; but it was chiefly from some expressions in his institutions about the Trinity (wherein yet he is acquitted by the most learned of themselves) and not from his expositions of Scripture, for which they raised their clamours. For the book called 'Calvino Turcismus,' written by Reynolds and Giffard, the apologist has forgotten the design of it. Calvin is no more concerned in it, than others of the first reformers; nor is it from any doctrine about the Deity of Christ in particular, but from the whole of the reformed religion, with the apostacies of some of that profession, that they compare it with Turcism. Something indeed, in a chapter or two, they speak about the Trinity, from some expressions of Luther, Melancthon, Calvin, and others: but as to Calvin's expositions of Scripture, they insist not on them. Possibly the apologist may have seen Pareus's 'Calvinus Orthodoxus,' in answer to Hunnius's 'Calvinus Judaizans;' if not, he may at any time have there an account of this calumny.

Having passed through the consideration of the two considerable heads of this discourse, in the method called for by the apologist (having only taken liberty to transpose them, as to first and last) I must profess myself as yet unsatisfied as to the necessity, or suitableness, of this kind of defence. The sum of that which I affirmed (which alone gives occasion to the defensative now under consideration) is, that to my observation, Grotius, in his Annotations had not left above one text of Scripture, if one, giving clear evidence to the Deity of Christ; of his satisfaction I said in sum the same thing. Had the apologist been pleased to have produced instances of any evidence for the disprovement of my assertion; I should very gladly and readily have acknowledged my mistake and oversight. I am still also in the same resolution, as to the latitude of the expression, though I have already by an induction of particulars, manifested his corrupting and perverting of so many, both in respect of the one head and of the other, with his express compliance with the Socinians in his so doing, as that I cannot have the least thought of letting fall my charge, which, with

render any such inquiry or inspection (observation), contains the first is, [illegible] it that which is so.

'That the word of God being [illegible] have done somewhat equal truth, that doctrine which is [illegible], than thus occasion- divine writ, must by all Christians corruption in general; as irrefragably confirmed, as a [illegible] mdication of the truths of be conceived to confirm it.' [illegible] the false glosses put upon

Ans. It is confessed, that [illegible] places of Scripture wherein press text of Scripture, is [illegible] work being fallen on an abler any divine truth. But the [illegible] professor of divinity, my de- out of the Annotations b[illegible] of my endeavour for that of the great truth ple[illegible] there is no such thing. [illegible] particulars insisted on by the had depraved all but [illegible] of rhetoric is laid out about was at hand; if it b[illegible] not the reader's trouble in ledged to be clear t[illegible] about them. If they did, it that which was c[illegible] discover his mistakes in them all not. Let the pla[illegible] of most of them, lies in that which by an inductio[illegible] he says, that 'I thus state the jea- or else the c[illegible] is owned by me, viz. that being

Second[illegible] closed in many things with the found in [illegible] replies, that 'this does not so edest and [illegible] was a Papist.' upon [illegible] prove Grotius to be a Papist, just[illegible] the management of the jealousy, bo[illegible] all own it, all which are I[illegible] whether he was in doctrine a [illegible] before insisted on, deter- [illegible] with the Roman interest or no, [illegible] observed by others, I desire the apo- [illegible] on Rev. xii. 5. that book [illegible] received his last hand. But [illegible] Grotius, or to charge his me- [illegible] prevarication in his Annotations

[illegible] press the general aphorism (as [illegible] &c. nor any person whatever [illegible] to Christ the head, by the same [illegible] and in the sense thereof, perfecting ho-

[illegible] Scyllam, iterumque; ad [illegible]

the fear of God, shall ever see his face in glory, so not what conclusion can regularly in reference to any person living or dead, be thence deduced.

It is of the Annotations whereof I have spoken, which I have my liberty to do: and I presume shall still continue, whilst I live in the same thoughts of them: though I should see a third defence of the learned Hugo Grotius.

The Epistles of Grotius to Crellius mentioned by the apologist in his first defence of him, giving some light to what hath been insisted on, I thought it not unfit to communicate them to the reader, as they came to my hand, having not as yet been printed that I know of.

Reverendo summæque eruditionis ac pietatis viro Domino Johanni Crellio pastori Racov. H. G. S.

'Libro tuo[b] quo ad eum quem ego quondam scripseram (Eruditissime Crelli) respondisti, adeo offensus non fui, ut etiam gratias tunc intra animum meum egerim, nunc et hisce agam literis. Primo, quod non tantum humane, sed et valde officiose mecum egeris, ita ut quæri nihil possim, nisi quod in me prædicando, modum interdum excedis, deinde vero, quod multa me docueris, partim utilia, partim jucunda scitu, meque exemplo tuo incitaveris ad penitius expendendum sensus sacrorum librorum. Bene autem in Epistola tua quæ mihi longe gratissima advenit, de me judicas, non esse me eorum in numero qui ob sententias salva pietate dissidentes alieno a quoquam sim animo, aut boni alicujus amicitiam repudiem. Equidem in libro[c] 'de vera Religione,' quem jam percurri, relecturus et posthac, multa invenio summo cum judicio observata. Illud vero sæculo gratulor, repertos homines qui nentiquam in controversiis subtilibus tantum ponunt, quantum in vera vitæ emendatione, et quotidiano ad sanctitatem profectu. Utinam et mea scripta aliquid ad hoc studium in animis hominum excitandum inflammandumque; conferre possint: tunc enim non frustra me vixisse hactenus existimem. Liber 'de veritate Religionis Christianæ' magis ut nobis esset solatio, quam ut aliis documento scriptus, non video

[b] This book of Crellius lay unanswered by Grotius above twenty years. For long he lived after the publishing of it. It is since fully answered by Essenius.

[c] That is the body of Socinian divinity written by Crellius and Volkelius.

quid post tot aliorum labores utilitatis afferre possit, nisi ipsa forte brevitate. Siquid tamen in eo est, quod tibi tuique similibus placeat, mihi supra evenit. Libris 'de jure Belli et Pacis' mihi præcipue propositum habui, ut feritatem illam, non Christianis tantum, sed et hominibus indignam, ad bella pro libitu suscipienda, pro libitu gerenda, quam gliscere tot populorum malo quotidie video, quantum in me est, sedarem. Gaudeo ad principum quorundam manus eos libros venisse, qui utinam partem eorum meliorem in suum animum admitterent. Nullus enim mihi ex eo labore suavior fructus contingere possit. Te vero quod attinet, credas, rogo, si quid unquam facere possim tui, aut eorum quos singulariter amas, causa, experturum te, quantum te tuo merito faciam. Nunc quum aliud possim nihil, Dominum Jesum supplice animo veneror, ut tibi aliisque; pietatem promoventibus propitius adsit.

x. Maii. M. DC. XXVI.
Tui nominis studiosissimus. H. G.

Tam pro Epistola (vir Clarissime) quam pro transmisso libro, gratias ago maximas. Constitui et legere et relegere diligenter quæcunque a te proficiscuntur, expertus quo cum fructu id antehac fecerim. Eo ipso tempore quo literas tuas accepi, versabar in lectione tuæ interpretationis in[d] Epistolam ad Galatas. Quantum judicare possum et scripti occasionem et propositum, et totam seriem dictionis, ut magna cum cura indagasti, ita feliciter admodum es assequutus. Quare Deum precor, ut et tibi et tui similibus, vitam det, et quæ alia ad istiusmodi labores necessaria. Mihi ad juvandam communem Christianismi causam, utinam tam adessent vires, quam promptus est animus: quippe me, a prima ætate, per varia disciplinarum genera jactatum, nulla res magis delectavit, quam rerum sacrarum meditatio. Id in rebus prosperis moderamen, id in adversis solamen sensi. Pacis consilia et amavi semper et amo nunc quoque; eoque doleo, quum video, tam pertinacibus iris committi inter se eos, qui Christi se esse dicunt. Si recte rem putamus, quantillis de causis———

Januarii. M. DC. XXXII. Amstelodam.

[d] Let the reader judge what annotations on that Epistle we are to expect from this man.

A

DISSERTATION

ON

DIVINE JUSTICE:

OR THE

CLAIMS OF VINDICATORY JUSTICE ASSERTED.

IN

THIS WORK THAT ESSENTIAL PROPERTY OF THE DIVINE NATURE IS DEMONSTRATED FROM THE SACRED WRITINGS, AND CLEARLY DEFENDED AGAINST SOCINUS AND HIS FOLLOWERS:

LIKEWISE,

THE NECESSARY EXERCISE THEREOF; TOGETHER WITH THE INDISPENSABLE NECESSITY OF THE SATISFACTION OF CHRIST FOR THE SALVATION OF SINNERS IS ESTABLISHED AGAINST VARIOUS CELEBRATED WRITERS.

NOW FIRST TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL LATIN.

WITH

A RECOMMENDATORY PREFACE

BY THE REV. JOHN STAFFORD, D. D.

AND OTHERS.

As the Publisher, in compliance with the wishes of many of the Subscribers to the Works of Dr. OWEN, had resolved on printing the following Translation of his 'Diatriba de Justicia Divina,' no place in the series appeared more suitable and convenient than the present. The translation was made by a Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. ORME, in his Memoirs of Dr. OWEN, pronounces it to be, 'on the whole, well executed, but rather too literal.' I have retained the recommendatory Preface and the Translator's Notes.—EDITOR.

TO THE PUBLIC.

THE numerous and valuable writings of Dr. Owen, have long ago, secured his praise in all the churches, as a first-rate writer upon theological subjects. Any recommendation, therefore, of the present work, seems unnecessary. As the Treatise, however, now offered to the public, has long been locked up in a dead language, it may not be improper to say, what will be granted by all competent judges, that the author discovers an uncommon acquaintance with his subject; that he has clearly explained the nature of Divine Justice, and demonstrated it to be, not merely an arbitrary thing, depending upon the sovereign pleasure of the Supreme Lawgiver, but essential to the divine nature. In doing this, he has overthrown the arguments of the Socinians and others against the atonement of Christ, and proved, that a complete satisfaction to the law and justice of God was necessary, in order that sinners might be pardoned, justified, sanctified, and eternally saved, consistently with the honour of all the divine perfections.

Whoever makes himself master of the doctor's reasoning in the following treatise, will be able to answer all the objections and cavils of the enemies of the truth therein contended for. It is therefore, earnestly recommended to the attention, and careful perusal of all, who wish to obtain right ideas of God,

the nature and extent of the divine law, the horrid nature and demerit of sin, &c. but especially to the attention of young divines. The translation upon the whole, is faithful. If it have any fault, it is perhaps its being too literal.

That it may meet with that reception which it justly merits from the public, and which the importance of the subject demands, is the earnest prayer of the servants in the gospel of Christ,

S. STAFFORD, D. D.
J. RYLAND, sen. M. A.
ROB. SIMPSON.

THE

PREFACE TO THE READER.

As perhaps, learned reader, you will think it strange, that I, who have such abundance of various and laborious employment of another kind, should think of publishing such a work as this; it may not be improper to lay before you a summary account of the reasons that induced me to this undertaking: and I do it the rather, that this little production may escape free from the injurious suspicions, which the manners of the times are but too apt to affix to works of this kind. It is now four months and upwards, since in the usual course of duty in defending certain theological theses in our university, it fell to my lot, to discourse and dispute on the vindicatory justice of God, and the necessity of its exercise, on the supposition of the existence of sin. Although these observations were directed to the best of my abilities immediately against the Socinians, yet, it being understood that many very respectable theologians entertained sentiments on this subject very different from mine, and although the warmest opposers of what we then maintained were obliged to acknowledge that our arguments are quite decisive against the adversaries, yet there were not wanting some who not altogether agreeing with us, employed themselves in strictures upon our opinion, and accused it of error, while others continued wavering, and in the diversity of opinions, knew not on which to fix. Much controversy ensuing in consequence of this, I agreed with some learned men to enter, both in writings and conversation upon an orderly and deliberate

investigation of the subject. And after the scruples of several had been removed by a more full consideration of our opinion (to effect which, the following considerations chiefly contributed, viz. that they clearly saw this doctrine conduced to the establishment of the necessity of the satisfaction of Jesus Christ, a precious truth which these worthy and good men, partakers of the grace and gift of righteousness through means of the blood of Christ, not only warmly favoured, but dearly venerated as the most honourable treasure of the church, the seed of a blessed immortality, and the darling jewel of our religion), I was greatly encouraged in the conferences with these gentlemen to take a deeper view of the subject, and to examine it more closely for the future benefit of mankind.

Besides several of those who had before examined, and were acquainted with our sentiments, or to whom, in consequence of our short discourse in the university on the subject, they began to be more acceptable; and these too considerable both for their number and rank, ceased not to urge me to a more close consideration and accurate review of the controversy. For in that public dissertation, it being confined, according to the general custom of such exercises in universities, within the narrow limits of an hour, I could only slightly touch on the nature of vindicatory justice; whereas the rules and limits of such exercises would not permit me to enter on the chief point, the great hinge of the controversy, viz. concerning the necessary exercise of that justice: this is the difficulty that requires the abilities of the most judicious and acute to investigate and solve. In this situation of matters, not only a more full view of the whole state of the controversy, but likewise of the weight of those arguments on which the truth of that

side of the question which we have espoused depends, as also an explanation and confutation of certain subtleties, whereby the opponents had embarrassed the minds of some inquirers after truth, became objects of general request. And, indeed, such were the circumstances of this controversy, that any one might easily perceive that a scholastic dissertation on the subject must take a very different turn, and could bear no farther resemblance, and owe nothing more to the former exercise than the having furnished an opportunity, or occasion, for its appearance in public.

Although then I was more than sufficiently full of employment already, yet, being excited by the encouragement of good men, and fully persuaded in my own mind, that the truth which we embrace, is so far from being of trivial consequence in our religion, that it is intimately connected with many, the most important articles of the Christian doctrine concerning the attributes of God, the satisfaction of Christ, and the nature of sin, and of our obedience; and that it strikes its roots deep through almost the whole of theology, or the acknowledging of the truth, which is according to godliness; fully persuaded, I say, of these facts, I prevailed with myself, rather than this doctrine should remain any longer neglected or buried, and hardly even known by name; or be held captive by the reasonings of some enslaving the minds of mankind, 'through philosophy and vain conceits,' to exert my best abilities in its declaration and defence. Several things, however, which, with your good leave, reader, I shall now mention, almost deterred me from the task when begun: the first and chief was the great difficulty of the subject itself, which among the more abstruse points of truth, is by no means the least abstruse. For, as every divine

truth has a peculiar majesty and reverence belonging to it, which debars from the spiritual knowledge of it (as it is in Christ), the ignorant and unstable; that is, those who are not taught of God, or become subject to the truth; so those points which dwell in more intimate recesses, and approach nearer its immense fountain, the 'Father of light,' darting brighter rays, by their excess of light, present a confounding darkness to the minds of the greatest men, and are as darkness to the eyes breaking forth amidst so great light. For what we call darkness in divine subjects, is nothing else than their celestial glory and splendour striking on the weak ball of our eyes, the rays of which we are not able, in this life, which 'is but a vapour, and which shineth but for a little,' to bear. Hence God himself, who is 'light, and in whom there is no darkness at all, who dwelleth in light inaccessible; and who clotheth himself with light as with a garment;' in respect of us, is said, 'to have made darkness his pavilion.'

Not, as the Roman Catholics say, that there is any reason that we should blasphemously accuse the Holy Scriptures of obscurity; 'for the law of the Lord is perfect, converting the soul: the testimony of the Lord is sure, making wise the simple. The statutes of the Lord are right, rejoicing the heart; the commandment of the Lord is pure, enlightening the eyes.' Nor is there reason to complain that any one part of the truth hath been too sparingly or obscurely revealed: for even the smallest portion of the divine word is, by the grace of the Holy Spirit assisting to dispose and frame the subject, or our hearts, so as to view the bright object of divine truth in its proper and spiritual light, sufficient to communicate the knowledge of truths of the last importance: for, it is owing to the nature of the doctrines them-

selves, and their exceeding splendour, that there are some things hard to be conceived and interpreted, and which surpass our capacity and comprehension. Whether this article of divine truth, which we are now inquiring into, be not akin to those which we have now mentioned, let the learned[a] judge and determine. I have, therefore, determined to place my chief dependance on his aid, 'who giveth to all liberally and upbraideth none.' For those unhappy gentlemen only lose their labour, and may not improperly be compared to the artists, who used more than common exertions in building Noah's[b] ark, and who, like bees, work for others, and not for themselves, in the search of truth, who, relying on their own abilities and industry, use every effort to ascertain and comprehend divine truths, while at the same time, they continue regardless, whether 'he who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath hitherto shone into their hearts, to give them the light of the knowledge of his glory, in the face of Jesus Christ:' for, after all, they can accomplish nothing more, by their utmost efforts, but to discover their technical or artificial ignorance.

Setting aside then the consideration of some phrases, and even of some arguments; yet, as to what relates to the principal point of the controversy, I hold myself bound in conscience and in honour, not even to imagine that I have attained a proper knowledge of any one article of truth, much less to publish it, unless through the Holy Spirit I have had such a taste of it, in its spiritual sense, as that I may be able, from the heart, to say, with the psalm-

[a] Especially those, says the author, who shall reflect what a close connexion there is between it, and the whole doctrine concerning the nature of God, the satisfaction of Christ, the desert of sin, and every one of the dark and more abstruse heads of our religion.

[b] Thereby hastening their own destruction.

ist, 'I have believed, and therefore have I spoken.' He, who in the investigation of truth, makes it his chief care to have his mind and will rendered subject to the faith, and obedient to the Father of lights, and who with attention waits upon him, whose throne is in the heavens; he alone attains to true wisdom, the others walk in a vain shew. It has then been my principal object, in tracing the depths and secret nature of the subject in question, while I a poor worm contemplated the majesty and glory of him, concerning whose perfections I was treating, to attend and obey with all humility and reverence, what the great God, the Lord hath spoken in his word: not at all doubting, but that whatever way he should incline my heart by the power of his Spirit and truth, I should be enabled, in a dependance on his aid, to bear the contradictions of a false knowledge, and all human and philosophical arguments.

And to say the truth, as I have adopted the opinion which I defend in this dissertation, from no regard to the arguments of either one or another learned man, and much less from any slavish attachment to authority, example, or traditionary prejudices, and from no confidence in the opinion, or abilities of others; but, as I hope, from a most humble contemplation of the holiness, purity, justice, right, dominion, wisdom, and mercy of God; so by the guidance of his Spirit alone, and power of his heart-changing grace, filling my mind with all the fulness of truth, and striking me with a deep awe and admiration of it, I have been enabled to surmount the difficulty of the research. Theology is the 'wisdom that is from above,' a habit of grace and spiritual gifts, the manifestation of the Spirit reporting what is conducive to happiness. It is not a science to be learned from the precepts of man, or from the rules of arts,

or method of other sciences, as those represent it, who also maintain that a natural man may attain all that artificial and methodical theology, even though in the matters of God, and mysteries of the gospel, he be blinder than a mole. What a distinguished theologian must he be, 'who receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God!'

But again, having sailed through this sea of troubles, and being ready to launch out upon the subject, that gigantic spectre, 'It is every where spoken against,' should have occasioned me no delay, had it not come forth inscribed with the mighty names of Augustine, Calvin, Musculus, Twiss, and Vossius. And although I could not but entertain for these divines that honour and respect which is due to such great names, yet, partly by considering myself as entitled to 'that freedom wherewith CHRIST hath made us free,' and partly by opposing to these, the names of other very learned theologians, viz. Pareus, Piscator, Molineus, Lubertus, Rivetus, Cameron, Maccovius, Junius, and others, who, after the spreading of the poison of Socinianism, have with great accuracy and caution investigated and cleared up this truth, I easily got rid of any uneasiness from that quarter.

Having thus surmounted these difficulties, and begun the undertaking by devoting to it a few leisure hours stolen from other engagements, the work prospered boyond all expectation; and by the favour of the 'Father of lights, who worketh in us both to will and to do of his good pleasure,' in a few days it was brought to a conclusion.

And now that the labour of composing was ended, I again entertained doubts, and continued for some time in suspense, whether, considering the manners of the times in which we live, it would not be more prudent

to throw the papers, with some other kindred compositions, on other subjects of divinity, into some secret coffers, there to be buried in eternal oblivion, than bring them forth to public discussion.

For even all know, with what vain arrogance, malice, party-spirit, and eager lust of attacking the labours of others, the minds of many are corrupted and infected. Not only then was it necessary, that I should anticipate and digest in my mind the contempt and scoffings, which these bantering, saucy, dull-witted, self-sufficient despisers of others, or any of such a contemptible race, whose greatest pleasure it is to disparage all kinds of exertions, however praiseworthy, might pour out against me; but I likewise foresaw, that I should have to contend with the soured tempers and prejudiced opinions of others, who being carried away by party-zeal, and roused by the unexpected state and condition of public [d] affairs, and who thinking themselves to be the men, and that wisdom was born and will die with them, look down with contempt upon all who differ from them; and not with these only, but I likewise knew, that I had a more severe scrutiny to undergo from some learned men, to whom, it was easy to conjecture this work, for many reasons would not be acceptable. For there are some by whom all labour employed in the search of any more obscure or difficult truth, is accounted as misemployed: nor do these want the ingenuity of assigning honourable pretences for their indolence. I should however be ashamed to enter into any serious argument with such, nor is it worth while to enter upon a review of their long declamations. And although these and many other things of such a kind, may appear grievous and hard to be borne to your dainty

[d] This treatise was written in the time of the Commonwealth.

gentlemen, who eagerly court splendour and fame; yet, ingenuously to say the truth, I am very fully persuaded, that no man can either think or speak of me and my works, with so much disregard and contempt, as I myself, from my soul both think and speak; and having in no respect any other expectation than that of contempt to myself and name, provided divine truth be promoted, all these considerations had long ago become not only of small consequence to me, but appeared as the merest trifles. For why should we be anxious about what shall become either of ourselves or our names: if only we 'commend our souls to God as to a faithful Creator in well-doing,' and by continuing in well-doing, 'stop the mouth of ignorant bablers.' God careth for us: 'Let us cast our burdens upon him, and he will sustain us.' Let but the truth triumph, vanquish, rout, and put to flight its enemies. 'Let the word of the cross have free course and be glorified.' Let wretched sinners learn daily more and more 'of fellowship with Christ in his sufferings;' of the necessity of satisfaction for sins, by the blood of the Son of God, so 'that he who is white and ruddy, and the chiefest among ten thousand, may appear so to them, yea, altogether lovely;' till being admitted into the chambers of the Church's husband, 'they drink love that is better than wine, and become a willing people in the day of his power, and in the beauty of holiness;' and I shall very little regard, 'being judged of man's judgment.'

Since then, I not only have believed what I have spoken, but as both my own heart, and God who is greater than my heart, are witnesses, that I have engaged in this labour for the truth, under the influence of the most sacred regard and reverence, for the majesty, purity, holiness, justice, grace, and mercy of

God, from a detestation of that abominable thing which his soul hateth; and with a heart inflamed with zeal for the honour and glory of our dearest Saviour Jesus Christ, who is fairer than the sons of men and altogether lovely, whom with my soul and all that is within me I worship, love, and adore, whose glorious coming I wish and long for ('come Lord Jesus, come quickly'), for 'whose sake I count all things but as loss and dung;' since, I say, I have engaged in this labour from these motives alone, I am under no anxiety or doubt, but it will meet with a favourable reception from impartial judges, from those acquainted with the terrors of the Lord, the curse of the law, the virtue of the cross, the power of the gospel, and the riches of the glory of divine grace.

There are, no doubt, many other portions and subjects of our religion, of that blessed trust committed to us for our instruction, on which we might dwell with greater pleasure and satisfaction of mind. Such I mean as afford a more free and wider scope of ranging, through the most pleasant meads of the Holy Scripture, and contemplating in these the transparent fountains of life, and rivers of consolation: subjects which unencumbered by the thickets of scholastic terms and distinctions, unembarassed by the impediments and sophisms of an enslaving philosophy or false knowledge, sweetly and pleasantly lead into a pure, unmixed, and delightful fellowship with the Father and with his Son, shedding abroad in the heart, the inmost loves of our beloved, with the odour of his sweet ointment poured forth.

This truth likewise has its uses, and such as are of the greatest importance to those who are walking in the way of holiness and evangelical obedience. A brief specimen and abstract of them is added, for the

benefit of the pious reader, in the end of the dissertation, in order to excite his love towards our beloved High Priest and Chief Shepherd, and true fear towards God, 'who is a consuming fire,' and whom we cannot serve acceptably, unless with 'reverence and godly fear.'

There can be no doubt, but that many points of doctrine still remain, on which the labours of the godly and learned may be usefully employed. For, although many reverend and learned divines, both of the present and former age, have composed from the Sacred Writings a synopsis, or methodical body of doctrine, or heavenly truth, and published their compositions under various titles; and, although other theological writings, catechistical, dogmatical, exegetical, casuistical, and polemical, have increased to such a mass, that the 'world can hardly contain the works that have been written;' yet, such is the nature of divine truth, so deep and inexhaustible the fountain of the Sacred Scriptures, whence we draw it, so innumerable the salutary remedies and antidotes proposed in these to dispel all the poisons and temptations wherewith the adversary can ever attack either the minds of the pious, or the peace of the church, and the true doctrine, that serious and thinking men can entertain no doubt, but that we perform a service praiseworthy and profitable to the church of Christ, when, under the direction of 'the Spirit of wisdom and revelation,' we bring forward, explain, and defend the most important and necessary articles of evangelical truth.

But, to be more particular: how sparingly, for instance, yea, how obscurely, how confusedly, is the whole economy of the Spirit towards believers (one of the greatest mysteries of our religion; a most invaluable portion of the salvation brought about for

us by Christ), described by divines in general? Or rather, by the most, is it not altogether neglected? In their catechisms, common-place books, public and private theses, systems, compends, &c. and even, in their commentaries, harmonies, and expositions, concerning the indwelling, sealing testimony, unction, and consolation of the Spirit. Good God! concerning this inestimable fruit of the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ! This invaluable treasure of the godly, though copiously revealed and explained in the Scriptures, there is almost a total silence. And, with regard to union and communion with Christ, and with his Father, and our Father, and some other doctrines respecting his person, as the husband and head of the church, the same observation holds good.

For almost, from the very period in which they were capable of judging even of the first principles of religion, the orthodox have applied themselves to clear up and explain those articles of the truth, which Satan, by his various artifices, hath endeavoured to darken, pervert, or undermine. But as there is no part of divine truth, which, since the eternal and sworn enmity took place between him and the seed of the woman, he hath not opposed with all his might, fury, and cunning; so he hath not thought proper, wholly to entrust the success of his interest to instruments delegated from among mankind, though many of them seem to have discovered such a wonderful promptitude, alacrity, and zeal, in transacting his business, that one would think they had been formed and fashioned for the purpose; but he hath reserved for that power which he hath over darkness and all kind of wickedness, a certain portion of his work to be administered in a peculiar manner by himself. And, as he has, in all

ages, reaped an abundant crop of tares from that part of his Lordship which he hired out to be improved by man, though from the nature of human affairs, not without much noise, tumult, blood, and slaughter; so from that which he thought proper to manage himself, without any delegated assistance, he has received a more abundant and richer crop of infernal fruit.

The exertions of Satan against the truth of the gospel may be distinguished into two divisions. In the first, as the god of this world, he endeavours to darken the minds of unbelievers, 'that the light of the glorious gospel of Christ may not shine into them.' With what success he exercises this soul-destroying employment we cannot pretend to say; but there is reason to lament that he hath succeeded, and still succeeds, beyond his utmost hope. In the other, he carries on an implacable war, an unremitting strife, not as formerly with Michael about the body of Moses, but about the Spirit of Christ; about some of the more distinguished articles of the truth, and the application of each of them, in order to cultivate communion with God the Father and with his Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, against the hearts of the godly, and the new creature formed within them.

In this situation of affairs, most Christian writers have made it their study to oppose that first effort of the devil, whereby, through means of his instruments, he openly endeavours to suppress the light, both natural and revealed; but they have not been equally solicitous to succour the minds of believers, 'when wrestling, not against flesh and blood, but against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spirits of wickedness in high places,' and almost ready to sink under the contest. Hence, I say, a very minute investigation

hath been set on foot by many, of those articles of religion which he has openly, through the instrumentality of the slaves of error and darkness, attacked, and the vindication of them made clear and plain. But those, which, both from their relation to practice, and a holy communion full of spiritual joy, to be cultivated with God, the old serpent hath reserved for his own attack in the hearts of believers, most writers, partly either because they were ignorant of his wiles, or partly because they saw not much evil publicly arising thence, and partly because the arguments of the adversary were not founded on any general principle, but only to be deduced from the private and particular state and case of individuals, have either passed over, or very slightly touched upon.

As to what pertains to theology itself, or that 'knowledge of the truth which is according to godliness,' wherewith being filled, 'we ourselves become pure and perfected to every good work,' and fit ministers of the New Testament, 'not of the letter, but of the Spirit, apt to teach, rightly dividing the word of truth;' that subject, I say, though a common and chief topic in the writings both of the schoolmen and others on religion, many have acknowledged to their fatal experience, when too late, is treated in too perplexed and intricate a manner to be of any real and general service.

For while they are warmly employed in disputing, whether theology be an art or a science, and whether it be a speculative or practical art or science? And while they attempt to measure it exactly by those rules, laws, and methods, which human reason has devised for other sciences, thus endeavouring to render it more plain and clear, they find themselves, to the grief and sorrow of many candidates for the truth, entangled in inextricable difficulties, and left in possession only of a human system of doctrines, having little or no

connexion at all with true theology. I hope, therefore, 'if I live and the Lord will,' to publish, but from no desire of gainsaying any one, some specimens of evangelical truth on the points before-mentioned, as well as on other subjects.*

As to the work that I have now in hand, the first part of the dissertation is, concerning the cause of the death of Christ; and in the execution of which I have the greatest pleasure and satisfaction (though proudly defied by the adversaries, so conceited with themselves and their productions are they), because 'I have determined to know nothing but Jesus Christ and him crucified:' at least, nothing that could divert my attention from that subject.

But now, learned reader, lest, as the saying is, 'the gate should become wider than the city,' if you will bear with me, while I say a few things of myself, however little worthy of your notice, I shall immediately conclude the preface.

About two years ago, the parliament of the commonwealth promoted me, while diligently employed, according to the measure of the gift of grace bestowed on me, in preaching the gospel, by their authority and influence, though with reluctance on my part, to a chair in the very celebrated university of Oxford. I mean not to relate what various employments fell to my lot from that period: what frequent journeys I became engaged in; not, indeed, expeditions of pleasure, or on my own or private account; but such as the unavoidable necessities of the university, and the commands of superiors, whose authority was not to be gainsaid, imposed upon me. And now I clearly found, that I, who dreaded almost every academical employment, as being unequal to the task,[f] and at a time too when I

* See Owen on the Spirit.

[f] 'For what,' says our author, in a long parenthesis, 'could be expected from a

had entertained hope, that through the goodness of God, in giving me leisure and retirement, and strength for study, that the deficiency of genius and penetration, might be made up by industry and diligence, was now so circumstanced that the career of my studies must be interrupted by more and greater impediments than ever before.

For, to mention first, what certainly is most weighty and important, the task of lecturing in public was put upon me, which would strictly and properly require the whole time and attention even of the most grave and experienced divine; and in the discharge of which, unless I had been greatly assisted and encouraged by the candour, piety, submission, and self-denial of the auditors; and by their respect for the divine institution, and their love of the truth, with every kind of indulgence and kind attention towards the earthen vessel, which distinguish most academicians of every rank, age, and description, beyond mankind in general; I had long lost all hope of discharging that province, either to the public advantage, or my own private satisfaction and comfort.

And as most of them are endowed with a pious disposition and Christian temper, and well furnished with superior gifts, and instructed in learning of every kind, which in the present imperfect and depraved state of human nature is apt to fill the minds of men with prejudices against 'the foolishness of preaching,' and to disapprove 'the simplicity that is in Christ,' I should be the most ungrateful of mankind, were I not to acknowledge that the humility, diligence, and alacrity with which they attended to, and obeyed the words

man not far advanced in years, who had for several years been very full of employment, and accustomed only to the popular mode of speaking, who being altogether devoted to the investigation and explanation of the saving grace of God through Jesus Christ, had taken leave of all scholastic studies, whose genius is by no means quick, and who had even forgot, in some measure, the portion of polite learning that he might have formerly acquired.'

of the cross, indulging neither pride of heart, nor animosity of mind, or itching of ears, though dispensed by a most unworthy servant of God in the gospel of his Son, have given, and still give me great courage in the discharge of the different duties of my office.

However, then, the most merciful Father of all things shall, in his infinite wisdom and goodness dispose of the affairs of our university; I could not but give such a public[g] testimony, as a regard to truth and duty required from me, to these very respectable and learned men (however much these treacherous calumniators and falsifying sycophants may rail, and shew their teeth upon the occasion), the heads of the colleges, who have merited so highly of the church, for their distinguished candour, great diligence, uncommon erudition, blameless politeness; many of whom are zealously studious of every kind of literature, and many who by their conduct in the early period of their youth give the most promising hopes of future merit: so that I would venture to affirm, that no impartial and unprejudiced judge will believe that our university hath

[g] Here our author introduces the following observation in a very long parenthesis: 'As reports are every where spread abroad, concerning the abolition and destruction of the colleges, and efforts for that purpose made by some who being entire strangers to every kind of literature, or at least ignorant of every thing of greater antiquity than what their own memory, or that of their fathers can reach, and regardless of the future, imagine the whole globe and bounds of human knowledge to be contained within the limits of their own little cabins, ignorant whether the sun ever shone beyond their own little island or not, neither knowing what they say, nor of whom they make their assertions; and by others who are deeply sunk in the basest of crimes, and who would therefore wish all light distinguishing between good and evil entirely extinguished. 'For evil doers hate the light, nor do they come to the light, lest their deeds should appear;' that they (mean lurchers hitherto) may fill up the measure of their iniquity with some kind of eclat; to which also may be added those, who never having become candidates for literature themselves, yet, by pushing themselves forward, have unseasonably thrust themselves into such services and offices, as necessarily require knowledge and learning; these, I say, like the fox who had lost his tail, would wish all the world deprived of the means of knowledge, lest their own shameful ignorance, despicable indolence, and total unfitness for the offices which they solicit or hold, should appear to all who have the least degree of understanding and sense; and lastly too, by a despicable herd of prodigal idle fellows, eagerly gaping for the revenues of the university.' For these reasons, our author says, he could not but give the above character of the heads and other members of that venerable body: a character which both the truth of the case, and the duty of his office required.

either been, for ages past, surpassed, or is now surpassed, either in point of a proper respect and esteem for piety, for the saving knowledge of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ; manners, orderly, and worthy of the Christian vocation; and for a due regard to doctrines, arts, languages, and all sciences that can be ornamental to wise, worthy, and good men, appointed for the public good, by any society of men in the world.

Relying then on the humanity, piety, and candour of such men ('who may be afflicted, but not straitened; persecuted, but not forsaken; cast down, but shall not be lost;' who carry about with them the life and death of the Lord Jesus Christ), though destitute of all strength of my own, and devoting myself entirely to him, 'who furnisheth seed to the sower; and who from the mouths of babes and sucklings ordaineth strength;' who hath appointed Christ a perpetual source of help, and who furnishes a seasonable aid to every pious effort, I have, in conjunction with my very learned colleague,* a very eminent man, and whose equal in the work of the gospel, if the parliament of the commonwealth had conjoined with him, they would have attended to the best interests of the university, continued in the discharge of the duties of this laborious and difficult province.

But not on this account alone, would I have been reluctant to return, after so long an interval of time, to this darling university. But another care, another office, and that by far the most weighty, was, by the concurring voice of the senate of the university; and notwithstanding my most earnest requests to the contrary, entrusted and assigned to me, and by the undertaking of which, I have knowingly and wittingly com-

* Mr. T. Goodwin, President of Magdalen College.

pounded with the loss of my peace, and all my studious pursuits.[h]

Such, candid reader, is the account of the author of the following little treatise, and of his situation when composing it: a man not wise in the estimation of others, in his own very foolish; first called from rural retirement and the noise of arms to this university, and very lately again returned to it from excursions in the cause of the gospel, not only to the extremities of this island, but to coasts beyond the seas, and now again deeply engaged in the various and weighty duties of his station; whether any thing exalted or refined can be expected from such a person, is easy for any one to determine.

With regard to our manner of writing, or Latin diction, as some are wont to acquire great praise from their sublimity of expression, allow me but a word or two. Know then reader, that you have to do with a person, who provided his words, but clearly express the sentiments of his mind, entertains a fixed and absolute disregard for all elegance and ornaments of speech. For,

> Dicite Pontifices, in sacris quid facit aurum?
> Say Bishops, of what avail is glitter to sacred subjects?

In my opinion indeed, he, who in a theological contest should please himself with the idea of displaying rhetorical flourishes, would derive no other advantage therefrom, but that his head, adorned with magnificent verbose garlands and pellets, would fall a richer victim to the criticisms of the learned.

But whatever shall be the decision of the serious and judicious, with respect to this treatise, if I shall any how stir up an emulation in others, on whom the

[h] In the year 1651, Dr. Owen was settled in the deanery of Christ's College; and in 1652 chosen vice-chancellor of that university.

grace of God may have bestowed more excellent gifts, to bring forward to public utility their pure, solid, and learned labours, and shall excite them from their light, to confer light on the splendour of this university, I shall be abundantly gratified. Farewell, pious reader, and think not lightly of him, who hath used his most zealous endeavours to serve thy interest in the cause of the gospel.

JOHN OWEN.

A

DISSERTATION

ON

DIVINE JUSTICE.

CHAP. I.

The introduction. The design of the work. Atheists. The prolepsis[a] of divine justice general. The divisions of justice, according to Aristotle. The sentiments of the schoolmen respecting these. Another division. Justice considered absolutely. Then in various respects.

In this treatise, we are to discourse of God and of his justice, the most illustrious of all the divine perfections; but especially of his[b] vindicatory justice; of the certainty of which, I most firmly believe that all mankind will, one time or other, be made fully sensible, either by faith in it here, as revealed in the word; or by feeling its effects, to their extreme misery, in the world hereafter. But as the human mind is blind to divine light, and as both our understandings and tongues are inadequate to conceive of God aright, and to declare him (hence, that common and just observation, that it is an arduous thing to speak of God aright), that we may handle so important a subject with that reverence and perspicuity wherewith it becomes it to be treated, we must chiefly depend on his aid, 'who was made the [c]righteousness of God for us, God himself blessed for ever.' But whatever I have written, and whatever I have asserted, on this subject, whether I have written and asserted it with modesty, sobriety, judgment, and humility, must be left to the decision of such as are competent judges.

[a] This word commonly means a previous and concise view of a subject, or, an anticipation of objections. In this treatise it means, a natural or innate conception of divine justice.

[b] The word in the original means either to claim and assert a right, or to punish the violation of it: by vindicatory justice then, we are to understand that perfection of the Deity, which disposes him to vindicate his right by punishing its violators. It ought never to be translated vindictive,* or understood as meaning revengeful.

[c] Or justice.

* But Dr. Owen thus designates this work; 'My book of the Vindictive Justice of God;' Works, vol. ix. p. 188. For the sense in which he uses the term 'vindictive,' see vol. vi. pp. 392, 393. vol. ix. 46, 47. vol. x. pp. 102, 103. Editor.

We think proper to divide this dissertation into two parts. In the first part, which contains the body of our opinion, after having premised some general descriptions of divine justice, I maintain sin-punishing justice to be natural, and in its exercise necessary to God. The truth of this assertion forms a very distinguished part of natural theology. The defence of it, to the best of my abilities, both against Socinians, who bitterly oppose it, as well as against certain of our own countrymen, who, in defiance of all truth, under a specious pretext, support the same pernicious scheme with them, shall be the subject of the latter part.

In almost all ages, there have existed some, who have denied the being of a God, although but very few, and these the most abandoned. And as mankind, for the most part, have submitted to the evidence of a divine existence; so there never has existed one, who has ever preferred an indictment of injustice against God, or who hath not declared him to be infinitely just. The despairing complaints of some in deep calamities; the unhallowed expostulations of others at the point of death, do not bespeak the real sentiments of the man, but the misery of his situation. As for instance, that expostulation of Job x. 3. 'Is it good unto thee that thou shouldst oppress?' And among the Gentiles, that of Brutus, 'O wretched virtue! how mere a nothing art thou, but a name.' And that furious exclamation of Titus, when dying, related by Suetonius, 'who, pulling aside his curtains, and looking up to the heavens, complained, that his life was taken from him, undeservedly, and unjustly.' Of the same kind was that late dreadful epiphonema[d] of a despairing Italian, related by Mersennus, who, speaking of God and the devil, in dread contempt of divine justice, exclaimed, 'Let the strongest take me.'

But as 'the judgments of God are unsearchable, and his ways past finding out,' those who have refused to submit to his absolute dominion and supreme jurisdiction (some monstrous human characters), have been hardy enough to assert that there is no God, rather than venture to call him unjust. Hence that common couplet.

Marmoreo tumulo Licinus jacet, at Cato parvo,
Pompeius nullo, credimus esse deos?

[d] A sudden unconnected exclamation.

Licinus lies buried in a marble tomb; Cato in a mean one;
Pompey has none: can we believe that there are gods?

And hence Ulysses is introduced by Euripides, expressing his horror of the gormandizing of the man-devouring Cyclops, in these verses:[e]

O, Jupiter, behold such violations of hospitality; for if thou regardest them not,
Thou art in vain accounted Jupiter: for thou canst be no god.

Beyond any doubt, the audacity of these abandoned triflers, who would wish to seem to act the mad part with a show of reason, is more akin to the madness of atheism, than to the folly of ascribing to the god whom they worship and acknowledge such attributes as would not only be unworthy, but disgraceful to him. Protagoras, therefore, not comprehending the justice of God, in respect of his government, hath written, 'With regard to the gods, I do not know whether they exist, or do not exist.' Yet, even among the Gentiles themselves, and those who were destitute of the true knowledge of the true God (for they, in some sense, were without God in the world), writers have not been wanting,[f] who have endeavoured, by serious and forcible arguments, to unravel the difficulty respecting the contrary lots of good and bad men in this life. Our first idea, therefore, of the Divine Being, and the natural conceptions of all men, demand and enforce the necessity of justice being ascribed to God. To be eloquent then in so easy a cause, or to triumph with arguments on a matter so universally acknowledged, we have neither leisure nor inclination. What, and of what kind the peculiar quality and nature of sin-punishing justice is, shall now be briefly explained. And that we may do this with the greater perspicuity and force of evidence, a few observations seem necessary to be premised concerning justice in general, and its more commonly received divisions.

The philosopher, Aristotle, long ago, as is well known, hath divided justice into universal and particular. Concerning the former, he says, that he might compare it to the celebrated saying, 'In justice every virtue is summarily comprehended.' And he affirms, that it in nowise differs from

[e] Eurip. in Cyclop. ver. 350.
[f] The most distinguished were Seneca and Plutarch.

virtue in general, unless in respect of its relation to another being.

But, he says, that particular justice is a synonimous part thereof, which he again distinguishes into distributive and commutative.[g] The schoolmen too agreeing with him, which is rather surprising, divide the divine justice into universal and particular. For that excellence, say they, is spoken of God and man by way of analogy:[h] nor is it like that bird mentioned by Homer, which goes by a double name; by one among mortals, by another among the immortals;

The gods call it Chalcis, but men, Cumindis.—Hom.

But is understood as existing in God principally, as in the first analogized[i] being. Nor do later divines dissent from them: nay, all of them, who have made the divine attributes the subject of their contemplations, have, by their unanimous voice, approved of this distinction, and given their suffrages in its favour.

But farther they assert, that particular justice, in respect of its exercise, consists either in what is said, or in what is done. That which is displayed in things said, in commands, is equity; in declarations, truth; both which the Holy Scriptures[k] do sometimes point out under the title of Divine Justice. But the justice which respects things done, is either that of government, or jurisdiction, or judgment: and this again they affirm to be either remunerative, or corrective; but that corrective is either castigatory, or vindicatory. With the last member of this last distinction, I begin this work: and yet, indeed, although the most learned of our divines, in later ages, have assented to this distribution of divine justice into these various significations, it seems proper to me to proceed in a manner somewhat different, and more suited to our purpose.

I say then, that the justice of God may be considered in a twofold manner.

[g] That which relates to fair exchange.

[h] Analogy means a resemblance between things with regard to some qualities or circumstances, properties or effects, though not in all.

[i] That is, the first being whose perfections have been explained by analogy: or, by tracing a resemblance between these perfections and something like them in ourselves, in kind or sort, though differing infinitely with respect to manner and degree.

[k] Rom. i. 14. iii. 21. Ezra ix. 15. Neh. ix. 8, &c. &c.

First, Absolutely, and in itself.

Secondly, In respect of its egress and exercise.

First. The justice of God, absolutely considered, is the universal rectitude and perfection of the divine nature: for such is the divine nature antecedent to all acts of his will, and suppositions of objects towards which it might operate. This excellence is most universal: nor from its own nature, as an excellence, can it belong[l] to any other being.

Secondly. It is to be viewed with respect to its egress and exercise. And thus, in the order of nature, it is considered as consequent, or at least as concomitant to some acts of the divine will, assigning or appointing to it a proper object. Hence that rectitude, which in itself is an absolute property of the divine nature, is considered as a relative and hypothetical[m] attribute, and has a certain habitude to its proper objects.

That is to say, this rectitude, or universal justice, has certain egresses towards objects out of itself, in consequence of the divine will, and in a manner agreeable to the rule of his supreme right and wisdom, namely, when some object of justice is supposed and appointed (which object must necessarily depend on the mere good pleasure of God, because it was possible it might never have existed at all; God notwithstanding continuing just and righteous to all eternity); and these egresses are twofold.

1. They are absolute and perfectly free, viz. in words.

2. They are necessary, viz. in actions.

For the justice of God is neither altogether one of that kind of perfections, which create and constitute an object to themselves, as power and wisdom do: nor of that kind which not only require an object for their exercise, but one peculiarly affected and circumstanced, as mercy, patience and forbearance do; but may be considered in both points of view, as shall be more fully demonstrated hereafter.

1. For, first, it has absolute egresses in words (constituting, and as it were creating an object to itself); as for instance, in words of legislation, and is then called equity; or in words of declaration and narration, and is then called truth. Both these,[n] I suppose for the present, to take place

[l] Or, have a respect to any other being. [m] Conditional.

[n] Viz. The egresses in words of legislation; and in words of declaration and narration.

absolutely and freely. Whether God hath necessarily prescribed a law to his rational creatures, at least one accompanied with threats and promises, is another consideration.

2. There are respective egresses of this justice in deeds, and according to the distinctions above-mentioned; that is to say, it is exercised either in the government of all things, according to what is due to them by the counsel and will of God; or, in judgments rewarding, or punishing, according to the rule of his right and wisdom, which also is the rule of equity in legislation, and of truth in the declarations annexed. In respect of these,[o] I call the egresses of the divine justice necessary, and such that they could not possibly be otherwise, which, by divine help, I shall prove hereafter. And this is the same as saying, that vindicatory justice is so natural to God, that sin being supposed, he cannot, according to the rule of his right, wisdom, and truth, but punish it. But antecedent to this whole exercise of the divine justice, I suppose a natural right, which indispensably requires the dependance and moral subjection of the rational creature, in God, all the egresses of whose justice, in words, contain an arrest of judgment till farther trial, in respect of the object.

It now then appears, that all these distinctions of divine justice, respect it not as considered in itself, but its egresses and exercise only; to make which clear, was the reason that I departed from the beaten track. Nay, perhaps, it would be a difficult matter to assign any virtue to God, but in the general, and not as having any specific ratio[p] of any virtue; but that which answers to the ratio of any particular virtue in God, consists in the exercise of the same. For instance, mercy is properly attributed to God, so far as it denotes the highest perfection in the will of God; the particular ratio or quality of which, viz. a disposition of assisting the miserable, with a compassion of their misery, is found not altogether as to some, as to others, altogether and only in the exercise of the above-mentioned perfection;[q] but it is

[o] Viz. the egresses in the government of things according to what is due to them, by the counsel of his will; or, in judgments rewarding or punishing, according to the rule of his right and wisdom.

[p] That is, any distinguishing sort or quality.

[q] In the general sparing mercy of God, the particular quality of mercy, viz. a disposition of assisting the miserable with a compassion of their misery, is not

called a proper attribute of God, because, by means of it, some operation is performed agreeable to the nature of God, which, in respect of his other attributes, his will would not produce. This kind, therefore, of the divine attributes, because they have proper and formal objects, thence only derive their formal and specific ratios. But all these observations upon justice must be briefly examined and explained, that we may arrive at the point intended.

CHAP. II.

The universal justice of God. The idle fancies of the schoolmen. The arguments of Durandus against commutative justice. Suarez's censure of the scholastic reasonings. His opinion of divine justice. The examination of it. A description of universal justice from the sacred writings. A division of it in respect of its egress. Rectitude of government in God. What, and of what kind. Definitions of the philosophers and lawyers. Divisions of the justice of government. A caution respecting these. Vindicatory justice. The opinions of the partisans. An explication of the true opinion. Who the adversaries are. The state of the controversy farther considered.

We are first then briefly to treat of the universal justice of God; or of his justice considered in itself, and absolutely, which contains in it all the divine excellencies. The schoolmen, treading in the steps of the philosophers, who have acknowledged no kind of justice which has not naturally some respect to another object, are for the most part silent concerning this justice. And once, by the way to take notice of these, on this as almost on every other subject, they are strangely divided. Duns Scotus, Durandus, and Poludamus, deny that there is commutative justice in God.[a]

For the master of the sentences himself calls God an impartial and just distributor, but says not a word of commutation. Thomas Aquinas,[b] and Cajetan, do the same; though the latter says, 'that some degree of commutative justice is

wholly found, because there are many of mankind towards whom this disposition of assisting is never effectually exerted; but in the pardoning mercy of God to his people, it is fully and gloriously displayed.

[a] Palud. on the Sent. book 4. distinct. 46.

[b] Thomas, first page of quest. 21. and Cajetan, 2. 2. qu. 61. A. 4.

discernible.' So also Ferorariensis, on the same place; and Scotus, in the third book of his treatise, 'of Nature and Grace,' chap. vii. Durandus, in particular, contends, with many arguments, that this kind of justice ought not to be assigned to God. First, because that this justice observes an equality between the thing given and received, which cannot be the case between us and God. And, secondly, because that we cannot be of any service to him (which he proves from Rom. xi. 35. Job xxii. 3. and xxxv. 7. Luke xvii. 10.), whereby he can be bound to make an equality with us by virtue of commutation. And, thirdly, because that we cannot make an equal return to God for benefits received. And, finally, that as there is no proper commutative justice between a father and his children, according to Aristotle's[c] opinion, much less can it subsist between God and us.

But the same Durandus likewise denies to God distributive justice,[d] because he is not indebted to any one: he, however, acknowledges some mode of distributive justice; and Pesantius[e] follows his opinion.

But Gabriel, on the same[f] distinction, asserts, commutative justice to be inherent in God; for there is a certain equality, as he says, between God and man, from the acceptation of God the receiver. Proudly enough said indeed! But what shall we say of these triflers? They resemble those advocates in Terence, whose opinion, after Demipho, embarassed by the cheats of Phormio the sycophant, had asked, he exclaims, 'Well done, gentlemen, I am now in a greater uncertainty than before.' So intricate were their answers, and resembling the practices of the Andabatæ.[g]

Hence Suarez himself, after he had reviewed the opinions of the schoolmen concerning the justice of God, bids adieu to them all, declaring, 'That the expressions of Scripture had greater weight with him than their philosophic human arguments.' But with much labour and prolixity, he insists that both distributive and commutative justice are to be ascribed to God, that so he might pave the way for that rotten fiction concerning the merits of Roman Catholics with God; a doctrine which, were even all his suppositions granted,

[c] Eth. b. 8. c. 8.
[d] On dist. 46.
[e] In. 2. 2. Thomas.
[f] A work to which he alludes.
[g] A kind of fencers who fought on horseback hood-winked.

appears not to follow, much less to be confirmed.[h] This opinion of Suarez, concerning vindicatory justice, as it is deservedly famous in scholastic theology, we think proper to lay before you in few words.

In his discourses concerning the justice of God,[i] he contends that the affection[k] of punishing, which he calls 'a perfection elicitive[l] of the act of punishing,' is properly and formally inherent in God; and it is so, because it hath a proper object, viz. to punish the guilt of sin which is honourable; nor does it include any imperfection, and therefore that some formal and proper divine attribute ought to correspond to that effect.

He farther maintains, that this affection of punishing is neither commutative nor distributive justice. His conclusions here I do not oppose, though I cannot approve of many of his reasonings and arguments. In fine, he contends, that vindicatory justice in 'God' is the same with universal, or legal, or providential justice, which we call the justice of government. But he makes a dishonourable and base conclusion, from a distinction about the persons punished, viz. into such as are merely passive sufferers, and such as spontaneously submit themselves to punishment, that they may satisfy the punitory justice of God: reasoning in such a manner, that after he has forced the whole doctrine concerning the commutative and distributive justice of God, to become subservient to that sacrilegious and proud error, concerning the merits of man with God, and even of one from the supererogation of another; he strenuously endeavours to establish a consistency between this doctrine of vindicatory justice, and a fiction, not less impious and disgraceful to the blood of Christ, 'which cleanseth us from all sin,' about penal satisfactions to be performed by such ways and means as God hath never prescribed, or even thought of.'

Desinat in piscem mulier formosa superne.—Hor.

Dismissing these bunglers (who know not the righteousness of God), then, from our dissertation, let us attend to the more sure word of prophecy. That word every where

[h] Suarez's Lectures of the Justice of God. [i] Sect. 5. [k] Or quality.
[l] That is, inducing to, or drawing forth the act of punishing.

asserts God to be just, and possessed of such justice as denotes the universal rectitude, and perfection of his divine nature. His essence is most wise, most perfect, most excellent, most merciful, most blessed: that, in fine, is the justice of God, according to the Scriptures, viz. considered absolutely, and in itself: nor would the Holy Scriptures have us to understand any thing else by divine justice, than the power and readiness of God to do all things rightly and becomingly, according to the rule of his wisdom, goodness, truth, mercy, and clemency. Hence the above-mentioned sophists agree, that justice, taken precisely, and in itself, and abstracting it from all human imperfections, simply means perfection without intrinsic imperfection: for it is not a virtue that rules the passions, but directs their operations.

Hence it presides, as it were, in all the divine decrees, actions, works and words, of whatsoever kind they be: there is no egress of the divine will; no work or exercise of providence, though immediately and distinctly breathing clemency, mercy, anger, truth, or wisdom, but in respect thereof, God is eminently said to be just, and to execute justice. Hence, Isa. li. 6. He is said to be 'just, and bringing salvation;' Rom. iii. 25, 26. Just in pardoning sin; Psal. cxliii. 11. Just in avenging and punishing sin; Rom. iii. 5, 6. Just in all the exercises of his supreme right and dominion; Job xxxiv. 12—14. Rom. ix. 8. 14, 15. He is just, in sparing according to his mercy. Just in punishing according to his anger and wrath. In a word, whatsoever by reason of his right, he doeth or worketh according 'to the counsel of his will,' whatever proceeds from his faithfulness, mercy, grace, love, clemency, anger, and even from his fury, is said to be done by, through, and because of his justice, as the perfection inducing to, or, the cause effecting and procuring such operations. It is evident then, that justice, universally taken, denotes the highest rectitude of the divine nature, and a power and promptitude of doing all things, in a manner becoming and agreeable to his wisdom, goodness, and right.

The more solemn egresses of this justice, to which all particular acts may be easily reduced, have been already pointed out: but equity in legislation, fidelity and truth in

declarations, and the promises annexed to them, in which God is often said to be just, and to execute justice, I think may be passed over, as being too remote from our purpose. But as it appears that some light may be thrown on this subject, which we are now treating of, from the consideration of the relation of rectitude and divine wisdom, that is, of universal justice to government and judgment, we must say a few words on that head.

But rectitude of government, to which that justice analogically corresponds, is that which philosophers and civilians unanimously agree to be the highest excellence, though they have variously described it. Aristotle calls it 'a habit by which men are capable of doing just things, and by which they both will and do just things;'[m] attributing to it aptitude, will, and action. Cicero[n] calls it 'an affection of the mind, giving to every one his due;' understanding by affection not any passion of the mind, but a habit. The civilians understand by it, 'a constant and perpetual will, assigning to every one his due.' The propriety of their definition, we leave to themselves. That constant and perpetual will of theirs, is the same as the habit of the philosophers, which, whether it be the proper genus[o] of this virtue, let logicians determine. Again, as they constantly attribute three acts to right, which is the object of justice, viz. 'to live honestly, to hurt nobody, and to give every one his due;' how comes it to pass that they define justice by one act, when doubtless it respects all right: therefore it is, they say, that to give every one his due, is not of the same extent in the definition of justice, and in the description of the acts of right.

But let them both unite in their sentiments as they please, neither the habit or affection of the philosophers, nor the living honestly, and hurting nobody, of the civilians, can be assigned to God. For in ascribing the perfection of excellencies to him, we exclude the ratio of habit or quality, properly so called, and every material and imperfect mode of operation. He must be a mortal man, and subject to a law to whom these things apply.

Moreover those (I speak of our own countrymen), who divide this justice of government into commutative and distributive, rob God entirely of the commutative, which con-

[m] Ethics, book 5. chap. 1. [n] De Finibus. [o] Or class.

sists in a mutual giving and receiving. 'For who first hath given any thing to him?' Who made 'thee to differ from another? He giveth no account of his matters.' But distributive, which belongs to him as the supreme governor of all things, who renders to every one his due, is proper to himself alone. This we have above asserted to be the justice of government, or judgment. Of this justice of government, frequent mention is made in the sacred writings. It is that perfection of the Divine Being, whereby he directs all his actions in governing and administering created things, according to the rule of his rectitude and wisdom. But this excellence, or habitude for action, in no wise differs from universal justice, unless in respect of its relation to another being. But what is a law to us in the administration of things, in God is his right, in conjunction with his most wise and just will. For God, as it is said, is a law unto himself. To this justice, are these passages to be referred, Zeph. iii. 5. 2 Chron. xii. 6. Psal. vii. 9. Jer. xii. 1, 2. Tim. iv. 8. with almost innumerable others. But in all the effects and egresses of this justice, God is justified, not from the reason of things, but from his dominion and supreme right. Thus, Job xiv. 14. xxxiii. 12, 13. xxxiv. 12—14. And this is the first egress of the divine rectitude in works.

The other egress of this justice is in judgment, the last member of the divisions of which above-mentioned, viz. that by which God punishes the crimes of rational beings, to whom a law hath been given, according to the rule of his right, is the vindicatory justice of which we are treating.

Here again, reader, I would wish to put you in mind, that I by no means assert many species of universal justice, or so to speak, particular or special justices, as distinct perfections in God, which others seem to do; but one only, viz. the universal and essential rectitude of the divine nature, and therefore I maintain, that this very vindicatory justice itself is the rectitude and perfection of the Deity variously exercised.

Some of the schoolmen, however, agree with me in opinion; for Cajetan[p] upon Thomas grants, that vindicatory jus-

[p] Quest. ii. 2.

ce, in a public person, differs nothing from legal and universal justice. Although he maintains that there is a peculiar pecies of justice in a private person; a position which, I onfess, I do not understand, since punishment, considered s punishment, is not the right of a private person. God ertainly does not punish us, as being injured, but as a ruler nd judge. But again, concerning this justice, another uestion arises, whether it be natural to God, or, an essential attribute of the divine nature; that is to say, such that the existence of sin being admitted, God must necessarily exercise it, because it supposes in him a constant and immutable will to punish sin: so that while he acts consistent with his nature, he cannot do otherwise than punish and avenge it? Or, whether it be a free act of the divine will, which he may exercise at pleasure? On this point theologians are divided. We shall consider what has been determined on the matter, by the most notorious enemies of divine truth, and especially by those of our own times.

1. Then, they own, 'That such a kind of justice is applicable to God, which, were he always inclined to exercise, he might, consistent with right, destroy all sinners, without waiting for their repentance, and so let no sin pass unpunished.'

2. 'That he will not pardon any sins, but those of the penitent.'

Nor do they deny, so far as I know,

3. 'That God hath determined the punishment of sin, by the rule of his right and wisdom.'

But they deny,

1. That perfection by which God punishes sins, either to be his justice, or to be so called in Scripture; but, only anger, fury, or fierce indignation, expressions, denoting in the clearest manner, the freedom of the divine will in the act of punishing. Although some of Socinus's followers, among whom is Crellius, have declared openly against him on this point.

Again, they deny.

2. That there is any such attribute in God as requires a satisfaction for sins, which he is willing to forgive; but maintain, that he is entirely free 'to yield up his claim of right,' as they phrase it, at pleasure; that therefore divine

justice ought, by no means, to be reckoned among the causes of Christ's death; nay more, say they, such a kind of justice may be found in the epistles of Iscariot to the Pharisees (they are the words of Gitichius), but is not to be found in the Holy Scriptures.

Such are the opinions of those concerning whom we are disputing at this present day, whether they be heretics; certainly they are not Christians. Between their sentiments and ours on this point, there is the widest difference: for we affirm, the justice by which God punishes sin, to be the very essential rectitude of Deity itself, exercised in the punishment of sins, according to the rule of his wisdom, and which is in itself no more free, than the divine essence.

This kind of justice Socinus opposes with all his might, in almost all his writings, but especially in his Theological Lectures of the Saviour, book i. chap. i. &c. Moscorovius also on the Racovian catechism, chap. viii. quest. 19. Ostorodius, a most absurd heretic, in his Institutions, chap. xxxi. and in his Disputations to Tradelius Volkelius, of the true Religion, book v. chap. xxi. Also Crellius, the most acute and learned of all the adversaries, in that book which he wished to have prefixed to the Dissertations of Volkelius, chap. xxviii. and in his Vindications against Grotius, chap. i. In a little work also, entitled, 'Of the Causes of the Death of Christ,' chap. xvi. He pursued the same object in almost all his other writings, both polemical and dogmatical, and likewise in his commentaries; a very artful man, and one that employed very great diligence and learning in the worst of causes. Michael Gitichius has the same thing in view, in his writings against Pareus, and in his dispute with Ludovicus Lucius, in defence of his first argument, a most trifling sophist, a mere copyist of Socinus, and a servile follower of his master. Of mightier powers too rise up against us, Valentinus Smalcius against Franzius; and, who is said to be still alive, the learned Jonas Schlichtingius. All these, with the rest of that herd, place all their hopes of overturning the doctrine of the satisfaction of Christ, in opposing this justice.

But these are not the only adversaries we have to do with: there are others, pious, worthy, and very learned divines, who, respecting the point of Christ's satisfaction, are

most strictly orthodox; and who, though they cannot find in their hearts directly to deny that such an attribute or power is essential to God: yet maintain all its egresses, and its whole exercise, respecting sin, to be so free and dependant on the mere free motion and good pleasure of the divine will, that should not that oppose, God might by his nod, by his word, without any trouble, by other modes and ways, besides the satisfaction of Christ, if it only seemed proper to his wisdom, take away, pardon, and make an end of sin, without inflicting any penalty for the transgression of his law. And this, it is said, was the opinion of Augustine. By which, I will say, rash and daring assertion, be it spoken without offence, for they are truly great men, by their nod and breath they suspend and disperse the very strongest arguments, by which the adversaries feel themselves most hardly pushed, and by which the belief of Christ's satisfaction is strongly supported; and deliver up our most holy cause, I had almost said, defenceless, to be the sport of the Philistines. Nay, not very long ago, it has been discovered and lamented by the orthodox, that very considerable assistance has been imprudently given by a learned countryman of our own, to these aliens, who defy the armies of the living God. 'For, if we could but get rid of this justice, even if we had no other proof,' says Socinus, 'that human fiction of Christ's satisfaction would be thoroughly exposed, and would vanish.' Soc. of the Saviour, book iii. chap. 1, &c.

Of our own countrymen, the only one I know is Rutherford, a Scotch divine, who roundly and boldly asserts, 'Punitive justice to be a free act of the divine will:' nor is he content with the bare assertion, but supported chiefly by his arguments, to whom the schoolmen are so much indebted, he defends the fallacy, against both Cameron and Voetius, those two thunderbolts of theological war; though, in my opinion, neither with a force of argument nor felicity of issue equal to his opponents. But both the one and the others grant, that God hath decreed to let no sin pass unpunished without a satisfaction: but that decree being supposed, with a law given, and a sanction of the same by threatenings, that a satisfaction was necessary: but, that punitive justice necessarily requires the punishment of all sins, ac-

cording to the rule of God's right and wisdom, this is what they deny, and endeavour to overturn.

But to me, these arguments are altogether astonishing; viz. 'that sin-punishing justice should be natural to God, and yet that God, sin being supposed to exist, *may either exercise it, or not exercise it.*' They may also say, and with as much propriety, that truth is natural to God; but upon a supposition that he were to converse with man, *he might either use it, or not:* or, that omnipotence is natural to God; but upon a supposition that he were inclined to do any work without himself, that it were free to him to act *omnipotently, or not:* or, finally, that sin-punishing justice is among the primary causes of the death of Christ, and that Christ was set forth as a propitiation, to declare his righteousness, and yet that, that justice required not the punishment of sin. For if it should require it, how is it possible that it should not necessarily require it, since God would be unjust, if he should not inflict punishment? Or farther, they might as well assert, that God willed that justice should be satisfied by so many and such great sufferings of his Son Christ, when that justice required no such thing; nay more, that setting aside the free act of the divine will, *sin and no sin* are the same with God, and that man's mortality hath not followed, chiefly as the consequence of sin, but of the will of God. These and such like difficulties, I leave to the authors of this opinion (for they are very learned men) to unravel. As to myself, they fill me with confusion and astonishment.

But this I cannot forbear to mention, that these very divines, who oppose our opinion, when hard pushed by their adversaries, perpetually have recourse in their disputations to this justice, as to their sacred anchor; and assert, that without a satisfaction, God could not pardon sin, consistent with his nature, justice, and truth. But as these are very great absurdities, it would have seemed strange to me, that any men of judgment and orthodoxy should have been so entangled in some of these sophisms, as to renounce the truth on their account, unless I had happened at one time myself to fall into the same snare; which, to the praise and glory of that truth, of which I am now a servant, I freely confess to have been my case.

But to avoid mistakes, as much as possible, in discussing the nature of this justice, we will make the following observations.

1. There are some attributes of Deity which, in order to their exercise, require no determined object antecedent to their egress: of this kind are wisdom and power. These attributes, at least, as to their first exercise, must be entirely free, and dependant on the mere good pleasure of God only; so that antecedent to their acting, the divine will is so indifferent as to every exercise of them, on objects without himself, that he might even will the opposite. But if we suppose that God wills to do any work without himself, he must act omnipotently and wisely.

There are again, some attributes, which can, in nowise, have an egress, or be exercised without an object predetermined, and, as it were, by some circumstances prepared for them: among these is punitive justice; for the exercise of which there would be no ground, but upon the supposition of the existence of a rational being, and its having sinned; but these being supposed, this justice must necessarily act according to its own rule.

2. But that rule is not any free act of the divine will, but a supreme, intrinsic, natural right of Deity, conjoined with wisdom, to which the entire exercise of this justice ought to be reduced. These men, entirely trifle then, who, devising certain absurd conclusions of their own, annex them to a supposition of the necessity of punitive justice as to its exercise: as for instance, that God ought to punish sin to the full extent of his power, and that he ought to punish every sin with eternal punishment, and that therefore he must preserve every creature that sins to eternity, and that he cannot do otherwise, I say they trifle; for God does not punish to the utmost extent of his power, but, so far as is just; and all modes and degrees of punishment are determined by the standard of the divine right and wisdom.

Whether that necessarily requires that every sin should be punished with eternal punishment, let those inquire who choose. 'Nobis non licet esse tam disertis.'

3. But the existence of a rational creature, and the moral dependance which it has, and must have upon God, being supposed, the first egress of this justice is in the constitution

of a penal law; not as a law which, as was before observed, originates from the justice of government, but as a penal law.

For if such a law were not made necessarily, it might be possible that God, should lose his natural right and dominion over his creatures, and thus he would not be God; or, that right being established, that the creature might not be subject to him, which implies a contradiction, not less, than if you were to say, that Abraham is the father of Isaac, but that, Isaac is not the son of Abraham. For, in case of a failure in point of obedience (a circumstance which might happen, and really hath happened), that dependance could be continued in no way, but through means of a vicarious punishment: and there must have been a penal law constituted, necessarily requiring that punishment. Hence arises a secondary right of punishing, which extends to every amplification of that penal law, in whatever manner made. But it has a second egress in the infliction of punishment.

4. And here it is to be remarked, that this justice necessarily respects punishment in general, as including in it the nature of punishment, and ordaining such a vindication of the divine honour, as God can acquiesce in: not the time, or degrees, or such like circumstances of punishment. Yea, not this, or that species of punishment; for it respects only the preservation of God's natural right, and the vindication of his glory; both which may be done by punishment in general, however circumstanced. A dispensation, therefore, with punishment (especially temporary punishment) by a delay of time, an increase or diminution of the degree, by no means prejudiceth the necessity of the exercise of this justice, which only intends an infliction of punishment in general.

5. But again, though we determine the egresses of this justice to be necessary, we do not deny that God exercises it freely: for that necessity doth not exclude a concomitant liberty, but only an antecedent indifference. This only we deny, viz. that, supposing a sinful creature, the will of God can be indifferent (by virtue of the punitive justice inherent in it) to inflict, or not inflict punishment upon that creature, or to the volition of punishment, or its opposite. The whole of Scripture, indeed, loudly testifies against any such indifference; nor is it consistent with God's supreme

right over his creatures: neither do they who espouse a different side, contend with a single word brought from the Scriptures. But that God punishes sins with a concomitant liberty, because he is of all agents the most free, we have not a doubt. Thus his intellectual will is carried towards happiness by an essential inclination antecedent to liberty, and notwithstanding it wills happiness with a concomitant liberty: for to act freely is the very nature of the will; yea, it must necessarily act freely.

Let our adversaries therefore dream as they please, that we determine God to be an absolutely necessary agent, when he is a most free one; and that his will is so circumscribed by some kind of justice, which we maintain, that he cannot will those things which, setting the consideration of that justice aside, would be free to him. For, we acknowledge the Deity to be both a necessary and free agent: necessary in respect of all his actions, internally, or in respect of the persons in the godhead towards one another: the Father necessarily begets the Son and loves himself: as to these and such like actions, he is of all necessary agents the most necessary. But in respect of the acts of the divine will, which have their operations and effects upon external objects, he is an agent absolutely free, being one 'who worketh all things according to the counsel of his own will.' But of these acts there are two kinds; for some are absolute and admit no respect to any antecedent condition.

Of this kind is his purpose of creating the world, and in it rational creatures, properly adapted to know and obey the creator, benefactor, and Lord of all. In works of this kind, God hath exercised the greatest liberty: his infinitely wise and infinitely free will is the fountain and origin of all things. Neither is there in God any kind of justice, or any other essential attribute, which could prescribe any limits or measure to the divine will. But this decree of creating being supposed, the divine will undergoes a double necessity, so to speak, both in respect of the event, and in respect of its manner of acting. For in respect of the event, it is necessary, from the immutability of God, that the world should be created: and in respect of the manner of doing it, that it should be done omnipotently, because God is essentially omnipotent; and it being once supposed that he wills

to do any work without himself, he must do it omnipotently. Yet, notwithstanding these considerations, in the creation of the world, God was entirely a free agent: he exercised will and understanding in acting, although the choice of acting or not acting, and of acting in one particular way or another, is taken away by his immutability and omnipotence.

There is another kind of the acts of the divine will, which could have no possible existence but upon a condition supposed.

This kind contains the egresses and exercise of those attributes which could not be exercised but upon a supposition of other antecedent acts; of which we have treated before. Of this kind, are all the acts of the divine will, in which justice, mercy, &c. exert their energy. But these attributes of the divine nature are, either for the purpose of preserving or continuing to God what belongs to him of right, supposing that state of things which he hath freely appointed; or for bestowing on his creatures some farther good. Of the former kind is vindicatory justice, which, as it cannot be exercised but upon the supposition of the existence of a rational being, and of its sin; so, these being supposed, the supreme right and dominion of the Deity could not be preserved entire, unless it were exercised. Of the latter kind is sparing mercy, by which God bestows an undeserved good on miserable creatures. For setting aside the consideration of their misery, this attribute cannot be exercised; but that being supposed, if he be inclined to bestow any undeserved good on creatures wretched through their own transgression, he may exercise this mercy, if he will. But again, in the exercise of that justice, although if it were not to be exercised, according to our former hypothesis, God would cease from his right and dominion, and so would not be God, still he is a free, and not an absolutely necessary agent; for, he acts from will and understanding, and not from an impetus of nature only, as fire burns: and he freely willed that state and condition of things, which being supposed, that justice must necessarily be exercised. Therefore, in the exercise of it, he is not less free than in speaking; for, supposing, as I said before, that his will were to speak any thing, it is necessary that he speak the truth. These loud outcries, therefore, which the adversaries so unseason-

ably make against our opinion, as if it determined God to be an absolutely necessary agent in his operations *ad extra*, entirely vanish and come to nought. But we will treat more fully of these things, when we come to answer objections.

Finally, let it be observed, that the nature of mercy and justice are different in respect of their exercise: for, between the act of mercy and its object, no natural obligation intervenes: for God is not bound to any one, to exercise any act of mercy, neither is he bound to reward obedience: for this is a debt due from his natural right, and from the moral dependence of the rational creature, and indispensably thence arising. But between the act of justice and its object, a natural obligation intervenes, arising from the indispensable subordination of the creature to God, which supposing disobedience or sin, could not otherwise be secured than by punishment. Nor is the liberty of the divine will diminished in any respect more by the necessary egresses of divine justice, than by the exercise of other attributes: for these necessary egresses are the consequence, not of an absolute, but of a conditional necessity; viz. a rational creature and its sin being supposed, and both existing freely in respect of God: but the necessary suppositions being made, the exercise of other perfections is also necessary; for it being supposed, that God were disposed to speak with man, he must necessarily speak according to truth.

CHAP. III.

A series of arguments in support of vindicatory justice. First, from the Scriptures. Three divisions of the passages of Scripture. The first, contains those which respect the purity and holiness of God. The second, those which respect God as the judge. What it is to judge with justice. The third, those which respect the divine supreme right. A second argument is taken from the general consent of mankind. A three-fold testimony of that consent. The first, from the Scriptures. Some testimonies of the heathens. The second, from the power of conscience. Testimonies concerning that power. The mark set upon Cain. The expression of the Emperor Adrian, when at the point of death. The consternation of mankind at prodigies. The horror of the wicked, whom even fictions terrify. Two conclusions. The third testimony, from the confession of all nations. A vindication of the argument against Rutherford. The regard paid to sacrifices among the nations. Different kinds of the same. Propitiatory sacrifices. Some instances of them.

THESE preliminaries being thus laid down to facilitate our entrance on the subject, I proceed to demonstrate, by a variety of arguments, both against enemies, and against friends from whom I dissent, that this punitive justice is natural to God, and necessary as to its egresses respecting sin. But because, since the entrance of sin into the world, God hath either continued, or increased the knowledge of himself, or accommodated it to our capacities by four ways, namely, by the written word, by a rational conscience, by his works of providence; and lastly, by the person of Jesus Christ his only-begotten Son, and by the mystery of godliness manifested in him; we will shew, that by each of these modes of communication he hath revealed and made known to us this his justice. Our first argument then is taken from the testimony of the sacred writings, which in almost numberless places ascribe this vindicatory justice to God.

The passages of Holy Scripture which ascribe this justice to God, may be classed under three divisions. The first contains those which certify, 'that the purity and holiness of God, hostilely oppose and detest sin. Whether holiness or purity be an attribute natural to God, and immutably residing in him, has not yet been called in question by our adversaries. They have not yet arrived at such a pitch of madness. But this is that universal perfection of God,

which, when he exercises in punishing the transgressions of his creatures, is called vindicatory justice. For whatever there be in God perpetually inherent, whatever excellence there be essential to his nature, which occasions his displeasure with sin, and which necessarily occasions this displeasure, this is that justice of which we are speaking.

But here first occurs to us that celebrated passage of the prophet Habakkuk, chap. i. 15. 'Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil, and canst not look on iniquity.' The prophet here ascribes to God the greatest detestation, and such an immortal hatred of sin, that he cannot look upon it; but, with a wrathful aversion of his countenance abominates and dooms it to punishment. But perhaps God thus hates sin, because he wills it; and by an act of his will, entirely free, though the state of things might be changed, without any injury to him, or diminution of his essential glory. But the Holy Spirit gives us a reason very different from this, viz. The purity of God's eyes: 'thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil.' But there is no one who can doubt that the prophet here intended the holiness of God: the incomprehensible, infinite, and most perfect holiness or purity of God, is the cause why he hates and detests all sin; and, that justice and holiness are the same as to the common and general notion of them, we have shewn before.

Of the same import is the admonition of Joshua in his address to the people of Israel, chap. xxiv. 19. 'Ye cannot serve the Lord;' (that is, he will not accept of a false and hypocritical worship from you) 'for he is a holy God; he is a jealous God; he will not forgive your transgressions, nor your sins.' God then will not forgive transgressions, that is, he will most certainly punish them, because he is most holy. But this holiness is the universal perfection of God, which, when exercised in punishing the sins of the creatures, is called vindicatory justice; that is, in relation to its exercise and effects; for in reality the holiness and justice of God are the same; neither of which, considered in itself and absolutely, differs from the divine nature; whence they are frequently used the one for the other.

Moreover, it is manifest, that God meant this holiness in that promulgation of his glorious name, or of the essential properties of his divine nature, made face to face, to Moses,

in Exod. xxxiv. 5. 7. which name he had also before declared; chap. xxiii. 7. That non-absolution or punishment denotes an external effect of the divine will, is granted: but when God proclaims this to be his name, 'The Lord, the Lord God, &c. that will by no means clear the guilty,' he manifestly leads us to the contemplation of that excellence essentially inherent in his nature, which induces him to such an act: but that, by whatever name it be distinguished in condescension to our capacities, is the justice that we mean.

That eulogium of divine justice by the psalmist, Psal. v. 54. 6. favours this opinion. 'For thou art not a God that hast pleasure in wickedness: neither shall evil dwell with thee: the foolish shall not stand in thy sight: thou hatest all the workers of iniquity: thou shalt destroy them that speak leasing: the Lord will abhor the bloody and deceitful man.' But those who deny this hatred of sin and sinners, and the disposition to punish them, to be perpetually, immutably, and habitually inherent in God, I am afraid have never strictly weighed in their thoughts the divine purity and holiness.

To the second class may be referred those passages of Scripture which ascribe to God the office of a judge, and which affirm that he judges, and will judge, all things with justice. The first which occurs is that celebrated expression of Abraham, Gen. xviii. 25. 'Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?' These are not the words of one who doubts, but of one enforcing a truth acknowledged and confessed among all; a truth upon which the intercession of this faithful friend of God, for the pious and just inhabitants of Sodom is founded: for Abraham here ascribes to God the power and office of a just judge; in consequence of which character, he must necessarily exercise judgment according to the different merits of mankind. This, the words in the preceding clause of the verse, accompanied with a vehement rejection and detestation of every suspicion that might arise to the contrary, sufficiently demonstrate, 'that be far from thee to do, viz. to slay the righteous with the wicked.' God then is a judge and a just one: and it is impossible for him not to exercise right or judgment. But that justice wherewith he is now endowed, and by which he exerciseth right, is not a free act of his will (for who would entertain

such contemptible thoughts even of an earthly judge) but a habit or excellence at all times inherent in his nature.

But this supreme excellence and general idea which Abraham made mention of and enforced, the apostle again afterward supports and recommends, Rom. iii. 5, 6. 'Is God unrighteous who taketh vengeance? God forbid, for then how shall God judge the world?' Unless he were just, how shall he judge the world? Therefore this most righteous of all judges, exerciseth justice in judging the world 'because he is just.'

For why should God so often be said to judge the world justly and in justice, unless his justice were that perfection, whence this righteous and just judgment flows and is derived; Acts xvii. 31. 'he hath appointed a day, in the which he will judge the world in righteousness, by that man whom he hath ordained:'—and in Rom. ii. 5. the day of the last judgment is called, 'the day of wrath, and of the revelation of the righteous judgment of God.'

But again, on this very account the justice of God is celebrated, and he himself, in an especial manner, is said to be just, because he inflicts punishment, and exercises his judgments according to the demerits of sinners. Rev. xvi. 5, 6. 'Thou art righteous, O Lord, which art, and wast, and shalt be, because thou hast judged thus; for they have shed the blood of saints and prophets, and thou hast given them blood to drink; for they are worthy.'

But all retaliation for a crime proceeds from vindicatory justice; but that God exercises that justice, and is thence denominated just, is evident. The Holy Spirit establishes this truth in the plainest words, Psal. ix. 4, 5. where he gloriously vindicates this justice of God,—'Thou hast maintained my right and my cause,' says the psalmist, 'thou sattest on the throne judging right. Thou hast rebuked the heathen, thou hast destroyed the wicked, thou hast put out their name for ever and ever.' God exerciseth justice and determines causes, as he sits upon his throne, that is, as being endowed with supreme judiciary power, and that, as he is a judge of righteousness, or most righteous judge. Psal. cxix. 137. 'Righteous art thou, O Lord, and upright are thy judgments.'

It now remains, that we take a view of one or two of

those passages of Scripture which, in consideration of this divine justice, assert the infliction of punishment for sin in itself, and as far as relates to the thing itself to be just. To this purpose is that of the apostle to the Rom. chap. i. 34. 'Who knowing the judgment, or justice, of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death.' Whatever, or of what kind soever that justice or right of God may be, of which the apostle is speaking, it seems evident that the three following properties belong to it.

1. That it is universally acknowledged, nay, it is not unknown, even to the most abandoned of mankind, and to those schools of every kind of wickedness which the apostle is there describing. Whence they derive this knowledge of the divine law and justice, shall be made appear hereafter.

2. That is the cause, source, and rule of all punishments, to be inflicted. For this is the right of God, 'that those who commit sin are worthy of death.' From this right of God it follows, 'that the wages of every sin is death.'

3. That it is natural and essential to God. For although in respect of its exercise, it may have a handle, or occasion, from some things external to the Deity, and in respect of its effects may have a meritorious cause, yet in respect of its source and root, it respects himself, as its subject, if God be absolutely perfect: if belonging to any other being, it cannot agree to him.

You will say that this right of God is free: but I deny, that any right of God, which respects his creatures, can, as a habit inherent in his nature, be free, though in the exercise of every right, God be absolutely free; neither can any free act of the divine will towards creatures be called any right of Deity, it is only the exercise of some right. But an act is distinguished from its habit or root.

And now it appears evident, that this right is not that supreme right or absolute dominion of God, which, under the primary notion of a Creator, must be necessarily ascribed to him; for it belongs not to the supreme Lord, as such to inflict punishment, but as ruler or judge.

The supreme dominion and right of God over his creatures, no doubt, so far as it supposes dependence and obedience, necessarily requires that a vicarious punishment should be appointed, in case of transgression or disobedience;

but the very appointment of punishment, as well as the infliction of it, flows from his right as the governor; which right, considered with respect to transgressions, is nothing else than vindicatory justice. The apostle therefore signifies that, that is, the justice always resident in God as a legislator, ruler, and judge of all things, which by common presumption, even the most abandoned of mankind acknowledge.

To these may be added two other passages which occur in the writings of the same apostle; 2 Thess. i. 6. 'Seeing it is a righteous thing with God to recompense tribulation to them that trouble you;' a recompense of tribulation is a real peculiar act of vindicatory justice; but that belongs to God as he is just. Thence the punishment of sin is called in Heb. ii. 2. 'a just recompense of reward,' and by Jude 7. 'the vengeance, or justice, of eternal fire.' Because, viz. it follows from that justice of God, that such crimes are justly recompensed by such a punishment.

But we will not be farther troublesome in reciting particular proofs; from those already mentioned, and from others equally strong, we thus briefly argue; that to that being, whose property it is 'to render unto every one according to his works,' not to clear the guilty, to condemn sinners worthy of death, and to inflict the same upon them, to hate sin, and who will in no wise let sin pass unpunished, and all this, because he is just, and because his justice so requires, sin-punishing justice naturally belongs, and that he cannot act contrary to that justice.

But the passages of Scripture just now mentioned, with many others, assert that all these properties above recounted, belong to and are proper to God, because he is just: therefore, this justice belongs to God, and is natural to him.

It matters not what we affirm of vindicatory justice; whether that it be meant of God essentially, and not only denominatively, that it has an absolute name (for it is called holiness and purity) that we have it expressed both in the abstract and concrete; for what is more than that, it is affirmed expressly, directly, and particularly, oft-times in the passages above-mentioned, that it requires the punishment of sinners, that it implies a constant and immutable will of

punishing every sin according to the rule of divine wisdom and right: impudent to a high degree indeed then must Socinus have been, who hath maintained that, that perfection of Deity by which he punisheth sin, is not called justice, but always anger or fury. Anger indeed and fury, analogically and effectively, belong to justice.

So much for our first argument.

The universal consent of mankind furnishes us with a second; from which we may reason in this manner: What common opinions and the innate conceptions of all assign to God, that is natural to God. But this corrective justice is so assigned to God; therefore this justice is natural to God.

The major proposition is evident; for what is not natural to God, neither exists in him by any mode of habit, or mode of affection, but is only a free act of the divine will; and the knowledge of that can by no means be naturally implanted in creatures: for whence should there be a universal previous conception of an act which might either take place, or never take place. No such thing was at the first engraven on the hearts of men, and the fabric of the world teaches us no such thing.

But the minor proposition is established by a three-fold proof. 1. By the testimony of the Scripture. 2. By the testimony of every sinner's conscience. 3. And by that of the public consent of all nations.

The Holy Scriptures testify that such an innate conception is implanted by God in the minds of men. Thus the apostle to the Romans, chap. i. 32. 'who knowing the judgment of God, that they who do such things are worthy of death.' He is here speaking of those nations that were the most forsaken by God, and delivered over to a reprobate mind: yet even to these he ascribes some remaining knowledge of this immutable right of God, which renders it necessary, that 'every transgression should receive its just recompense of reward,' and that sinners should be deserving of death in such a manner, that it would be unworthy of God not to inflict it; that is to say, although the operations of this observing and acknowledging principle should often become very languid, and be even almost entirely overwhelmed by abounding wickedness; for 'what they know

naturally as brute beasts, in those things they corrupt themselves,' yet, that mankind must cease to exist before they can altogether lose this innate sense of divine right and judgment. Hence the barbarians conclude against Paul, then a prisoner, and in bonds, seeing the viper hanging on one of his hands, that 'no doubt he was a murderer, whom, though he had escaped the sea, yet vengeance suffered not to live.' Here they argue, from the effect to the cause, which in matters relating to moral good or evil, they could not, unless convinced in their consciences, that there is an inviolable connexion between sin and punishment, which they here ascribe to justice.

Evidences of God's justice, from Pagan writers.

Justice among them, according to their fabulous theology, which was particularly favoured by the bulk of the people, was the daughter of Jupiter, whom he set over the affairs of mortals, to avenge the injuries which they should do to one another, and to inflict condign punishment on all those who should impiously offend against the gods.

Hence, Hesiod speaking of Jupiter, says,

He married a second wife, the fair Themis, who brought forth the Hours,
And Eunomia, and Justice, &c.
Who should watch o'er the actions of mortal men.—Hesiod in Theog.

Again, the same author says,

Justice is a virgin, descended from Jupiter,
Chaste, and honour'd by the heavenly deities;
And when any one hath injur'd her,
Indirectly committing the injury, &c.—Hesiod in Oper.

Also, Orpheus in the hymns,

I sing the eye of Justice, who looketh behind her, and is fair,
Who likewise sits upon the sacred throne of sovereign Jupiter,
As the avenger of the unjust.

Hence, these common sayings,

God hath a just eye;
God hath found the transgressor.

In all which, and in numberless other such passages, the wisest men in those times of ignorance, have announced their sense of this vindicatory justice.

And among the Latins, the following passages prove their sense of the same.

Aspiciunt oculis, &c.
The gods above beheld the affairs of mortals with impartial eyes.
Raro antecedentem, &c.
Seldom hath punishment, through lameness of foot, left off pursuit of the wicked man, though he hath had the start of her.—Horace.

Also, that celebrated response of the Delphic Oracle, recorded by Ælian:

> But divine justice traces out the sources of crimes,
> Nor can it be avoided even by the descendants of Jupiter;
> But it hangs over the heads of the wicked themselves, and over the heads of their
> Children; and one disaster to their race is followed by another.

All which assert this vindicatory justice.

This then, as Plutarch says, is the ancient faith of mankind; or in the words of Aristotle, 'opinion concerning God,' which Dion Prusæensis calls 'a very strong and eternal persuasion, from time immemorial received, and still remaining among all nations.'

Secondly, The consciences of all mankind concur to corrobate this truth; but the cause which has numberless witnesses to support it, cannot fail. Hence, not only the flight, hiding places, and fig-leaf aprons of our primogenitor, but every word of dire meaning and evil omen, as terror, horror, tremor, and whatever else harasses guilty mortals, have derived their origin. Conscious to themselves of their wickedness, and convinced of the divine dominion over them, this idea, above all, dwells in their minds, that he with whom they have to do, is supremly just, and the avenger of all sin. From this consideration, even the people of God have been induced to believe, that death must inevitably be their portion, should they be but for once sisted in his presence. Not that the mass of the body is to us an obscure and dark prison (as the Platonists' dream), whence, when we obtain a view of divine things, being formerly enveloped by that mass, it is immediately suggested to the mind, that the bond of union between mind and body must be instantly dissolved.

It must indeed be acknowledged, that through sin we have been transformed into worms, moles, bats, and owls; but the cause of this general fear and dismay is not to be derived from this source.

The justice and purity of God, on account of which he can bear nothing impure or filthy to come into his presence, occurs to sinners minds: wherefore, they think of nothing else, but of a present God, of punishment prepared, and of deserved penalties to be immediately inflicted. The thought of the Deity bursting in upon the mind, imme-

diately every sinner stands confessed a debtor, a guilty and self-condemned criminal. Fetters, prisons, rods, axes, and fire, without delay, and without end, rise to his view. Whence some have judged the mark set upon Cain to have been some horrible tremor, by which, being continually shaken and agitated, he was known to all. Hence too these following verses:

Whither flyest thou Enceladus? Whatever coasts thou shalt arrive on,
Thou wilt always be under the eye of Jupiter.

And these,

'As every one's conscience is, so in his heart he conceives hope or fear, according to his actions.

'——This is the firsta punishment, that even in his own judgment, no guilty person is acquitted.

'——— You may think that we have passed over those whom a guilty conscience holds abashed, and lashes with its inexorable scourge; the mind, the executioner shaking the secret lash.'—See Voss. on Idol. book i. chap. 2.

It is the saying of a certain author, that punishment is coeval with injustice; and, that the horror of natural conscience is not terminated by the limits of human life.

Sunt aliquid manes: lethum non omnia finit,
Lucida que evictos effugit umbra rogos.

The soul is something, death ends not at all,
And the light spirit escapes the vanquished funeral pile.

Hence the famous verses of Adrian, the Roman Emperor, spoken on his death-bed:

Animula vagula, blandula,
Hospes comesque corporis,
Quæ nunc abibis in loca?
Pallidula, rigida, nudula,
Nec (ut soles) dabis joca.

'Alas, my soul, thou pleasing companion of this body, thou fleeting thing, that art now deserting it! Whither art thou flying? To what unknown scene? All trembling, fearful, and pensive! What now is become of thy former wit and humour? Thou shalt jest and be gay no more.'

Translated thus by Pope.

Ah fleeting spirit; wandering fire,
That long hast warm'd my tender breast,
Must thou no more this frame inspire?
No more a pleasing cheerful guest?

a Or, Chief.

Whither, ah whither art thou flying!
To what dark undiscover'd shore?
Thou seem'st all trembling, shiv'ring, dying,
And wit and humour are no more!

'That which is truly evil,' says Tertullian, 'not even those who are under its influence, dare defend as good. All evil fills nature with fear, or shame. Evil doers are glad to lie concealed; they avoid making their appearance: they tremble when apprehended.' Hence the Heathens have represented Jove himself, when conscious of any crime, as not free from fear. We find Mercury thus speaking of him in Plautus;

Etenim ille, &c.

Even that Jupiter, by whose order I come hither,
Dreads evil no less than any of us:
Being himself descended from a human father and mother,
There is no reason to wonder, that he should fear for himself.

Hence too, mankind have a dread awe of every thing in nature that is grand, unusual, and strange; as thunders, lightenings, or eclipses of the heavenly bodies; and tremble at every prodigy, spectre, or comet; nay, even at the hob-goblins of the night, exclaiming, like the woman of Sarepta, upon the death of her son, 'What have I to do with thee? Art thou come to put me in remembrance of my iniquities?' Hence, even the most abandoned of men, when vengeance for their sins hangs over their heads, have confessed their sins, and acknowledged the divine justice.

It is related by Suetonius, that Nero, that disgrace of human nature, just before his death, exclaimed, 'My wife, my mother, and my father, are forcing me to my end.'[b] Most deservedly celebrated too is that expression of Mauricius the Capadocian, when slain by Phocas, 'Just art thou, O Lord, and thy judgments are righteous.'

But moreover, while guilty man dreads the consequences of evil, which he knows he has really committed, he torments and vexes himself even with fictitious fears and bugbears: hence these verses of Horace;

[c] Somnia, terrores magicos, miracula, sagas,
Nocturnos lemures, portentaque Thessala finxit. [rides?]

[b] His mother, Agrippa, had poisoned her last husband, the Emperor Claudius, to make way for his succession; and Nero rewarded her, by causing her to be murdered. He likewise caused his wife, Octavia, and his tutor, Seneca, to lose their lives; and was, in every respect, perhaps one of the greatest monsters of wickedness that ever disgraced human nature.

[c] Hor. Epis. ii. 2. 208.

Ideas for the most part ridiculous; but as the old proverb says, 'Tis but reasonable that they should wear the fetters which themselves have forged.' Hence the guilty trembling mob is imposed upon, and cheated by impostors: by vagrant fortune-tellers and astrologers. If any illiterate juggler shall have foretold a year of darkness, alluding, viz. to the night-season of the year, the consternation is as great, as if Hannibal were at the gates of the city. The stings of conscience vex and goad them, and their minds have such presentiments of divine justice, that they look upon every new prodigy as final, or portentous of the final consummation. I pass over observing, at present, that, if once a conviction of the guilt of any sin be carried home to the mind, this solemn tribunal cannot thoroughly be dislodged from any man's bosom, either by dismal solitude, or by frequent company; by affluence of delicacies, or by habits of wickedness and impiety; nor, in fine, by any endeavours after the practice of innocence. The apostle in his Epistle to the Romans, chap. ii. enters more fully into this subject. Two things, then, are to be concluded from what has been said that mankind are guilty, and that they acknowledge.

First. That God hates sin, as contrary to himself, and that therefore it is impossible for a sinner, with safety to appear before him. But if God hate sin, he does it either from his nature, or because he so wills it; but it cannot be because he wills it, for in that case he might not will it: a supposition most absurd. And indeed, that assertion of Socinus, is every way barbarous, abominable, and most unworthy of God, wherein he says, 'I maintain that our damnation derives its origin, not from any justice of God, but from the free-will of God.' Socinus 'of the Saviour;' chap. 8. p. 3. But if God hate sin by nature, then by nature he is just, and vindicatory justice is natural to him.

Secondly. That our sins are debts, and therefore we shun the sight of our creditor. But I mean such a debt, as with relation to God's supreme dominion, implies in it a perpetual right of punishment; and such is the second proof of the minor proposition of the second argument. The third remains.

The public consent of all nations furnishes the third proof of this truth. There are writers indeed who have affirmed, a thing by no means credible, that some nations have

been so given up to a reprobate mind, that they acknowledge no Deity. Socinus hath written, that a certain Dominican friar, a worthy honest man, had related this much to himself of the Brasilians, and other natives of America. But who can assure us that this friar has not falsified, according to the usual custom of travellers, or that Socinus himself has not invented this story (for he had a genius fertile in falsehoods), to answer his own ends; but let this matter rest on the credit of Socinus, who was but little better than an infidel. But nobody, even by report, hath heard that there exist any who have acknowledged the being of a God, and who have not, at the same time, declared him to be just, to be displeased with sinners and sin, and that it is the duty of mankind to propitiate him, if they would enjoy his favour.

But a respectable writer objects, viz. Rutherford on Providence, chap. 22. p. 355. That this argument, that, that which men know of God by the natural power of conscience, must be naturally inherent in God, is of no weight; 'for,' says he, 'by the natural power of conscience, men know that God does many good things freely, without himself; as for instance, that he has created the world; that the sun rises and gives light; and yet in these operations God does not act from any necessity of nature.'

But this learned man blunders miserably here, as often elsewhere, in his apprehension of the design and meaning of his opponents; for they do not use this argument to prove that the egresses of divine justice are necessary, but that justice itself is necessary to God, which Socinians deny. What is his answer to these arguments? Mankind acknowledge many things, says he, which God does freely. To be sure they do, when he exhibits them before their eyes: but what follows from that? so too they acknowledge that God punishes sin, when he punishes it. But because all mankind, from the works of God, and from the natural power of conscience, acknowledge God to be good and bountiful, we may, without hesitation, conclude goodness and bounty to be essential attributes of God; so likewise, because from the natural power of conscience, and the consideration of God's works of Providence, they conclude and agree that God is just: we contend, that justice is natural to God.

But as mankind have testified this consent by other methods, so they have especially done it by sacrifices: concerning which, Pliny says, 'That all the world have agreed in them, although enemies or strangers to one another.' But since these are plainly of a divine origin, and instituted to prefigure (so to speak) the true atonement by the blood of Christ, in which he hath been the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world; that is, from the promise made of the seed of the woman, and from the sacrifice of Abel which followed, the use of them descended to all the posterity of Adam; therefore, though afterward the whole plan and purpose of the institution was lost, among by far the greatest part of mankind, and even the true God himself, to whom alone they were due, was unknown; and though no traces of the thing signified, namely, the promised seed remained, yet still the thing itself, and the general notion of appeasing the Deity by sacrifices, hath survived all the darkness, impieties, dreadful wickedness, punishments, migrations of nations, downfalls, and destructions of cities, states, and people, in which the world for these many ages hath been involved. For a consciousness of sin, and a sense of divine and avenging justice, have taken deeper root in the heart of man, than that they can by any means be eradicated.

There were four kinds of sacrifices among the Gentiles. First, the propitiatory or peace-making sacrifices; for by those, they thought they could render the gods propitious, or appease them; or avert the anger of the gods, and obtain peace with them: hence these verses on that undertaking of the Greeks in the exordium of Homer.

> But let some prophet, or some sacred sage,
> Explore the cause of great Apollo's rage:
> Or learn the wasteful vengeance to remove
> By mystic dreams; for dreams descend from Jove.
> If broken vows this heavy curse have laid,
> Let altars smoke, and hecatombs be paid:
> So heaven atoned shall dying Greece restore,
> And Phœbus dart his burning shafts no more.—POPE'S HOMER.

They were desirous of appeasing Apollo by sacrifices, who had inflicted on them a lamentable mortality. To the same purpose is that passage of Virgil,

> The prophet[d] first with sacrifice adores
> The greater gods; their pardon then implores, &c.—DRYDEN'S VIRG.

[d] Viz. Helenus, Æneid, book 3.

Hence too that lamentation of the person in the Penalus of Plautus, who could not make satisfaction to his gods.

'Unhappy man that I am,' says he, 'to-day I have sacrificed six lambs to my much-incensed gods, and yet I have not been able to render Venus propitious to me: and as I could not appease her, I came instantly off.'

And Suetonius, speaking of Otho, says, 'he endeavours, by all kinds of piaculary sacrifices, to propitiate the manes of Galba, by whom he had seen himself thrust down and expelled.' And the same author affirms of Nero, 'that he had been instructed that kings were wont to expiate the heavenly prodigies by the slaughter of some illustrious victim, and to turn them from themselves upon the heads of their nobles.' Though this perhaps rather belongs to the second kind. But innumerable expressions to this purpose are extant, both among the Greek and Latin authors.

The second kind were the expiatory or purifying sacrifices, by which sins were said to be atoned, expiated, and cleansed, and sinners purified, purged, and made desirous of peace, and the anger of the gods turned aside and averted. It would be tedious, and perhaps superfluous, to produce examples: the learned can easily trace them in great abundance. The other kinds were the eucharistical and prophetical, which have no relation to our present purpose.

In this way of appeasing the Deity, mankind, I say, formerly agreed: whence it is evident, that an innate conception of this sin-avenging justice is natural to all; and, therefore, that that justice is to be reckoned among the essential attributes of the divine nature, concerning which only, and not concerning the free acts of his will, mankind universally agree.

CHAP. IV.

The origin of human sacrifices. Their use among the Jews, Assyrians, Germans, Goths, the inhabitants of Marseilles, the Normans, the Francs, the Tyrians, the Egyptians, and the ancient Gauls. Testimonies of Cicero and Cæsar, that they were used among the Britons and Romans by the Druids. A fiction of Appio concerning the worship in the temple of Jerusalem. The names of some persons sacrificed. The use of human sacrifices among the Gentiles, proved from Clemens of Alexandria, Dionysius of Halicarnassia, Porphyry, Philo, Eusebius, Tertullian, Euripides. Instances of human sacrifices in the sacred Scriptures. The remarkable obedience of Abraham. What the neighbouring nations might have gathered from that event. Why human sacrifices were not instituted by God. The story of Iphigenia. The history of Jephtha. Whether he put his daughter to death. The cause of the difficulty. The impious sacrifice of the king of Moab. The abominable superstition of the Rugiani. The craftiness of the devil. Vindications of the argument. The same concluded.

But it is strange to think what a stir was made, by the ancient enemy of mankind, to prevent any ray of light respecting the true sacrifice, that was to be made in the fulness of time, from being communicated to the minds of men through means of this universal ceremony and custom of sacrificing. Hence, he influenced the most of the nations to the heinous, horrible, and detestable crime of offering human sacrifices, in order to make atonement for themselves, and render God propitious by such an abominable wickedness.

But as it seems probable, that some light may be borrowed from the consideration of these sacrifices, in which, mankind, from the presumption of a future judgment, have so closely agreed, perhaps the learned reader will think it not foreign to our purpose to dwell a little on the subject, and to reckon up some examples. This abomination, prohibited by God, under the penalty of a total extermination, was divers times committed by the Jews, running headlong into forbidden wickedness, while urged on by the stings of conscience to this infernal remedy. They offered their children as burnt-sacrifices to Moloch, that is, to the Saturn of the Tyrians; not to the planet of that name; not to the Father of the Cretan Jupiter; but to the Saturn of the Tyrians, that is, to Baal, or to the sun; and not by making

them to pass between two fires for purification, as some think, but by burning them in the manner of a whole burnt-offering. Psal. cvi. 36—38. 'And they served their idols which were a snare unto them: yea, they sacrificed their sons and their daughters unto devils, and shed innocent blood, even the blood of their sons and of their daughters, whom they sacrificed unto the idols of Canaan, and the land was polluted with blood.' Almost the whole world, during the times of that ignorance which God winked at, paid court to the devil. Since then, it is abundantly evident, from these sacrifices, by what a sense of vindicatory justice, horror of punishment, and consciousness of sin, mankind are constrained: we must enlarge a little on the consideration of them.

Tacitus speaking of the Germans, says, 'Of the gods, they chiefly worship Mercury, to whom, on certain days, they hold it as an article of religion and piety to sacrifice human victims: Mars, they have always been accustomed to appease by a most cruel worship; for his victims were the deaths of the captives.' Jornandes affirms the same of the Goths. And thus Lucan writes in his siege of Marseilles;

'———Here the sacred rites of the gods are barbarous in their manner; altars are built for deadly ceremonies, and every tree is purified by human blood.'

And the same author, in the sixth book, from his Precepts of Magic, has these verses.

Vulnere si ventris, &c.

'If contrary to nature, the child be extracted through a wound in the belly, to be served up on the hot altars.'

Virgil bears witness that such sacrifices were offered to Phœbus or the Sun.—Æneid x.

> Next Lycas fell; who not like others born,
> Was from his wretched mother ripp'd and torn:
> Sacred, O Phœbus! from his birth to thee.—DRYDEN'S VIRGIL.

But Acosta asserts, that infants are sacrificed, even at this very time, to the Sun, in Cuscum, the capital of Peru.

And thus the Scriptures testify, 2 Kings xvii. 29—31.

'Howbeit, every nation made gods of their own, and put them in the houses of the high places, which the Samaritans had made, every nation in their cities wherein they dwelt. And

the men of Babylon made Succoth-benoth, and the men of Cuth made Nergal, and the men of Hamath made Ashima; and the Avites made Nibhaz and Tartak, and the Sepharvites burnt their children in fire to Adrammelech and Anammelech the gods of Sepharvaim.'

Ditmarus, in his first book, testifies, 'that the Normans and Danes sacrificed yearly, in the month of January, to their gods, ninety-nine human creatures, as many horses, besides dogs and cocks.' But what Procopius, on the Gothic war writes, is truly astonishing, viz. 'that the Francs made use of human victims in his time, even though they then worshipped Christ.' Alas! for such a kind of Christianity. The practices of the Tyrians,[a] Carthaginians, and Egyptians, in this respect, are known to every one. And Theodoret says, 'that in Rhodes, some person was sacrificed to Saturn, on the sixteenth of the calends of November, which, after having been for a long time observed, became a custom. And they used to reserve one of those who had been capitally condemned till the feast of Saturn.'

Porphyry, 'on Abstinence from Animals,' relates the customs of the Phœnicians concerning this matter. 'The Phœnicians,' says he, 'in great disasters, either by wars, or commotions, or pestilence, used to sacrifice one of their dearest friends, or relations, to Saturn, devoted to this fate by the common suffrages.' They were called Phœnicians, from the word φοῖνιξ, which signifies a red colour; φοῖνιξ, according to Eustathius, is from φόνος, which signifies blood; thence the colour called φοινῖκὸς, or the purple colour. Hence, the learned conjecture, that the Phœnicians were the descendants of Esau or Edom, whose name also signifies red, and from whom also the Red Sea was named. Edom, then φοῖνιξ and ἐρυθραῖος, mean the same, viz. red. Why may we not then conjecture, that the Phœnicians or Idumæans, were first led to this custom, from some corrupt tradition concerning the sacrificing of Isaac, the father of Esau, the leader and head of their nation. This, at least, makes for the conjecture, that while other nations sacrificed enemies or strangers, Porphyry bears witness that they sacrificed one of their dearest friends or relations. But Isaac

[a] Concerning the Tyrians, see Curtius, book fourth; and concerning the Carthaginians, see Diodorus, book twentieth.

was not to Abraham one of the dearest, but the only dear one. From such corrupt traditions as these, it is not to be wondered, that the consciences of men, struck with a fear of punishment, should have been encouraged to persevere in so cruel and superstitious a worship.

Concerning the ancient Gauls, we have the most creditable evidences, Cicero, and Julius Cæsar; the former of whom charges them with the practice of offering human sacrifices, as a horrid crime, and certain evidence of their contempt of Deity. The other, however, commends them on this very account, on the score of a more severe religion. 'If at any time induced by fear, they think it necessary that the gods should be appeased, they defile their altars and temples with human victims; as if they could not practice religion, without first violating it by their wickedness. For who does not know, that even at this day, they retain that savage and barbarous custom of sacrificing human beings; thinking that the immortal gods can be appeased by the blood and wickedness of man.' Cicero pro Fonteio. But Cæsar, the conqueror of the Gauls, gives us a very different account of these kind of sacrifices; 'this nation,' says he, 'of all the Gauls, is most devoted to religious observances; and for that reason, those who labour under any grievous distemper, or who are conversant in dangers and battles, either sacrifice human victims, or vow that they will sacrifice them, and they employ the Druids as the conductors of such sacrifices; for they have an opinion that, unless a human life be given for a human life, the heavenly deities cannot be appeased.' These last words seem to me to acknowledge a persuasion that must have arisen from some ancient tradition about the substitution of the Son of Man, in the stead of sinners, as a propitiation for sin.

No doubt can be entertained concerning the inhabitants of Britain, but that they were guilty of the same practices; for from them came the Druids, the first promoters of that superstition, not only in the Gauls, but even in Italy, and in the city of Rome itself. 'The doctrine of the Druids,' says Cæsar, 'is thought to have been found in Britain, and brought thence into Gaul: and now such as are desirous to examine more particularly into that matter, generally go thither for the sake of information.' Book vi. of the wars

in Gaul. But Tacitus informs us with what kind of sacrifices they performed their divine services there, in the fourteenth book of his annals. 'When the island of Anglesea was conquered by Paulinus, a guard,' says he, 'was placed over the vanquished, and the groves devoted to cruel superstitions were hewn down (the same was done by Cæsar in the siege of Marseilles; Lucan, book third); for it was an article of their religion to sacrifice their captives on the altars, and to consult their gods by human entrails.'

Hence that verse in Horace.

Visam Britannos hospitibus feros.
I will visit the Britons cruel to strangers.

At which remote place,[b] the Britons used to sacrifice their guests for victims; yea, even in Rome itself, as Plutarch, in his life of Marcellus testifies, they buried, by order of the high-priests, 'a man and woman of Gaul, and a man and woman of Greece,' alive in the cattle market, to avert some calamity by such a fatal sacrifice. Whether this was done yearly, as some think, I am rather inclined to doubt.

Of the same kind was the religion of the Decii, devoting themselves for the safety of the city. Hence a suspicion arose, and was every where rumoured among the Gentiles concerning the sacred rites of the Jews, with which they were unacquainted, viz. that they were wont to be solemnized with human sacrifices. For although after the destruction of the temple, it was manifest that they worshipped the God of heaven only, yet so long as they celebrated the secret mysteries appointed them by God, Josephus against Appio bears witness, that they laboured under the infamy of that horrible crime, viz. of sacrificing human victims, among those who were unacquainted with the Jewish polity; where he also recites, from the same Appio, a most ridiculous fiction about a young Greek captive, being delivered by Antiochus, when he impiously spoiled the temple, after having been fed there on a sumptuous diet for the space of a year, that he might make the fatter a victim.

A custom that prevailed with some, not unlike this untruth about the young Greek kept in the temple, seems to have given rise to it. For thus Diodorus, in book v. writes of the Druids, 'They fix up their malefactors upon poles,

[b] Viz. Anglesea.

after having kept them five years (it seems they fattened much slower than at Jerusalem), and sacrifice them to their gods; and with other first-fruits of the year, offer them on large funeral piles.' Theodoret also mentions something of that kind concerning the Rhodians, in the first book 'of the Greek Affections;' the words have been mentioned before.

But that young Greek, destined for sacrifice, in Appio, has no name; that is, there never was any such person.

> But, friend, discover faithful what I crave,
> Artful concealment ill becomes the brave;
> Say what thy birth, and what the name you bore,
> Imposed by parents in the natal hour.—
>
> Pope's[c] Homer's Odyssey, book. viii.

But after having prepared the plot, he ought not to have shunned the task of giving names to the actors. We have the name of a Persian sacrificed even among the Thracians, in Herodotus, book ix. 'The Thracians of Apsinthium,' says he, 'having seized Oiobazus flying into Thrace, sacrificed him after their custom to Pleistorus, the god of the country.'

There is still remaining, if I rightly remember, the name of a Spanish soldier, a captive with other of his companions among the Mexicans, well known inhabitants of America, who being sacrificed on a very high altar to the gods of the country, when his heart was pulled out, if we can credit Peter Martyr, author of the History of the West Indies, tumbling down upon the sand, exclaimed, 'O companions, they have murdered me.' Clemens of Alexandria makes mention of Theopompus, a king of the Lacedemonians, being sacrificed by Aristomenes the Messenian. His words, which elegantly set forth this custom of all the nations, we shall beg leave to trouble the reader with: 'But now, when they had invaded all states and nations as plagues (he is speaking of dæmons) they demanded cruel sacrifices; and one Aristomenes, a Messenian, slew three hundred in honour of Ithometan Jupiter, thinking that he sacrificed so many hecatombs in due form, and of such a kind. Among these, too, was Theopompus, king of the Lacedemonians, an illustrious victim. But the inhabitants of Mount Taurus, who dwell about the Tauric Chersonese, instantly sacrifice

[c] The words in the original apply much better to our author's meaning. See them, Odyss. lib. viii. v. 550.

whatever shipwrecked strangers they find upon their coasts to Diana of Taurus.' 'Thence, ye inhospitable shores, Euripides again and again bewails in his scenes these your sacrifices.'—Clemens's Exhortations to the Greeks.

But what he says concerning Euripides, has a reference to the story of Iphigenia among the inhabitants of Taurus:[d] where, however, the poet signifies that she detested such kinds of sacrifices; for he introduces Iphigenia, then priestess of Diana, thus bewailing her lot:

'They have appointed me priestess in these temples, where Diana, the goddess of the festival, is delighted with such laws; whose name alone is honourable: but I say no more, dreading the goddess. For I sacrifice (and it long hath been a custom of the state), every Grecian that arrives in this country.'—Eur. Iph. in Tauris.

Thus far Clemens, who also demonstrates the same thing of the Thessalians, Lycians, Lesbians, Phocensians, and Romans, from Monimus, Antoclides, Pythocles, and Demaratus. That deed too of Agamemnon, alluded to by Virgil, furnishes another proof.

> Sanguine placastis ventos, et virgine cæsa, &c.
>
> O, Grecians, when the Trojan shores you sought,
> Your passage with a virgin's blood was bought.
>
> DRYDEN'S VIRG.

Tertullian also bears witness to this wickedness: 'In Africa they openly sacrificed infants to Saturn, even down to the time of the proconsulate of Tiberius; and what is surprising, even in that most religious city of the pious descendants of Æneas, there is a certain Jupiter, whom, at his games, they drench with human blood.'

It is notoriously known, that in the sanguinary games of the Romans, they made atonement to the gods with human blood, namely, that of captives. But Eusebius[e] Pamphilus enters the most fully of any into this matter: for he shews from Porphyry, Philo, Clemens, Dionysius of Halicarnassia, and Diodorus Siculus, that this ceremony of offering human sacrifices was practised all over the world. Porphyry, indeed, shews, at large, who instituted this kind of worship

[d] In the play of Euripides, called Iphigenia in Tauris.

[e] Bishop of Cæsarea, in Palestine, a very learned prelate, and one of the greatest writers of his time.

in different places, and who put an end to it. Another very ingenious poet brings an accusation of extreme folly and madness, against this rite, in these verses. It is a Plebeian addressing Agamemnon:

> Tu quum pro vitula, statuis dulcem Aulide natam,
> Ante aras, spargisque mola caput, Improbe, Salsa,
> Rectum animi servas?
>
> When your own child you to the altar led,
> And pour'd the salted meal upon her head;
> When you beheld the lovely victim slain,
> Unnatural Father! were you sound of brain?

Agamemnon is introduced thus apologizing for himself, on account of the utility and necessity of the sacrifice.

> Verum ego, ut hærentes adverso littore naves
> Eriperem, prudens placavi sanguine Divos.
>
> But I, while adverse winds tempestuous roar,
> To loose our fated navy from the shore,
> Wisely with blood the powers divine adore.
>
> FRANCIS'S HORACE.

The Plebeian again charges him with madness:

> Nempe tuo, furiose?
>
> What! your own blood, you madman?

But Philo, in his first book, relates that one Saturn (there were many illustrious persons of that name, as well as of the name of Hercules), when the enemies of his country were oppressing it, sacrificed at the altars his own daughter named Leudem, which among them, viz. the Tyrians, means only-begotten.

I have little or no doubt but that this Saturn was Jephthah the Israelite; that their Hercules was Joshua, the celebrated Vossius has clearly proved. Book i. of Idol.

But as we have made mention of Jephthah, it will not be foreign to our purpose, briefly to treat of these three famous examples of human sacrifices recorded in the sacred writings. The first is contained in that celebrated history concerning the trial of Abraham: an undertaking so wonderful and astonishing, that no age hath ever produced, or will produce its like. It even exceeds every thing that fabulous Greece hath presumed in story. A most indulgent and af-

fectionate father, weighed down with age,[f] is ordered to offer his only son, the pillar of his house and family, the trust of heaven, a son solemnly promised him by God, the foundation of the future church, in whom, according to the oracles of God, all the nations of the earth were to be blessed; this most innocent, and most obedient son, he is ordered to offer as a burnt-offering: a dreadful kind of sacrifice indeed! which required, that the victim should be first slain, afterward cut in pieces, and lastly burnt by the hand of a father! What though the purpose was not accomplished, God having graciously so ordained it; this obedience of the holy man is, notwithstanding, to be had in everlasting remembrance! And forasmuch as he begun the task with a sincere heart and unfeigned faith, the Holy Spirit bears testimony to him, as if he had really offered his son. Heb. xi. 17. 'By faith Abraham, when he was tried, offered up Isaac: and he that had received the promises, offered up his only-begotten.' The fame of this transaction, no doubt, was spread, in ancient times, over many of the Eastern nations. But that those, who were altogethe rignorant of the communion and friendship which Abraham cultivated with the Lord, and yet were convinced in their consciences, that a more noble sacrifice than all cattle, and a more precious victim was necessary to be offered to God (for if this persuasion had not been deeply impressed on their minds, the devil could not have induced them to that dreadful worship), assumed the courage of practising the same thing, from that event, there is not any room to doubt. And farther, if any report were spread abroad concerning the divine command and oracle which Abraham received, the eyes of all would be turned upon him as the wisest and holiest of men, and they would be led, perhaps, to conclude falsely that God might be propitiated by such kind of victims. For they did not this, from any rivalship of Abraham, whom they respected as a wise and just man; but being deceived by that action of his, and endeavouring at an expiation of their own crimes, they did the same thing that he

[f] Abraham is now said to have been a hundred and thirty-three years of age: for some are of opinion that Isaac, at the time he was to have been sacrificed, was thirty-three years old: Josephus says, twenty-five. The Jews in Seder Olam, thirty-six. Nor is it any objection that he is called Naar, for so Benjamin, the father of many children is called, Gen. xliii.

did, but with a very different end: for the offering up of Isaac was a type of the sacrifice of Jesus Christ.

But from that right and dominion, which God naturally hath over all the creatures, or from that superior excellence and eminence, wherewith he is endowed and constituted, he might, without any degree or suspicion of injustice or cruelty, exact victims as a tribute from man; but he hath declared his will to the contrary; Exod. xxxiv. 19, 20. 'But the firstlings of an ass thou shalt redeem with a lamb: and the first born of thy sons thou shalt redeem.' Partly, lest human blood, of which he has the highest care, should become of little account; but especially, because all mankind in general being polluted with iniquities, a type of his immaculate son could not be taken from among them.

But this history, the falsifying poets of the Greeks have corrupted, by that fable of theirs, concerning the sacrifice of Iphigenia, begun by her father Agamemnon, but who was liberated by the substitution of a doe:[g] hence, in Euripides, these words are falsely applied to the virgin, destined to be sacrificed, which (the proper changes being made), might with more propriety be spoken of Isaac, when acting in obedience to the command of God, and of his father.

——— ὦ πάτερ πάρειμί σοι, &c. &c.

'O, father, I am here present, and I cheerfully deliver up my body, for my country, and for all Greece, to be sacrificed at the altar of the goddess, by those who now conduct me thither, if the oracle so require.'—Euripid. Iphigenia in Aulis, near the end.

It is worth while to notice, by the way, the use of the word ὑπὲρ; the virgin to be sacrificed, declared, that she was willing to appease the anger of the gods, and suffer punishment in behalf of, or, instead of her country and all Greece: and but a little before she is introduced, exulting in these words,

Ελισσετ' αμφι ναον, &c.

'Invoke to her temple, to her altar, Diana, queen Diana,

[g] Agamemnon, as the story runs, had killed one of Diana's stags; and the goddess would be appeased on no other terms than by the sacrifice of his daughter: but after she was laid on the pile, Diana, pitying the virgin, put a doe in her room, and made Iphigenia her priestess.

the blessed Diana: for if it shall be necessary, by my blood and sacrifice I will obliterate the oracle.'

Justly celebrated too, in the second place, is the history of Jephthah's sacrificing his only daughter, related by the Holy Spirit, in these words, Judges xi. 30, 31. 'And Jephthah vowed a vow unto the Lord, and said, If thou shalt without fail deliver the children of Ammon into mine hands; then it shall be, that whatsoever cometh forth of the doors of my house to meet me, when I return in peace from the children of Ammon, shall surely be the Lord's, and I will offer it up for a burnt-offering.' But when he returned, 'his daughter came out to meet him; and at the end of two months, he did with her according to his vow.' If any passage ever puzzled both Jewish and Christian interpreters, ancient and modern, as well as all your disputants upon, and patchers up of common-place difficulties, this one has. For on the one hand, here it is supposed, that all offering of human sacrifices is detested and abhorred by God; and to ascribe such a thing to a man of piety, and one celebrated by the Holy Spirit for his faith, many will not venture. But again, on the other hand, the words of the history, the circumstances, the grief and lamentation of the father, seem hardly capable of admitting any other meaning. But to me these things are ambiguous.[h]

First, It is evident, that a gross ignorance of the law, either in making the vow, or in executing it, is by no means to be ascribed to Jephthah, who was, though a military man, a man of piety, a fearer of God, and well acquainted with the sacred writings. Now then, if he simply made a vow; that a compensation and redemption, according to the valuation of the priests, ought to have been made, could not have escaped him; and therefore there was no reason why he should so much bewail the event of a vow, by which he had engaged himself to the Lord, and to which he was bound: for he might both keep his faith, and free his daughter, according to the words of the law; Lev. xxvii. 21. 31.

Or if we should conjecture, that he was so grossly mistaken, and entirely unacquainted with divine matters, was there no priest or scribe among all the people, who, during

[h] That is, the expressions relating to this subject are capable of more meanings than one; and to ascertain the right one, is attended with difficulties.

that time which he granted to his daughter, at her own request, to bewail her virginity, could instruct this illustrious leader, who had lately merited so highly of the commonwealth, in the meaning of the law, so that he should neither vex himself, render his family extinct, nor worship God, to no purpose, by a vain superstition? I have no doubt then, but that Jephthah performed his duty in executing his vow, according to the precept of the law, however much he might have erred in his original conception of it.

Nor is it less doubtful, in the second place, that Jephthah did not offer his daughter as a burnt-offering, as the words of the vow imply, according to the ceremony and institution of that kind of sacrifice: for as these sacrifices could be performed by the priest only, by killing the victim, cutting it in pieces, and consuming it by fire upon the altar; offices, in which no priest would have ministered or assisted: so also, such kind of sacrifices are enumerated among the abominations to the Lord which he hateth; Deut. xii. 31. 'Thou shalt not do so unto the Lord thy God; for every abomination to the Lord which he hateth, have they done unto their gods: for even their sons and their daughters have they burnt in the fire to their gods.'

Nor does it seem probable that Jephthah had dedicated his daughter to God, that she should perpetually remain a virgin: for neither hath God instituted any such kind of worship; nor could the forced virginity of the daughter by any means ever be reckoned to the account of the father, as any valuable consideration, in place of a victim.

As then there were two kinds of things devoted to God: the first of which, was of the class of those, which, as God did not order that they should be offered in sacrifice, it was made a statute, that they should be valued by the priest, at a fair valuation, and be redeemed, and so return again to common use. The law of these is delivered, Lev. xxvii. 1, 2. &c. 'And the Lord spake unto Moses, saying, Speak unto the children of Israel, and say unto them, when a man shall make a singular vow, the persons shall be for the Lord, by thy estimation. And thy estimation shall be, of the male from twenty years old, even unto sixty years old, even thy estimation shall be fifty shekels of silver, after the shekel of the sanctuary. And if it be a female, then thy estimation

And ver. 8. 'But if he be
n he shall present himself
shall value him: according
he priest value him.'
were called *Chærem*,[1] con-
ple vow, of which there was
be made by the priest: the
in the 28th and 29th verses
ithstanding, no devoted thing
the Lord, of all that he hath,
of the field of his possession
devoted thing is most holy
, which shall be devoted of
ut shall surely be put to death.'
of these two kinds the vow of
es, if I mistake not, the whole diffi-

ot to the first is as clear as the day;
that it did, he might easily have ex-
family from all grief on that account,
ation made by the priest. It was then a
his vow, Jephthah had vowed to the
s to be redeemed, but accounted 'most
rd;' as in verses 27, 28. before-mentioned.
bted, whether a rational creature could be
: but in fact there can hardly remain any
t: to the person who considers the text itself,
appear: the words are, 'every devoted thing is
to the Lord: none devoted, which shall be de-
n, shall be redeemed, but shall surely be put to
is evident from the foregoing verse, that the
men,' point not at the efficient cause, but the
of the vow; where, the same words, in the original,
be otherwise rendered than by 'of' or 'touching man,'
out of' or 'from among mankind or men,' or 'of the class
n.' And all those writers interpret the words in this
(and there are not a few of them both among Jews and
stians) who are of opinion, that the passage ought to be

[1] A thing or person so devoted as not to be redeemed.
pointing not at the persons vowing, but at the object of their vow, or at
ed or devoted by them.

explained as relating to the enemies of God devoted to universal slaughter and destruction.

As Jephthah then had devoted his daughter as a *Cherem*, it seems hardly to admit of a doubt that the cause of his consternation and sorrow at meeting her was, because, that according to the law he had slain her, having devoted her to God in such a manner as not to be redeemed.

It would be foreign to our purpose to agitate this question any farther. We shall only say, then, that after having maturely weighed all the circumstances of the text, and of the thing itself, according to the measure of our abilities, we have gone into the opinion of those who maintain, that Jephthah gave up his daughter to death, she being devoted to God in such a manner, as according to the law not to be redeemed, that Supreme Being, who has the absolute right and power of life and death, so requiring[l] it. The theologians of both nations,[m] who espouse this side of the question, are both numerous and renowned. Peter Martyr testifies, that almost all the more ancient Rabbins agreed in this opinion. Josephus in his Antiquities follows them, although he hath not determined Jephthah to be free of blame. Of the fathers, it is sufficient, for the matter is not to be determined by votes, that Hieron in his epistle to Julian; Ambrose on Virginity, book the third; Augustine on the book of Judges; and of those in later times, Peter Martyr in his commentary on the 11th of Judges; and Ludovicus Capellus, in that excellent treatise of his concerning Jephthah's vow, have either approved, or at least have not dissented from this opinion. What Epiphanius[n] relates concerning the deification of Jephthah's daughter, favours this opinion: 'In Sebaste,' says he, 'which was formerly called Samaria, having deified the daughter of Jephthah, they yearly celebrate a solemn festival in honour of her,' Yea, more, the most learned agree that the fame of this transaction was so spread among the Gentile nations, that thence Homer, Euripides, and others, seized the occasion of raising that fable about

[l] The author here uses the words, 'at least interpretatively,' before 'so requiring it:' meaning thereby, as I understand him, that the just and proper interpretation of the passage wherein this history is recorded, and of the others quoted, relating to vows, had clearly determined him to adopt this opinion.

[m] That is, both of the Jewish and Christian persuasion.

[n] Patriarch of Constantinople in the year 520.

Agamemnon's sacrificing his daughter; and that there never was any other Iphigenia than Jephthegenia, nor Iphianassa[o] than Ιφθιανασσα,[p] or Jephtheanassa.

But this was a kind of human sacrifice, by which, as God intended to shadow forth the true sacrifice of his Son; so, the enemy of the human race aping the Almighty, and taking advantage of, and insulting the blindness, of mankind, and the horror of their troubled consciences arising from a sense of the guilt of sin, influenced and compelled them to the performance of ceremonies of a similar kind.

There is no need that we should dwell on the third instance of this kind of sacrifices that occurs in the sacred writings; viz. that of the king of Moab, during the siege of his city, offering up either his own son, or the king of Edom's upon the wall, as he was a heathen and a worshipper of Satan, according to the custom of the Phœnicians. Despairing of his situation, when it seemed to him that the city could no longer be defended; and when he had no hope of breaking through, or of escaping, he offered his own son, in my opinion (for the king of Edom had no first-born to succeed him in the government, being himself only a deputy king) as a sacrifice to the gods of his country, to procure a deliverance. The three kings then departed from the city which they were besieging, God so directing it, either having entered into an agreement to that purpose, or because of the war not being successfully ended (for the conjectures on this point are by no means satisfactory), some indignation having broke out among the troops of the Israelites, who also themselves were idolaters.[q] See 2 Kings iii. 26, 27.

[o] Iphianassa, as story says, was daughter of Proetus, king of the Argives, who preferring herself in beauty to Juno, was struck with such a madness as to believe herself to be a cow: but was afterward cured by Melampus, a famous physician, to whom she was given in marriage.

[p] Or, than the daughter of Jephthah: for Iphigenia, see note on p. 388.

[q] Dr. Gill agrees with our author, that the king of Moab sacrified his own son; and thinks that he might be induced to offer him thus publicly on the wall, that it might be seen by the camp of Israel, and move their compassion; but rather that he did it as a religious action to appease the Deity by a human sacrifice; and that it was offered either to the true God, in imitation of Abraham, or to his idol Chemosh, the sun. It was usual with the heathens, particularly the Phœnicians, when in calamity and distress, to offer up what was most dear and valuable to them, see p. 381. Dr. Gill seems of opinion that the cause why the three kings broke up the siege was, that after this barbarous and shocking sacrifice, the Moabites became quite desperate, and that the kings, seeing them resolved to sell their lives so dear, and to hold out to the last

We shall conclude this train of testimonies with that noted account of the Rugiani, certain inhabitants of an island of Sclavonia, related by Albertus Crantzius, from which we may learn the dreadful judgment of God against a late superstition of Christians.

'Some preachers of the gospel of Christ,' who and what they were the historian shews, 'converted the whole island of the Rugiani to the faith: then they built an oratory in honour of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, and in memory of St. Vitus, patron of Corveia. But after, by divine permission, matters were changed, and the Rugiani fell off from the faith, having instantly expelled the priests and Christians, they converted their religion into superstition;[r] for they worship St. Vitus, whom we acknowledge as a martyr and servant of Christ, as God; nor is there any barbarous people under heaven, that more dread Christians and priests: whence also, in peculiar honour of St. Vitus, they have been accustomed to sacrifice, yearly, any Christian that may accidently fall into their hands.' A more horrible issue of Christianity sinking into superstition, would, perhaps, be difficult to be found. But we are now tired of dwelling on such horrid rites and abominable sacrifices. Forasmuch, then, as we ourselves are the offspring of those who are wholly polluted with such sacrifices, and by nature not better or wiser than they; but only, through the rich, free, and unspeakable mercy of God, have been 'translated from the power of darkness, and the kingdom of Satan, into his marvellous light,' it is most evident, that by every tie we are bound to offer and devote ourselves wholly to Christ our deliverer, and most glorious Saviour, 'who hath loved us; and who gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify to himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works.'

Thus the prophecies concerning the oblation of Christ

man, thought fit to raise the siege. A very natural explication of these words, 'and there was great indignation against Israel,' if the indignation be understood as applicable only to the Moabites: but the concluding sentence of our author on this subject seems to imply it to be his opinion, that there were also dissensions and indignation in the allied army; perhaps, between the Edomites, the idolatrous Israelites, and the worshippers of the true God, arising from the horrid spectacle they had witnessed. This is only ventured as a conjecture, that may better account for the sudden departure of the kings.

[r] Their religion, at best, had been contaminated with the superstitions of the church of Rome.

being but badly understood, mankind were seduced, through the instigation of the devil, to pollute themselves with these inhuman and accursed sacrifices. Perhaps too, that most artful seducer had it in view, by such sacrifices, to prejudice the more acute and intelligent part of mankind against that life-giving sacrifice, that was to be destructive of his kingdom: for, such now held these atrocious sacrifices and detestable rites in abhorrence. However, to keep the minds of men in suspense, and in subjection to himself, he did not fail from another quarter, by words, obliquely, to spread abroad and send forth ambiguous oracles, as if such rites and sacrifices were of no avail for the expiation of sins: thence these verses in Cato's Distichs;

Cum sis ipse nocens moritur cur victima pro te?
Stultitia est morte alterius sperare salutem.

'Since it is thyself that art guilty, why need any victim die for thee? It is madness to expect salvation from the death of another.'

I have no doubt but that this last verse is a diabolical oracle.

By such deceitful practices the old serpent, inflamed with envy, and being himself for ever lost, because he could not eradicate every sense of avenging justice (which is as a curb to restrain the fury of the wicked) from the minds of men, wished to lead them into mazes, that he might still keep them the slaves of sin, and subject to his own dominion.

There have been, and still are, some of mankind, I confess it, who, from indulging their vices, are seared in their consciences, and whose minds are become callous by the practice of iniquity; who, flattering themselves to their own destruction, have falsely conceived, either that God does not trouble himself about such things, or that he can be easily appeased, and without any trouble. Hence that profane wretch, introduced by Erasmus, after having settled matters with the Dominican commissaries, to a jolly companion of his own, when he asked him, 'Whether God would ratify the bargain?' answers, 'I fear rather lest the devil should not ratify it, for God by nature is easy to be appeased.' It is from the same idea, that many of the barbarous natives of America idly fancying that there are two

gods, one good, and another evil, say, that there is no need to offer sacrifices to the good one, because being naturally good, he is not disposed to hurt or injure any one: but they use all possible care, both by words and actions, and every kind of horrible sacrifice, to please the evil one. Likewise those, who are called by Mersennus, Deists, exclaim, 'that the bigots, or superstitiously religious, who believe in infernal punishments, are worse than Atheists who deny that there is a God.' So too, some new masters among our own countrymen talk of nothing, in their discourses, but of the goodness of God: his supreme right, dominion, and vindicatory justice, are of no account with them: but he himself knows how to preserve his glory and his truth pure and entire, in spite of the abilities, and without regard to the delicacy of these fashionable and dainty gentlemen.

But Rutherford, on Providence, answers, that 'the Gentiles formerly borrowed their purgations and lustrations[t] from the Jews, and not from the light of nature;' but he must be a mere novice in the knowledge of these matters, into whose mind even the slightest thought of that kind could enter. For I believe there is no one who doubts the custom and ceremony of sacrificing among the Gentile nations to be much more ancient than the Mosaic institutions. Nor can any one imagine, that this universal custom among all nations, tribes and people, civilized and barbarous, unknown to one another, differently situated and scattered all over the world, could have first arisen and proceeded from the institutions of the Jews.

'But,' says he, 'the light is dark, that a sinful creature could dream of being able to perform a satisfaction, and make propitiatory expiations to an infinite God incensed, and such too as would be satisfactory for sin:' yea, I say, that a sinful creature could perform this is false, and a presumption only arising from that darkness which we are in by nature: but notwithstanding it is true, that God must be appeased by a propitiatory sacrifice, if we would that our sins should be forgiven us; and this much he hath pointed out to all mankind by that light of nature, obscure indeed,

[t] That is, their acts or ceremonies of cleansing or purifying themselves from guilt by sacrifice or otherwise; the latter word more particularly means the operation of cleansing by water.

but not dark. Nor is it necessary, in order to prove this, that we should have recourse to the fabulous antiquities of the Egyptians, the very modest writer of which, Manetho, the high-priest of Heliopolis, who lived in the time of Ptolemy Philadelphus, and took his history from the Seriadic Hieroglyphical[u] obelisks, writes, that the Egyptian empire had endured to the time of Alexander the Great, through thirty-one dynasties,[x] containing a period of five thousand three hundred and fifty-three years: this is the sum of the years according to that writer, as Scaliger collects it, to which Vossius has added two years. But other Egyptians have been, by no means, satisfied with this period of time. 'For, from Isiris and Isis, to the reign of Alexander, who built a city of his own name in Egypt, they reckon more than ten thousand years; and as some write little less than thirteen thousand years,' says Diodorus; during which period of time, they say that the sun had four times changed his course, for that he had twice risen in the west and set in the east: which things, though they may seem the dreams of madmen, strictly and properly understood; yet some very learned men entertain a hope, by means of the distinction of the years which the Egyptians used, and the description of their festivals, of reconciling them with the truth of the Holy Scriptures.

But passing over these things, it can hardly be doubted, that Jupiter Ammon, among the Egyptians, was no other than Cham, the son of Noah, and Bacchus, Noah himself; and that Vulcan, among other nations, was Tubal Cain; to all whom, and to others, sacrifices were offered before the birth of Moses. What too do they say to this? that Job, among the Gentiles, offered burnt-offerings before the institution of the Mosaic ceremonies: see chap. i. 5. xlii. 8. And Jethro, the priest of Midian, offered a burnt-offering and sacrifices to God, even in the very camp of the Israelites in the wilderness, Exod. viii. Either then the sacrifice of Cain and Abel, or that of Adam himself and Eve, con-

[u] Hieroglyphics are emblems or pictures that were used in the first method of writing; but after characters were introduced, they became generally unintelligible, and contributed much to promote idolatry. They were used by the Egyptian priests to conceal the mysteries of their religion from the vulgar, and were thence called hieroglyphics, i. e. sacred engravings or carvings. They were originally engraven or carved on walls and obelisks.

[x] A-dynasty, in history, means a succession of kings in the same line.

sisting of those beasts, of whose skins, coats were made to them by God,[y] and by whose blood the covenant was ratified, which could not have been made with them after their fall without shedding of blood, gave the first occasion to mankind of discharging that persuasion, concerning the necessity of appeasing the offended Deity, which hath arisen from the light of nature, through this channel of sacrificing. Yea, it is evident that this innate notion concerning vindicatory justice, and the observation of its exercise and egress have given rise to all divine worship. Hence that expression, 'primus in orbe Deos fecit timor:' 'fear first created gods.' And hence these verses in Virgil, spoken by king Evander.

——Non hæc solennia nobis, &c.

These rites, these altars, and this feast, O King!
From no vain fears, or superstition spring;
Or blind devotion, or from blinder chance;
Or heady zeal, or brutal ignorance:
But sav'd from danger, with a grateful sense,
The labours of a god we recompense.

But I do not mention these things, as if it were my opinion that sacrifices are prescribed by the law of nature:[z] but, from the agreement of mankind in the ceremony of sacrificing, I maintain, that they have possessed a constant sense of sin and vindicatory justice, discovering to them more and more of this rite, from its first commencement, by means of tradition.

But to return from this digression: it appears, that such a presumption of corrective justice is implanted in all by nature, that it cannot by any means be eradicated; but since these universal conceptions by no means relate to what may belong, or not belong to God at his free pleasure, it follows that sin-avenging justice is natural to God: the point that was to be proved.

I shall only add, in one word, that an argument from the consent of all, is by consent of all allowed to be very strong:

[y] Gen. iii. 21. 'Unto Adam also, and to his wife, did the Lord God make coats of skins and clothed them.'

[z] The most of the Romish clergy, says our author, maintain this opinion, that so they may pave the way for establishing the blasphemous sacrifice of the mass. Thus Less: 'on Justice and Right:' Suarez, book 2. however, is of a different opinion; 'for,' says he, 'there is no natural precept, from which it can be sufficiently gathered that a determination to any particular mode of that worship is at all necessary to good morals.' In p. 3. of his Theol. on quest. 8. distinct. 71. sect. 8.

For thus says the philosopher, 'what is admitted by all, we also admit; but he who would destroy such faith can himself advance nothing more credible.' Aristotle, Nicom. 3.

And Hesiod says,

'That sentiment cannot be altogether groundless, which many people agree in publishing.' And 'when we discourse of the eternity of the soul,' says Seneca, 'the consent of mankind, is considered as a weighty argument; I content myself with this public persuasion.' Seneca. Ep. 117.

And again, Aristotle says,

'It is a very strong proof, if all shall agree in what we shall say.' And that observation another author concurs, 'The things that are commonly agreed on are worthy of credit.' And here endeth the second argument.

CHAP. V.

The third argument. This divine attribute demonstrated in the works of Providence. That passage of the apostle to the Romans, chap. i. 18. *considered. Anger, what it is. The definitions of the philosophers. The opinion of Lactantius concerning the anger of God. Anger often ascribed to God in the Holy Scriptures. In what sense this is done. The divine anger denotes,* 1. *The effect of anger.* 2. *The will of punishing. What that will is in God. Why the justice of God is expressed by anger. The manifestation of the divine anger, what it is. How it is revealed from heaven. The sum of the argument. The fourth argument. Vindicatory justice revealed in the cross of Christ. The attributes of God. How displayed in Christ. Heads of other arguments. The conclusion.*

It remains then, that we should now consider, in the third place, what testimony God has given, and is still giving to this essential attribute of his in the works of providence. This Paul takes notice of; Rom. i. 18. 'For the wrath of God,' says he, 'is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who hold the truth in unrighteousness.'

The philosopher, Aristotle, says, that anger is, 'A desire of punishing on account of an apparent neglect.'[a] A de-

[a] Book viii. chap. 5. of his Topics.

finition, perhaps, not altogether accurate. Seneca says, that Aristotle's definition of anger, that it is 'a desire of requiting pain,' differs but little from his own, viz. 'That anger is a desire of inflicting punishment,' book i. of anger, chap. iii. where he discusses it with great elegance, according to the maxims of the Stoics. But Aristotle reckons ἀοργησιαν[b] among vices, or extremes in the 7th chapter of the 2d book of his Ethics to Nicomedes. But Phavorinus says, that 'anger is a desire to punish the person appearing to have injured you, contrary to what is fit and proper.' But in whatever manner it be defined, it is beyond a doubt that it cannot, properly speaking, belong to God. Lactantius Firmianus, therefore, is lashed by the learned, who, in his book 'of the anger of God,' chap. iv. in refuting the Stoics, who contend, that anger ought not in any manner whatever to be ascribed to God, has ventured to ascribe to the Deity commotions and affections of mind, but such as are just and good. Suarez, however, excuses him, in his disputation 'of the divine justice,' sect. 5. and contends, that the nature of anger is very specially preserved in the disposition of punishing offences.

But however this matter be, certain it is, that God assumes no affection of our nature so often to himself, in Scripture, as this: and that too, in words, which for the most part, in the Old Testament, denotes the greatest commotion of mind. Wrath, fury, the heat of great anger, indignation, hot anger, smoking anger, wrathful anger, anger appearing in the countenance, inflaming the nostrils, rousing the heart, flaming, and consuming, are often assigned to him, and in words too, which, among the Hebrews, express the parts of the body affected by such commotions.[c]

In fine, there is no perturbation of the mind, no commotion of the spirits, no change of the bodily parts, by which either the materiality, or formality[d] (as they phrase it) of anger is expressed, when we are most deeply affected thereby, which he has not assumed to himself.

[b] A deprivation of irascibility.

[c] Numb. xxv. 4. Deut. xiii. 17. Josh. vii. 26. Psal. lxxviii. 49. Isa. xiii. 9. Deut. xxix. 24. Judges ii. 14. Psal. lxxiv. 1. lxix. 24. Isa. xxx. 30. Lam. ii. 6. Ezek. v. 15. Isa. xxxiv. 2. 2 Chron. xxviii. 11. Ezra x. 14. Hab. iii. 8. 12.

[d] The materiality of anger is, what is essentially necessary to constitute anger; the formality means its external marks and characters.

But since with God 'there is no variableness, neither shadow of turning,' beyond all doubt it will be worth while strictly to examine what he means by this description of his most holy and unchangeable nature, so well accommodated to our weak capacities. Every material circumstance, such as, in us, is the commotion of the blood, and gall about the heart, and likewise those troublesome affections of sorrow and pain, with which it is accompanied, being entirely excluded, we shall consider, what this anger of God means.

First, Then it is manifest, that by the anger of God, the effects of anger are denoted. 'God is not unrighteous who taketh vengeance;' Rom. iii. 5. And it is said, Eph. v. 6. 'Because of these things, the wrath of God cometh upon the children of disobedience.' That is, God will most assuredly punish them. Hence the frequent mention of the wrath to come; that is, the last and everlasting punishment. Thus, that great and terrible day, 'in which God will judge the world by that man whom he hath ordained,' is called 'the day of his wrath,' because it is the day of 'the revelation of the righteous judgment of God;' Rom. ii. 5. And he is said to be slow to wrath, because he oftentimes proceeds slowly, as it seems to us, to inflict punishment, or recompense evil. But, perhaps, this difficulty is better obviated by Peter, who removes every idea of slowness from God, but ascribes to him patience and long-suffering in Christ towards the faithful; and of this dispensation, even the whole world, in a secondary sense, are made partakers. 'The Lord is not slack,' says he, 'concerning his promise (the promise, viz. of a future judgment), as some men count slackness, but is long-suffering to us-ward, not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance;' 2 Pet. iii. 8, 9.

Nay, the threatening of punishment is sometimes described by the words anger, fury, wrath, and fierce wrath. Thus, Jonah iii. 9. 'Who can tell if God will turn and repent, and turn away from his fierce anger, that we perish not;' that is, whether he may not, upon our humiliation and repentance, avert from us the grievous punishment denounced by the prophet.

But, secondly, It denotes a constant and immutable will in God of avenging and punishing, by a just punishment, every injury, transgression, and sin. And hence that ex-

pression, Rom. ix. 22. 'What if God willing to shew his anger;' that is, his justice, or constant will of punishing sinners: for when any external operations of the Deity are described by a word denoting a human affection that is wont to produce such effects, the Holy Scripture means to point out to us some perfection perpetually resident in God, whence these operations flow, and which is their proper and next principle.[e]

And what is that perfection but this justice, of which we are discoursing? For we must remove far from God every idea of anger, properly so called, which, in respect of its causes and effects, and of its own nature, supposes even the greatest perturbation, change, and inquietude of all the affections, in its subject; and yet we are under the necessity of ascribing to him a nature adapted to effect those operations, which are reckoned to belong to anger. But since the Scriptures testify, that God works these works, as he is just, and because he is just (and we have proved it above), it plainly appears that, that perfection of the Divine nature is nothing else but this vindicatory justice. Whence Thomas Aquinas asserts[f], that anger is not said to be in God, in allusion to any passion of the mind, but to the judgment or decisions of his justice. Nay, that anger may not only be reduced to justice, but that the words themselves are synonimous, and that they are taken so in Scripture, is certain. Psal. vii. 6. 9. 'Arise, O Lord, in thine anger, lift up thyself because of the rage of mine enemies: and awake for me to the judgment that thou hast commanded. O let the wickedness of the wicked come to an end; but establish the just: for the righteous God trieth the heart and reins.' To judge in anger, or with justice, are phrases of the same import. Psal. lvi. 7. 'Shall they escape by iniquity? in thine anger cast down the people, O God.' Or, in justice, cast them down, because of their iniquity. Thus, when he justly destroyed the people of Israel by the king of Babylon, he says, it came to pass through his anger; 2 Kings xxiv. 20. 'For through the anger of the Lord, it came to pass in Jerusalem and Judah, until he had cast them out from his presence, that Zedekiah rebelled against the king of Babylon.'

[e] That is, the principle from which they immediately flow.
[f] Quest. 47. article 1.

But the apostle says, that this anger or punitory justice revealed from heaven.' The apostle uses the same word re, that is translated 'revealed,' in the preceding verse, en speaking of the manifestation or revelation of the righ- usness of faith in the gospel. Therefore, some have been opinion, that the apostle here asserts, that this very anger God is again and again made known and manifest, or enly declared in the gospel against unbelievers. But to hat purpose, then, is there any mention made of heaven, hence that manifestation or revelation is said to have been ade? The apostle, therefore, uses the word in a different ense in the 18th verse from that which it is used in, in the preceding. There it means a manifestation by the preaching of the word; here it signifies a declaration by examples; and therefore a certain person hath, not improperly, trans- lated the word, 'is laid open,' or 'clearly appears;' that is, is proved by numberless instances. Moreover, this verse is the principal of the arguments, by which the apostle proves the necessity of justification by faith in the remission of sins through the blood of Christ; because that all have sinned, and thereby rendered God their open and avowed enemy.

The apostle then affirms, that God hath taken care that his anger against sin, or that his justice should appear by in- numerable examples of punishments inflicted on mankind for their sins, in his providential government of the world; and that it should appear in so clear a manner, that there should be no room left for conjectures about the matter. Not that punishment is always inflicted on the wicked and impious, while in this world, or at least that it appears to be so; for very many of them enjoy all the pleasures of a rich and flourishing outward estate; but besides, that he exercises his anger on their consciences, as we proved before; and that the external good things of fortune, as they call them, are only a fattening of them for the day of slaughter; even in this life he oft-times, in the middle of their career, exer- cises his severe judgments against the public enemies of heaven; the monsters of the earth, the architects of wicked- ness, sunk in the mire and filth of their vices; and that too, even to the entire ruin and desolation both of whole nations, and of particular individuals, whom, by a remarkable pu-

nishment, he thinks proper to make an example and spectacle of to the world, both to angels and to men.

Therefore, although 'God willing to shew his wrath, and to make his power known,' not in that way only, viz. by exercising public punishments in this life, of which we are now speaking, 'endured with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath, fitted to destruction:' and though he should not instantly dart his lightnings against all, and every individual of the abandoned and profane, yet mankind will easily discern[g] what the mind and thoughts of God are, what his right and pleasure, and of what kind his anger and justice are with regard to every sin whatever. Therefore, the apostle affirms, that the anger of God, of which he gives only some instances, is by these judgments openly declared against all unrighteousness and ungodliness of men whatever; whether they fail in the worship and duty which they owe to God, or in the duties which it is incumbent on them to perform to one another. Moreover, that the solemn revelation of this divine justice consists, not only in those judgments which sooner or later he hath exercised upon particular persons, but also in the whole series of his divine dispensations towards men, in which, as he gives testimony both to his goodness and patience, inasmuch as 'he maketh his sun to shine on the evil and the good, and sendeth rain on the just, and the unjust,[h] and leaves not himself without a witness, in that he doth good, and gives us rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness;' so also he gives equally clear signs and testimonies of his anger, severity, and indignation, or of his punitory justice. Hence, on account of the efficacy of the divine anger, exercising its power and influence far and near, this visible world, as if the very fuel of the curse, is appointed as the seat and abode of all kinds of misery, grief, lamentation, cares, wrath, vanity, and inquietude. Why need I mention tempests, thunders, lightnings, deluges, pestilences, with many things more, by means of which, on account of the wickedness of man, universal nature is struck with horror. All these, beyond a doubt, have a respect to the revelation of God's anger or justice, against the unrighteousness and ungodliness of men.

[g] Viz. from those instances of punishment which he is pleased, in his wisdom, sometimes openly and awfully to inflict upon the wicked.

[h] Matt. v. 46. Acts xiv. 17.

Moreover, the apostle testifies this revelation to be made from heaven. Even the most abandoned cannot but observe punishments of various kinds making havoc every where in the world, and innumerable evils brooding, as it were, over the very texture of the universe. But because they wish for and desire nothing more ardently, than either that there were no God, or that he paid no regard to human affairs, they either really ascribe, or pretend to ascribe all these things to chance, fortune, the revolutions of the stars and their influence, or finally, to natural causes. In order to free the minds of men from this pernicious deceit of atheism, the apostle affirms that all these things come to pass from heaven; that is, under the direction of God, or, by a divine power and providence punishing the sins and wickedness of men, and manifesting the justice of God. Thus, 'The Lord rained upon Sodom and Gomorrah brimstone and fire from the Lord out of heaven;' Gen. xix. 24. Which cities, by that punishment inflicted on them from heaven, he hath set up as an example, in every future age, to all those who should afterward persevere in the like impieties. To these considerations add, that the apostle, from this demonstration of the divine anger from heaven against the sins of men, argues the necessity of appointing an atonement through the blood of Christ; ver. 23—25. which would by no means follow, but upon this supposition, that that anger of God was such that it could not be averted without the intervention of an atonement.

But not to be tedious, it is evident that God, by the works of his providence, in the government of this world, gives a most copious testimony to his vindicatory justice, not inferior to that given to his goodness, or any other of his attributes; which testimony, concerning himself and his nature, he makes known, and openly exhibits to all by innumerable examples, constantly provided and appointed for that purpose. He then who shall deny this justice to be essential to God, may for the same reason reject his goodness and long-suffering patience.

The fourth argument shall be taken from the revelation of that name, glory, and nature, which God hath exhibited to us in and through Christ; John i. 18. 'No man hath seen God at any time; the only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him:' him who, though

he be light itself, and dwelleth in light inaccessible, yet in respect of us, who, without Christ are naturally blinder than moles, is covered with darkness. In creation, in legislation, and in the works of providence, God indeed hath plainly marked out and discovered to us certain traces of his power, wisdom, goodness, justice, and long-sufferance. But besides that, there are some attributes of his nature, the knowledge of which could not reach the ears of sinners but by Christ; such as his love to his peculiar people, his sparing mercy, his free and saving grace: and even others, which he hath made known to us in some measure, by the ways and means above-mentioned, we could have no clear or saving knowledge of, unless in and through this same Christ; 'for in him are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge:' in him, God hath fully and clearly exhibited himself to us to be loved, adored, and known; and that not only in regard of his heavenly doctrine, 'in which he hath brought life and immortality to light through the gospel;'[a] God finishing the revelation of himself to mankind, by the mission and ministry of his Son; but also exhibiting both in the person of Christ, and in his mediatorial office, the brightness of his own glory, and the express image of his person, he glorified his own name, and manifested his nature, to all those at least, who being engrafted into Christ, and baptized into his Spirit, enjoy both the Father and the Son. But in the whole matter of salvation by the Mediator, God-man, there is no excellence of God, no essential property, no attribute of his nature, the glory of which is the chief end of all his works, that he hath more clearly and eminently displayed than this punitory justice.

It was for the display of his justice, that he set forth Christ as a propitiation through faith in his blood. He spared him not, but laid the punishment of us all upon him. It was for this that he was pleased to bruise him, to put him to grief, and to make his soul an offering for sin.

The infinite wisdom of God, his inexpressible grace, free love, boundless mercy, goodness, and benevolence to men, in the constitution of such a Mediator, viz. a God-man, are not more illustriously displayed, to the astonishment of men and angels, in bringing sinful man from death, condemnation, and a state of enmity, into a state of life, of sal-

[a] 2 Tim. i. 10.

vation, of glory, and of union and communion with himself, than is this punitory justice, for the satisfaction, manifestation, and glory of which, this whole scheme, pregnant with innumerable mysteries, was instituted. But that attribute, whose glory and manifestation God intended and accomplished both in the appointment of his only-begotten Son to the office of mediator, and in his mission must be natural to him. And there is no need of arguments to prove, that this was his vindicatory justice. Yea, supposing this justice, and all regard to it entirely set aside, the glory of God's love in sending his son, and delivering him up to the death for us all, which the Scriptures so much extol, is manifestly much obscured, if it do not rather totally disappear. For what kind of love can that be which God hath shewn, in doing what there was no occasion for him to do?

We will not at present enter fully into the consideration of other arguments by which the knowledge of this truth is supported; among which that of the necessity of assigning to God (observing a just analogy) whatever perfections or excellencies are found among the creatures, is not of the least importance. These we pass: partly that we may not be tedious to the learned reader; partly, because the truth flows in a channel, already sufficiently replenished with proofs. It would be easy, however, to shew that this justice denotes the highest perfection; and by no means includes any imperfection; on account of which it should be excluded from the divine nature; neither in the definition of it does one iota occur that can imply any imperfection; but all perfection, simple or formal, simply and formally is found in God. But when this perfection is employed in any operation respecting another being, and having for its object the common good, it necessarily acquires the nature of justice.

I shall not be farther troublesome to my readers; if what has been already said amount not to proof sufficient, I know not what is sufficient. I urge only one testimony more from Scripture and conclude.

It is found in Heb. x. 26. 'For if we sin wilfully after that we have received the knowledge of the truth, there remaineth no more sacrifice for sins, but a certain fearful looking for of judgment, and fiery indignation.' But, perhaps

God will pardon without any sacrifice; the apostle is of a contrary opinion; 'where there is no sacrifice for sin,' he argues, that from the very nature of the thing, there must be 'a looking for of judgment and fiery indignation;' the very point that was to be proved.

I could heartily wish that some sinner, whose conscience, the hand of the omnipotent God hath lately touched, 'whose sore ran in the night and ceased not,' and whose 'soul refused to be comforted,' whose 'grief is heavier than the sand of the sea,' in whom 'the arrows of the Almighty stick fast, the poison whereof drinketh up the Spirit,'[k] were to estimate and determine this difficult and doubtful dispute. Let us, I say, have recourse to a person, who being convinced by the Spirit, of his debts to God, is weighed down by their burden, while the sharp arrows of Christ are piercing the heart; Psal. xlv. 5. and let us inform him, that God, with the greatest ease by his nod, or by the light touch of his finger, so to speak, can blot out, hide, and forgive all his sins. Will he rest satisfied in such a thought? Will he immediately subscribe to it? Will he not rather exclaim, 'I have heard many such things, miserable comforters are ye all?'[l] nay, ye are preachers of lies, physicians of no value.' The terrors of the Lord which surround me, and beset me day and night, you feel not; I have to do with the most just, the most holy, the supreme Judge of all, 'who will do right, and will by no means clear the guilty.' Therefore 'my days are consumed like smoke, and my bones are burnt as an hearth; my heart is smitten and withered like grass; so that I forget to eat my bread. By reason of the voice of my groaning, my bones cleave to my skin.[m] I am afflicted and ready to die from my youth up; while I suffer thy terrors, I am distracted. Thy fierce wrath goeth over me, thy terrors have cut me off;' I wish I were hid in the grave, yea, even in the pit, unless the judge himself, say to me, 'Deliver him from going down to the pit, I have found a ransom.'[o] Indeed, when the recollection of that very melancholy period comes into mind, when first God was pleased by his Spirit effectually to convince the heart of me, a poor sinner of sin, and when the whole of God's controversy with me

[k] Job vi. 2—4. [l] Job. vi. 2. [m] Psal. cii. 3—5.
[n] Psal. lxxxviii. 15, 16. [o] Job xxxiii. 24.

for sin is again presented to my view, I cannot sufficiently wonder what thoughts could possess those men, who have treated of the remission of sins, in so very slight, I had almost said, contemptuous a manner. But these reflections are rather foreign to our present business.

CHAP. VI.

Another head of the first part of the dissertation. Arguments for the necessary egress of vindicatory justice from the supposition of sin. The first argument. God's hatred of sin; what. Whether God by nature hates sin, or because he wills so to do. Testimonies from holy Scripture. Dr. Twiss's answer. The sum of it. The same obviated. The relation between obedience as to reward, and sin as to punishment, not the same. Justice and mercy, in respect of their exercise, different. The second argument. The description of God in the Scriptures, in respect of sin. In what sense he is called a consuming fire. Twiss's answer refuted. The fallacies of the answer.

We have sufficiently proved, if I be not mistaken, that sin-punishing justice is natural to God. The opposite arguments, more numerous than weighty, shall be considered hereafter. We are now to prove the second part of the question, viz. that the existence and sin of a rational creature being supposed, the exercise of this justice is necessary. And granting what follows from what we have already said concerning the nature of justice, especially from the first argument, our proofs must necessarily be conclusive. The first is this:

He who cannot but hate all sin, cannot but punish sin; for to hate sin is, as to the affection, to will to punish it; and as to the effect, the punishment itself. And to be unable, not to will the punishment of sin, is the same with the necessity of punishing it: for he who cannot but will to punish sin, cannot but punish it. 'For our God is in the heavens, he hath done whatsoever he pleaseth;' Psal. cxv. 3. Now, when we say that God necessarily punishes sin, we mean, that on account of the rectitude and perfection of his nature, he cannot possess an indifference of will to punish. For it being supposed that God hates sin, he must hate it either by nature, or by choice; if it be by nature, then we have gained

our point; if by choice, or because he wills it, then it is possible for him not to hate it; nay, he may even justly will the contrary, or exercise a contrary act about the same object: for those acts of the divine will are most free, viz. which have their foundation in the will only; that is to say, that it is even possible for him to love sin; for the divine will is not inclined to any object, but that if it should be inclined to its contrary, that might, consistent with justice, be done. This reasoning Durandus agrees to, and this, Twiss urges as an argument: the conclusion then must be, that God may love sin, considered as sin:

Credat Apella.

The sons of circumcision may receive
The wond'rous tale, which I shall ne'er believe.—FRANCIS, HORACE.

For, 'God hates all workers of iniquity;' Psal. v. 5. 'He calls it the abominable thing that he hateth;' Jer. xliv. 4. Besides these, other passages of Scripture testify that God hates sin, and that he cannot but hate it. 'Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil, and canst not look on iniquity;' Hab. i. 13. On account of the purity of God's eyes, that is, of his holiness, an attribute which none hath ever ventured to 'deny, he cannot look on iniquity,' that is, he cannot but hate it. 'Thou art not a God that hast pleasure in wickedness,' says the psalmist; Psal. v. 4, 5. that is, thou art a God who hatest all wickedness, for 'evil shall not dwell with thee, and the foolish shall not stand in thy sight, thou hatest all the workers of iniquity.' Is it a free act of the divine will that he here describes, which might or might not be executed without any injury to the holiness, purity, and justice of God? or, the divine nature itself, as averse to, hating and punishing every sin? Why shall not the foolish stand in God's sight? Is it because he freely wills to punish them? or, because our God, to all workers of iniquity is a consuming fire? Not that the nature of God can wax hot at the sight of sin, in a natural manner, as fire doth after the combustible materials have been applied to it; but, that punishment as naturally follows sin, as its consequence, on account of the pressing demand of justice, as fire consumes the fuel that is applied to it.

But it is not without good reason that God, who is love,

so often testifies in the Holy Scriptures his hatred and abomination of sin, 'the wicked, and him that loveth violence, his soul hateth;' Psal. xi. 5. Speaking of sinners, Lev. xxvi. 30. he says, 'and my soul shall abhor you.' He calls sin that abominable thing: there is nothing that God hates but sin, and because of sin only, other things are liable to his hatred. In what sense passions and affections are ascribed to God, and what he would have us to understand by such a description of his nature and attributes, is known to every body. But of all the affections of human nature, hatred is the most restless and turbulent, and to the person who is under its influence, and who can neither divest himself of it, nor give a satisfactory vent to its motions, the most tormenting and vexatious. For as it takes its rise from a disagreement with and dislike of its object, so that object is always viewed as repugnant and offensive: no wonder then, that it should rouse the most vehement commotions and bitterest sensations. But God, who enjoys eternal, and infinite happiness and glory, as he is far removed from any such perturbations, and placed far beyond all variableness or shadow of change, would not assume this affection so often, for our instruction, unless he meant clearly to point out to us this supreme, immutable, and constant purpose of punishing sin, as that monster, whose property it is to be the object of God's hatred, that is, of the hatred of infinite goodness, to be natural and essential to him.

The learned Twiss answers, 'I cannot agree, that God by nature equally punishes and hates sin, unless you mean that hatred in the Deity to respect his will as appointing a punishment for sin: in which sense I acknowledge it to be true, that God equally, from nature and necessity, punishes and hates sin: but I deny it to be necessary that he should either so hate sin, or punish it; if hatred be understood to mean God's displeasure, I maintain that it is not equally natural to God to punish sin, and to hate it; for we maintain it to be necessary that every sin should displease God; but it is not necessary that God should punish every sin.' The sum of the answer is this; God's hatred of sin is taken either for his will of punishing it, and so is not natural to God, or for his displeasure, on account of sin, and so is natural to him: but it does not thence follow, that God necessarily

punishes every sin, and that he can let no sin pass unpunished.

But, first, This learned gentleman denies what has been proved; nor does he deign to advance a word to invalidate the proof. He denies that God naturally hates sin, hatred being taken for the will of punishing; but this we have before demonstrated both from Scripture and reason. It would be easy, indeed, to elude the force of any argument in this manner. Afterward he acknowledges, that every sin must necessarily be displeasing to God; this, then, depends not on the free-will of God, but on his nature; it belongs then immutably to God, and it is altogether impossible that it should not displease him. This, then, is supposed, that sin is always displeasing to God, but that God may or may not punish it, but pardon the sin, and cherish the sinner, though his sin eternally displease him; for that depends upon his nature, which is eternally immutable. Nor is it possible, that what hath been sin, should ever be any thing but sin. From this natural displeasure, then, with sin, we may with propriety argue to its necessary punishment; otherwise, what meaneth that despairing exclamation of alarmed hypocrites? 'Who among us shall dwell with the devouring fire? Who among us shall dwell with everlasting burnings?'[a]

The learned doctor retorts; 'Obedience must necessarily please God, but God is not bound by his justice necessarily to reward it.' But the learned gentleman will hardly maintain, that the proportion between obedience as to reward, and disobedience as to punishment, is the same; for God is bound to reward no man for obedience performed, for that is due to him by natural right; Luke xvii. 10. 'So likewise ye, when ye shall have done all those things which are commanded you, say, We are unprofitable servants: we have done that which was our duty to do.' Psal. xvi. 2. 'My goodness extendeth not unto thee.' But every man owes to God obedience, or is obnoxious to a vicarious punishment; nor can the moral dependance of a rational creature on its Creator be otherwise preserved. 'The wages of sin is death; but the gift of God is eternal life;' Rom. vi. 23.

Away, then, with all proud thoughts of equalling the proportion between obedience as to reward, and sin as to pu-

[a] Isa. xxxiii. 14.

nishment. 'Who hath first given to him, and it shall be recompensed unto him again? For of him, and through him, and to him, are all things: to whom be glory for ever. Amen;' Rom. xi. 35, 36. 'What hast thou, O man, that thou hast not received? But if thou hast received it, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received it?' 1 Cor. iv. 7. God requireth nothing of us but what he hath formerly given us, and therefore he has every right to require it, although he were to bestow no rewards. What? Doth not God observe a just proportion in the infliction of punishments, so that the degrees of punishment, according to the rule of his justice should not exceed the demerit of the transgression? 'Shall not the judge of all the earth do right?' But beware, Dr. Twiss, of asserting, That there is any proportion between the eternal fruition of God, and the inexpressible participation of his glory, in which he hath been graciously pleased, that the reward of our obedience should consist, and the obedience of an insignificant reptile, almost less than nothing. Whatever dignity or happiness we arrive at, we are still God's creatures.

It is impossible, that he who is blessed for ever and ever, and is so infinitely happy in his own essential glory, that he stands in no need of us, or of our services; and who, in requiring all that we are, and all that we can do, only requires his own, can, by the receipt of it, become bound in any debt or obligation. For God, I say, from the beginning, stood in no need of our praise; nor did he create us that he might have creatures to honour him, but that agreeable to his goodness he might conduct us to happiness.

But he again retorts, and maintains, 'That God can punish where he does not hate; and therefore, he may hate and not punish; for he punished his most holy Son, whom God forbid, that we should say he ever hated.' But besides, that this mode of arguing, from opposites, hardly holds good in theology: though God hated not his Son when he punished him, personally considered, he however hated the sins, on account of which he punished him (and even himself substitutively considered with respect to the effect of sin), no less than if they had been laid to any sinner: yea, and from this argument it follows, that God cannot hate sin, and not punish it; for when he laid sins, which he hates, to the

charge of his most holy Son, whom he loved with the highest love, yet he could not but punish him.

The representation or description of God, and of the Divine nature, in respect of its habitude[b] to sin, which the Scriptures furnish us with, and the description of sin, with relation to God and his justice, supply us with a second argument. They call God 'a consuming fire,'[c] a God who 'will by no means clear the guilty.'[d]

They represent sin as 'that abominable thing which he hateth,'[e] which he will destroy, as the fire devoureth the stubble, and the flame consumeth the chaff.' As then consuming fire cannot but burn and consume stubble, when applied to it, so neither can God do otherwise than punish sin, that abominable thing, which is consuming or destroying it, whenever presented before him and his justice.

But the very learned Twiss replies, 'That God is a consuming fire, but an intelligent and rational one, not a natural and insensible one; and this,' says he, 'is manifest from this, that this fire once burnt something not[f] consumable, namely, his own Son, in whom there was no sin; which,' says he, 'may serve as a proof, that this fire may not burn what is consumable, when applied to it.'

But, in my opinion, this very learned man was never more unhappy in extricating himself: for first, he acknowledges God to be 'a consuming fire,' though a rational and intelligent one, not a natural and insensible one; but the comparison was made between the events of the operations, not the modes of operating. Nobody ever said that God acts without sense, or from absolute necessity and principles of nature, without any concomitant liberty; but although he

[b] Habitude means the state of a person or a thing, with relation to something else: the habitude of the divine nature with respect to sin, is a disposition to punish it.

[c] Rom. xii. 29. Deut. iv. 24. Isa. xiii. 13.

[d] Exod. xxxiv. 7. [e] Jer. xliv. 4. Isa. v. 24.

[f] The word in the original is 'combustibile,' meaning something that is susceptible of, and consumable by fire. It must be evident to every one that the phrase is used in allusion to the metaphor, which represents God as a consuming fire. The Son of God then was not, strictly and properly speaking, consumable, or susceptible of this fire; that is, he was by no means the object of divine anger, or punishment, considered as the Son of God, and without any relation to mankind; but on the contrary, was the beloved of his Father, with whom he was always well pleased: but he was liable to the effect of this fire, that is, of God's vindicatory justice, as our representative and federal head. And every sinner is consumable by this fire, that is, is properly and naturally the object of divine wrath and punishment.

acts by will and understanding, we have said that his nature as necessarily requires him to punish any sin committed, as natural and insensible fire burns the combustible matter that is applied to it. But the learned gentleman does not deny this, nay, he even confirms it, granting that, with respect to sin, God 'is a consuming fire,' though only an intelligent and rational one.

I am sorry that this very learned author should have used the expression, 'that this fire burnt something not consumable,' when he punished his most holy and well-beloved Son: for God did not punish Christ as his most holy Son, but as our Mediator, and the surety of the covenant, 'whom he made sin for us, though he knew no sin;' surely, 'he laid upon him our sins,' before 'the chastisement of our peace was upon him:' but in this sense he was very susceptible of the effects of this fire, viz. when considered as bearing the guilt of all our sins, and therefore it was that by fire the Lord did plead with him,[g] therefore, what this very learned man asserts, in the third place, falls to the ground; for the conclusion from such a very false supposition, must necessarily be false. We go on to the third argument.

CHAP. VII.

The third argument. The non-punishment of sin is contrary to the glory of God's justice. Likewise of his holiness and dominion. A fourth argument. The necessity of a satisfaction being made by the death of Christ. No necessary cause, or cogent reason for the death of Christ, according to the adversaries. The objection refuted. The use of sacrifices. The end of the first part of the dissertation.

Our third argument is this: It is absolutely necessary that God should preserve his glory entire to all eternity; but sin being supposed, without any punishment due to it, he cannot preserve his glory free from violation; therefore, it is necessary that he should punish it. Concerning the major proposition,[a] there is no dispute; for all acknowledge, not

[g] Isa. lxvi. 16.

[a] Our author here speaks in the language, and reasons in the manner of logicians, the prevalent mode of reasoning at the time when he wrote: for the sake of those unacquainted with that art, it may not be improper to observe, that the above argument is what they call a syllogism; and that a syllogism consists of three propo-

only that it is necessary to God that he should preserve his glory, but that this is incumbent on him by a necessity of nature, for he cannot but love himself; he is Jehovah, and will not give his glory to another.[b] The truth of the assumption is no less clear, for the very nature of the thing itself proclaims, that the glory of justice, or of holiness and dominion, could not otherwise be preserved and secured, than by the punishment of sin.

For first, The glory of God is displayed in doing the things that are just; but in omitting these, it is impaired, not less than in doing the things that are contrary. 'He that justifieth the wicked, and he that condemneth the just, even they both are an abomination to the Lord.'[c] 'Shall not the judge of all the earth do right?' or, what is just? But it is a righteous or just thing with God to recompense tribulation to the disobedient,[d] and to punish those, who, on account of sin, are worthy of death. Suppose, then, that God should let the disobedient, whom it is a just thing for him to punish, go unpunished, and that those who are worthy of death should never be required to die, but that he should clear the guilty and the wicked, although he hath declared them to be an abomination to him; where is the glory of his justice? That it is most evident, that God thus punishes, because he is just, we have proved before. 'Is God unrighteous or unjust, who taketh vengeance? God forbid; for then, how shall God judge the world?' 'And he is righteous, or just, because he hath given them blood to drink, who were worthy of it;'[e] and would be so far unjust, were he not to inflict punishment on those deserving it.

Secondly, A proper regard is not shewn to divine holiness, nor is its glory manifested, unless the punishment due to sin be inflicted. Holiness is opposed to sin, 'for God is of purer eyes than to behold evil, and cannot look on iniquity;'[f] and is the cause why he cannot let sin pass unpu-

sitions: the first is called the major, the second the minor, and the third the conclusion. In the above argument the major proposition is, 'it is absolutely necessary that God should preserve his glory entire to all eternity.' The minor is, 'but sin being supposed, without any punishment due to it, he cannot preserve his glory free from violation.' The conclusion is, 'therefore it is necessary that he should punish it.' The minor is sometimes called the assumption, and sometimes the conclusion is so named. They are both included under this title by our author in the following sentence.

[b] Isa. xlii. 8. [c] Prov. xvii. 15. [d] 2 Thess. i. 6. Rom. i. 32.
[e] Rom. iii. 5. Rev. xvi. 5—7. [f] Hab. i. 13.

nished, 'ye cannot serve the Lord; for he is a holy God: he will not forgive your transgressions, nor your sins,'[g] said Joshua to the Israelites. For why? Can any thing impure and polluted stand before his holy Majesty? He himself declares the contrary, 'that he is not a God that hath pleasure in wickedness;' that, 'evil shall not dwell with him;' that 'the foolish shall not stand in his sight;' that 'he hateth all the workers of iniquity.' And that, 'there shall in no wise enter into the New Jerusalem, any thing that defileth, neither whatsoever worketh abomination or maketh a lie.'[h] Nor can Jesus Christ present his church to his Father, 'till it be sanctified and cleansed, with the washing of water by the word, and made a glorious church, not having spot, or wrinkle, or any such thing; but holy, and without blemish.'[i] And we are enjoined to be holy, because he is holy. 'But all things are to be purged with blood, and without shedding of blood, there is no remission.'[k]

Thirdly, We have sufficiently shewn above, that the natural dominion which God hath over rational creatures, and which, they by sin renounce, could not otherwise be preserved, or continued, than by means of a vicarious punishment. And now let impartial judges decide, whether it be necessary to God, that he should preserve entire the glory of his justice, holiness, and supreme dominion, or not?

Fourthly, And which is a principal point to be considered on this subject, were the opinions of the adversaries to be admitted, and were we to suppose that God might will the salvation of any sinner, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to assign any sufficient and necessary cause of the death of Christ. For, let us suppose that God hath imposed on mankind a law, ratified by a threatening of eternal death; and that they, by a violation of that law, have deserved the punishment threatened, and consequently are become liable to eternal death. Again, Let us suppose, that God in that threatening, did not expressly intend the death of the sinner; but afterward declared what, and of what kind he willed that the guilt of sin should be, and what punishment he might justly inflict on the sinner, and what the sinner himself ought to expect (all which things flow from the free determination of God), but that he might by his nod, word,

[g] Josh. xxiv. 9. [h] Psal. v. 4—6. Rev. xxi. 27. [i] Eph. v. 26, 27. [k] Heb. ix. 22.

without any trouble, though no satisfaction were either made, or received, without the least diminution of his glory, and without any affront or dishonour to any attribute, or any injury or disgrace to himself, consistent with the preservation of his right, dominion, and justice, freely pardon the sins of those whom he might will to save; what sufficient reason could be given, pray then, why he should lay those sins so easily remissible to the charge of his most holy Son, and on their account subject him to such dreadful sufferings?

While Socinians do not acknowledge other ends of the whole of this dispensation and mystery, than those which they assign, they will be unable, to all eternity, to give any probable reason, why a most merciful and just God should expose a most innocent and holy man, who was his own Son, by way of eminence, and who was introduced by himself into the world in a preternatural manner, as they themselves acknowledge, to afflictions and sufferings of every kind, while among the living he pointed out to them the way of life; and at last to a cruel, ignominious, and accursed death.

I very well know that I cannot pretend to be either ingenious or quick-sighted; but respecting this matter, I am not ashamed to confess my dulness to be such, that I cannot see that God, consistent with the preservation of his right and glory entire, could, without the intervention of a ransom, pardon sins, as if justice did not require their punishment, or that Christ had died in vain. For why? Hath not God set him forth to be a propitiation for the demonstration, or declaration of his sin-punishing justice? But how could that justice be demonstrated by an action which it did not require? or, if the action might be omitted without any diminution of it? If God would have been infinitely just to eternity, nor would have done any thing contrary and offensive to justice, though he had never inflicted punishment upon any sin? Could any ruler become highly famed and celebrated on account of his justice, by doing those things, which, from the right of his dominion, he can do without injustice, but to the performance of which he is no way obligated by the virtue of justice? But if the adversaries suppose, that, when God freely made a law for his rational creatures, he freely appointed a punishment for transgression, freely substituted Christ in the room of transgressors: in

fine, that God did all these things, and the like, because so it pleased him, and that therefore we are to acquiesce in that most wise and free-will of his disposing all things at his pleasure; they should not find me opposing them; unless God himself had taught us in his word, 'that sin is that abominable thing which his soul hateth,' which is affrontive to him, which entirely casteth off all regard to that glory, honour, and reverence, which are due to him: and that to the sinner himself, it is something evil and bitter, 'for he shall eat of the fruit of his doings, and be filled with his own counsels;' and that God, with respect to sinners, is a 'consuming fire,' an everlasting burning, in which they shall dwell; that 'he will by no means clear the guilty,' that he judgeth those who are worthy of death, and by his just judgment taketh vengeance on them; and that, therefore, 'without the shedding of blood, there can be no remission;' and that without a victim for sin, there remaineth to sinners, 'nothing but a fearful looking for of judgment and fiery indignation, that shall consume the adversaries;' and that he had appointed from the beginning, his only-begotten Son, for the declaration and satisfaction of his justice, and the recovery of his glory, to open the way to heaven, otherwise shut, and to remain shut for ever: if, I say, God had not instructed us in these and such-like truths from his word, I should not oppose them: but these being clearly laid down in the word, we solemnly declare our belief, that no sinner could obtain the remission of his sins, provided that we are disposed to acknowledge God to be just, without a price of redemption.

Perhaps, some one will say, it doth not follow from the death of Christ, that God necessarily punisheth sin, for Christ himself, in his agony, placeth the passing away of the cup among things possible. 'All things,' saith he, 'Father, are possible with thee. Let this cup pass from me.'

I answer, it is well known, that the word 'impossibility' may be considered in a twofold point of view: the first is in itself absolute, which respects the absolute power of God, antecedent to any free act of the divine will: in this respect, it was not impossible that, that cup should pass from Christ. The second is conditional, which respects the power of God, as directed in a certain order, that is determined, and (if I

[1] Or ransom.

might so phrase it) circumscribed by some act of the divine will; and in this sense it was impossible: that is to say, it being supposed, that God willed to pardon any sins to sinners, it could not be done without laying their punishment upon the surety; but we do not pursue this argument farther at present, because we intend to resume it again in the consideration of the doctrine of Christ's satisfaction.

There are yet many arguments very proper for establishing the truth on our side of the question, which we choose not to enter on largely and on set purpose, lest we should be tiresome to the reader; perhaps, however, it will be judged worth while briefly to sketch out some heads of them, and annex them to the former arguments concerning justice and the exercise thereof. The first is to this purport:

A second act presupposes a first; and a constant manner of operating proves a habit. A sign also expresses the thing signified. Because God doeth good to all, we believe him to be good and endowed with supreme goodness. For how could he so constantly and uniformly do good, unless he himself were good? Yea, from second acts the Holy Scriptures sometimes teach the first; as for instance, that God is the living God, because he giveth life to all; that he is good, because he doeth good: why may we not also say, and that he is just, endowed with that justice of which we are treating, because 'God perverteth not judgment; neither doth the Almighty pervert justice;' but 'the Lord is righteous, and upright are his judgments.'[m] A constant, then, and uniform course of just operation in punishing sin, proves punitory justice to be essentially inherent in God. From his law, which is the sign[n] of the divine will, the same is evident. For the nature of the thing signified is, that it resembles the sign appointed for the purpose of expressing it. That the same thing may be said of the anger, fury, and severity of God hath been shewn above; Rom. i. 8.

A second, It is not the part of a just judge, of his mere good pleasure, to let the wicked pass unpunished: 'he that justifieth the wicked is an abomination to the Lord,' and 'woe to them that call evil good.' But God is a just judge: 'but one, who is not liable to render a reason,' you will say,

[m] Job viii. 3. Psal. cxix. 137.
[n] That is, which sheweth what the divine will is.

and 'who is by no means subject to a law.' But the nature of God is a law to itself: he cannot lie, because he himself is truth; nor act unjustly, because he is just. Such as God is by nature, such is he in the acts of his will.

A third, The argument, from the immutable difference of things in themselves, is of very considerable weight. For that which is sin, because it destroys that subjection of the creature which is due to the Creator, cannot even, by the omnipotence of God, be made to be not sin. To hate the supreme good implies a contradiction. But if from the nature of the thing, sin be sin, in relation to the supreme perfection of God, from the nature of the thing too it is its own punishment. Yea, God hath ordered children to obey their parents, because this is right.[o]

A fourth, The adversaries acknowledge, 'that God cannot save the impenitent and obstinately wicked, without injury to the glory, and holiness, and perfection, of his nature.' Why so? 'The justice of God,' say they, 'will not suffer it.' But what kind of justice is that, I ask, which can regard certain modes and relations of transgression or sin, and will not regard the transgression or sin itself?

A fifth, God punishes sin either because he simply wills it, or because it is just that sin should be punished. If because he simply wills it, then the will of God is the alone cause of the perdition of a sinful creature. But he himself testifies to the contrary, viz. that man's ruin is of himself; 'O Israel[p] thou hast destroyed thyself; but in me is thy help.' Again, justice does not require that the things which God doeth of his mere good pleasure should come to pass, more, than that they should not come to pass. But if it be not more just that sins should be punished, than that they should not be punished, it is certain that the non-punishment or free pardon of sin is more agreeable to the goodness, grace, love, and compassion of God, than the infliction of punishment; how then comes it to pass, that disregarding these attributes, he should freely will that which no essential property of his nature requires? If then sin be sin, because God wills it; if the transgression of the law deserve punishment because God wills it; and the punishment be at length inflicted because God wills it; the order of things,

[o] In the original, just.

[p] Hos. xiii. 9.

or the condition which they are in by virtue of their respect and relation to the dominion and perfection of God, requiring no such thing, why pray, should we either hate or abhor sin, when the bare will of God alone is to be considered, both in respect of the decree which supposes that there is nothing in sin, and which implies no change of the state of things, and also in respect of its execution? But if God punish sin, because, by virtue of his natural justice it is just that it should be punished, then it is unjust not to punish it. But is God unjust? God forbid.

I am truly ashamed of those divines, who have nothing more commonly in their mouths, both in their disputations and discourses to the people, than 'that God might by other means have provided for the safety and honour of his justice, but that, that way by the blood of his Son was more proper and becoming.' So said Augustine of old: but what then? Of that absolute power, which they dream of, by which he might, without any intervening sacrifice, forgive sins, not the least syllable is mentioned in the whole sacred writings: nor am I afraid to affirm that a more convenient device to weaken our faith, love, and gratitude, cannot be invented. Away, then, with such speculations which teach that the mystery of the love of God the Father, of the blood of Jesus Christ, of the grace of the Holy Spirit are either indifferent, or at least were not necessary for procuring and bestowing salvation and eternal glory on miserable sinners. But it is manifest, that by such artifices Socinians endeavour to overthrow the whole healing and heavenly doctrine of the gospel: 'My soul, come not thou into their secret.' But that God should institute so many expiatory typical sacrifices, and attended with so great labour and cost, with a sanction of severe punishments upon delinquents, with this view only to communicate instruction, and to serve to lead us to Christ, though they could in no wise take away the guilt of sin:[r] that he should appoint his own Son, not only to death, but to a bloody, ignominious, accursed death, to be inflicted with such shame and disgrace as hath not been purged away through so many generations that have passed since that death, even to the present time; that Jehovah

[r] Heb. x. 1. There the apostle argues for the necessity of the satisfaction of Christ, which he could not, if the guilt of sin could have been taken away by any other way whatever.

nself should have been pleased to bruise him, to put him grief; that he made his own sword to awake against him, d forsook him;[s] that God, I say, should have done these d such like things, without being induced to it by any cessary cause, let those who can, comprehend and ex- in.

PART II.

CHAP. VIII.

bjections of the adversaries answered. The Racovian catechism particularly considered. The force of the argument for the satisfaction of Christ, from punitory justice. The catechists deny that justice to be inherent in God. And also sparing mercy. Their first argument weighed and refuted. Justice and mercy are not opposite. Two kinds of the divine attributes. Their second and third arguments, with the answers annexed.

It is now time to meet the objections of the adversaries, and so at length put an end to this dispute, as far as regards the subject matter of it, already drawn out to such a length, and yet farther to be continued. We must first then encounter the Socinians themselves, on whose account we first engaged in this undertaking; and afterward we shall compare notes with a few learned friends. But as very lately the Racovian catechism of these heretics hath been repeatedly printed among us, we shall first consider what is to be met with there in opposition to the truth which we assert.

The Socinians grant in that catechism of theirs, the argument for the satisfaction of Christ, drawn from the nature of this punitory justice 'to be plausible in appearance;' yea, they must necessarily acknowledge it to be such as that they cannot even in appearance oppose it, without being guilty of the dreadful sacrilege of robbing God of his essential attributes; and therefore they deny either this justice or sparing mercy to be naturally inherent in God; and they endeavour to defend the robbery by a three-fold argument. Their first is this: 'as to mercy, that it is not inherent in

[s] See Isa. liii. 10.

[a] This treatise was published in Latin, in the year 1653.

God in the manner that they think,[d] is evident from this consideration, that if it were naturally inherent in God, God would not wholly punish any sin; as in like manner, if that justice were naturally inherent in God, as they think, God could forgive no sin: for God can never do any thing against what is naturally inherent in him. As for instance, as wisdom is naturally inherent in God, God never doeth any thing contrary to it, but whatsoever he doeth, he doeth all things wisely. But as it is manifest that God forgives and punishes sins when he will, it appears, that such a kind of mercy and justice as they think of, is not naturally inherent in God, but is the effect of his own will.'

I answer first, that we have laid it down as a fixed principle that mercy is essential to God, and that the nature of it in God is the same with justice we willingly grant. Rutherford alone hath asserted that mercy is essential to God, but that this justice is a free act of the divine will. The falsity and folly of his assertion, let himself be answerable for; the thing speaks for itself. To speak the truth, justice is attributed to God properly and by way of habit, mercy only analogically and by way of affection; and in the first covenant God paved no way for the display of his mercy, but proceeded in that which led straight to the glory of his justice; nevertheless we maintain the one to be no less naturally inherent in God than the other. 'But if it were naturally inherent in God,' say the catechists, 'God would not punish any sin.' Why? I say; mention some plea. 'Because,' say they, 'God cannot do any thing contrary to what is naturally inherent in him; but it is manifest that God punishes sin.' But whose sins doth God punish? The sins of the impenitent, the unbelieving, the rebellious, for whose offences the justice of God hath never been satisfied. But, is not this contrary to mercy? Let every just judge then be called cruel; the punishment of sin then is contrary to mercy, either in respect of the infliction of the punishment itself, or because it supposes in God a quality opposite to mercy; the contrariety is not in respect of the infliction of punishment; for between an external act of divine power and eternal attributes of Deity, no opposition can be sup-

[d] Let the reader remember that the compilers of the Racovian catechism are now speaking, and that the words 'they think' allude to the sentiments of the orthodox.

posed; nor can it be, because punishment supposes some quality in God opposite to mercy, for that which is opposite to mercy is cruelty; but God is free from every suspicion of cruelty, yet he punishes the sins of the impenitent, as the Socinians themselves acknowledge.

But that punitory justice, say they, which you assign as the source of punishment, is opposite to mercy. How, I say, can that be? Punitory justice, essentially considered, is the very perfection and rectitude of God itself, essentially considered; and the essence of mercy, so to speak, is the same. But the essence of God, which is most simple, is not opposed to itself; moreover, both have their actual egresses by means of the acts of the divine will, which is always one alone and self-consistent. Objectively considered, I acknowledge they have different, but not contrary, effects; for to punish the impenitent guilty, for whom no satisfaction hath been made, is not contrary to the pardoning of those who believe and are penitent, through the blood of the Mediator, which was shed for the remission of sins. In one word, it is not necessary, that, though actions be contrary, the essential principles should also be contrary.

But they again urge, 'Wisdom is naturally inherent in God, and he never doeth any thing contrary to it; for whatsoever he doeth, he doeth all things wisely.' We answer, It hath been proved before that the punishment of sin is not contrary to mercy. But they urge something farther, and insinuate that God not only cannot act contrary to his wisdom, but that in every work he exerciseth it; 'whatsoever he doeth,' say they, 'he doeth wisely.' But the nature of all the divine attributes, in respect of their exercise, is not the same; for some create and constitute an object to themselves, as power and wisdom, which God must necessarily exercise in all his works; some require an object constituted for their egress; and for these it is sufficient, that no work be done that is opposite, or derogatory to their honour; of this kind are mercy and justice, as was said before.

Thus far concerning mercy.

The objections that they bring against justice are easily answered: 'If justice be naturally inherent in God,' say they, 'then he could let no sin pass unpunished.' We readily grant that God passes by no sin unpunished, nor can do it.

He forgives our sins, but he doth not absolutely let them pass unpunished; every sin hath its just recompense of reward, either in the sinner, or the surety; but to pardon sin for which justice hath been satisfied, is nowise contrary to justice; that the nature of justice and mercy, in respect of their relation to their object, is different, hath been shewn before. Such is their first argument; the second follows, which is this:

'That justice which the adversaries oppose to mercy,' say they, 'whereby God punisheth sins, the sacred Scriptures nowhere point out by the name of justice, but call it the anger and fury of God.' We answer, in the first place, that it is a very gross mistake, that we oppose justice to mercy. These catechists have need themselves to be catechized.

In the second place; Let those, who shall please to consult the passages formerly mentioned and explained on this head, determine, whether the Sacred Scriptures call this justice[a] by its own proper name or not? In the third place; Anger or fury are, in reality, as to their effects, reducible to justice; hence that which is called 'wrath' or 'anger' in Rom. i. 18. in the thirty-first verse is called 'judgment.'[b] Such is their second, and now follows the third argument.

'When God forgives sins, it is attributed in Scripture to his justice. [c]If we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all iniquity. Being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Jesus Christ, whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God; to declare, I say, at this time his righteousness; that he might be just, and the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus.' We answer; that we have already shewn, at great length, that justice, universally taken, is the perfection and rectitude of God, and has various egresses both in words and in deeds, according to the constitution of the objects about which it may be employed: hence effects distinct and in some measure different, are attributed to the same virtue. But the justice, on account of which, God is said to forgive sins, is the justice of faithfulness,

[a] This point is treated, at great length, and clearly proved in the third chapter.
[b] The original word means a just sentence, or righteous judgment.
[c] 1 John i. 9. Rom. iii. 24—26.

as the foundation of its exercise in this punitory
o which, when satisfied, God, who cannot lie, pro-
forgiveness of sins through Jesus Christ, which
beyond all doubt he will perform, because he is
and just. And thus vanishes in smoke all that
happy catechists have scraped together against this
ruth.

CHAP. IX.

taken to task. His first mistake. God doth not punish sins as being ...ved with supreme dominion. The first argument of Crellius. The ver. The translation of punishment upon Christ, in what view made God. Whether the remission of sins, without a satisfaction made, could e place, without injury to him to whom punishment belongs. Whether ery one can resign his right. Right twofold. The right of debt, what: d what that of government. A natural and positive right. Positive ht, what: a description also of natural right. Concessions of Crellius.

CRELLIUS treats this subject at great length, and with his usual artifice and acuteness, in his first book 'of the true religion,' prefixed to the works of Volkelius, on the same subject.[a]

First, then, he asserts, 'That God hath a power of inflicting and of not inflicting punishment; but that it is by no means repugnant to divine justice, to pardon the sinner whom by his right he might punish.'

But here Crellius, which is a bad omen, as they say, stumbles in the very threshold; supposing punishment to be competent to God, as he hath, or is endowed with an absolute and supreme dominion over the creatures. God never punisheth, or is said to punish, as using that power: it is the part of a governor or judge to inflict punishment, and the Scriptures furnish sufficient evidence that both these relations belong to him in the infliction of punishment. [b] 'There is one Lawgiver, who is able to save and to destroy. He maintaineth right, and sitteth on his throne judging right. He is Judge of all the earth. He is the supreme Judge. He hath prepared his throne for judg-

[a] Chap. xxiii. title, 'Of the Power of God;' p. 181, &c.

[b] James iv. 12. Psal. ix. 4, 5. Gen. xviii. 25. Psal. l. 6. ix. 8, 9. xciv. 2. Heb. xii. 23, &c.

ment, and he shall judge the world in righteousness: he shall minister judgment to the people in righteousness. He is Judge of the earth, who will render a reward to the proud. He is Jehovah, our Judge, our Lawgiver, and our King. And God the Judge of all.' In all the acts of his absolute dominion and supreme power, God is most free, and this the apostle openly asserts with regard to his decrees making distinctions among mankind, in respect of their last end, and the means thereto conducing, according to his mere good pleasure; see Rom. ix. Moreover, in some operations and dispensations of providence concerning mankind, both the godly and ungodly, I acknowledge, that God frequently asserts the equity and rectitude of his government, from that supreme right which he possesseth, and may exercise.

[c] 'Behold,—God is greater than man. Why dost thou strive against him; for he giveth not an account of any of his matters.' 'Yea, surely, God will not do wickedly, neither will the Almighty pervert judgment. Who hath given him a charge over the earth? or, who hath disposed the whole world? if he set his heart upon man, if he gather to himself his spirit and his breath; all flesh shall perish together, and man shall return again unto dust.'

But that God punishes omissions, and avenges transgressions, as the supreme [d]Lord of all, and not as a Ruler of the universe and Judge of the world, is an opinion supported by no probable reason, and by no testimony of Scripture. But let us hear what Crellius himself has to say. He thus proceeds:

'He injures none, whether he punish or do not punish; if so be that the question is only respecting his right: for the punishment is not owing to the offending person, but he owes it; and he owes it to him upon whom the whole injury will ultimately redound, who in this matter is God; but if you consider the matter in itself, every one has it in his

[c] Job xxxiii. 12, 13.

[d] As supreme Lord of the universe, he exerciseth an uncontrolled dominion, doing 'in the armies of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth, whatsoever seemeth good unto him.' But as the Ruler and Judge of the world, he distributeth impartial justice, 'giving to every one according to his works.' The force of this argument then is this, that in viewing God, as punishing sin, we are not to consider him as supreme Lord, who may exercise an absolute and uncontrolled will; but as a righteous Judge, bound by a law to administer justice, and by a law founded in his nature, necessarily requiring him so to do.

power to prosecute his right, and likewise not to prosecute it, or to yield up of it as much as he pleases: for this is the nature of a proper and sovereign right.

Ans. It is easy to be seen, that the former fallacy diffuses its fibres through the whole of this reasoning. For the right, a dispensation with which he maintains to be lawful, he affirms to be a sovereign right, or the right of a lord and master; but this right is not the subject in question. It is a ruler and judge to whom punishment belongs, and who repays it; I would not, indeed, deny that God's supreme and sovereign right has a place in the matter of the satisfaction made by Christ in our stead: for although to inflict punishment be the office of a ruler and judge,[e] yet the very translation of guilt from us upon Christ, constituting him sin for us, is a most free act, and an act of supreme power; unless, perhaps, the acceptance of the promise made by the surety, belong of right to him as ruler, and there be no other act to be assigned to God.

But let us consider these arguments of Crellius severally. 'He injures no one,' says he, 'whether he punish or not:' but an omission of the infliction of punishment, where it is due, cannot take place without injury to that justice on which it is incumbent to inflict the punishment. 'For he that justifieth the wicked, is an abomination to the Lord.'[f] And a heavy woe is pronounced on them 'that call evil good, and good evil.' It is true, that God neither injures nor can injure any one, either in what he hath done, or might do: 'for who hath first given to him, and it shall be restored to him again.' Nor is it less true, that he will not, yea, that he cannot do injury to his own justice, which requireth the punishment of every sin. An earthly judge may oftentimes spare a guilty person without injury to another, but not without injustice in himself; yea, Crellius asserts, that God cannot forgive the sins of some sinners; namely, the contumacious, without injury to himself; for this, as he says, would be unworthy of God. But we are sure, that every sin, without exception, setting aside the consideration of the re-

[e] That both these relations, viz. of a Ruler and Judge, are to be assigned to God, the Scriptures amply testify. See p. 41, &c.

[f] Prov. xvii. 15. Isa. v. 20.

demption by Christ, would be attended with contumacy for ever: were it not for that consideration then, it would be unworthy of God to pardon the sins of any sinner.

Crellius adds, 'Punishment is not owing to the sinner, but he owes it, and owes to him, on whom all the injury will ultimately redound, who is God.' But because punishment is not owing to the sinner, but he owes it to the ruler, it doth not follow, that the ruler may not inflict that punishment: punishment, indeed, is not so owing to the sinner that an injury would be done him, were it not inflicted: the debt of a sinner is not of such a kind, that he can ask or enforce the payment of it: and a debt, properly speaking, implies such a condition.[s] But the sinner hath merited punishment in such a manner, that it is just he should suffer it: but again, the infliction of punishment belongs not to God, as injured; which Crellius signifies, but as he is the Ruler of all, and the Judge of sinners, to whom it belongs to preserve the good of the whole, and the dependance of his creatures on himself.

He thus proceeds: 'But if you consider the thing in itself, every one has it in his power to prosecute his right, and likewise not to prosecute it, or to yield up of it as much as he pleases.'

Ans. As Socinus himself, in his third book 'of the Saviour,' chap. 2. hath afforded an opportunity to all our theologians who have opposed Socinianism, of discussing this foolish axiom, 'that every one may recede from his right;' we shall answer but in few words to these positions of Crellius, and to the conclusions which he there draws, as flowing from them.

There is then a double right: in the first place, that of a debt; in the second place, that of government: what is purely a debt, may be forgiven; for that only takes place in those things, which are of an indifferent right; the prosecution of which neither nature nor justice obliges. There is also a debt, though perhaps improperly so called, the right of which it is unlawful to renounce; but our sins, in respect

[s] The debt of a sinner is not any valuable consideration due to him, as a debt is to a creditor; but due by him as a debt is by a debtor: and in consequence of the failure of payment, punishment becomes due to him, i. e. is or may be inflicted in vindication of violated justice; but this is what he could not either claim, or would wish to receive.

of God, are not debts only, nor properly, but metaphorically[h] so called.

The right of government, moreover, is either natural or positive; the positive right of government, so to speak, is that which magistrates have over their subjects; and he who affirms that they can recede wholly from this right, must be either a madman or a fool; but this right, as far as pertains to its exercise in respect of the infliction of punishment, either tends to the good of the whole republic, as in ordinary cases; or, as in some extraordinary cases, gives place, to its hurt: for it is possible that even the exaction of punishment, in a certain condition of a state, may be hurtful: in such a situation of things, the ruler or magistrate has a power not to use his right of government, in respect of particular crimes; or rather, he ought to use it in such a manner as is the most likely to attain the end: for he is bound to regard principally the good of the whole; and the safety of the people ought to be his supreme law. But he who affirms, that in ordinary cases a magistrate may renounce his right, when that renunciation cannot but turn out to the hurt of the public good, is a stranger to all right. The same person may also affirm, that parents may renounce their right over their children, so as not to take any care at all about them; and that they might do so lawfully, that is, consistent with honour and decency. Yea, this is not a cessation from the prosecution of right, but from the performance of a duty: for the right of government supposes a duty: 'for rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil: wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same: for he is the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid, for he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.'[i] The question is not what magistrates do, but what as the guardians and protectors of the law they ought to do. See Psal. ci. 8.

There is also a natural right of government: such is the

[h] Sin is most accurately defined by our Westminster divines, in that inimitable compendium of sound doctrine, the shorter catechism, to be 'any want of conformity unto, or transgression of the law of God.'

[i] Rom. xiii. 3, 4.

divine right over the creatures: the right, I say, of God over rational creatures is natural to him, therefore immutable, indispensable, and which cannot by any means be derogated. Thence too, the debt of our obedience is natural and indispensable, nor is there any other kind of obligation to punishment. God, from the very nature of the thing, has dominion over us, and our subjection to him, is either by obedience or a vicarious punishment, which succeeds in case of any omission or transgression on our part, as Crellius himself acknowledges. Those then who say, that it is free to God to use this right or not, as he pleaseth, may as well say, that it is free to God, to be our God and Lord or not. For the demand of obedience, and the exaction of punishment, equally belong to God. But the Judge of the universe exercises his right; and his perpetual right, whence sinners are accounted worthy of death, he cannot but preserve unimpaired and entire.

The remaining objections which are interspersed here and there in that book of his 'concerning God,' against the vindicatory justice of God, either fall in with those which have been mentioned from the 'Racovian catechism,' or shall be reduced to the order of those which follow.

We think proper, by way of conclusion, to annex some concessions of Crellius. 'There is,' says he, 'a certain regard to honour with which God himself cannot dispense.'[k] Every transgression then of that regard hath a punishment coeval with itself, which, from the justice of God must necessarily be inflicted. 'Yea,' says he, 'neither the holiness nor majesty of God permit that his commands should, in any respect, be violated with impunity.'[l] But the holiness of God is natural to him: an essential, then, and necessary attribute of God requires the punishment of sinners: but he himself farther adds, 'it is unworthy of God to let the wickedness of obstinate sinners pass unpunished: for this is the first and perpetual effect of divine severity, not to pardon those who do not repent.'[m] But we know for certain, that all sinners would continue obstinate to all eternity, unless God be pleased, for Christ's sake, to renew them by his omnipotent grace to repentance. Crellius then grants, that it is unwor-

[k] Book i. chap. xxiii. p. 180. 'Of the true Religion.' [l] Book i. chap. xxviii.
[m] Chap. xxii. 186. and chap. xxviii.

thy of God to let the sins of those pass unpunished, for whom Christ hath not made satisfaction. He again testifies also, that God hates and abhors all sin;[n] and grants that the mode of conducting the punishment of sin is derived from the divine justice.[o] But the thing itself is from that same being, from whom the mode or manner of it is derived: if the mode of punishment be from divine justice, the punishment itself can flow from no other source.

CHAP. X.

The opinion of Socinius considered. What he thought of our present question,[a] viz. that it is the hinge on which the whole controversy, concerning the satisfaction of Christ turns. His vain boasting, as if having disproved this vindicatory justice, he had snatched the prize from his adversaries. Other clear proofs of the satisfaction of Christ. That it is our duty to acquiesce in the revealed will of God. The truth not to be forsaken. Mercy and justice not opposite. Vain distinctions of Socinus concerning divine justice. The consideration of these distinctions. His first argument against vindicatory justice. The solution of it. The anger and severity of God, what. Universal and particular justice, in what they agree. The false reasoning and vain boasting of the adversary.

We come now to Socinus himself. In almost all his writings he opposes this punitory justice. We shall consider what he hath written against Covetus, in that treatise of his entitled, 'Of Jesus Christ the Saviour;' and what he only repeats in other places, as occasion required. In the first book, and first chapter; and also in the third book, and first chapter of that work, expressly, and of set purpose, he opposes himself vehemently, and with all his might, to the truth on this point. But because he very well understood, that, by the establishment of this justice, a knife is put to the throat of his opinion, and that it cannot be defended (that is, that no reason can be given why Christ our Saviour is called Jesus Christ), he maintains that the whole controversy concerning the satisfaction of Christ hinges on this very question. The reader will perceive from the arguments already used, that I am of the same opinion. For, it being granted that this justice belongs to God, not even So-

[n] Chap. xxx. 3. 9. [o] Chap. i. p. 78. of his Answer to Grotius.

[a] Viz. Whether vindicatory justice be essential and natural to God, and the exercise of it or the punishment of sin, consequently necessary?

cinus, though doubtless a man of a great, very artful, and fertile genius, could devise any way of obtaining salvation for sinners without a satisfaction. For had he either found out one, or even feigned it upon a supposition, he would not have wanted the effrontery of imposing it on the minds of the credulous and fanatic, which, however, he nowhere hath attempted.

But on the other hand, gallantly supposing that he had removed this justice out of the way, as if the business were entirely settled, and the strong tower of his adversaries destroyed, he highly glories in the triumphs acquired for himself and his followers: 'for,' says he, 'having got rid of this justice, had we no other argument, that human fiction of the satisfaction of Jesus Christ must be thoroughly detected and totally vanish.' This vain boasting of his, the learned and pious have long ago sufficiently checked by innumerable testimonies from Scripture.

And forasmuch as the fact is abundantly clear, that Christ bore our sins, God laying them upon him, and that by his satisfaction he purchased eternal salvation; though it had even pleased God to keep the causes and reasons of this infinitely wise transaction, hid to all eternity, in the abyss of his own goodness and wisdom, it would have been our duty to acquiesce in the infinite holiness and wisdom of his will. So also it is beyond any doubt, that no helps of our faith are to be despised, and that no revelations of the divine nature and will are to be neglected, by which our merciful Father leads us into a more intimate and saving knowledge of this mystery of holiness.

We also, to whom the most sacred deposit of this divine truth hath been committed, would immediately judge ourselves unworthy of it, should we spontaneously betray any one point or jot of it, much less so strong a pillar of our faith and hope to its adversaries. Though then we have other unanswerable proofs of the satisfaction of Christ, which the gates of hell shall in vain oppose, and numberless testimonies of the God who cannot lie; so that we may suppose Socinus is only idly insulting those, who grant that God might forgive sin without any intervention of a satisfaction, but that he would not, an expression which I by no means approve, we however think it necessary that

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a twofold justice, who renders different recompenses to those who merit differently. But his whole treatise, from beginning to end, is disgracefully built on a mistaken and falsely assumed principle: for he supposes, that 'every sin shall not receive its just recompense of reward,' from divine justice; but that God punishes some sins, and can punish others only if he please. From an exceeding desire to exclude all consideration of the satisfaction of Christ entirely, in the matter of inflicting punishment for sins, he stumbled against this stone: for God most certainly will finally punish the impenitent to all eternity; because he is just, and because there is no sacrifice for their sins: nor is it less true, that God casts out and destroys many, who are strangers to the covenant of grace, not waiting for their repentance; but that he effectually leads others to repentance; not because he exerciseth a twofold justice, but because his justice hath been satisfied for the sins of the latter by Christ, whereas it is not so with regard to the former. See Rom. iii. 25. But because he would not acknowledge the foundation for that distinction, which may be seen in the acts or exercise of the divine justice concerning sinners, to be laid in the blood of Christ, he hath feigned a twofold justice, and a twofold mercy opposed to it, of which there is not the most distant mention made in the sacred Scriptures; and which ought not by any means to be ascribed to the divine nature, which is in itself most simple.

But coming to himself again, he denies that in the sacred writings there is any mention at all made of any kind of justice that is opposed to mercy; we, indeed, have never said that justice is opposed to mercy; but as it clearly appears, that it is his wish to deny to God the whole of that kind of justice, whence in punishing sins he is said, or may be said to be just (which punishment is an effect different from the pardon of sin that flows from mercy), we choose not to contend about words. Let us see then what kind of arguments he produces to support his robbing God of this essential attribute. He says, 'that the word justice, when applied to God in the sacred writings, is never opposed to mercy, but chiefly, and for the most part, means rectitude and equity.'

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but this, I am sure, is by no means of advantage,
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hat,' says he, 'which is opposed to mercy, is not
tice by the sacred writers; but is called severity,
or fury, or vengeance, or by some such name.'
ur opponent avails himself nothing by this asser-
that which is false proves nothing. By that, which
is opposed to mercy, he understands that virtue in
which he punishes sins and sinners according as
erve. But that this is never called justice in Scrip-
that God is not thence said to be just, is so mani-
lse, that no body would dare to affirm it, but one
ned to say any thing in support of a bad cause. Let
der but consult the passages adduced on this head in
rd chapter, and he will be astonished at the impu-
of the man. But all are agreed, that anger, fury, and
denoting such troubled affections, ought not properly
ascribed to God, but only in respect of their effects;
gh analogically and reductively[b] they belong to correc-
justice; because, in exercising his judgments, God is
to use them; but they do not denote any perfection in-
ent in God, any farther than they can be reduced to jus-
e; but only a certain mode of certain divine actions; for
od doth not punish sins because he is angry, but because
is just; although in the punishment of them, according
our conception of things, he discovers anger.

He next proceeds to produce some passages, in order to
prove that the justice of God, in the sacred writings, viz. that
universal justice, which we have before described, is often
used for the infinite rectitude of the divine nature (what no-
body ever denied), where, in mentioning the justice of faith-
fulness and remunerative justice, agreeable to his faithful-
ness, which always hath respect to the covenant of grace,
ratified and established in the blood of Christ, God is said
to pardon sins, and to reward those that believe according
to his justice; and thence he concludes, 'that a justice op-

[b] i. e. by consequence.

posed to mercy, by which God must punish sin, is not inherent in God.' 'For what,' says he, 'is more agreeable to the divine nature, and consequently, more equitable and just, than to do good to the wretched and despised race of mankind, though unworthy; and freely to make them partakers of his glory.'

This surely is trifling in a serious matter, if any thing can be so called, for even novices will not bear one to argue from a position of universal justice to a negation of particular justice; much less shall we readily assent to him, who maintain, that that particular justice is by no means distinguished from the universal rectitude of the divine nature; but that that rectitude is so called, in respect of the egresses, that it has, in consequence of the supposition of sin; but it is consonant with sound doctrine, 'that that which is agreeable to the divine nature, should be considered also as righteous and just;' and this Socinus acknowledges. We agree, that it is agreeble to the divine nature to do good to sinners; but at the same time we dare not deny, 'that the right of God is, that those who transgress are worthy of death; both which properties of his nature, he hath very clearly demonstrated in the satisfaction of Christ; 'whom he hath set forth to be a propitiation, through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins;' whom, while the heretic rejecteth, he walketh in darkness, a stranger to the true and saving knowledge of God, and engaged wholly in his own vain imaginations.

But Socinus, as if having achieved some great exploit, at length thus concludes: 'That punitory justice is not a virtue inherent in God, or a divine quality or property, but the effect of his will; and that that justice, by which God always punishes impenitent sinners, is so called, not properly, but by accident, viz. because it is agreeable to true justice or rectitude.' We have already considered the arguments that he has produced in support of this opinion; whether they be of such weight, that they should induce us to deny this justice; and whether, to punish sinners be essential and proper to God, or only accidental, let the readers, from what hath been said on the subject, determine. So much for our first skirmish with Socinus.

CHAP. XI.

The arguments of Socinus against punitory justice weighed. A false hypothesis of his. Sins, in what sense they are debts. The first argument of Socinus, in which he takes for granted what ought to have been proved. A trifling supposition substituted for a proof. Whether that excellence, by virtue of which God punishes sins, be called justice in the Scriptures. The severity of God, what. Our opponent's second argument. It labours under the same deficiency as the first. It is not opposite to mercy to punish the guilty. There is a distinction between acts and habits. Our opponent confounds them. The mercy of God infinite, so also is his justice. A distinction of the divine attributes. In pardoning sins through Jesus Christ, God hath exercised infinite justice and infinite mercy. The conclusion of the contest with Socinus.

In the third part, and first chapter of his treatise, being determined to contend, to his utmost, against the satisfaction of Christ, he maintains, 'that God, consistent with his right, could pardon our sins, without any real satisfaction received for them.' And he endeavours to support the assertion, chiefly by the following argument, viz. 'That God is our creditor, that our sins are debts, which we have contracted with him; but that every one may yield up his right, and more especially God, who is the supreme Lord of all, and extolled in the Scriptures for his liberality and goodness. Hence, then, it is evident, that God can pardon sins without any satisfaction received; and that he is inclined to do so, he uses his best endeavours afterward to prove.'

But because he foresaw that his first supposition, the foundation of his whole future reasoning, was too much exposed and obnoxious to the divine justice, he labours hard, in the first chapter, to remove that out of the way entirely. Let us attend then to his reasoning, and follow him step by step; for if he have not insuperably, and beyond all confutation proved, that God can forgive sins without a satisfaction, what he afterward argues concerning the will, liberality, and mercy of God, will become of no weight or consideration; yea, the foundation being destroyed, the whole edifice, or Babylonish tower, must instantly tumble to the ground. He thus proceeds:

'But you will say, It is necessary that God should take

care to satisfy his justice, which he cannot, even himself, renounce, unless he, in a manner, deny himself.'

Ans. You are right, Socinus; we do affirm, agreeable to the Holy Scriptures, that the justice of God is in such a manner natural to him, that if it be necessary that he should preserve the glory of his essential attributes undiminished, he cannot but indispensably exact the punishment of every sin and transgression of his law, and render a just recompense of reward to all sinners, or to their surety; and therefore we contend, that without a satisfaction made, no one could obtain the remission of sins, and eternal salvation. Let us see, Socinus, what you have to oppose to this.

'All along from the beginning of this answer,' says he, 'I have sufficiently shewn, that that justice which you contend ought at all events to be satisfied, is not inherent in God, but is the effect of his own will; for when God punishes sinners, that we may call this work of his by some worthy name, we say that he then exerciseth justice; wherefore, there is no need that God should either provide for the satisfaction of that justice, or renounce it.'

Ans. We have already considered what Socinus says, in the beginning of his treatise, against the justice of God; if I mistake not, we have shewn, that the heretic had lost his labour, and that it is far beyond his power to dethrone the Deity; 'for he sitteth on his throne judging[a] righteously.' But we diminutive beings have not first, or of our own accord, maintained, that God is just, and that he exerciseth justice in the punishment of sinners, 'that we might call his work by some worthy name;' but the Judge of all the earth himself, the God of truth, in almost innumerable places, gives this testimony of himself in the sacred records, and these ought always to be the only, as they are the infallible guide of our judgments.

Distrusting then what he has formerly asserted (or it being manifestly of no weight), he attempts again, by other sophisms, to establish the reasoning which he had formerly begun. And he thus proceeds:

'But besides the arguments which I have already used, to prove that that justice is not inherent in God, it chiefly appears from this, that were it naturally resident in God, he

[a] Psal. ix. 4.

could never pardon not even the least transgression to any one; for God never doeth any thing, nor can do any thing that is opposite to the qualities inherent in him: as for instance, as wisdom and equity are naturally inherent in God, that justice never doth, or can do any thing contrary to wisdom and equity, as we have seen above,' &c.

The intelligent reader can easily perceive, that Socinus proves nothing by this argument, but that he even absurdly adds heap upon heap to his own supposition; or that with a bold effrontery, he takes for granted the thing to be determined. It is, indeed, our opinion, that God cannot pass the smallest sin unpunished, and that he cannot, because he can do nothing that is opposite to the qualities inherent in him. But this our opponent brings forward as a great absurdity, that must bear against us in support of our own cause, but without even any appearance of a proof. But we have before demonstrated the state of the matter to be thus: that God neither actually pardons any sin, without a satisfaction made, or can pardon it, without an infringement of his justice, by which he condemns sinners worthy of death. So that, as God never doth, nor can do the things which are opposite to his equity and wisdom; so he neither doth, nor can do those which are opposite to his justice. But to pardon the sins of believers, on account of the satisfaction of Christ, 'whom he hath set forth as a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness,' is not opposite to his justice. But these seem absurdities to Socinus, and why should not they? 'For we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumbling-block, and unto the Greeks foolishness; —but this preaching of the cross is to them that perish foolishness.'[a]

Yea, in common equity, nothing could be mentioned more unequitable and unwise, than this would be opposite to justice, viz. not to pardon those sins for which that justice hath been amply satisfied: and must then this heretic, not only, for nothing, substitute his own most absurd, yea, execrable opinion, viz. 'That Jesus Christ hath not made satisfaction for our sins, nor borne their punishment; that is, that he was not made sin for us, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him?' An opinion neither prov-

[a] 1 Cor. chap. i.

ed, nor that will ever be proved, to all eternity: but also insinuate it as a proof of another error, which that alone, it is evident, first begot in his mind. Indeed, I cannot sufficiently wonder, that some, by the sophisms of such disputants, are so easily transformed to another gospel, 'forsaking him who called them to the grace of Christ.'

'But that justice,' says Socinus, 'which, as we have seen before, in the sacred writings, is not called justice, but severity or vengeance, or by some such names, so far as it is opposed to mercy, is nothing else but to punish sins; but to punish sins, and to pardon sins, are entirely opposite to one another.'

A fine painter's shew-board, but void of truth.

Ans. What the adversary so often yelps out, is totally without foundation, viz. that that justice is never called by its proper name in the Scriptures. It is not only called by its own name, but is also called purity and holiness, which are essential attributes of the Deity. It is called severity, vengeance, and anger, but only improperly, and analogically, and in respect of the effects which it produceth. What he asserts too of this justice, viz. that it is nothing else but to punish sin, very improperly confounding a habit, an act, and an effect, is altogether without foundation, and most absurd. 'The Lord is just, and his judgments are righteous: the judge of all the earth doeth right.' And in fine, it is false, that this justice is opposed to mercy. For it is beyond any doubt, that different operations and effects may, in different views, be ascribed to one and the same righteous principle. To punish sins, and to pardon sins, unless spoken in the same point of view, are not opposed to one another. God, indeed, pardons to us those sins which he punished in our surety; which foolishness of God is wiser than men.

Our opponent thus proceeds: 'If that justice be inherent in God; that is, if there be any property in God, which is altogether inclined expressly to punish any sins of mankind whatsoever, whether penitent or impenitent, he neither spares, nor can spare any one; for as to what you teachers in the church have devised, that according to this justice, he can punish sin, even though the sinner should not be punished; that is quite inconsistent with this, and every other kind of justice.'

Our opponent again idly fancies, that we are hard pressed by this conclusion: we grant, yea, we solemnly believe and declare, that because of his justice, God can never spare any sinner, unless he expressly punish his sins in another. But he artfully and shrewdly endeavours to load our opinion with prejudice, insinuating, 'that God then could not even spare the penitent.' But we believe all repentance of sin to be founded in the satisfaction and blood of Christ; for, 'him God hath exalted with his right hand to be a Prince and a Saviour, to give repentance to Israel, and forgiveness of sins.'[b] God then both can spare the penitent, and according to the promises of the gospel, most certainly doth spare them: those, viz. for whose sins, satisfaction hath been made through the blood of Christ, 'who gave himself a ransom for them:' but, that to punish sin, without the delinquent's being punished, is neither contrary to this, nor to any other kind of justice, absolutely considered, through divine help, shall be demonstrated in its proper place.

Hitherto our opponent hath discovered nothing but mere fancies, vain repetitions, absurd allegations, and a shameful ignorance of the argument. He thus proceeds: 'But should you say, that by the same reasoning it may be proved, that mercy is not inherent in God; for if it were, he could never inflict punishment on any, as mercy is nothing else, but to pardon those who have offended. I will answer, as I have slightly noticed before, that it is very true, that mercy, so far as it is opposed to that justice, that is, to severity and vengeance, is not inherent in God, but is the effect of his will: when then the sacred Scriptures testify, that God is merciful, they mean nothing more, than that God very often, and very easily pardoneth sin, if at least they speak of this mercy; for there is another kind of divine mercy, of which, according to the old translation, mention is frequently made in the sacred writings, which ought rather to be called goodness, and hath a more extensive signification; for it comprehends the whole divine beneficence, whether it be exercised in the pardon of sin, or in communication of any other kind of benefit to mankind.'

It hath been shewn already, that it is not proved by such reasoning as this, that justice is not inherent in God;

[b] Acts vi.

nor from the force of such an argument will it easily appear, that the divine mercy suffers any degradation: what he supposes, in the first place, is altogether without foundation, namely, 'That the divine mercy is nothing else than to forgive offenders,' whereas in this, an external effect of that mercy is only shewn, which is itself an essential property of the divine nature; for he pardoneth sins, because he is merciful. The supposition also is groundless, 'That if mercy were inherent in God, he could never inflict punishment on any.' For to inflict punishment on the impenitent, and those for whose sins the divine justice hath in no manner been satisfied, is not opposite to mercy.

For mercy in God is not a sympathy, or condolence with the miseries of others, with an inclination of assisting them, a virtue which oft-times borders near upon vice, but is that supreme perfection of the divine nature, whereby it is naturally disposed to assist the miserable, and which, the proper suppositions [c]being made, and the glory of his other perfections preserved, he willingly exerciseth, and is inclined to exercise. But this is not opposed to the justice of God; neither is it an effect of his free-will (which expression, concerning the exercise of justice, our opponent foolishly wrests to the virtue itself), but a natural attribute of the Deity. What he adds concerning a twofold mercy of God, are idle fancies: for the sparing mercy of which we are discoursing, by no means differs from that benignity, grace, or goodness of God, of which he makes mention; for that very benignity, with respect to the special egresses, which it hath towards miserable sinners, from the free-will of God, is that very mercy itself. That assertion of his too, must also be noticed, by the way, viz. 'That God very easily pardoneth sin,' which as it is a very precious truth, if a regard be had to the oblation and satisfaction of his Son; so, simply spoken of him, who hath threatened death to every transgression, and whose right it is, that sinners should be worthy of death, all, whosoever, shall be cited before his tribunal, aliens and strangers to Christ, will find to be without foundation, and an absolute falsehood.

'But it is evident,' says he, 'that neither the justice, nor mercy, of which we are treating, are inherent in God, from

[c] That is, the existence and misery of a rational creature being supposed.

what we read, viz. 'That he is the Lord God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering and abundant in goodness,'[d] which plainly shews that these two, viz. his long-suffering or slowness to anger, and his abundant goodness, or great mercy, are the effects of his will, the one of which is surpassed in greatness by the other; and they cannot consist with one another; and they are limited: whereas those qualities which are truly inherent in God, have no limit, and are all consistent with one another, and in respect of their greatness, are all absolutely equal.'

Our opponent again very improperly applies a comparison made between external acts, to the internal habits themselves. That, anger and compassion, which are only attributed to God effectively, are free effects of the divine will, limited as to their object, and unequal, which cannot be exercised about the same person, in their highest degree, we acknowledge.

But there is no reason that what is applicable to acts, or rather to effects, should also be applicable to the perfections whence these flow. But in that promulgation of the glory or name of God which we have in Exod. xxxiv. 6. he shews what, and of what kind his disposition is towards those whom, viz. he hath purchased as his peculiar people through Jesus Christ; and what patience, long-suffering and compassion he is disposed to exercise towards them:[e] but in respect of all other sinners, he concludes, 'that he will by no means clear the guilty,' or deliver them from the guilt of sin, which, indeed, strikes at the very root of Socinianism: but to conclude from this, that the divine perfections are opposite, one to another, unequal, or surpassing one another in greatness, is only the extreme folly of one, 'ignorant of the righteousness, or justice, of God, and going about to establish a righteousness, or justice, of his own.' He proceeds thus.

'Hence it is manifest how grievously they err, who affirm both this justice and mercy of God to be infinite: for as to justice, being deceived by the appearance of the word, they see not, that they say no more than this, that the severity and anger of God are infinite, contrary to the most express testimonies of the sacred Scriptures, which, as we have

[d] See Exod. xxxiv. 6. Numb. xiv. 18.

[e] See 2 Pet. iii. 9, &c.

just now said, declare God to be slow to anger: that divine justice which hath no limit, is not this of which we are discoursing: but that which alone, as we have seen before, is distinguished by this illustrious name in Scripture, and which by another name may be called rectitude and equity. This indeed is inherent in God, and is most conspicuous in all his works; and by virtue of this alone, as we shall see hereafter, even, if we had no other proof, that human fiction of the satisfaction of Christ, would be thoroughly detected and vanish.'

Our opponent here serves up again nothing but his old dish variously dressed, and repeatedly refused: we declare justice to be infinite, not deceived by the shew of a word, but being so taught by the express testimonies of the sacred Scriptures, and by the most convincing and unanswerable arguments; and we solemnly maintain it, not only with regard to that universal justice which may be called rectitude (though improperly), but also concerning that particular sin-avenging justice, which we deny to differ either essentially or subjectively[f] from the former: but that, anger or severity, so far as they denote effects of divine justice, or punishment inflicted, are infinite only in duration. 'Seeing it is a righteous thing with God, to take vengeance on them who know him not, and that obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ; who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power.'[g] But in respect of that divine excellence which they point out, we affirm them to be in every respect infinite.

But it would be altogether superfluous, here again to repeat what we have before clearly settled concerning this justice, or again to recite the texts of Scripture formerly adduced. The sum is this: sin-avenging justice differs not in reality, from that universal justice, which our opponent does not deny to be perpetually inherent in God, and a natural attribute: it is only distinguished from it, in respect of its egress to its own proper object; for the egresses of justice against sin, flow from the most holy perfection of Deity itself. But anger and severity, so far as they may be

[f] That is, as it relates to God, who is the subject of it.
[g] See 2 Thess. i. 6. 8, 9.

reduced to that justice which is manifested in them, are also infinite; in respect of their effects, they have their limits assigned them by the wisdom and justice of God: these things, however, have been proved before.

But let the pious reader judge, whether our opponent, who hath presumed to call, the highest mystery of the gospel, the alone foundation of the salvation of sinners, the darling jewel of our religion, the greatest testimony of the divine love, our victory over the devil, death, and hell, 'a human fiction,' had sufficient cause to annex so dreadful an expression to the conclusion of this so long continued debate. He adds, in the last place,

'But as to mercy, that is the pardon of sins, how dare they affirm that to be infinite, when it is evident from the whole of Scripture, that God doth not always use it, but frequently exerciseth vengeance and severity. Why, but because they have so shockingly blundered, that they have not attended to this, that these are only different effects of the divine will, but are not any properties, and have persuaded themselves, that both of them are inherent in God: but how could they ever entertain such a persuasion, when, as we have said, the one destroys the other? But this they deny, and maintain that God exercised both of them perfectly in the salvation procured for us by Christ, which will more clearly appear from what follows to be not only false, but ridiculous. Meantime let them tell us, pray, when God punishes the guilty, but especially when he doth not even grant them time to repent, what kind of mercy he exerciseth towards these? But if God doth many things, in which not even any trace of that mercy appears, although he be said to be merciful and full of compassion in Scripture, must we not say that he doeth many things, in which that justice is by no means discernible, to which he is said to be exceeding slow? We must then conclude, according to our opinion, that there is no such justice in God, as expressly dictates the necessary punishment of sin, and which he hath not a power to renounce. And since this is the case, it is abundantly evident, that there is no reason why God cannot freely pardon the sins of whomsoever he may please, without any satisfaction received.'

Ans. On these heads a few observations shall suffice:

1. It is affirmed, without any shew of reason, that mercy in God is not infinite, because sometimes he exerciseth severity, that is, that God cannot be called merciful, if he punish any guilty and impenitent sinners: to prove mercy to be an essential property of God, it is sufficient, that he exercises it towards any: for in this very matter, that ought to be set down as a natural perfection in God, which is the proper and immediate source and ground of that operation. Which attributes have no egress but towards objects placed in particular circumstances; nor have they any effects, without some free act of the divine will[h] intervening: nor does it any more follow that the effects of mercy ought to be infinite, if it be itself infinite, than that the works of God ought to be immense, because immensity is an essential property of his nature.

2. By what argument will our opponent prove, that the relation between mercy and justice is, in such a manner the same, that because God exerciseth no mercy towards some, that is, so as to pardon their sins, that therefore he should not account it necessary to exercise justice towards every sin? We have formerly mentioned in what view they are distinct; namely, that God is bound to exercise mercy to none: but that, he cannot but exercise his justice towards sinners (provided he be inclined to be just), if he would preserve his natural right and dominion over his creatures, and the holiness and purity of his nature uninjured and entire; for disobedience would take away all dependance of the creature on God, unless a compensation were made to him by a vicarious punishment: but according to the Sacred Scriptures we maintain, that God exercised both the one and the other, both justice and mercy; in justly punishing Christ, in mercifully pardoning sins which he laid upon him, to us, who deserved everlasting punishment: which things, though they may be ridiculous to Socinus (for the things of the Spirit of God are foolishness to him) no divine truth however, of any kind whatever, is more frequently, more plainly, or more clearly declared in the sacred writings. 'For all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God; being justified freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, whom God hath set forth to be a pro-

[h] See Rom. ix. 13.

pitiation through faith in his blood; to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through, the forbearance of God: to declare, I say, at this time his righteousness: that he might be just, and the justifier of him, who believeth in Jesus.'[i] But, setting the consideration of Christ altogether aside, there is no doubt, but that Socinus would carry off the prize in this contest. But while it is reckoned worth while to have any regard to him, it is easy to perceive that this heretic uses nothing but continued false reasonings and false conclusions. For it is made evident to us in Christ the Son, how, and by what means, God, infinitely merciful and infinitely just, acting on the principles of strict justice with some, and of mere grace with others, but in exercising both the one and the other, both justice and mercy, in and through the Mediator; the one indeed, in his own proper person, and the other towards those for whom he was surety, hath declared himself.

But while Socinus despised and set at nought him and his grace, is it to be wondered at, if he 'became vain in his imaginations, and that his foolish heart was darkened?'

For what need I say more? doth not God exercise supreme and infinite mercy towards us miserable and lost sinners, in pardoning our sins through Christ? Have we deserved any such thing, who, after doing all that we can do, even when roused and assisted by his grace, are still unprofitable servants? Did we appoint a sacrifice, that his anger might be averted, and that an atonement to his justice might be made, from our own storehouse, sheepfold, or herd? Yea, when we were enemies to him, alienated from his life, without help, and without strength, dead in trespasses and in sins, knowing of no such thing, wishing for, or expecting no such thing, he himself 'made Christ to be sin for us who knew no sin: that he might free us from the wrath to come;' that an expiation being made for our sins, we might be presented blameless before him, to the praise and glory of his grace. But whether he shewed the strictest justice and severity towards our surety, over whom he exercised a most gracious care, both on his own[k] account, and for our sakes, and whom he did not spare, shall afterward be considered.

[i] Rom. iii. 23—26.

[k] Behold my servant whom I uphold; mine elect in whom my soul delighteth; Isa. xlii. 1.

Whether then, when our opponent relying on these subtleties of his, concludes, 'That there is no justice in God which dictates the necessity of punishing sin; and that therefore, there is no reason why God cannot freely pardon the sins of whomsoever he may please, without any satisfaction received;' and then, as if he had accomplished a glorious achievement, triumphs over the cross of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, be not acting the part of a most silly trifler, and absurd heretic, let the reader determine. But as all the arguments which he afterward uses against the satisfaction of Christ, have their foundation, in this most false supposition, which the Scriptures, as hath been shewn, so often contradict, and on which he always depends in all his disputations; whether those have acted for the interest of the church of God, who have voluntarily surrendered to him this impregnable tower of truth, which he hath in vain laid siege to, that he might with greater audacity carry on his attacks upon the gospel, is well known to God. We, as we hope, instructed by his word, entertain very different sentiments from theirs on this point.

But when our opponent has come to the conclusion of this dispute, he introduces many fictions about the mere good-will of God, in pardoning sins, about his ceasing from his right, without injury to any one, about the injustice of the substitution of a surety, in the room of sinners: all which arguments, as they depend on a false foundation, yea, on a most base error, it would be easy here to shew, how vain, false, and absurd they are; unless we had determined, with God's will, to explain the doctrine of the satisfaction of Jesus Christ, the greatest treasure of the gospel, and to defend and vindicate it from the unjust calumnies of heretics, in the proper place and time.

CHAP. XII.

The progress of the dispute to the theologians of our own country. The supreme authority of divine truth. Who they are, and what kind of men, who have gone into factions about this matter. The Coryphæus of the adversaries, the very illustrious Twiss. The occasion of his publishing his opinion. The opinion of the Arminians. The effects of the death of Christ, what. Twiss acknowledges punitory justice to be natural to God. The division of the dispute with Twiss. Maccovius's answers to the arguments of Twiss. The plan of our disputation.

We come now to those, and the consideration of their opinion who[a] agreeing with us concerning the satisfaction of Jesus Christ, as revealed in the Scriptures, yet, it being supposed that God willed the salvation of sinners, contend, that the whole necessity of it flowed from the most free-will of God; though they by no means deny sin-avenging justice to be natural to God.

But those who maintain this opinion are so numerous and respectable, and men who have merited so highly of the church of God, that, although the free man of Christ, and taught to call no man on earth master, in matters of religion, unless I had on my side, not fewer, and equally famous men, I should have a religious scruple, publicly to differ from them. I acknowledge, that every, even the least particle of divine truth is furnished from heaven with authority towards every disciple of Jesus Christ, who is the way, the life, and the truth, of holding it fast in the love and admiration of it, and of enforcing its claim, defence, and declaration, even though the whole world should rise up against him. But, perhaps, it would be unbecoming in one who would cheerfully enter as a disciple, to oppose such great learned men, and those too so well trained to the field of dispute, unless supported by the dignity and suffrages of others, not inferior even to those in merit.

But if modesty must be violated, all will agree, that it ought to be violated in the cause of truth; and especially,

[a] They agree, that the satisfaction by Christ is the way of salvation revealed in the Scriptures; but that it is so, because God willed it should be so: and deny, that there was any necessity for such a satisfaction arising from the nature of divine justice.

as I perceive, that the authority of some theologians is of so great weight with many of our countrymen, that not having duly weighed and pondered the matter, but relying on this, they go into the opinion, contrary to that which we have undertaken to defend. Considering it of importance to weigh the arguments which these very illustrious men have used, although I knew myself not only unequal to the task, but that in marshalling the line for such a controversy, I am not deserving of even a third or fourth place from the van, having been only accustomed to the popular mode of declaiming; however, I do not fear to engage in this undertaking, whatever it be; nothing doubting, but that from my attempt, though weak, the readers will easily perceive, that the truth might triumph gloriously, were any one furnished with better abilities to come forward in its defence.

But here, first, of all the antagonists, and who indeed is almost equal to them all, the very learned Twiss opposes himself to us; concerning whose opinion, in general, a few things are to be premised, before we come to the answers of objections.

The consideration of Arminius's opinion, concerning the efficacy of the death of Christ, and its efficiency, gave occasion to this learned man of first publishing his own sentiments. Arminius contends, 'That Christ, by his satisfaction only accomplished this much, that God now, consistent with the honour of his justice (as it had been satisfied), might pardon sinners, if he willed so to do.'

This most absurd opinion, so highly derogatory to divine grace, and the merit of the death of Christ, this illustrious man was inclined to differ from, so far, that he maintained, that, that consideration, viz. 'That God could forgive sins, his justice not opposing it (as having been satisfied), had no place among the effects of Christ's death.'

But Arminius is the only one, so far as I know, among our opponents of this opinion: and he himself, in asserting it, is scarcely uniform and self consistent. I may venture to affirm, that of his followers there are none, unless it be some mean skulker, who swears by the words of his master. The opinion of Corvinus, which Twiss afterward discusses, is plainly different. Episcopius, likewise, after Arminius, the Coryphæus of that cause, and by far its most noble cham-

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fering and abundant in goodness,'[d] which
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greatness, is only the extreme folly of one,
righteousness, or justice, of God, and going
sh a righteousness, or justice, of his own.'
us.

s manifest how grievously they err, who af-
justice and mercy of God to be infinite: for
being deceived by the appearance of the word,
hat they say no more than this, that the seve-
God are infinite, contrary to the most ex-
of the sacred Scriptures, which, as we have

[d] Numb. xiv. 18. [e] See 2 Pet. iii. 9, &c.

Maccovius hath, with great success, performed this task; giving, by no means trifling, but rather, for the most part, very solid answers to these four arguments, which Twiss calls his principal; and in a very plain and perspicuous manner, as was his general custom, in all his writings.

But neither the plan of our work permits us to withdraw from this undertaking, though unequal to it; nor perhaps hath Maccovius satisfied his readers in every particular. Indeed, some things seem necessary to be added, that this controversy with Twiss may occasion no trouble to any one for the future. This veteran leader, then, so well trained to the scholastic field, going before, and pointing us out the way, we shall, with your good leave, reader, briefly try these arguments by the rule of Scripture and right reason; and I doubt not, but we shall clearly demonstrate, to all impartial judges of things, that this learned man hath by no means proved what he intended.

CHAP. XIII.

Twiss's first argument. Its answer. A trifling view of the divine attributes. Whether God could, by his absolute power forgive sins without a satisfaction: to let sins pass unpunished, implies a contradiction; and that twofold. What these contradictions are. Whether God may do, what man may do? Whether every man may renounce his right? Whether God cannot forgive sins because of his justice? The second argument. Its answer. Distinctions of necessity. God doth no work, without himself, from absolute necessity. Conditional necessity. Natural necessity twofold. God doth not punish to the extent of his power, but to the extent of his justice. God always acts with a concomitant liberty. An argument of the illustrious Vossius considered. God a consuming fire, but an intellectual one. An exception of Twiss's. Whether independent of the divine appointment, sin would merit punishment? In punishment, what things are to be considered. The relation between obedience as to reward, and disobedience as to punishment not the same. The comparison between mercy and justice, by Vossius improperly instituted.

THE first argument of this great man is this: 'If God cannot forgive sins without a satisfaction, it is either because he cannot, on account of his justice, or because he cannot by his power: but neither of these can be affirmed.'

Ans. That enumeration of the divine attributes, as to the

present cause, is mere trifling; for what God cannot do in respect of one attribute, he can do in respect of none: or, in other words, that which cannot be done, because of any one essential property, cannot be done, because of them all. As for instance, if there be any thing which God cannot do, in respect of truth, he cannot do that in any manner, or in any respect. In the acts of the divine will, purely free, the case is otherwise; for, in a divided sense, God may do any thing (that is, he may create new worlds), which, if a decree of creating this, and no other, be supposed, he could not do. But the objects presented to any attribute of the divine nature, admit not of various respects, but are in their own kind absolutely necessary: therefore, we deny the minor. Neither in respect of justice, nor in respect of power, can this be done.

But our learned antagonist leads the proof of it through its parts; and first, after a marginal animadversion on a certain dream of Piscator's he affirms, that it cannot be maintained, that God cannot forgive sins by his power without a satisfaction.

'For,' says he, 'if God by his might, or absolute power, cannot pardon sin, then it is absolutely impossible for sin to be pardoned, or not to be punished; therefore, not to pardon sin, consists of contradictory terms; the contradiction then ought to be shewn, as none appears from the formal terms. And on the other hand, it is evident, that man not only can pardon, but that it is his duty to pardon his enemies, when they trangress against him.'

Ans. The non-punishment of sin, implies a contradiction; not indeed formally, and in the terms, but virtually, and eminently, in respect of the thing itself: for, in the first place, it implies, that God is the Lord of mankind, by a natural and indispensable right, but that mankind are not subject to him, neither as to obedience, nor as to punishment; which would be the direct case, if sin should pass with impunity. For that natural and necessary dependance being cut off (which also in another respect is moral), which accords to a rational creature in respect of its Creator and supreme Lord, which really comes to pass by means of sin, it cannot be renewed, or made amends for, but by punishment. In the second place, to hate sin, that is, to will to

punish it, and not to hate sin, to will to let it pass unpunished, are manifestly contradictory.

If you say that God hath it in his power, not to hate sin, you say that he hath the contrary in his power, that is, that he can love sin; for if he hate sin, of his free-will, he may will the contrary. For the divine will is not so determinately inclined towards any secondary object, by any thing in itself, that can justly oppose its inclination to its opposite; this Scotus maintains, and Twiss agrees with him. But to will good, and to love justice, are not less natural to God, than to be himself. Here is then a double contradiction in that assertion of this very learned man, viz. 'That God can forgive sin, absolutely, without any satisfaction received.'

'But it is manifest,' says he, 'that man not only can pardon, but that it is his duty to pardon his enemies, and therefore, this does not imply a contradiction.'

Ans. The supposition is denied, that God may do, what man may do. That learned man raises this objection himself, that man may sin, which God cannot do, and at great length, and with much erudition, explains away this example. But as this instance of Twiss's is not quite satisfactory to us, we think proper to proceed in a different manner.

I say, then, in the first place, that divine and human forgiveness are plainly of a different kind; the forgiveness of man only respects the hurt, the forgiveness of God respects the guilt. Man pardons sins, so far as any particular injury hath been done himself; God pardons sin, as the good of the universe is injured. Secondly, Neither is it in the power of any man to let sins pass unpunished, yea, of none absolutely, to whom the right of punishing is competent; for, although a private person may recede from his right, which, for the most part, is of charity; yet it is, by no means allowed to a public person to renounce his right, which is a right of government, especially if that renunciation should in any way turn out to the hurt of the public. In the third place, then, I say that, that instance is nothing to the purpose: for although a private person may at certain times renounce his right and dominion in certain cases, and ought to do so, it doth not follow from that, that God, whose right and dominion is natural and indispensable, and which he cannot renounce unless he deny himself, can do the same.

In the fourth place, the non-punishment of sin, is an injury to the universe; for the glory of divine justice would be affronted with impunity.

Our celebrated antagonist proceeds to the consideration of divine justice: 'But neither,' says he, 'can it be consistently said, that God cannot do this because of his justice; if it be supposed, that he can do it by his power.' But Scotus reasons with more judgment and accuracy on this point. 'The divine will is not so inclined towards any secondary object, by any thing in itself,' says he, 'that can oppose its being justly inclined towards its opposite, in the same manner as without contradiction it may will its opposite; otherwise, it may will absolutely and not justly, which is inconsistent with divine perfection.'

Ans. We maintain that God, from his nature cannot do this; and therefore, that he cannot either by his power or his justice; and as our learned antagonist produces no argument to prove that God can do it without resistance from his justice, but what flows from this false supposition, that he can do it by his power, it is not necessary to give ourselves any trouble on this head. But to Scotus, we answer: the divine will may incline to things opposite, in respect of the egresses of all those divine attributes which constitute and create objects to themselves; but not in respect of those attributes which have no egress towards their objects, but upon a condition supposed: as for instance, God may justly speak or not speak with man: but it being supposed that he wills to speak, the divine will cannot be indifferent whether he speak truth or not. So much for his first principal argument.

The second is this:

'If God cannot let sin pass unpunished, then he must punish it from an absolute necessity: but this no one can maintain consistent with reason.'

This consequence the learned doctor supposes, without any argument to support it: but we deny the consequence, nor will he ever be able to prove, that there is no other kind of necessity but an absolute necessity. There is also a necessity arising from a supposed condition, and which deprives not the agent of a concomitant liberty. God could not but create the world; but God did not create the world from an

absolute necessity, although it was necessary, upon a supposition, that it should be created. It is necessary that God should speak truly, but he doth not speak from an absolute necessity; but it being supposed that he wills to speak, it is impossible, that he should not speak truly. We say, therefore, that God cannot but punish sin, or, that he necessarily punishes sin, not, however, from an absolute necessity of nature, as a father begets a son, but upon the suppositions[a] before-mentioned, by a necessity which excludes an antecedent indifference, but not a concomitant liberty in the agent; for in punishing sins he acts by volition, and with understanding.

But that necessity (you will say), of what kind soever it be, flows from the nature of God, not his will or decree. But all necessity of nature seems to be absolute. I acknowledge, indeed, that all necessity of nature, considered in the first act, and thing signified, is absolute in its kind; but in the second act, and in its exercise, it is not so. The reader will easily perceive now, that our very learned antagonist had no reason for freely supposing that consequence, which I reckon the very lowest of all the devices he has fallen upon.

'If then,' says he, 'God must punish sin from a natural necessity, he must necessarily punish it, to the extent of his power; but this, with great accuracy, he shews to be absurd, by a variety of arguments.'

Ans. Maccovius hath, sometime ago, very clearly answered this reasoning. We reject his consequence, as built upon a false supposition. For that necessity, from which God punisheth sin, does not require that he should punish it to the extent of his power, but so far as is just. We do not conceive God to be a senseless inanimate agent, as if he acted from principles of nature, after a natural manner, without a concomitant liberty; for he doth all things freely with understanding and by volition, even those things which, by supposition, he doeth necessarily, according to what his most holy nature requires.

The argument which the celebrated Vossius uses against our opinion, is of no greater weight. 'Every agent (says that very learned man), that acts naturally, acts upon an ob-

[a] Viz. That he willed to create a rational being, and to permit it to transgress the law of its creation.

ject naturally receptive of its action: wherefore, if to punish were natural, viz. in that acceptation which necessity carries with it, such action could not pass from the person of a sinner to another person.'

But this learned man is mistaken, when he imagines that we affirm God to be such a natural agent, as must, without sense, and immediately operate upon the object that is receptive of it, in a manner altogether natural, and without any concomitant liberty, that is, without any free act of understanding or volition. For although God be 'a consuming fire,' he is an intellectual one. Nor is a sinner alone an object properly receptive of the exercise of God's vindicatory justice, as he hath committed the transgressions in his own person; for antecedent to every act of that justice, properly so called, in respect of the elect, God appointed a surety, and this surety being appointed, and all the sins of the elect laid upon him, he in their room and stead, is the proper object of this vindicatory justice, so far as relates to their sins.

But Twiss thus replies, 'If God punish as far as he can, with justice, that is, as far as sin deserves; then it must be either as far as sin deserves, according to the free constitution of God; or without any regard to the divine constitution. If according to the divine constitution, this is nothing else but to assert, that God punishes not so far as he can; but so far as he wills. If without any regard to the divine constitution, then without the divine constitution, sin so deserves punishment, that God ought to punish sin, because of his justice: but I conclude this to be false in this manner: if disobedience deserve punishment in this manner, that is, without the divine constitution; therefore obedience will also, in like manner, deserve a reward, without the divine constitution; for no reason can be shewn, that any one should maintain that even angels have merited, by their obedience, that God should reward them with celestial glory.'

'But although these arguments are specious, yet, strictly considered, they have no greater weight than those already discussed; for in the punishment of sin, two things are to be considered: 1. The punishment itself, so far as it is in its own nature something grievous and troublesome to the creature, and proper to recover the violated right of God. In

this respect, we say, that sin merits punishment antecedently to every free act of the divine will, or to the divine constitution: or, if you would rather have it thus expressed; that it is just that God should inflict punishment, considered as such on the transgressor, without regard to any free constitution; for, if without regard to such a constitution, sin be sin, and evil, evil; and unless it be so, to hate the greatest and best of beings, may be the highest virtue, and to love him the greatest vice; why may not punishment be due to it, without regard to such a consideration? 2. In punishment, the mode, time, and degree, are especially to be considered: in respect of these, God punishes sin according to the divine constitution; for the justice of God, only demanding punishment in general, as including in it the nature of punishment, nothing hinders but that God should freely appoint the mode and degree of it: he punishes them because it is just that he should do so; and consequently, indispensably necessary: he punishes, in one mode or in another, in one degree or in another; because, according to his wisdom he hath determined freely so to do. What we understand by modes and degrees of punishment, shall be afterward explained.

'But (says our celebrated antagonist), if disobedience thus deserves punishment, why should not obedience in like manner deserve a reward? for no reason to the contrary can be assigned.' I wish this learned man had not so expressed himself; for he will never be able to prove that the relation between obedience, as to reward, and disobedience, as to punishment, is the same; for between obedience and the reward, there intervenes no natural obligation: God is brought under an obligation to no one, for any kind of obedience; 'for after we have done all, we are still unprofitable servants.' But God's right, that rational creatures should be subject to him, either by obedience or a vicarious punishment, is indispensable. In a word, obedience is due to God, in such a manner, that from the nature of the thing, he can be debtor to none, in conferring rewards: but disobedience would destroy all dependance of the creature upon God, unless a recompense be made by punishment.

The celebrated Vossius again reasons improperly, in the passage before quoted, from a comparison made between

justice and mercy. 'The question is not,' says he 'whether it be just that a satisfaction be received; but whether it be unjust that it should not be received: for it doth not follow, that if God be merciful in doing one thing or another, that he would be unmerciful in not doing it.' I acknowledge, that it does not follow; for although mercy be natural to God, as to the habit, yet because there is no natural obligation between it and its proper object, it is, as to all its acts entirely free: but the nature of the thing, about which it is employed, is not indispensable; as we have shewn before to be the case with regard to justice. So much for the learned Twiss's second argument, with the consideration of it.

CHAP. XIV.

Twiss's third argument. A dispensation with regard to the punishment of sin, what, and of what kind. The nature of punishment, and its circumstances. The instance of this learned opponent refuted. The considerations of rewarding and punishing, different. How long, and in what sense God can dispense with the punishment due to sin. God the supreme governor of the Jewish polity: also, the Lord of all. The fourth argument of Twiss. The answer. Whether God can inflict punishment on an innocent person. In what sense God is more willing to do acts of kindness than to punish. What kind of willingness that assertion respects. The conclusion of the answer to Twiss's principal arguments.

THE third argument in this: 'God can inflict a milder punishment than sin deserves; therefore, he can by his absolute power, suspend the punishment altogether.'

Ans. I answer, that the punishment which a sin deserves, may be considered in a twofold point of view. 1. As by means of it God compels to order a disobedient creature, that hath cast off its dependance on his supreme and natural dominion, in such a manner that his will may be done with that creature that is itself unwilling to do it: and in this point of view he cannot inflict a more mild punishment than sin deserves. Yea, properly speaking, in this respect it cannot be said to admit of degrees, either milder or more severe. And in this sense alone we deny the foregoing proposition. 2. It may be considered in this other point of view, viz. as God, for the greater manifestation of his glory,

such kind of benefits on a sinful creature, as are opposite to the punishment due to sin, without regard to Christ and his satisfaction: but that difference respects a will, commanding and exhorting according to morality, not decreeing or acting naturally.

And these are what this learned writer calls his principal arguments; in which he contends that God can let sin pass unpunished, without any satisfaction. I hope, that impartial judges, however great respect they may have for the name of Twiss, will not be offended, that I have made these short answers to his arguments, as certainly they have been conducted without violence or sarcasm, and by no means from any weak desire of attacking so very illustrious a man, for whose many and great qualities, none can have a greater respect. But I have engaged in this task from an earnest desire of preserving, undiminished, the glory of divine justice, and of establishing the necessity of the satisfaction of Christ, lest the Socinians should wrest to their purpose the arguments of this learned man; on the principal of which they place a principal dependance, and by which they acknowledge that they have been induced to adopt heretical opinions.

Our very learned antagonist adds other arguments to these; some of which have been satisfactorily answered by Maccovius; others belong not, according to our view of it, to the present controversy; and others will come to be considered in our vindication of the arguments of Piscator and Lubbertus, impugned by this celebrated writer, of which we shall take a short review; and therefore shall not now enter into any particular consideration of them.

CHAP. XV.

The defence of Sibrandus Lubbertus against Twiss. The agreement of these very learned men in a point of the utmost importance. A vindication of his argument from God's hatred against sin. Liberality and justice different. A sentiment of Lubbertus undeservedly charged with atheism. What kind of necessity of operation we suppose in God: this pointed out. The sophistical reasoning of this learned writer. How God is bound to manifest any property of his nature. The reasons of Lubbertus and Twiss's objections to the same, considered. That passage of the apostle, Rom. i. 32. *considered and vindicated. His* [a] *mode of disputing rejected. The force of the argument from* Rom. i. 32. *The righteous judgment of God, what. Our federal representative, and those represented by him, are one mystical body. An answer to Twiss's arguments;* Exod. xxxiv. 7. *The learned writer's answer respecting that passage. A defence of the passage. Punitory justice a name of God. Whether those for whom Christ hath made satisfaction, ought to be called guilty.* Psal. v. 5—7. *the sense of that passage considered. From these three passages the argument is one and the same. Lubbertus's argument from the definition of justice, weighed. How vindicatory justice is distinguished from universal. The natures of liberality and justice evidently different. Punishment belongs to God. In inflicting punishment, God vindicates his right. Will and necessity, whether they be opposite. The end of the defence of Lubbertus.*

THE learned Twiss, when about to reply to the arguments of Lubbertus, brings forward two assertions of his; to the first of which he consents, but not to the latter. The first maintains, 'corrective justice to be essential to God;' which he approves: and herein we congratulate this very learned man, that thus far, at least, he assents to the truth; and in so doing hath given cause to the Socinians to grieve. But, 'that it is natural to God to hate and punish sin;' which is Lubbertus's second assertion, he denies: the nicety of his discrimination here is truly astonishing: for what is God's hatred against sin, but this corrective justice? How then is it possible that that justice should be natural to God, and the hatred of sin not so likewise? I very well know that the learned man will not allow that there is any such affection as hatred in God, properly so called. What is it then else than the constant will of punishing sin? but that is the very vindicatory justice of which we treat. Besides, if to hate,

[a] Viz. Twiss's.

sin be not natural to God, then it is a thing free and indifferent to him: he may then not hate it; he may, according to the opinion of Scotus, formerly mentioned as approved by Twiss, will its contrary; that is, he may love and approve of sin, though 'he be of purer eyes than to behold iniquity.' But, with good reason, he farther maintains, that 'mercy is essential to God, and yet that it is not necessary that he should shew mercy to any one; but of his free good pleasure he sheweth mercy to whomsoever he sheweth mercy.' We have again and again before shewn that justice and mercy, in respect of their exercise, are different: God is under no obligation to exercise mercy towards any one; but he owes it to himself to preserve his own natural right and dominion over his rational creatures: and the learned gentleman cannot shew that there is any such obligation, arising from the nature of the thing itself, between remunerating justice and liberality, on which he next insists, and their objects, as there is between corrective justice and its objects.

But he brings a grievous charge, no less than even that of atheism, against this sentiment of Lubbertus; and on a double account: for, first, he says, 'that hence it follows, that God is a necessary, and not a free agent:' and he calls that proposition, a spreading gangrene. 1. But theologians agree, and without any risk of atheism, that God is, in respect of his operations, within himself, a necessary agent. 2. If it be necessary that God should do any thing upon some condition supposed, is he therefore to be accounted a necessary, and not a free agent? Perhaps never any one hath made God more a necessary agent, than Twiss himself doth; for he every where maintains, that upon the supposition of a decree, it is necessary that God should do all things in conformity to it: which, however, I do by no means mention as finding fault with. Upon the supposition of a decree, for instance, God could not but create the world; but is he therefore to be called a necessary agent in the creation of the world? by no means. But you will say, 'that necessity flows from the free-will of God; but that which you dream of, arises from the principles of his nature; and therefore, how widely different!' I willingly grant, indeed, that the decree of creating the world, flowed from the

free-will of God; but this being supposed, it was necessary to the divine nature, which is immutable, that it should be created. Nor do we ascribe any other kind of natural necessity to God in punishing sins. The decree of creating rational creatures bound to render him obedience, and so far liable to his right and dominion; and that he willed to permit these creatures to transgress the law of their creation, flowed merely from his free-will; but these things being once supposed, it necessarily belongs to the divine nature, as it is just, to punish those who so transgress: but that God exerciseth a concomitant liberty in punishing them, we have several times allowed; and we have no doubt, but if this be atheism, it is also Christianity.

Secondly. 'Is God at all bound,' says our very learned antagonist, 'or in any manner obliged to manifest his justice, more than to manifest his mercy, munificence, and liberality? It is evident that God is not bound to exercise any one property whatever, more than another: wherefore, either all things must be said to be necessarily performed by God; and even that the world was not made of his free-will, but from a natural necessity; or that all things have been, and still are, freely done by God.' But besides that this reasoning is sophistical, it injures not our cause. The whole matter may be clearly explained in one word, God is not absolutely bound to manifest any property of his nature, much less one more than another, for this respects the free purpose of God; but upon a condition supposed, God may be more bound to exercise one property than another; for this relates to its exercise. But none of us have said that it is necessary that God should punish sin, because he is necessarily bound to demonstrate his justice; for in this very thing he demonstrates his[b] justice; but it is necessary that he should punish because he is just. The learned writer then confounds the decree of manifesting the glory of the divine properties, to which God is absolutely bound by none of his properties, with the exercise of these properties upon a condition supposed; which we have endeavoured to prove to be necessary, with respect to vindicatory justice.

In what sense all things are said to be done by God necessarily, though he be a free agent, hath been already ex-

[b] Rom. i. 18.

plained. By these arguments, then, whereby he endeavours to weigh down our opinion with prejudices, it is evident that our antagonist hath nothing availed himself: let us now see whether he hath been more successful in his replies to Lubbertus, than in his system of opposition.

He briefly states five arguments of Lubbertus, to each of which he answers in order.

That passage of the apostle to the Romans, chap. i. 32. 'Who knowing the judgment,' i. e. that the just, right, or righteous judgment of God is, 'that they who do such things are worthy of death,' is quoted as a proof of this doctrine, by Lubbertus. Twiss thus replies: 'I acknowledge, that they who commit such things, are worthy of death: but it by no means follows from this, that it is necessary that God should punish them; which I shall demonstrate by a twofold argument; for if that followed, it would follow that they who commit such things must necessarily be punished; but the elect, because of sin, are worthy of death; but they are not punished at all, much less necessarily. Will you say, because they who have committed such things are worthy of death, that therefore it is necessary, from an absolute necessity, that either they or others, that is, that either they themselves, who are deserving of death, or some one else, on their account, though innocent, should be punished? Who can digest such a consequence as this? Again, If they are worthy of death, then they shall die the death; either then a temporal or eternal one: beyond all doubt, he will answer, an eternal death. It is necessary, therefore, that they should exist to all eternity, and by an absolute necessity; to the end, that they may be punished to all eternity. And so then God cannot annihilate a creature.'

But, with this great man's good leave, neither his mode of disputing, viz. by substituting a double argument in the place of one solid and clear answer, is at all satisfactory; nor are these arguments of any service to his cause; the first of which is captious, and not all solid; the other too nice and curious. For, first, Lubbertus does not contend that God cannot pardon sin without a satisfaction, because simply, by some reason or other, sinners are worthy of death: but for this reason only, because the righteous judgment, or

just right of God is, that they who commit such things are worthy of death; and that therefore it would be unjust in God not to inflict that punishment; namely, because, according to the justice of God, which Twiss himself acknowledges to be natural and essential to him, they are worthy of death; and therefore necessarily to be punished. But the arguments of Twiss do not prove the contrary; for the elect themselves are worthy of death, and therefore necessarily to be punished; not from an absolute necessity in respect of the mode of acting in God the punisher, but in respect of a condition supposed, and which excludes not the liberty of the agent: that is to say, God may inflict the punishment due to one on another, after, in consequence of his own right, and the consent of that other, he hath laid the sins upon that other, on account of which he inflicts the punishment; he might punish the elect, either in their own persons or in their surety standing in their room and stead; and when he is punished, they also are punished: for in this point of view the federal head, and those represented by him, are not considered as distinct, but as one: for although they are not one in respect of personal unity, they are however one; that is, one body, in mystical union: yea, one mystical Christ:[c] viz. the surety is the head, those represented by him the members; and when the head is punished, the members also are punished. Nor could even he himself be called a surety absolutely innocent; for although he was properly and personally innocent, he was imputatively and substitutively guilty. 'For God made him to be sin for us: he laid the sins of us all upon him.'[d]

The second argument which this learned writer uses to confute the conclusion of Lubbertus, is of no greater weight: we are not in the councils of God, so that we can precisely pronounce, with regard to his judgments and his ways: that God is able absolutely to reduce to nothing any creature that he hath created out of nothing, no one can doubt; but it being supposed, that that creature is guilty of sin, and that that sin, according to the right and justice of God, deserves eternal death, we with confidence maintain, that

[c] See 1 Cor. xii. 12. &c. 'For as the body is one, and hath many members, and all the members of that one body being many, are one body; so also is Christ,' &c.
[d] 2 Cor. v. 21. Isa. liii. 6.

God, who cannot deny himself, cannot reduce it to nothing: neither is there any thing absurd that can be inferred from this.

To the second proof brought from the word of God, declaring himself by that name of his, 'who will by no means clear the guilty,'[e] he answers, 'It is true that God will by no means clear the guilty; yet it is evident that not a few are cleared by God: the guilty, then, whom he doth not clear, must be those who have neither repented nor believed in Christ. Hence it follows, that every one hath either been punished, or will be punished, either in himself or in Christ; which we do not at all deny: but it doth not at all follow hence, that God doth this from a necessity of nature, for it is possible that it may proceed from the free will of God; neither doth it belong to him to exercise his mercy and bounty from a necessity of nature, but of his free will.'

But 1. It is of no service to his cause, to urge, that God does not punish some guilty sinners in their own persons, but clears them, when this learned man grants, yea, contends that they have all been punished in Christ their head; by whom justice was fully satisfied. 2. It hath been several times shewn before how God, from a necessity of nature punishes sin, and yet with a concomitant liberty of will; and the difference between justice and mercy, in respect of their exercise and egress towards their proper objects, hath been shewn: so that we do not think it proper to insist farther on these at present. These considerations then being set aside, it is evident that this learned man has not attended to the force of the argument: for that conclusion does not arise from the passage, that in respect of the event God clears none unpunished either in themselves or in their surety; an assertion which nobody but a Socinian speaks against; but rather this, that as punitory justice is a natural attribute of God, a very considerable portion of his essential glory, yea, a well-known name of God, 'he can by no means clear the guilty,' unless he were to deny himself, and deliver up his glory to another, than which nothing is farther from God. But those, for whom the divine justice hath been satisfied by Christ, ought not, in respect of the demand of that justice, to be called guilty; for their obli-

[e] See Exod. xxxiv. 6, 7.

gation to punishment, viz. the guilt of sin, is taken away; so that it is just with God to deliver them from the wrath to come, although it be free to him at what time he may will, that that deliverance, in respect of them, should take place, and be manifested to their consciences, that so 'being justified by faith, they may have peace with God.'

To these verses, cited by Lubbertus from the fifth Psalm,[f] verses 4th, 5th, and 6th, he thus replies: 'The prophet is testifying,' says he, 'that God hates all who work iniquity; however, it is sufficiently evident, that God does not punish all who work iniquity; for he does not punish the elect: I acknowledge, that God will in his own time destroy all the wicked out of Christ; but of his free will, and from no consideration of necessity, as he is an agent, entirely free.'

I am not altogether satisfied with this assertion, 'that God doth not punish all who work iniquity;' neither does the instance of the elect confirm it: for even the learned gentleman does not deny that all their sins have been punished in Christ. We maintain alone, that God cannot but punish every sin, because he is just: but whether he chose to do this in their own persons, or in their surety, rests entirely with himself: therefore, it doth not derogate from his justice, that he transferred the sins of some upon Christ, and punished them in him; but they themselves, though personally guilty, before Christ took their guilt upon himself, are not however punished, nor can be accounted guilty, in respect of the judgment of God, their sins not being imputed to them; or they ought to be said to have been punished in Christ their head, with whom they are now closely united. In the second place we have shewn before, and the learned gentleman acknowledges it, that a free act of the will may be consistent with some regard to necessity.

Allow me, then, from these three passages of Scripture, cited by Lubbertus, to collect one argument only; which, if I mistake not, no one of the various arguments of our very learned antagonist, nor even all of them, will be able to overthrow. It is to this purpose: If that just right or righteous judgment of God be essential, viz. that which is made ma-

[f] The words are, 'For thou art not a God that hath pleasure in wickedness: neither shall any evil dwell with thee. The foolish shall not stand in thy sight; thou hatest all workers of iniquity. Thou shalt destroy them that speak leasing: the Lord will abhor the bloody and deceitful man.'

nifest and known to all by nature:[g] if his avenging justice be such, that he will by no means clear the guilty:[h] If, as he hates sin, so he will destroy all the workers of iniquity;[i] then it is natural to God to punish sin, and he cannot let it pass unpunished; for he can do nothing contrary to his natural attributes, exercised about their proper objects: but the former part of the argument is true,[k] so also must the latter.

But Lubbertus likewise reasons by an argument taken from the common definition of justice; to which Twiss also refers: 'Vindicatory justice,' says he, 'is the eternal will of God, to give to every one his own; therefore it belongs truly or naturally to God.' Twiss cites these words from Lubbertus; for his writings against Vossius I have not by me at present. Now although this justly celebrated man sometimes agrees to this conclusion, yet as he twitches the argument various ways, we shall, as briefly as possible, bring it in regular order to a point. 'First of all,' says he, 'allow me to put you in mind, that that definition of justice holds good only with regard to justice in general; but not with regard to vindicatory justice in particular; for the whole of justice is employed in giving to every one his own.' I have said before, that that definition of the civilians was not quite agreeable to me; nor in every respect satisfactory: but the objection of Twiss's is of no weight; for vindicatory justice is not distinguished from universal justice, or justice generally so called, as to its habit; but only in respect of its egress to its proper object: and therefore, nothing ought to be included in the definition, which is not found also in the thing itself. Although, then, the learned opponent throws obstacles in the way, he cannot deny that vindicatory justice is, 'a will to give to every one his own, or what is due to him.'

'But let Lubbertus bethink himself,' says Twiss, 'whether the divine bounty is not likewise the eternal will of the Deity to give to some, beyond what is their own? Would it not then justly follow that it is necessary, and even from absolute necessity, that he should exercise his bounty towards some?'

But neither is this comparison, between things dissi-

[g] See Rom. i. 32. [h] See Exod. xxxiv. 4. [i] Psal. v. 4—6.
[k] Being founded on the words of Scripture.

mar of the smallest advantage to our adversary's cause; for, 1. The objects themselves, about which these attributes are employed, are very different: for who does not see that there cannot be any comparison formed between the giving to every one according to his right, and giving to some beyond their right. That, to give to any one beyond his right, is a most free act of the will, the thing itself declares: but to give to every one his own, or what is due to him, the very thing itself requires. All acknowledge that it depends on the mere good pleasure of the Deity, whether he may will to be bounteous towards any: but who, but an impious wretch, would be bold enough to dispute whether he may will to be just towards any? But besides, supposing a constant will in the Deity, of giving to some beyond their right, or of bestowing on them more than they deserve, in what respect it would not be necessary (the question does not respect absolute necessity) to him to exercise that bounty towards these some, I absolutely do not comprehend. But, with regard to the divine bounty, and in what sense that is ascribed to God, and what kind of habitude of the divine will it denotes, this is not the place to inquire.

He again says, 'If hence it follow, that it is necessary that God should give to each his due, it will certainly be necessary that he should give to each of us eternal damnation.'

Thus, that punishment belongs not to us, but to God himself, the learned gentleman will afterward acknowledge: but God may give to every one his own, or what is due to every one, in the infliction of punishment, although he do not inflict it on the sinners themselves, but on their surety, substituted in their room and stead. Thus he gives glory to his justice, and does no injury to us; for no one can demand it as his right to be punished; for no one hath a right to require punishment, which is an involuntary evil; but rather becomes subject to the right of another.

To these he replies, 'If justice be only the will of giving to every one his own, it is not the necessity of giving it.'

But here the learned gentleman trifles; for will and necessity are not opposed, as a thing itself may be prior, and the mode or affection of it posterior to some other things,

either in the first or second act.[1] Neither hath any one defined the justice of God by necessity, although from his justice it is necessary that he should act justly: though it be the will of God, viz. 'to give every one what is his due,' yet it is a constant and immutable will; which, as it differs not in any respect from the divine essence itself, must exist necessarily; and a proper object for its exercise being supposed, it must necessarily operate, though it act freely.

In the last place, then, this celebrated writer denies, 'That punishment can properly be called ours, in such a sense, that from his will of giving to every one his own, it should be necessary that God should inflict it upon us sinners; but he asserts, that it belongs to God, as having the full power either of inflicting or relaxing it.' That punishment is ours, or belongs to us, cannot be said with propriety; it must be traced to the source whence it hath its rise; that is, whence it is just that it should be inflicted upon sinners; but this is the just right or righteous judgment of God; Rom. i. 32. Thus far, then, it may be reckoned among the things that belong to God, as it is his justice that requires it should be inflicted: but it does not follow, that God has a full power of inflicting it, or relaxing it, because in this sense it may be accounted among the things which belong to him: God owes it to himself to have a proper regard to the honour of all his own perfections.

We choose not to enter any farther on the arguments which this learned writer advances either in his disputations against Lubbertus, or in his answers to his arguments; partly, as they coincide with those mentioned before, and have been considered in the vindication of the argument taken from the consideration of God's hatred against sin; and partly as they militate only against a natural and absolute necessity; which, in the present case, we do not assert.

[1] God's will of giving to every man his own, was from everlasting, justice being an essential attribute of his unchangeable nature; but it is only after the supposition of a rational being that had sinned, that he must necessarily, i. e. from the very principles of his nature, exercise that will towards sinners, and give them the wages of sin, viz. death.

CHAP. XVI.

Piscator's opinion of this controversy. How far we assent to it. Twiss's arguments militate against it. How God punishes from a natural necessity. How God is a consuming fire. God's right, of what kind. Its exercise necessary, from some thing supposed. Whence the obligation of God to exercise it arises. Other objections of Twiss discussed.

THE consideration of what our justly celebrated antagonist hath advanced against Piscator, whom he declares to hold the first place among the theologians of the present day; and to shine as far superior to the rest, as the moon doth to the lesser stars, shall put an end to this dispute. He has chosen Piscator's notes upon his collation of Vorstius, as the subject of his consideration and discussion. In general we are inclined to give our voice in favour of the sentiments of Piscator; but as the disciples of Christ ought to call none on earth master, in matters of religion, we by no means hold ourselves bound to support all the phrases, arguments, or reasons, that he may have used in defence of his opinion. Setting aside, then, all anxious search after words, expressions, &c. the minutiæ of similies, which I could wish this distinguished writer had paid less attention to; we will endeavour to repel every charge brought against our common and principal cause; and to place this truth, which we have thus far defended, as we are now speedily hastening to a conclusion, beyond the reach of attacks, and trouble from its adversaries.

The first argument then of Piscator, to which he replies, is taken from that comparison made in Heb. xii. 2. between God, in respect of his vindicatory justice, and a consuming fire. From this passage Piscator concludes, 'That as fire, from the property of its nature, cannot but burn combustible matter when applied to it, and that by a natural necessity; so God, from the perfection of his justice, cannot but punish sin when committed; that is, when presented before that justice.' What he asserts, with regard to a natural and absolute necessity, we do not admit; for God neither exerciseth, nor can exercise any act towards objects without himself in a natural manner, or as an agent merely natural. He indeed, is a fire, but rational and intelligent fire; although,

then, it be no less necessary to him to punish sins, than it is to fire to burn the combustible matter applied to it: the same manner of operation, however, accords not to him as to fire, for he worketh as an intelligent agent; that is, with a concomitant liberty in the acts of his will, and a consistent liberty in the acts of his understanding. We agree, then, with Piscator in his conclusion, though not in his manner of leading his proof: the objections made to it by the learned Twiss, we shall try by the standard of truth.

First, then, he maintains, and with many laboured arguments, that God doth not punish sin from a necessity of nature, which excludes every kind of liberty. But whom do these kind of arguments affect? they apply not at all to us: for Piscator himself seems to have understood nothing else by a natural necessity, than that necessity which we have so often discussed, particularly modified. For he says, 'That God doth some things by a natural necessity, because by nature he cannot do otherwise.' That is, sin being supposed to exist, from the strict demands of that justice, which is natural to him, he cannot but punish it, or act otherwise than punish it; although he may do this, without any encroachment on his liberty, as his intellectual will is inclined to happiness, by a natural inclination, yet wills happiness with a concomitant liberty; for it would not be a will, should it act otherwise, as freedom of action is the very essence of the will. But the arguments of Twiss do not oppose this kind of necessity, but that only which belongs to animate, merely natural agents; which entirely excludes all sorts of liberty, properly so called.

Let us particularly examine some of this learned gentleman's arguments. 'If,' says he, 'God must punish sin from a necessity of nature, he must punish it as soon as committed.' Granted; were he to act by such a necessity of nature, as denotes a necessary principle and mode of acting; but not if by a necessity that is improperly so called, because it is supposed that his nature necessarily requires that he should so act: as for instance, suppose that he wills to speak, he must by necessity of his nature speak truly, for God cannot lie; yet he speaks freely, when he speaks truly.

Again, 'If,' says he, 'God punished from a necessity of nature, then, as often as he inflicted punishment, he would

inflict it to the utmost of his power, as fire burns with all its force: but this cannot be said without blasphemy.'

Here again, this learned man draws absurd conclusions from a false supposition. The nature of God requires that he should punish as far as is just, not as far as he is able. It is necessary, sin being supposed to exist, that he should inflict punishment; not the greatest that he is able to inflict, but as great as his right and justice require: for in ordaining punishment, he proceeds freely according to the rule of these. It is necessary that the glory of the divine holiness, purity, and dominion, should be vindicated; but in what manner, at what time, in what degree, or by what kind of punishment, belongs entirely to God; and we are not of his counsels: but I am fully confident, that the arguments last urged by this learned gentleman, may be answered in one word. I say, then, God punishes according to what is due to sin by the rule of his right, not to what extent he is able. As for instance, God does not use his omnipotence from an absolute necessity of nature; but supposing that he wills to do any work without himself, he cannot act but omnipotently. Neither, however, doth it hence follow, that God acts to the utmost extent of his power; for he might have created more worlds. We do not then affirm, that God is so bound by the laws of an absolute necessity, that like an insensible and merely natural agent, it would be impossible for him, by his infinite wisdom, to assign, according to the rule and demand of his justice, degrees, modes, duration, and extension of punishment; according to the degrees of the demerit, or circumstances of the sin; or even to transfer it upon the surety, who has voluntarily, and with his own approbation, submitted himself in the room of sinners; but we only affirm, that his natural and essential justice indispensably requires that every sin should have its just recompense of reward: and were not this the case, a sinful creature might emancipate itself from the power of its Creator and Lord. This very learned man having, according to his usual custom, introduced these preliminary observations, at length advances his answers to Piscator's argument; the nature and quality of which we shall particularly consider. That which he chiefly depends upon, which he forges from the Scripture, that asserts God, in respect of sin, to be 'a con-

suming fire,' we have examined in the proof of our second argument, and have shewn of how little weight it is to invalidate the force of our argument.

To that asseveration of Abraham, 'Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?' he thus answers; 'He will do right certainly; but his own right, and will exercise it according to his own free appointment; but without the divine appointment, I acknowledge no right, to the exercise of which God can be influenced by any kind of necessity.'

Ans. That God exerciseth his right, or doeth right, according to his own free appointment, may be admitted in a sound sense; for in that exercise of his right he uses volition and understanding; or more properly, he hath not appointed or determined so to act; for so to act is natural and essential to him concerning the things about which there is no free determination. It is indeed of the free determination of God, that any right can be exercised, or any attribute manifested; for he freely decreed to create creatures, over which he hath a right; but he might not have decreed it so; and in every exercise of his right, there are certain things which we have mentioned before, which are not the objects of free determination; but that no right belongs to God, without his divine appointment, to the exercise of which he is bound, is asserted without probability, and appears evidently false; for supposing that God willed to create rational creatures, does it depend upon his free determination, that the right of dominion, and the exercise of it should belong to him? If so, God might be neither the Lord nor God of his creatures; and a rational creature may be neither creature nor rational; for both its creation and reason suppose a dependance on, and subjection to, some Lord and Creator. If the right then of dominion depended on the free determination of God, then God might freely and justly determine that he would neither have nor exercise such right; for he might determine the contrary of that which he hath freely determined, without any injustice or any incongruity. From himself, then, and not from any one without himself, that is, from his own nature, he receives the obligation to exercise his right, both of dominion and of justice; thus, by nature he must speak truly, if he wills to speak.

'But I cannot,' says this renowned man, 'sufficiently express my astonishment at this very grave divine's assertion,[a] viz. That God without injury to his justice, may will evil antecedently to whomsoever he pleases (for which I do not find fault with him), but that he does not assert that God, for the same, or a better reason, might do good to a creature, notwithstanding its demerit, by pardoning its sin.'

If by 'willing evil antecedently' be understood his willing to inflict evil without regard to the demerit of sin, it is a point too intricate for me to determine; if the evil refer to the infliction of it, I must differ from this learned doctor. If it refer to the willing, the assertion avails not his cause; for, if we suppose that God, without doing injury to any one, without dishonouring any of his own attributes, without regard to sin, hath decreed to punish a creature for the sin that it was to commit; would it not thence follow, that God might let sin pass unpunished, in despite both of his own glory, and to the entire destruction of the dependance of rational[b] creatures; nor is the following comment of our celebrated opponent of any greater weight, viz. 'That God would not be omnipotent, if he necessarily punishes sin; for thence it would follow, that God cannot annihilate a sinful creature which he created out of nothing; which,' says he, 'is evidently contrary to omnipotence.'

But how many things are there which this learned gentleman himself acknowledges, that God, with respect to his decree, cannot do without any disparagement to his omnipotence? He could not break the bones of Christ; but the person must be deprived of reason who would assert, that this is any diminution of the divine omnipotence. If, then, there be many things which God cannot do without any the smallest detraction from his omnipotence, because by a free determination he hath decreed not to do them, is he to be thought less omnipotent, so to speak, because he cannot, on account of his justice, let sins committed pass unpunished? Is God not omnipotent, because on account of his nature he cannot lie? Yea, he would not be omnipotent if he could

[a] Viz. Piscator's.

[b] Because if he punished a creature for sin merely, because he willed or determined so to do; and not because the nature of sin necessarily so required; he might as easily will the contrary, and consequently the subordination of the creature would be entirely subverted.

renounce his right and justice; for to permit a sinful creature to shake off his natural dominion, is not a mark of omnipotence but of impotence; than which nothing is more remote from God.

After having brought the dispute thus far, and accurately weighed what remains of Dr. Twiss's answer to Piscator, there seemed to me nothing that could occur to give any trouble to an intelligent reader; as there is no reason, then, either to give farther trouble to the reader or myself on this point, we here conclude the controversy: and this I do with entertaining the strongest hopes that no person of discretion, or who is unacquainted with the pernicious devices which almost every where abound, will impute it to me as a matter of blame, that I, a person of no consideration, and so very full too of employment, that I could devote only a few leisure hours to this disputation, should have attacked the theological digression of a man so very illustrious and renowned; not only among our own countrymen, but even in foreign nations; as the attack has been made in the cause of truth.

CHAP. XVII.

Rutherford reviewed. An oversight of that learned man. His opinion of punitory justice. He contends that divine justice exists in God freely. The consideration of that assertion. This learned writer and Twiss disagree. His first argument. Its answer. The appointment of Christ to death, twofold. The appointment of Christ to the mediatorial office, an act of supreme dominion. The punishment of Christ an act of punitory justice. An argument of that learned man, easy to answer. The examination of the same. The learned writer proves things not denied; passes over things to be denied. What kind of necessity we ascribe to God in punishing sins. A necessity upon a condition supposed. What the suppositions are upon which that necessity is founded. A difference between those things which are necessary by a decree, and those which are so from the divine nature. The second argument of that learned man. His obscure manner of writing pointed out. Justice and mercy different in respect of their exercise. What it is to owe the good of punitory justice to the universe. This learned man's third argument. The answer. Whether God could forbid sin, and not under the penalty of eternal death. Concerning the management of punishment in human courts from the divine appointment. The manner of it. What this learned author understands by the internal court of God. This learned author's fourth argument. All acts of grace have a respect to Christ. His fifth argument. The answer. A dissertation on the various degrees of punishment. For what reason God may act unequally with equals. Concerning the delay of punishment, and its various dispensations.

THE consideration of the arguments advanced by Mr. Samuel Rutherford[d] against this truth which we are now maintaining, shall conclude this dissertation. He maintains, as I have observed before, 'That punitory justice exists not in God by necessity of nature, but freely.' And he has said, that Twiss hath proved this, by a variety of arguments; one of which, in preference to the others, he builds on, as unanswerable.

But, with this great man's leave, I must tell him, that Twiss hath never even said, much less proved, 'That punitory justice exists freely in God, and not from a necessity of nature;' nor, indeed, can it be said by any one, with any shew of reason: for punitory justice denotes the habit of justice; nor is it less justice because it is punitory. But be assured the accurate Twiss hath never main-

[d] In his book on Providence, chap. 22. page 345.

tained that any habit exists in God freely, and not from a necessity of nature. We have before accounted in what sense habits are ascribed to God: even the more sagacious Socinians do not fall into such a blunder; but they deny such a habit to exist in God at all, and entirely divest him of this justice. Twiss, indeed, maintains, that the exercise of that justice is free to God, but grants that justice itself is a natural attribute of God; the Socinians, that it is only a free act of the divine will: which party this learned author favours, appears not from his words. If by justice he means the habit, he sides with the Socinians; if the act and exercise, he is of the same opinion with Twiss, although he expresses his sentiments rather unhappily. But let us consider this learned writer's arguments.

The first, which he acknowledges to be taken from Twiss (the same thing may be said of most of his others) and which he pronounces unanswerable, is this: 'God gave up his most innocent Son, our Lord Jesus Christ to death, in consequence of his punitory justice, and it was certainly in his power not to have devoted him to death; for from no necessity of nature did God devote his Son to death; for if so, then God would not have been God, which is absurd; for of his free love he gave him up to death;' John iii. 6. Rom. viii. 32.

As there is no need of a sword to cut this indissoluble knot, as he calls it, let us try by words what we can do to untie it. I answer then, 'The devoting of Christ to death is taken in a twofold sense: 1. For the appointment of Christ to the office of surety, and to suffer the punishment of our sins in our room and stead. 2. For the infliction of punishment upon Christ, now appointed our surety; and our delivery through his death being now supposed.'

The devoting of Christ to death, considered in the first sense, we deny to be an act of punitory justice, or to have arisen from that justice. For that act by which God destined his Son to the work of mediation, by which, in respect of their guilt, he transferred from us all our sins, and laid them upon Christ, are acts of supreme dominion, and breathe love and grace rather than avenging justice. But the punishment of Christ, made sin for us, is an act of punitory justice. Nor upon the supposition that he was received in

our room as our surety, could it be otherwise; and although in drawing such consequences, I think we ought to refrain as to what might be possible, I am not, however, afraid to affirm, that God could not have been God, that is, just and true, if he had not devoted to death his Son, when thus appointed our Mediator.

What shall we say, when we consider that even this learned man was aware of this twofold sense of the phrase 'the devoting of Christ to death,' he even had thoroughly weighed that distinction, or else he is inconsistent with, and shamefully contradicts himself; for in the beginning of the argument he asserts, 'that the devoting of Christ to death has its rise from punitory justice:' but in the end, he says, it was from 'free love;' but certainly punishing justice is not free love; he must then either acknowledge a twofold appointment of Christ to death, or he cannot be consistent with himself. But the passages of Scripture that he quotes, evidently mean the appointment of Christ to death, as we have explained it in the first sense of the phrase.

What reason this learned man had for so much boasting of this argument, as unanswerable, let the reader determine: to me it appears not only very easily answerable, but far beneath many others, that one, disputing on such a subject, must encounter.

But he introduces some as making answers to his argument, who affirm 'that Christ was not innocent, but a sinner by imputation, and made sin for us, and that it was necessary, from the essential justice of God, and his authority, as enjoining, that he should make atonement for sin, in himself, and in his own person.'

I applaud the prudence of this learned man, who from no kind of necessity, but freely, frames answers to his own arguments: here he has exhibited such a one, as nobody but himself would have dreamed of. For, although what your disputants, or this learned divine, fighting with himself, say be true, he must however be a fool, who can believe that it has any relation to the present subject. To those adversaries who urge, 'that God freely punishes sin because he punished his Son, who knew no sin, and who contend that God may equally not punish the guilty, as punish the innocent,' we answer, that Christ, though intrinsically and per-

sonally innocent, yet, as he was by substitution, and consequently legally guilty, is no instance of the punishment of an innocent person; for he was not punished as the most innocent Son of God. Passing over these things, then, and indeed they are of no import to the present subject, he endeavours to prove, by several arguments, that God laid our sins upon Christ, by constituting him surety, and from no necessity of nature: but even this effort is of no service to his cause, for this we by no means deny, so that his labour is entirely superfluous. At length, however, in the progress of the dispute, this learned gentleman advances some arguments that seem suitable to his purpose.

'We readily grant,' says he, 'upon supposition, that Christ was made our surety by the decree of God, that he could not be but punished by God, and yet freely, as God created the world of mere free will, though necessarily, in respect of his immutability; for it cannot be that a free action should impose on God a natural or physical necessity of doing any thing.'

We have shewn before what kind of a necessity we ascribe to God, in punishing sins. It is not an inanimate or merely physical necessity, as if God acted from principles of nature in a manner altogether natural, that is, without any intervening act of understanding or will; 'for he worketh all things according to the counsel of his will.' But it is such a necessity as leaves to God an entire concomitant liberty in acting; but which necessarily, by destroying all antecedent indifference, accomplishes its object, viz. the punishment of sin, the justice, holiness, and purity of God, so requiring. But this necessity, though it hindereth not the divine liberty, any more than that which is incumbent on God of doing any thing in consequence of a decree from the immutability of his nature; yet it arises not from a decree, but from things themselves, particularly constituted, and not as the other kind of necessity from a decree only: and therefore, in those things which God does necessarily, merely from the supposition of a decree, he has a regard to the decree, accomplishes the thing to be done, antecedently to the consideration of any necessity incumbent on him; but in those whose necessity arises from the demand of the divine nature, a decree only supposes a certain condition of things,

which being supposed, immediately and without any consideration of any respect to a decree, it is necessary that one or another consequence should follow. As for instance, after God decreed that he would create the world, it was impossible that he should not create it, because he is immutable: and the decree immediately respected that very thing, viz. the creation of it. But the necessity of punishing sin arises from the justice and holiness of God; it being supposed that in consequence of a decree, a rational creature existed, and was permitted to transgress: but he punishes the transgression which he decreed to permit, because he is just, and not only because he decreed to punish it. The necessity then of creating the world arises from a decree; the necessity of punishing sin from justice.

'But it is impossible,' says Rutherford, 'that a free action can impose a natural or physical necessity of doing any thing upon God.'

But by a free action it can be proved, that certain things may be placed in such a condition, that God could not but exercise certain acts towards them, on account of the strict demand of some attribute of his nature, though not from a physical and insensible necessity, which excludes all liberty of action: for it being supposed, that in consequence of a free decree God willed to speak with man, it is necessary from the decree that he should speak; but that he should speak truth is necessary from the necessity of his nature. Supposing then a free action, in which he hath decreed to speak, a natural necessity of speaking truth is incumbent on God, nor can he do otherwise than speak truth. Supposing sin to exist, and that God willed to do any thing with regard to sin (although perhaps this is not in consequence of a decree), it is necessary, by necessity of nature, that he should do justice; that is, that he should punish it: 'for the righteous judgment of God is, that they who do such things,' viz. who commit sin, 'are worthy of death.' There are certain attributes of the Deity, which have no egress but towards certain objects particularly modified; for they do not constitute or create objects to themselves, as other divine attributes do; but these objects being once constituted by a free act of the divine will, they must necessarily, for such is their nature and manner, be exercised.

these to be punished by men, because they are sins, why cannot he for the same reason manage matters so in his own internal court, and suspend all punishment; and nevertheless forbid the same transgressions?'

A fine shew of reasoning; but there is no real solid truth in it; for all is false.

In what sense sin deserves punishment from the necessity of the divine nature, we have already shewn at large. Neither, however, do we think ourselves bound to teach, that God could not forbid sin but under the penalty of eternal death: for we hold that not one or another kind of punishment is necessary; but that punishment itself is necessary, and the punishment, according to the rule of God's wisdom and justice is death. Moreover, a rational creature, conscious of its proper subjection and obediential dependance, being created and existing, God did not account it at all necessary to forbid it to sin by a free act of his will, under one penalty or another; for both these follow from the very situation of the creature, and the order of dependance, viz. that it should not transgress by withdrawing itself from the right and dominion of the Creator; and if it should transgress, that it should be obnoxious, and exposed to coercion and punishment. But it being supposed that God should forbid sin by an external legislation, the appointment of punishment, even though there should be no mention made of it, must be coequal with the prohibition.

'But God,' says he,' in his human court, forbids sin by a modification of the punishment annexed; as for instance, theft, under the penalty of a quadruple restitution; why may he not do likewise in his own internal court, and consequently suspend all punishment?'

There is no need of much disputation, to prove that there is nothing sound or substantial in these arguments. The modification of punishment respects either its appointment or infliction. Punishment itself is considered either in respect of its general end, which is the punishment of transgression, and has a regard to the condition of the creatures with respect to God; or in respect of some special end, and has a respect to the condition of the creatures among themselves. But whatever modification punishment may undergo, provided it attains its proper end, by accom-

plishing the object in view, the nature of punishment is preserved no less than if numberless degress were added to it. As to the establishment of punishment, then, in a human court, as it has not primarily and properly a respect to the punishment of transgression, nor a regard to the condition of the creatures, with respect to God; but with respect to one another, that degree of punishment is just, which is fit and proper for accomplishing the proposed end.

The punishment then of theft, by a quadruple restitution had, in its appointment, no such modification conjoined with it, as could render it unfit and improper in respect of the end proposed, among that people to whom that law concerning retributions was given; but as the infliction of punishment, according to the sentence of the law, depended on the supreme ruler of that people, it belonged to him to provide, that no temporal dispensation with punishment, exercised by him, in right of his dominion, should turn out to the injury of the commonwealth.

But hence this learned writer concludes, 'That in his own internal forum, God may modify and suspend punishment.'

We can only conjecture what he means by the internal court of God. From the justice of God the appointment of punishment is derived; but that is improperly called a court. How far God is at liberty, by this justice, to exercise his power in pardoning sins, the Scriptures shew. The just right of God is, that 'they who commit sin are worthy of death;' 'but he may modify the punishment,' says our author. But not even in a human court can any such modification be admitted, as would render the punishment useless in respect of its end; nor in respect of God do we think any degree or mode of punishment necessary, but such as may answer the end of the punishment, so far as respects the state of the creatures with respect to God. Nor is any argument from a human court applied to the divine justice; nor from the modification the suspension for a limited time; nor from a suspension to the total punishment; all which this learned author supposes, of any force.

The sum of the whole is this; as we have laid it down, that God must necessarily, from his right and justice, inflict punishment on sin, so far as this punishment tends to

preserve the state of the creature's dependance on its Creator, and proper and natural Lord; so whatever constitutions or inflictions of punishment, with any particular modification or dispensation we have admitted, do not, as the supreme judgment of all is reserved to the destined time, at all operate against our opinion.

The other reasons advanced by this learned author in support of this argument, are not of sufficient weight to merit attention. It hath been clearly proved already, that the supposition of the pardon of sin, without an intervening satisfaction, implies a contradiction, though not in the terms, in the very thing itself. Nor does it follow that God can, without any punishment, forgive sin; to avoid which, all rational creatures are indispensably bound, from his natural right over them; because any distinguished action among mankind, to the performance of which they are bound by no law, may be rewarded; there being no threatening of punishments for the neglect of it, annexed, that has a respect to a privilege not due: by such consequences, drawn from such arguments, the learned gentleman will neither establish his own opinion, nor prejudice ours.

He proceeds in the fourth place: 'God,' says he, 'worketh nothing without himself, from a necessity of nature.' This objection hath been already answered, by a distinction of necessity into that which is absolute, and that which is conditional; nor shall we now delay the reader, by repeating what has been said elsewhere. 'But to punish sin,' says he, 'is not in any respect more agreeable to the divine nature, than not to punish it; but this is an act of grace and liberty; that is, an act which God freely exerciseth.'

But, according to Rutherford, 'it is much more disagreeable,' to speak in his own words, 'to the divine nature, to punish sin, than not to punish it; for not to punish it, or to forgive it, proceeds from that mercy which is essential; but to punish it, from that justice which is a free act of the divine will; but such things as are natural and necessary have a previous and weightier influence with God, than those which are free and may or may not take place.' Our learned author means, that setting aside the consideration of his free decree, God is indifferent to inflict punishment, or not inflict it. But by what argument will he maintain this

absurd expression? Does it follow from this, that God is said in Scripture, to restrain his anger, and not to cut off the wicked? But surely he is not ignorant that such declarations of divine grace have either a respect to Christ, by whom satisfaction for sin was made; or only denote a temporal suspension of punishment, till the day of public and general retribution.

In the fifth place, he maintains, 'that a natural necessity will admit of no dispensation, modification, or delay, which however, it is evident, that God either uses, or may use, in the punishment of sin.'

Ans. With respect to absolute necessity, which excludes all liberty, perhaps this is true; but with respect to that necessity which we maintain, which admits of a concomitant liberty in acting; it is altogether without foundation. Again, a dispensation with, or delay of punishment, regards either temporary punishment, with which we grant that God may freely dispense; when the immediate end of that punishment hath not a respect to the creatures, in that state of subjection which they owe to God; or eternal punishment, and in respect of that, the time of inflicting it, &c. and freely to appoint it belongs entirely to God; but that he should inflict the punishment itself, is just and necessary.

Nor does that instance, brought from the various degrees of punishment, at all avail him, viz. 'That if God can add or take away one degree of punishment, then he may two, and so annihilate the whole punishment:' for we are speaking of punishment, as it includes in it the nature of punishment, and is ordained to preserve God's right and dominion over his creatures, and to avenge the purity and holiness of God; not of it, as in consequence of the divine wisdom and justice being this or that kind of punishment, or consisting of degrees; for thus far extends that liberty which we ascribe to God in the exercise of his justice, that it belongs to him entirely to determine according to the counsel of his will, with regard to the degrees, mode, and time to be observed in the infliction of punishment; and no doubt but a proportion of the punishment to the faults is observed; so that by how much one sin exceeds another in quality, by so much one punishment exceeds another punishment in degree; and in the infliction of punishment,

God has a respect to the comparative demerit of sins among themselves. We acknowledge, indeed, that God acts differently with persons in the same situation; but not without a respect to Christ and his satisfaction. The satisfaction of Christ is not indeed the cause of that decree, by which he determined such a dispensation of things; but the mediation of Christ, 'who was made sin for those to whom their sins are not imputed,' is the foundation for the actual administration of the whole of that decree, respecting that part of it which consists in the dispensation of free grace and sparing mercy. What this learned writer adds, namely, 'That not to punish is sometimes an act of severe justice; and that therefore, God does not punish from a necessity of nature,' is grossly sophistical; for not to punish denotes either the total removal of punishment altogether, as is the case with the elect, for whom Christ died; which, so far from being an act of severe justice, that this learned man will not deny to proceed from the highest grace and mercy; or it denotes only a suspension of some temporal punishment, and for a short time; to the end that sinners may fill up the measure of their iniquity. But this is not, properly speaking, not to punish, but to punish in a different manner, and in a manner more severe than that to which it succeeds.

What observations our learned author adds in the close of his arguments, are either sophistical or very untheological. He says, viz. 'That God, influenced by our prayers, averts even an eternal punishment after that we have deserved it:' but what? Is it to be imputed to our prayers, that God averts from us the wrath to come? What occasion is there, pray then, for the satisfaction of Christ? We have hitherto been so dull and stupid as to believe, that the turning away from us of punishment, which has a respect to our faith and prayers, consisted in the dispensation of grace, peace, and the remission of the sins, for which Christ made satisfaction; and that God averted from us no deserved punishment but what was laid upon Christ; 'who hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, by being made a curse for us.'

In his proofs of the sixth argument, which this learned author adds to his former from Twiss, he says, 'There is [illegible]er reason, nor any shadow of reason in it, that the delay [illegible]nishment, or a dispensation with it, as to time and

manner, can be determined by the free good pleasure of God, either one way or other; if to punish, or punishment in itself, and absolutely considered, be necessary.'

We have explained before what were our sentiments, as to what relates to the distinction between punishment simply considered, and attended with particular circumstances in the manner of its infliction. We affirm, that a punishment proportioned to sin, according to the rule of the divine justice, from God's natural right, and from his essential justice and holiness, is necessarily inflicted to vindicate his glory, establish his government, and preserve his perfections entire and undiminished: and God himself hath revealed to us, that this just recompense of reward consists in death eternal; 'for the righteous judgment of God is, that they who commit sin are worthy of death.' It is just, then, and consequently necessary, that that punishment of death, viz. eternal, should be inflicted; but as God, though a consuming fire, is a rational or intellectual fire, who in exercising the excellencies or qualities of his nature, proceeds with reason and understanding, it is free to him to appoint the time, manner, and such-like circumstances as must necessarily attend that punishment in general, so as shall be most for his own glory, and the more illustrious display of his justice. But when Rutherford says, 'That there is neither any reason, or shadow of reason in this;' let us see what solidity there is in the arguments by which he supports his assertion.

'The determination of an infernal punishment, as to its manner and time, and consequently as to its eternal duration, will then depend on the mere good pleasure of God: therefore, God can determine the end and measure of infernal punishment; and therefore he is able not to punish, and to will not farther to punish those condemned to eternal torments; therefore it is not of absolute necessity that he punishes.' But here is nothing but dross, as the saying is, instead of a treasure. The time concerning which we speak, is of the infliction of punishment, not of its duration. He who asserts, that an end may be put to eternal punishments, expressly contradicts himself: we say, that God hath revealed to us, that the punishment due to every sin, from his right and by the rule of his justice, is eternal: nor could the *thing in itself* be otherwise, for the punishment of a finite

and sinful creature could not otherwise make any compensation for the guilt of its sin: but as it is certain, that God in the first threatening, and in the curse of the law, observed a strict impartiality, and appointed not any kind of punishment, but what according to the rule of his justice, sin deserved; and as the apostle testifies, 'That the righteous judgment of God is, that they who commit sin, are worthy of death:' and we acknowledge that death to be eternal, and that an injury done to God, infinite, in respect of the object, could not be punished in a subject in every respect finite, otherwise than by a punishment infinite in respect of duration; that the continuation or suspension of this punishment, which it is just should be inflicted, does not undermine the divine liberty, we are bold to affirm; for it is not free to God to act justly or not. But we have shewn before how absurd it is to imagine that the divine omnipotence suffers any degradation; because upon this supposition he must necessarily preserve alive a sinful creature to all eternity, and be unable to annihilate it.

CHAP. XVIII.

The conclusion of this dissertation. The use of the doctrine herein vindicated. God's hatred against sin revealed in various ways. The dreadful effects of sin all over the creation. Enmity between God and every sin. Threatenings and the punishment of sin appointed. The description of sin in the sacred Scriptures. To what great miseries we are liable through sin. The excellency of grace, in pardoning sin through Christ. Gratitude and obedience due from the pardoned. An historical fact concerning Tigranes, king of Armenia. Christ to be loved for his cross above all things. The glory of God's justice revealed by this doctrine; and also of his wisdom and holiness.

LET us at length put an end to this dispute; and as all 'acknowledging of the truth ought to be after godliness,'[a] we shall adduce such useful and practical evident conclusions, as flow from this truth which we have thus far set forth and defended, that we may not be thought to have spent our labour in vain.

First, then, Hence we sinners may learn the abominable

[a] Titus i. 5.

nature of sin. Whatever there is in heaven or in earth that we have seen, or of which we have heard; whatever declares the glory of the Creator, also exposes this disgraceful fall of the creature. The genuine offspring of sin are death and hell; 'for sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth death.' That the heavens cast out their native inhabitants, viz. 'the angels, who kept not their first estate, but who left their own habitations,'[b] &c. That the earth is filled with darkness, resentments, griefs, malediction, and revenge, is to be attributed entirely to this cankerous ulcer of nature. Hence 'the wrath of God is revealed from heaven.' The earth,[c] lately founded by a most beneficent Creator, is cursed Hence the old world, having but just emerged from the deluge, 'when the heavens and the earth, which now are, by the same word are kept in store, reserved unto fire against the day of judgment and perdition of ungodly men.'[d]

Yea, forasmuch as in this state of things which we have described, as being permitted by the will of God, 'the creature was made subject to vanity,' there is none of the creatures, which by its confusion, vanity, and inquietude, does not declare this detestable poison with which it is thoroughly infected, to be exceeding sinful. This is the source and origin of all evils to sinners themselves; whatever darkness, tumult, vanity, slavery, fearful looking for of judgment, and fiery indignation to consume the adversaries, oppresses, tortures, harasses, vexes, burns, corrupts, or kills; whatever from without, penal, grievous, sad, dire, dreadful, even the last unavoidable calamity itself, is all to be attributed to this prolific parent of miseries. Some one perhaps will wonder what this so great a plague is, which perverts the course of the creation; what crime, what kind of inexpiable wickedness, that it hath procured to creatures, so very highly exalted, and created in the image of God, to share of his glory, after being banished from heaven and paradise, an eternal deprivation of his glory, punishment to which no measure or end is appointed; what hath so incensed the mind of the most bountiful and merciful Father of all, and imbittered his anger, that he should bring eternal sorrows on the work of his own hands, 'and kindle a fire that should

[b] James i. 15. Jude 6. [c] Gen. iii. 17. [d] 2 Pet. iii. 7. Rom. viii. 20.

burn to the lowest bottom, and inflame the foundations of the mountains?'. I will tell him in one word:

Is it to be wondered at, that God should be disposed severely to punish that which earnestly wishes him not to be God, and strives to accomplish this with all its might? Sin opposes the divine nature and existence; it is enmity against God, and is not an idle enemy; it has even engaged in a mortal war with all the attributes of God. He would not be God if he did not avenge, by the punishment of the guilty, his own injury. He hath often and heavily complained in his word, that by sin he is robbed of his glory and honour, affronted, exposed to calumny and blasphemy; that neither his holiness, nor his justice, nor name, nor right, or dominion, are preserved pure and untainted. For he hath created all things for his own glory, and it belongs to the natural right of God to preserve that glory entire by the subjection of all his creatures, in their proper stations, to himself: and shall we not reckon that sin is entirely destructive of that order which would entirely wrest that right out of his hands, and a thing to be restrained by the severest punishments? Let sinners then be informed, that every the least transgression abounds so much with hatred against God, is so highly injurious to him; and so far as is in its power, brands him with such folly, impotence, and injustice; so directly robs him of all his honour, glory, and power, that if he wills to be God, he can by no means suffer it to escape unpunished.

It was not for nothing that on that day on which he made man a living soul, he threatened him with death, even eternal death; that in giving his law, he thundered forth so many dread execrations against this fatal evil: that he hath threatened it with such punishment, with so great anger, with fury, wrath, tribulation, and anguish: that with a view to vindicate his own glory, and provide for the salvation of sinners, he made his most holy Son, 'who was holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners,' sin and a curse;[e] and subjected him to that last punishment, the death of the cross, including in it the satisfaction due to his violated law. All these things divine justice required as neces-

[e] Heb. xi. 2. 7. 2 Cor. v. 21. Gal. iii. 13.

sary to the preservation of his honour, glory, wisdom, and dominion: let every proud complaint of sinners then be hushed; 'for we know that the judgment of God is according to truth against them that do evil.'[f]

But sin, in respect of the creature, is folly, madness, fury, blindness, hardness, darkness, stupor, giddiness, torpor, turpitude, uncleanness, nastiness, a stain, a spot, an apostacy, degeneracy, a wandering from the mark, a turning aside from the right path, a disease, a languor, destruction, death. In respect of the Creator, it is a disgrace, an affront, blasphemy, enmity, hatred, contempt, rebellion, an injury. In respect of its own nature it is poison, a stench, dung, a vomit, polluted blood, a plague, a pestilence, an abominable thing, a curse; which, by its most pernicious power of metamorphosing, hath transformed angels into devils, light into darkness, life into death, paradise into a desert, a pleasant, fruitful, blessed world into a vain, dark, accursed prison; and the Lord of all, into a servant of servants: which hath rendered man, the glory of God, an enemy to himself, a wolf to others, hateful to God, his own destroyer, the destruction of others, the plague of the world, a monster, and a ruin; attempting to violate the eternal, natural, and indispensable right of God, to cut the thread of the creature's dependance on the Creator, it introduced with it this world of iniquity.

First, then, to address you, who live, or rather are dead, under the guilt, dominion, power, and law of sin: how shall ye escape the damnation of hell? The judgment of God is, that they who commit those things, to which you are totally given up, and which you cannot refrain from, are worthy of death. 'It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God:'[g] since it is a just thing with him, 'to render to every one according to his works:' and who shall deliver you out of his mighty hand? Wherewith can the wrath to come be averted? Wherewithal can you make atonement to so great a judge? Sacrifices avail nothing; hence those words in the prophet, which express not so much the language of inquiry, as of confusion and astonishment: 'Wherewithal shall I come before the Lord, and bow myself before the Most High God? Shall I come before him with burnt offerings, with calves of a year old? Will the Lord be pleased

[f] Rom. ii. 2. [g] Heb. x. 31.

with thousands of rams, or with ten thousands of rivers of oil? Shall I give my first-born for my transgressions, the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul?' Would you attempt an obedience, arduous and expensive beyond all credibility? By such dreadful propitiations, by such dire and accursed sacrifices, at the thought of which human nature shudders, would you appease the offended Deity? You are not the first whom a vain superstition and ignorance of the justice of God hath forced to turn away their ears from the sighs and cries of tender infants, breathing out their very vitals, your own blood, in vain. These furies, which now by starts, agitate us within, will, by their vain attempts against the snares of death, torment us to all eternity: for God, the judge of all, will not accept of 'sacrifice, or offering, or burnt-offerings for sin; with these he is not at all delighted; for the redemption of the soul is precious, and ceaseth for ever.'[h] God cannot so lightly esteem or disregard his holiness, justice, and glory, to which your sins have done so great an injury, that he should renounce them all for the sake of hostile conspirators; unless there should be some other remedy quickly provided for us; unless the judge himself shall provide a lamb for a burnt-offering; unless the gates of a city of refuge shall be quickly opened to you, exclaiming and trembling at the avenging curse of the law, unless you can find access to the horns of the altar. If God be to remain blessed for ever, you must doubtless perish for ever. If then, you have the least concern or anxiety for your eternal state, hasten, 'while it is called to-day, to lay hold on the hope that is set before you.' Give yourselves up entirely to him; receive him 'whom God hath set forth as a propitiation, through faith in his blood; that he might declare his righteousness.' But what, and how bitter a sense of sin, how deep a humiliation, contrition, and dejection of heart and spirit, what self-hatred, condemnation, and contempt, what great self-indignation and revenge; what esteem, what faith in the necessity, excellence, and dignity of the righteousness and satisfaction of Christ, especially if God hath graciously condescended to bestow his Holy Spirit, to convince men's hearts of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment (without whose effectual aid and

[h] Psal. lxix. 8.

heart-changing grace, even the most apposite remedies applied to this disease, will be in vain), and to excite and work such sentiments concerning the transgression of the divine law, the nature of sin, or the disobedience of the creatures. A persuasion how fit and proper, those who have spiritual eyes will easily perceive.

To those happy persons, 'whose sins are forgiven, and to whom God will not impute iniquity,' because he hath laid their transgressions upon Christ, the knowledge of this divine truth is as a spur to quicken them to the practice of every virtue, and to sincere obedience: for in what high, yea, infinite honour and esteem must God be held by him, who, having escaped from the snares of death and the destruction due to him, through his inexpressible mercy, hath thoroughly weighed the nature of sin, and the consequences of it, which we have mentioned before? for whosoever shall reflect with himself, that such is the quality and nature of sin, and that it is so impiously inimical to God, that unless by some means his justice be satisfied by the punishment of another, he could not pardon it, or let it pass unpunished, will even acknowledge himself indebted to eternal love for the remission of the least transgression; because in inexpressible grace and goodness it hath been forgiven. And hence too we may learn, how much beyond all other objects of our affection, we are bound to love with our heart and soul, and all that is within us, our dear and beloved deliverer, and most merciful Saviour, Jesus Christ, 'who hath delivered us from the wrath to come.'

When Tigranes, son of the king of Armenia, had said to Cyrus that he would purchase his wife's liberty at the price of his life, and she was consequently set free by Cyrus; while some were admiring and extolling one virtue of Cyrus, and some another; she being asked what she most admired in that illustrious hero, answered, 'My thoughts were not turned upon him.' Her husband again asking her, 'Upon whom then?' She replied, 'Upon him who said that he would redeem me from slavery at the expense of his life.' Is not he then to be caressed and dearly beloved, to be contemplated with faith, love, and joy, who answered for our lives with his own; devoted himself to punishment: and at the price of his blood, 'while we were yet enemies,' purchased

us, and rendered us 'a peculiar people to himself?' We, now secure, may contemplate in his agony, sweat, tremor, horror, exclamations, prayers, cross, and blood, what is God's severity against sin, what the punishment of the broken law and curse are. Unless God, the Judge and Ruler of all, after having thoroughly examined the nature, hearts, breasts, ways, and lives of us all, had thence collected whatever was contrary to his law, improper, unjust, and impure; whatever displeased the eyes of his purity, provoked his justice, roused his anger and severity, and laid it all on the shoulders of our Redeemer, and condemned it in his flesh; it had been better for us, rather than to be left eternally entangled in the snares of death and of the curse, never to have enjoyed this common air, but to have been annihilated as soon as born. 'Wretched men that we are, who shall deliver us' from this most miserable state by nature? 'Thanks be to God, through our Lord Jesus Christ.' May we always then be 'sick of love,' towards our deliverer; may he always be our 'beloved, who is white and ruddy, and the chiefest among ten thousand.'

The acknowledging of this truth has a respect not only to the manifestation of his justice, but also of the wisdom, holiness, and dominion of God over his creatures: for that justice, which in respect of its effect and egress we call vindicatory, which as we have before demonstrated is natural to God, and essential; and therefore absolutely perfect in itself, or rather perfection itself; this very truth, which we have thus far defended, evidently illustrates: as also his supreme rectitude in the exercise of it, 'when he sits on his throne judging righteously;' and how severe a judge he will be towards impenitent sinners, whose sins are not expiated in the blood of Christ. That justice is not a free act of the divine will, which God may use or renounce at pleasure; nor is sin only a debt of ours, which as we were unable to pay, he might forgive, by only freely receding from his right: for what reason then could be assigned why the Father of mercies should so severely punish his most holy Son on our account, that he might, according to justice, deliver us from our sins; when without any difficulty, by one act of his will, and that too a most free and holy act, he could have delivered both himself, and us wretched sinners, from this evil? But it exists

in God in the manner of a habit, natural to the divine essence itself, perpetually and immutably inherent in it; which, from his very nature, he must necessarily exercise in every work that respecteth the proper object of his justice; for sin is that ineffable evil, which would overturn God's whole right over his creatures, unless it were punished. As then the perfection of divine justice is infinite, and such as God cannot by any means relax, it is of the last importance to sinners seriously and deeply to bethink themselves how they are to stand before him.

Moreover, the infinite wisdom of God, the traces of which we so clearly read in creation, legislation, and in the other works of God, are hereby wondrously displayed, to the eternal astonishment of men and angels: for none but an infinitely wise God, could bring it about, that that which in its own nature is opposite to him, inimical, and full of obstinacy, should turn out to his highest honour, and the eternal glory of his grace. Yea, the divine wisdom not only had respect to God himself, and to the security of his glory, honour, right, and justice, but even provided for the good of miserable sinners, for their best interests, exaltation, and salvation; and from the impoisoned bowels of sin itself. 'Out of the eater came forth meat, and out of the strong came forth sweetness;' by interposing a surety and covenant-head between sin and the sinner; between the transgression of the law and its transgressor, he condemned and punished sin, restored the law, and freed the sinner both from sin, and from the law. 'He hath abounded towards us in all wisdom and prudence;' Eph. i. 8. 'When he made all men see what is the fellowship of the mystery, which from the beginning of the world hath been hid in God;' chap. iii. 9. 'For in Christ Jesus all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge are hid;' Col. ii. 3.

It will be read and attended to, as an eternal miracle of God's providence, that he should have made the captivity, or wicked sale of Joseph, by means of so many windings perplexed mazes, and strange occurrences, issue at last in his own exaltation and the preservation of his brethren, who impiously sold him. But if any one, though endowed with the tongues of angels and of men, should attempt to describe this mystery of divine wisdom, whereby it is evident that

God exalts his own name, and not only recovers his former honour, but even raises it, manifests his justice, preserves inviolable his right and dominion in pardoning sin, wherewith he is highly pleased, and incredibly *delighted* (and unless this heavenly discovery, a truly God-like *invention*, had intervened, he could not have pardoned even *the least* sin), he must feel his language not only deficient, but the *eye* of the mind overpowered with light, will fill him with awe and astonishment: that that which is the greatest, yea, the only disgrace and affront to God, should turn out to his highest honour and glory; that that which could not be permitted to triumph without the greatest injury to the justice, right, holiness, and truth of God, should find grace and pardon to the eternal and glorious display of *justice*, right, holiness, and truth, was a work that required infinite wisdom: an arduous task, and every way worthy of God.

Finally. Let us constantly contemplate in the mirror of this truth, the holiness of God, whereby 'he *is of purer eyes* than to behold evil: in whose presence the wicked shall not stand:' that we ourselves may become more pure in heart, and more holy in life, speech, and behaviour.

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
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